TMI Blog2010 (12) TMI 1161X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... Manual and they be allowed to serve till they attain the age upto 62 years. 3. Facts and circumstances giving rise to these appeals are that the respondent no.1 in first case was appointed as a District Government Counsel (Revenue-1), Agra vide order dated 30.11.1988 for a fixed tenure. His term was renewed from time to time upto 31.12.1992. The proposal for renewal of his tenure was forwarded by the District Magistrate, Agra in 1993 and 1996, however, no order was passed on the said proposals. Ultimately, the State Government passed an order dated 2.12.1998 dispensing with the services of the said respondent. Being aggrieved, he preferred Writ Petition No.3867 of 1998 challenging the order of dispensing with his services, wherein the interim order was passed that the said respondent would be allowed to continue till further orders of the court. Thus, he continued to work under the said interim order till 2008, when the provisions of L.R. Manual were amended with effect from 13.8.2008, reducing the age of District Government Counsel from 62 to 60 years. As he had already completed age of 60 years, thus was disengaged, whereby respondent preferred Writ Petition No. 11170(M/B) of ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... contrary, Shri Dhruv Mehta, learned Senior counsel appearing for the respondents Association and Shri Manohar Lal Sharma appearing for the Distt. Government Counsel have submitted that in making the proposal for appointment of the Distt. Government Counsel by the Distt. Magistrate, dispensation of consultation with the District Judge itself is a serious matter and High Court has rightly stayed the operation of the amended provisions of the L.R. Manual and no interference is required. In case the High Court has stayed the operation of the amended clauses of the L.R. Manual, the old L.R. Manual becomes automatically operative. Therefore, the High Court was justified in issuing direction to consider the cases of renewal/extension under the unamended provisions of the Manual. Thus, appeals lack merit and are liable to be dismissed. 7. We have considered the rival submissions made by learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. So far as the respondent District Government Counsel is concerned, admittedly, his term has not been extended/renewed by passing any order after 1992. He had been continuing under the interim order dated 7.12.1998 passed by the High Court. There ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... IR 1994 SC 1474). 11. In view of the above, it is evident that even in government services where the terms and conditions of service are governed by the statutory provisions, the Legislature is competent to enhance or reduce the age of superannuation. In view of the above, it is beyond our imaginations as why such a course is not permissible for the appellant-State while fixing the age of working of the District Government Advocates. 12. In Bhavesh D. Parish Ors. v. Union of India Anr., AIR 2000 SC 2047, this Court observed that while considering the constitutional validity of statutory provisions, the court should be very slow in staying the operation of the statutory provisions. It is permissible for the court to interfere at interim stage only in those few cases where the view reflected in the legislation is not possible to be taken at all . Thus, the court should not generally stay the operation of law. 13. In Siliguri Municipality Ors. v. Amalendu Das Ors., AIR 1984 SC 653, this Court had taken note of the fact that the High Court had been passing stay orders in some cases involving the same question of law and facts though it vacated the interim orders pa ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... 9 has already been stayed by this court vide order dated 3.5.2010. In fact there is a joint petition in these appeals and thus by inadvertence the operation of order dated 4.9.2008 in W.P. No.7851 (M/B) of 2008 could not be stayed. In order to maintain consistency in our order, it is required to pass the same order in the said case also. More so, in the Ist case, the High Court, in spite of taking note that the petitioner therein had been working under the interim order of the court since December 1998, i.e. for twelve years entertained his second writ petition without deciding the first writ petition. 17. So far as the issue of dispensation of consultation with the District Judge is concerned, this court has hitherto taken a view that his opinion would have supremacy, thus requires to be examined considering the judgments of this court in Kumari Shrilekha Vidyarthi etc. etc. v. State of U.P. Ors., AIR 1991 SC 537; Harpal Singh Chauhan Ors. v. State of U.P., AIR 1993 SC 2436; State of U.P. v. Ramesh Chandra Sharma Ors., AIR 1996 SC 864; State of U.P. Anr. v. Johri Mal, AIR 2004 SC 3800; and State of U.P. Ors. v. Netra Pal Singh Ors., AIR 2004 SC 3513. 18. The H ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ed of by the said order of the Appellate Authority would be restored and it can be said to be pending before the Appellate Authority after the quashing of the order of the Appellate Authority. The same cannot be said with regard to an order staying the operation of the order of the Appellate Authority because in spite of the said order, the order of the Appellate Authority continues to exist in law and so long as it exists, it cannot be said that the appeal which has been disposed of by the said order has not been disposed of and is still pending. 21. Thus, there is a clear distinction between repeal and suspension of the statutory provisions and the material difference between both is that repeal removes the law entirely; when suspended, it still exists and has operation in other respects except wherein it has been suspended. Thus, a repeal puts an end to the law. A suspension holds it in abeyance. 22. This Court in Bhagat Ram Sharma v. Union of India Ors., AIR 1988 SC 740, explained the distinction between repeal and amendment observing that amendment includes abrogation or deletion of a provision in an existing statutes. If the amendment of an existing law is small, th ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... in case of subordinate legislation. In the instant case, the L.R. Manual is consisted of executive instructions, which can be replaced any time by another set of executive instructions. (Vide Johri Mal (supra). Therefore, question of revival of the repealed clauses of L.R. Manual in case the substituted clauses are struck down by the court, would not arise. In view of this, the interim order would amount to substituting the legal policy by the judicial order, and thus not sustainable. 25. In view of the above, both the appeals succeed and are allowed. The impugned orders dated 30.11.2009 and 4.9.2008 are hereby set aside. However, in view of the peculiar fact-situation existing herein, the order (s), if any, passed by the State Authorities under the interim order dated 4.9.2008, would not be disturbed till the final disposal of the cases. 26. This Court after taking note of the nature of appointment involved in such cases made a request to the High Court in Special Leave Petition (C) No.12751 of 2009 (Ram Autar Saini, Advocate v. Ram Singh Lodhi Ors.) vide order dated 15.5.2009 to dispose of the matters at an early date. However, it appears that the said order could not ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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