9911796707
TMI Blog2016 (2) TMI 414X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... and 12/1/2015 issued by the respondent No. 2 are barred by limitation and be pleased to strike down the same as being wholly without jurisdiction; (B) Your Lordships may be pleased to issue a writ, order or directions in the nature of certiorari or any other writ, order or direction of like nature, to call for, examine the records in relation to and quash the impugned Summons dated 9/12.2014, impugned Notices dated 18/12/2014 and impugned Letters dated 18/12/2014, 29/12/2014 and 12/1/2015 issued by Respondent No. 2 at Annexure "A" colly.; (C) Your Lordships may be pleased to issue a Writ of Mandamus, or a Writ in the nature of Mandamus, or any other appropriate Writ, Order of directions, restraining the Respondents by their servants, agents and subordinates from, directly or indirectly giving effect to or acting upon impugned Summons dated 9/12/2014, impugned Notices dated 18/12/2014 and impugned Letters dated 18/12/2014, 29/12/2014 and 12/1/2015 issued by the Respondent No. 2 at Annexure "A" Colly.; (D) Your Lordships may be pleased to issue a writ. order or directions in the nature of Prohibition or any other writ, order or direction of like nature, to quash the impugne ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... Pharmaceuticals Ltd. has also challenged the impugned notices issued under section 201(1) and 201(1A) of the Income Tax Act, issued for A.Y. 2008-09. 3.00. Thus, in all these petitions, the respective petitioners - assessee have challenged the notices issued under section 201(1) of the Act on the ground that the said notices are barred by proviso to section 201(3) of the Act, as the same are issued at different time after expiry of two years from the end of the financial year in which the Statement is filed for the said years. 3.01. The respective petitioners have also prayed to declare that section 201 of the Act as amended by Finance Act, 2014 (Act No.2 of 2014) is prospective and does not apply to the proceedings where period of passing the order has expired before 1/10/2014. 4.00. Mr.Mihir Joshi, learned Senior Advocate has appeared on behalf of the petitioner in Special Civil Application No. 1623 of 2015 and Mr.R.K. Patel, learned advocate has appeared on behalf of the petitioner in Special Civil Application No. 4771 of 2015. Mr.M.R. Bhatt, learned Senior Advocate has appeared with Ms.Mauna Bhatt, learned advocate, on behalf of the Income Tax Department in all these matter ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... titioner to furnish the factual information as sought by the officer. Hence, the petitioner has preferred the Special Civil Application No. 1623 of 2015. 7.00. The challenge to the impugned notices / summonses which are issued under section 201 of the Act are mainly on the following grounds :- (i) Section 201 provides for consequences of failure to deduct tax. The said Section 201 was amended by Finance Act, 2008 with retrospective effect from 01/06/2002 wherein the proceedings were to be initiated within reasonable period of time. Subsequently Section 201(3) and Section 201(4) were introduced w.e.f. 01/04/2010 by Finance (No.2) Act, 2009 which provided period of limitation of two years from the end of financial year in which the Statement is filed in a case and four years from the end of financial year where the Statement has not been filed. Therefore in the present case a limitation under Section 20l(3)(i) of the Act for passing orders expired on 31/03/2011 and 31/03/2012. (ii)That Section 201(3) of the Act was amended on 28/05/2012 by Finance Act, 2012 with retrospective effect from 01/04/2010 whereby the limitation was substituted from four years to six years for passing t ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... t the time period for passing an order had lapsed under Section 201 for the relevant financial year and therefore a vested right had accrued in favour of the petitioner which can only be taken away by an express retrospective amendment. Hence the substantive right is conferred by a statute which remains unaffected by subsequent changes in law unless modified expressly or by necessary implication. It is trite law that every gimme is prospective unless it is expressly or by necessary implication made to have retrospective operation. Limitation provision therefore can be procedural in the context of one set of facts but substantive in the context of different set of facts because right can accrue to both the parties. In such a situation test is to see whether the statute, if applied retrospectively to a particular type of case would impair existing rights and obligations. An accrued right to plead a time barred, which is acquired after the lapse of the statutory period, is nevertheless a right, even though it arises under an Act which is procedural and a right which is not to be taken away pleading retrospective operation unless a contrary intention is discernible from the statute. ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... of Jyoti Traders was in respect of the proviso which provided that the assessment and reassessment may be made after the expiration of the period aforesaid but not after expiration of eight years from the end of such year. To understand it more precisely the relevant provision of Section 21 dealt in the said judgment read as under: "Section 21. Assessment of tax on the turnover not assessed during the year. (1)If the assessing authority has reason to believe that the whole or any part of the turnover of the dealer, for any assessment year or part thereof has escaped assessment to tax or has been under assessed or has been assessed to tax at a rate lower than that at which it is assessable under this Act, or any deductions or exemptions have been wrongly allowed in respect thereof the assessing authority may, after issuing notice to the dealer and making such inquiry as it may consider necessary, assess or re-assess the dealer or tax according to law : Provided that the tax shall be charged at the rate at which it would have been charged had the turnover not escaped assessment, or full assessment as the case may be. Explanation. ....... (2)Except as otherwise provided in t ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... appearing on behalf of the petitioner has submitted that the judgment relied on by the respondent No. 2 in the case of CTO Vs. Biswanath Jhujhunwala & Anr., reported in 1996(5) SCC 626, for the principles laid down there in would not apply to the present case as the facts in the said judgment are different from the facts of the present case. (a) In the said judgment, assessments were completed on 17/02/1969 and 26/03/1969. Under rule 80(5) of the Bengal Sales Tax Act, 1941 as it then stood, the assessment can be revised if the assessment has been made or the order has been passed more than four years previously. Accordingly the period of four years expired on 26/03/1973. The said sub rule 80(5) was amended by a notification dated 30/03/1974 w.e.f. 01/11/1971 under which the assessment can be revised if the assessment has been made or the order has been passed more than six years previously. Therefore it was with retrospective effect from 01/11/1971 though notification was dated 30/03/1974. Hence as on 1/11/1971 the period of four years under the unamended rule 80(5) had not expired. In that context at the time when the amended section came into force w.e.f. 1/11/1971, the period ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... re the language of the amended Section 201(3) by the Finance Act, 2014 is clear as it does not expressly provides or mentions to commence proceedings in respect of FY or extend the time limit from retrospective effect which had already expired. 8.8.Mr.Mihir Joshi, learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of the petitioner has submitted that even decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of N.Ranga Rao and Sons v. State of Karnataka, reported in 2007 (9) SCC 691 and in the case of Thirumalai Chemicals Ltd. Versus Union of India & other, reported in 2011 (6) SCC 379 relied upon by Mr.Bhatt, learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of the Income Tax Department contending that the aspect of limitation is a procedural law and same would not apply to the facts of the case as the said judgement do not deal with the aspects where vested right has accrued in favour of the petitioner as it becomes a substantive right once the proceedings are time barred and attained finality and that to when the amended provision is not given retrospective effect in order to cover the proceedings which are time barred. Making above submissions and relying upon above decisions, it is reque ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ent is made or credit is given. It is submitted that, therefore, the Section itself provides for limitation period of 7 years from the end of the financial year in which payment is made or credit is given. It is submitted that in the instant case, period of 7 years has not elapsed from the end of financial year in which payment is made or credit is given. It is submitted that, therefore, the impugned notices / summonses cannot be said to be barred by period of limitation as provided under the Act. 10.03. Mr.M.R. Bhatt, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the revenue has further submitted that earlier provision had bifurcation as contained in clauses (i) and (ii) of sub- section (3) with regard to statement being filed, payment made or credit given. It is submitted that as compared thereto, the legislature has done away with this distinction and the amendment prescribes a common period of limitation so as to align the time limit with the provision of Section 148 of the Act. 10.04. Mr.M.R. Bhatt, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the revenue has heavily relied upon the Memorandum to the Finance Bill (No.2) 2014. It is submitted that in the Memorandum it is specifically note ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... in the aforesaid case, the Hon'ble Supreme Court was considering the provisions of Sections 37 of 1922 Act. It is submitted that unamended Section 34(1)(iii) provided for a period of one year in respect of an agent. It is submitted that by the amended clause (iii), a negative covenant was placed putting an embargo on the assessing officer not to issue a notice after an expiry of two years. It is submitted that it is only by reason of this negative proviso that petition came to be allowed by the Court as can be seen from para 3 of the judgment. It is submitted that In the present case, there is no such negative proviso. It is submitted that in fact in the said decision also in para 5, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that "there was no scope for issuing a notice unless the Legislature expressly gave power to the Income Tax officer to issue notice under the amended section notwithstanding the expiry of the period under the unamended provision or unless there was overlapping of the period within which notice could be issued under the old and the amended provision". 