TMI Blog1990 (1) TMI 309X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... uate in urban areas specified in Sub-section (3) of Section 1. Section 2 indicates the buildings to which the Act shall not apply. We are concerned with Sub-section (2) of Section 2, the relevant part whereof reads as under: Except as provided in Sub-section (5) of Section 12, Sub-section (1-A) of Section 21, Sub-section (2) of Section 24, Sections 24-A, 24-B, 24-C or Sub-section (3) of Section 29, nothing in this Act shall apply to building during a period of ten years from the date on which its construction is completed. Since it is not disputed before us that the construction of the suit property was completed in 1967, we need not set out the provisos and the explanations to the sub-section. 2. Section 3 defines the various expressions used in the Act. Under Clause (a) 'tenant', in relation to a building means a person by whom its rent is payable and 'building' according to Clause (i) means a residential or non-residential roofed structure including any land, garages and out-houses appurtenant thereto. Any person to whom rent is or if the building were let, would be, payable, including his agent or attorney or such person, is a 'landlord' within ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... This Section carried an explanation which came to be omitted by Section 8(iv) (and be deemed always to have been omitted) of the Civil Laws Amendment Act, 1972. Section 40 lays down that where an appeal or revision arising out of a suit for eviction of a tenant from any building to which the old Act did not apply is pending on the date of commencement of this Act, it shall be disposed of in accordance with the provisions of Section 39, which shall mutatis mutandis apply. 5. The plain reading of Section 39 makes it clear that the said section obliges the court to refuse to pass a decree for eviction, except on any of the grounds mentioned in the proviso to Sub-section (1) or in Clauses (b) to (g) of Sub-section (2) of Section 20, if the following four requirements are satisfied: (i) the building is one to which the old Act (the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947U.P. Act No. Ill of 1947) did not apply; (ii) the eviction suit must be pending on the date of commencement of the Act i.e., 15th July, 1972: (iii) the tenant deposits in court the entire amount of rent/damages for the use and occupation of the building together with interest at 9% per annu ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... sing of an eviction decree if the tenant deposits in court within the time allowed the entire arrears of rent together with interest and costs. If the suit is on anyone or more of the exempted grounds, the landlord is permitted to proceed with the same, if necessary by effecting an amendment in the pleading and by adducing additional evidence. Such a suit may be continued and if the ground or grounds pleaded is/are proved, the court is entitled to grant eviction. It, therefore, seems clear to us that the legislature intended to protect eviction of a tenant on the ground of arrears of rent if the tenant complied with the conditions of Section 39. 7. In the present proceedings it is not disputed that the construction of the demised premises was completed in 1967 and the letting had taken place in the same year. It is also not disputed that immediately on the completion of ten years the tenant deposited on 2nd September, 1977 an amount of ₹ 4,005 being the arrears of rent inclusive of interest and cost. It is not disputed that this payment was made within one month after the expiry of the period of ten years stipulated in Section 2(2) of the Act to take advantage of Section 3 ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... of the disputed shop must be taken to have been completed on the date of the first assessment, i.e. 1st April, 1968, within the meaning of the said provision. The tenant challenged the finding on the ground that the date of occupation should have been taken to be the date of completion of the construction and not the date of the first assessment. The Division Bench to which the case was referred concluded that the construction of the shop must be deemed to have been completed on 1st April, 1968 i.e. at the date of the first assessment and not at the date of actual occupation and hence the provisions of the Act had no application to the building till the date of the decision of the revision application on 23rd March, 1978 as the period of 10 years expired later on 31st March, 1978. This Court upheld the finding that the date of construction must be taken as the date of first assessment i.e. 1st April, 1968 and not the date of actual occupation. To overcome this difficulty it was contended on behalf of the tenant that on a correct reading of Section 2(2) the exemption engrafted therein would not embrace buildings constructed prior to the enforcement of the Act. This Court construing ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... aragraph 13 of the judgment as under: The moment a building becomes ten years old to be reckoned from the date of completion, the new Rent Act would become applicable. 10. The decision in Om Prakash Gupta's case (supra) was rightly distinguished on the ground that it was not necessary in that case to deal with the question whether the tenant would be entitled to the benefit of Section 39 as the building had not become ten years old when the revision was disposed of by the High Court on 23rd March 1978. Dealing next with the contention that the Court had to decide the case on the basis of the cause of action that had accrued before the institution of the suit and not on a new cause of action, this Court, relying on the observations to the effect that subsequent developments can be looked into muffle in paragraph 14 of the decision in Pasupuleti Venkateswarlu v. Motor and General Traders, , observed as under: Normally amendment is not allowed if it changes the cause of action. But it is well recognised that where the amendment does not constitute an addition of a new cause of action, or raise a new case, but amounts to no more than adding to the facts already on the r ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e