TMI Blog1965 (4) TMI 112X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ses from them. While the application was pending, Allen Berry Co. went into liquidation and was in due course dissolved and its name was, thereupon, struck off from the records of the proceedings. The Controller later heard the application and made an order in favour of the respondents for recovery of possession of the premises from the appellant alone. An appeal by the appellant to the Rent Control Tribunal under the Act against this order was dismissed. The appellant then moved the High Court of Punjab for setting aside the order of the Tribunal, but there also it was unsuccessful. It has now come to this Court in further appeal. It was contended that the order for recovery of possession made against the appellant after Allen Berry Co. had ceased to be a party to the proceedings, was incompetent. This contention was based on an interpretation of the terms of sub-s. (1) of s. 14, the material part of which is set out below: S. 14 (1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law or contract, no order or decree for the recovery of possession of any premises shall be made by any court or Controller in favour of the landlord against a tenant: Provid ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... refore, set out the circumstances in which the operative part of the proviso is set in motion, that is, the circumstances in which an order for recovery of possession may be made. If this is so, as I think it is, the clauses could not have been intended to indicate the person against whom an order for recovery of possession could be made. This purpose was entirely different. 1 am not suggesting that an order for recovery of possession against the assigning tenant cannot be made. All that I say is that the clauses do not intend to indicate the persons against whom an order for recovery of possession can be made and so it cannot be argued that the order cannot be made against any other person. Now the article the appears to me to have been used to show that the tenant assigning must be the tenant of the landlord seeking eviction. So read, the effect of the proviso in cl. (b) is that a landlord can recover possession if his tenant has assigned. sub-let or transferred possession without his consent. This would be the natural reading of the provision and would carry out the intention of the Act. If this is not the correct reading of the provision, the situation would be anomalous. ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ord became entitled to recover possession under cl. (b) of the proviso; clearly then the statute intended the landlord to recover possession. It would be our duty to give effect to that intention unless the language used made it plainly impossible. I have earlier said that the language used does not compel the view that the only person against whom an order for recovery of possession can be made is the tenant assigning or sub- letting without the landlord's consent. That being so, orders against all persons in occupation must have been contemplated so that the landlord might without further trouble recover possession. Further find it impossible to hold that the language used indicates an intention that when a right has accrued to a landlord to recover possession, that right would be taken away from him when the tenant assigning has become extinct without leaving a successor, an event which is only accidental and certainly rare. A court would be fully justified in holding that in such a case it was intended that an order for recovery of possession can be made against the assignee alone for that would enable the object of the statute which was to enable the landlord to recover ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... nt against this view that the direct tenant would protect them, for they cannot be made to depend on him for the protection of their rights. The direct tenant may be negligent or incompetent in his defence; he may even collude with the landlord or he may just not bother. If the assignee or the sub-tenant is thus entitled to be heard to oppose the order for eviction, that would be another reason for saying that an order eviction could be made against them also; if they could oppose the making of the order, it would be unnatural to say that the order could not be made against them. In what 1 have said in this paragraph, I do not wish to be understood as holding that in view of' s. 25 an order for eviction against a tenant is in fact binding on his assignee or sub-tenant. Such a decision is not necessary for this case. I wish, however, to point out that if s. 25 does not make the ejectment order so binding, the appellant cannot resort to it for any assistance. I have now dealt with the first argument in support of the appeal and I find it unacceptable. The other argument was that the order for recovery of possession was unwarranted as in fact there had been a consent of the r ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... no difference. The facts which are not in dispute and which have been stated in the judgment of Bachawat J. need not be recapitulated because what I have already said is sufficient to enable me to deal with the point. The relevant part of s. 14(1) reads thus: Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law or contract no order or decree for the recovery of possession of any premises shall be made by any Court or Controller in favour of the landlord against a tenant: Provided that the Controller may, on an application made to him in the prescribed manner, make an order for the recovery of possession of the premises on one or more of the following grounds only, namely:- (b) that the tenant has, on or after the 9th day of June, 1952, sublet, assigned or otherwise parted with the possession of the whole or any part of the premises without obtaining the consent in writing of the landlord; It is not necessary to refer to cl. (a) or to the several clauses following el. (b) in this sub-section or to any of the sub-sections of s. 14. Looking at sub-s. (1) what we find is that it enacts a bar to the making of an order or decree for the recovery of posses ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ailable to the landlord no matter what the tenant had done if the records of the proceeding became defective because neither the tenant nor his legal representative was any longer a party to those proceedings. The reason for this is that the ground upon which the landlord's application is based can be availed of for lifting the ban on the eviction by the Rent Controller of the tenant alone. Unless an order is obtained against the tenant there would be no occasion for pressing in aid the provisions of s. 25 of the Act. Where during the pendency of the proceedings before the Rent Controller the tenant dies or makes an assignment of whatever interest he may still have left in the demised premises no difficulty would arise because his legal representative or assignee could be brought on record in his place. But, it must be admitted, that an anomalous position results where the tenant happening to be a company is dissolved during the pendency of the proceedings and can, therefore, be not represented by any person. The Act does not contemplate this position nor even does the Code of Civil Procedure and so we have it that the defect in the record resulting from the dissolution of a co ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... limited company, had gone into voluntary liquidation on September 26, 1959 and it was finally wound up and dissolved on October 29, 1960. On its dissolution, the tenant ceased to exist, and by order of the Rent Controller, its name was struck off from the array of parties in the pending application. By an order dated October 10, 1962, the Rent Controller passed an order of eviction against the appellant. An appeal by the appellant to the Rent Control Tribunal, Delhi was dismissed on January 23, 1963, and a second appeal to the Punjab High Court was dismissed on May 10, 1963. A Letters Patent Appeal from the order dated May 10, 1963 was dismissed on December 11, 1963 on the ground that the appeal was not maintainable, and an appeal to this Court from the last order was dismissed on January 18, 1965. The appellant has now preferred this appeal from the order dated May 10, 1963 by special leave granted by this Court. The respondents-landlords instituted the proceeding for eviction of the tenant and its assignee relying on the provisions of s. 14(1) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (Act 59 of 1958), the relevant portion of which is as follows: 14(1). Notwithstanding anything to ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... t other paragraphs of the proviso contemplate the eviction of the tenant on the ground of some act on the part of the tenant against whom the proceeding for possession is brought, but under paragraph (b), the assignment is a ground of eviction of both the assigning tenant and the assignee, and in the event of an assignment without the consent in writing of the landlord, the Controller has jurisdiction to make an order for possession not only against the assigning tenant but also against the assignee. Counsel for the appellant next referred us to cl. 7 of the lease, which is in these terms: That, whenever such an interpretation would be necessary in order to give the fullest scope and effect legally possible to any covenant or contract herein contained, the expression 'The Lessor' hereinbefore used shall include his heirs, executors, administrators and assigns and the expression 'The Lessee' hereinbefore used shall include their representatives and assigns. Counsel for the appellant submitted that by cl. 7 of the lease, the landlords have given their consent in writing to the assignment. I cannot accept this submission. The consent in writing within the me ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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