10.10. Mr.M.R. Bhatt, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the revenue has further submitted that the decisi ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... nother Versus Commissioner of Sales Tax, Madhya Pradsesh and another, reported in (1986) 24 ELT 180 SC, are required to be referred to and considered. Considering the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the aforesaid decisions and as observed hereinabove, as the present petitions involve pure question of law, the objections raised by the revenue against entertainability and/or maintainability of the present petitions against the show cause notices are hereby overrules and the present petitions are considered on merits. 11.02. Short question posed for consideration of these petitions is as to, whether section 201(3) of the Income Tax Act as amended on 1/10/2014 by Finance Act of 2014 would be applicable retrospectively or prospectively and whether the said provision would be applicable with respect to the proceedings under the Income Tax Act for A.Y. 2008-09 and 2009-2010?, the proceedings which had already become time barred in view of the provisions of section 201(3) of the Act prior to amendment in section 201(3) of the Act by Finance Act 2014? 12.00. While considering the aforesaid question, provisions of section 201 of the Income Tax Act, as amended from time to tim ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... s Act; or (b) referred to in sub-section (IA) of section 192, being an employer, does not deduct, or does not pay, or after so deducting fails to pay, the whole or any part of the tax, as required by or under this Act, then, such person, shall, without prejudice to any other consequences which he may incur, be deemed to be an assessee in default in respect of such tax: Provided that no penalty shall be charged under section 121 from such person, unless the Assessing Officer is satisfied that such person, without good and sufficient reasons, has failed to deduct and pay such tax. (1A) Without prejudice to the provisions of sub-section (1), if any such person, principal officer or company as is referred to in that sub-section does not deduct the whole or any part of the tax or after deducting fails to pay the tax as required by or under this Act, he or it shall be liable to pay simple interest, - (i) at one per cent for every month or part of a month on the amount of such tax from the date on which such tax was deductible to the date on which such tax is deducted; and (ii) at one and one half per cent for every month or part of a month on the amount of such tax from th ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... made or credit is given, in any other case: Provided that such order for a financial year commencing on or before the 1st day of April, 2007 may be passed at any time on or before the 31st day March, 2011." 12.05. Subsequently, section 201(3) of the Act has been further amended by Finance Act No.2 of 2014 w.e.f. 1/10/2014, which reads as under : "Consequences of failure to deduct or pay : 201(3). No order shall be made under sub-section (1) deeming a person to be an assessee in default for failure to deduct the whole or any part of the tax from a person resident in India, at any time after the expiry of seven years from the end of the financial year in which payment is made or credit is given." As stated hereinabove, question posed before this Court is whether section 201(3) of the Income Tax Act as amended by Finance Act No.2 of 2014 would be applicable prospectively or retrospectively. 12.06. From the aforesaid chronological events and section 201 as amended from time to time, it emerges that prior to section 201 came to be amended by Finance Act No.2 of 2009, Income Tax Act did not provide for any limitation of time for passing an order under section 201(1) holding a ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... l year in which the payment is made or credit is given. To provide sufficient time for pending cases, it is proposed to provide that such proceedings for a financial year beginning from 1st April, 2007 and earlier years can be completed by the 31st March, 2011. However, no time-limits have been prescribed for order under subsection (1) of section 201 where- (a). the deductor has deducted but not deposited the tax deducted at source, as this would be a case of defalcation of government dues; (b). the employer has failed to pay the tax wholly or partly, under sub-section (1A) of section 192, as the employee would not have paid tax on such perquisites; (c). the deductee is a non-resident as it may not be administratively possible to recover the tax from the non-resident. It is proposed to make these amendments effective from 1st April, 2010. Accordingly it will apply to such orders passed on or after the 1st April, 20I0. From the aforesaid chronological events, it appears that section 201(3)(ii) of the Act came to be further amended by Finance Act of 2012, however, with retrospective effect from 1/4/2010 whereby in sub-section (3) in clause (ii), further words "four years" ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... 