benefit of Section 39 of the Act. But that apart, in a subsequent decision of this Court in Nand Kishore Marwah v. Samundri Devi, , this Court dissented from the view in Vineet Kumar's case on the ground that the attention of the Court was not drawn to Om Prakash Gupta's case (supra) which specifically considered the provisions of the Act and in particular the language of Section 39 of the Act to point out that in order to attract that provision it must be shown that the suit was pending at the commencement of the Act i.e. on 15th July, 1975. Referring to Section 20 of the Act, which bars institution of a suit for eviction of a tenant except on grounds specified in Clauses (a) to (g) this Court observed as under: This clearly indicates that the restriction put under Section 20 is to the institution of the suit itself and therefore it is clear that if the provisions of this Act applied then no suit for eviction can be instituted except on the ground specified in the sub-sections of this section. Keeping in view the language of this section if we examine the provisions contained in Sub-section (2) of Section (2) it will be clear that for a newly constructed building the ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... is well settled that no man should suffer because of the fault of the court or delay in the procedure. Broom has stated the maxim act us curiae neminem gravabit --an act of court shall prejudice no man. Therefore, having regard to the time normally consumed for adjudication, the ten years' exemption or holiday from the application of the Rent Act would become illusory, if the suit has to be filed within that time and be disposed of finally. It is common knowledge that unless a suit is instituted soon after the date of letting it would never be disposed of within ten years and even then within that time it may not be disposed of. That will make the ten years holiday from the Rent Act illusory and provide no incentive to the landlords to build new e houses to solve problem of shortages of houses. The purpose of legislation would thus be defeated. Purposive interpretation in a social amelioration legislation is an imperative irrespective of anything else. Proceeding further, this Court said: We are clearly of the opinion that having regard to the language we must find the reason and the spirit of the law. If the immunity from the operation of the Rent Act is made and depend ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... (Chapter IV) contained in the Act. This freedom from the operation of the Act for ten years is given for the obvious purpose of encouraging building activity to ease the problem of scarcity of accommodation. The provisions of the Act in this behalf must, therefore, be understood in this background. 15. Section 2(2) in terms says that the provisions of the Act will not apply to new constructions for a period of ten years from the date of completion of the construction. Read positively it means that the Act will apply to such buildings on the expiry of the recess period. But how are suits already filed during the recess period to be dealt with? Does the Act offer any clue in this behalf? In this connection the only provisions which come to mind are Sections 39 and 40 of the Act, Section 39 deals with suits pending on the date of commencement of the Act, Section 40 extends protection to an appeal or revision pending on the date of commencement of the Act provided it has arisen out of an eviction suit filed against a tenant to which the old Act did not apply. Such an appeal or revision has to be disposed of in the same manner as the suit is required to be dealt with under Section 39 ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ars of rent. In cases falling within the exemption clauses of that section, the legislature has itself permitted the landlord to proceed with the suit and claim eviction on any of the grounds enumerated in the proviso to Sub-section (1) or in Clauses (b) to (g) of Sub-section (2) of Section 20 of the Act, if necessary by making the required amendment in the pleadings and by adducing additional evidence where necessary. 16. It therefore seems to us that the legislature desired to limit the scope of the application of Sections 39 and 40 to suits, appeals and revisions pending on the date of commencement of the Act, i.e. 15th July 1972, relating to buildings to which the old Act did not apply and to which the new Act was to apply forthwith and not at a later date. This is clear from the fact that the section contemplates deposit of arrears of rent and damages together with interest and cost within one month from such date of commencement meaning the date of commencement or the Act. To put it differently the section expects the tenant to make the deposit within one month from 15th July, 1972. This may not be possible unless the Act is to apply to the building forthwith. Of course ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... a date subsequent to 15th July, 1972. Ordinarily the rule of construction is that the same expression where it appears more than once in the same statute, more so in the same provision, must receive the same meaning unless the context suggests otherwise Besides, such an interpretation would render the use of prefix 'such' before the word 'commencement' redundant. Thirdly such an interpretation would run counter to the view taken by this Court in Atma Ram Mittal's case (supra) wherein it was held that no man can be made to suffer because of the court's fault or court's delay in the disposal of the suit. To put it differently if the suit could be disposed of within the period of ten years, the tenant would not be entitled to the protection of Section 39 but if the suit is prolonged beyond ten years the tenant would be entitled to such protection. Such an interpretation would encourage the tenant to protract the litigation and if he succeeds in delaying the disposal of the suit till the expiry of ten years he would secure the benefit of Section 39, otherwise not. We are, therefore, of the opinion that it is not possible to uphold the argument. 18. In th ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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