15th January, 2013. However, there does not exist any express provision in the Act for enabling a deductor to file correction statement. In order to bring clarity in the matter relating to filing of correction statement, it is proposed to amend section 200 of the Act to allow the deductor to file correction statements. Consequently. it is also proposed to amend provisions of section 200A of the Act for enabling processing of correction statement filed. The existing provisions of section 201(1) of the Act provide for passing of an order deeming a payer as assessee in default if he does not deduct or does not pay or after deduction fails to pay the whole or part of the tax as per the provisions of Chapter XVII-B of the Act. Section 201 (3) of the Act provides for time limit for passing of order under section 201(1) of the Act for deeming a payer as assessee in default for failure to deduct tax from payments made to a resident. Clause 201(3) of the Act provides that no order under section 201(1) of the Act shall be passed after expiry of two years from the end of the financial year in which TDS statement has been filed. Currently. the processing of TDS statement is done in the com ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... nt had not been filed. However, section 201(3) of the Act as amended by Finance Act No.2 of 2014, as mentioned in the memorandum of the Finance Bill No.2 of 2014 is stated to have effect from 1st October, 2014. Thus, wherever the Parliament / Legislature wanted to make provisions applicable retrospectively, it has been so provided. 12.15. At this stage, it is required to be noted that while making amendment in section 201(3) of the Act by Finance Act No.2 of 2014, does not so specifically provide that the said amendment shall be made applicable retrospectively. 12.16. On the other-hand, it is specifically stated that the said amendment will take effect from 1/10/2014. As observed hereinabove, in the present cases, limitations provided for passing order under section 201(1) of the Act for A.Y. 2007-08 and 2008-09 had already been expired on 31/3/2011 and 31/3/2012, respectively, i.e. prior to section 201(3) came to be amended by Finance Act No.2 of 2014. 13.00. In the backdrop of the above facts, few decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court on the point and more particularly, with respect to retrospective applicability of the provisions of the Act are required to be referred t ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... of the Finance Act, 1956, authority was conferred upon the Income-tax Officer to assess a person as an agent of a foreign party under S. 43 within two years from the end of the year of assessment. But authority of the Income-tax Officer under the Act before it was amended by the Finance Act of 1956 having already come to an end, the amending provision will not assist him to commence a proceeding even though at the date when he issued the notice it is within the period provided by that amending Act. This will be so, notwithstanding the fact that there has been no determinable point of time between the expiry of the time provided under the old Act and the commencement of the amending Act. The legislature has given to S. 18 of the Finance Act 1956, only a limited retrospective operation i.e. up to April 1,1956, only. That provision must be read subject to the rule that in the absence of an express provision or clear implication, the Legislature does not intend to attribute to the amending provision a greater retrospectivity than is expressly mentioned, nor to authorize the Income-tax Officer to commence proceedings which before the new Act came into force had by the expiry of the peri ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... based on the well-known rule of interpretation that unless the terms of the statute expressly so provide or unless there is a necessary implication, retrospective operation should not be given to the statute so as to affect, alter or destroy any right already acquired or to revive any remedy already lost by efflux of time. On behalf of the appellants reference was made to the opening phrase "Where in respect of any assessment year after the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1940" occurring in S. 297 (2) (d) (ii) of the new Act, but these general words cannot take in their sweep all assessment years subsequent to the year ending on 31st March, 1940 without regard to the question whether the right to re-open the assessment in respect of any assessment year was or was not barred under the repealed Act. We consider that the language of the new Section must be read as applicable only to those cases where the right of the Income Tax Officer to reopen the assessment was not barred under the repealed Section. In our view the new statute does not disclose in express terms or by necessary implication that there was a revival of the right of the Income Tax Officer to re-open an assessment ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... esident party under the Income Tax Act before it was amended, ended on March 31, 1956. It is true that under the amending Act by Section 18 of the Finance Act, 1956, authority was conferred upon the Income Tax Officer to assess a person as an agent of a foreign party under Section 43 within two years from the end of the year of assessment. But authority of the Income Tax Officer under the Act before it was amended by the Finance Act of 1956, having already come to an end the amending provision will not assist him to commence a proceeding even though at the date when he issued the notice it is within the period provided by that amending Act. This will be so, notwithstanding the fact that there has been no determinable point of time between the expiry of the time provided under the old Act and the commencement of the amending Act. The legislature has given to Section 18 of the Finance Act 1956, only a limited retrospective operation, i. e. up to April 1, 1956 only. That provision must be read subject to the rule that in the absence of an express provision or clear implication, the legislature does not intend to attribute to the amending provision a greater retrospectivity than is exp ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... law of limitation has been held to be a procedural law, there are exceptions to this principle. Generally the law of limitation which is in vogue on the date of the commencement of the action governs it. But there are certain exceptions to this principle. The new law of limitation providing a longer period cannot revive a dead remedy. Nor can it suddenly extinguish vested right of action by providing for a shorter period of limitation." 13.04. In the case of Thirumalai Chemicals Limited versus Union of India and Others reported in (2011) 6 SCC 739, while discussing the law of limitation, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in paragraph Nos.29 to 33 has observed and held as under : "Law of Limitation 29. Law of limitation is generally regarded as procedural and its object is not to create any right but to prescribe periods within which legal proceedings be instituted for enforcement of rights which exist under substantive law. On expiry of the period of limitation, the right to sue comes to an end and if a particular right of action had become time barred under the earlier statute of limitation the right is not revived by the provision of the latest statute. Statutes of limitation ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... under an Act which is procedural and a right which is not to be taken away pleading retrospective operation unless a contrary intention is discernible from the statute. Therefore, unless the language clearly manifests in express terms or by necessary implication, a contrary intention a statute divesting vested rights is to be construed as prospective. 33.A statute, merely procedural is to be construed as retrospective and a statute while procedural in nature affects vested rights adversely is to be construed as prospective. The manner of filing an appeal, under subsection (2) of Section 19 of FEMA and the time within which such an appeal has to be preferred and the power conferred on the Tribunal to condone delay under the proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 19 are matters of procedure and act retrospectively, so as to cover causes of action which arose under FERA. " 13.05. At this stage, decision of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in the case of Yew Bon Tew also known as Yong Boon Tiew Versus Kenderran Bas Mara, reported in 1983 (1) A.C. 553 is required to be referred to and considered. In the aforesaid decision, Privy Council has observed and held as under : ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... retrospective sense, and if so to what extent, depends, on the intention of the legislature as expressed in the wording of the statute, having regard to the normal canons of construction and to the relevant provisions of any interpretation statute. From authorities cited, it is my considered judgment that whether the prospective or retrospective Rule of construction should apply depends on the nature of the new statute or amending statute. If it is purely a procedural statute and does not deal with substantive rights then the retrospective Rule of construction should apply. But where the statute deals with substantive rights, or deals with both procedural and substantive rights, then the prospective Rule of construction is applicable... From the authority laid down in 'The Ydun' I am of the View that the amending Act deals only in procedure. In the absence of any express provision to the contrary, the amending Act should, therefore, apply retrospectively. The learned judge added that, if the Plaintiffs had begun their action before the 1974 Act came into force, the Defendants would have escaped liability, thus taking the view that the Act, though retrospective in relatio ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... within the new time or is abridged so as to deprive him of time within which to institute it whilst he still has time to so, very different considerations could arise. A cause of action which can be enforced is a very different thing to a cause of action the remedy for which is barred by lapse of time. Statutes which enable a person to enforce a cause of action which was then barred or provide a bar to an existing cause of action by abridging the time for its institution could hardly be described as merely procedural. They would affect substantive rights". Whether a statute has a retrospective effect cannot in all cases safely be decided by classifying the statute as procedural or substantive. For example, in "The Ydun" case the barque might have grounded on 13 May instead of 13 September 1893 and the Act might have come into force on 5 December 1893 when it received the Royal Assent, instead of 27 days later. Had those been the facts the Act would, if its procedural character were the true criterion of its effect, have deprived the owners of their ability to pursue their cause of action on the day the Act reached the Statute Book. A Limitation Act which had such a decisive ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... rospective operation so as to allow upsetting of proceedings, which had already been concluded and attained finality. The amendment to sub-section (1) of Section 150 is not expressed to be retrospective and, therefore, has to be held as only prospective. The amendment made to subsection (1) of Section 150 which intends to lift embargo of period of limitation under Section 149 to enable Authorities to reopen assessments not only on the basis of Orders passed in proceedings under the IT Act but also on Order of a Court in any proceedings under any law has to be applied prospectively on or after 1-4- 1989 when the said amendment was introduced to subsection (1). The provision in sub-section (1) therefore can have only prospective operation to assessments, which have not become final due to expiry of period of limitation prescribed for assessment under Section 149 of the Act. 21. On a proper construction of the provisions of Section 150(1) and the effect of its operation from 1- 4-1989, we are clearly of the opinion that the provisions cannot be given retrospective effect prior to 1-4-1989 for assessments which have already become final due to bar of limitation prior to 1-4-1989. Ta ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ation is not applicable to declaratory statutes... In determining, therefore, the nature of the Act, regard must be had to the substance rather than to the form. If a new Act is 'to explain' an earlier Act, it would be without object unless construed retrospectively. An explanatory Act is generally passed to supply an obvious omission or to clear up doubts as to the meaning of the previous Act. It is well-settled that if a statute is curative or merely declaratory of the previous law retrospective operation is generally intended... An amending Act may be purely declaratory to clear a meaning of a provision of the principal Act which was already implicit. A clarificatory amendment of this nature will have retrospective effect (ibid., pages 468-69). 15. Though retrospectivity is not to be presumed and rather there is presumption against retrospectivity, according to Craies (Statute Law, 7th Edn.), it is open for the Legislature to enact laws having retrospective operation. This can be achieved by express enactment or by necessary implication from the language employed. If it is a necessary implication from the language employed that the Legislature intended a particular se ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... f them. 17. A validating clause coupled with a substantive statutory change is therefore only one of the methods to leave actions unsustainable under the unamended statute, undisturbed. Consequently, the absence of a validating clause would not by itself affect the retrospective operation of the statutory provision, if such retrospectivity is otherwise apparent." 13.08. Identical question came to be considered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of K.M. Sharma (supra) and while considering the question whether the provisions of section 150(1) as amended from 1/4/1989 can be given retrospective effect prior to 1/4/1989 for assessments which have already become final due to bar of limitation prior to 1/4/1989, while holding that the said provision cannot be given retrospective effect prior to 1/4/1989 for assessments which have already become final due to bar of limitation prior to 1/4/1989, in paragraph Nos.14 and 21 the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed and held as under :- "14. Fiscal statute more particularly on a provision such as the present one regulating period of limitation must receive strict construction. Law of limitation is intended to give certainty ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... passed under the Act or under any other law." 14.00. Now, so far as reliance placed upon the decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Ahmedabad Manufacturing & Calico Printing Co. Ltd. (supra) as well as another decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Jyoti Traders (supra), by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the revenue is concerned, on facts and considering the provisions which came to be considered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the aforesaid decisions, none of the aforesaid decisions shall be applicable to the facts of the case on hand. In the case of Jyoti Traders (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court was considering the proviso to section 21 which specifically provided that assessment and reassessment may be made after expiration of the period aforesaid but not after the expiration of 8 years and from the end of such year. In the aforesaid proviso it expressly enabled assessment where period expires and it operates upon expiry of limitation period. Therefore, the said decision shall not be applicable considering the wordings used in section 201 as amended by Finance Act, 2014, more particularly when it has been expressly p ..... 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