TMI Blog2007 (3) TMI 769X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... o appreciate the contentions urged on behalf of the parties in these appeals. A Notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') was issued by the Lieutenant Governor of Delhi on January 23, 1965 for acquisition of lands measuring 6241 bighas 12 biswas in village Mahipalpur which was required for a public purpose, namely - Planned Development of Delhi. A declaration under Section 6 of the Act relating to 4759 bighas 1 biswa was made on December 12, 1966 and another declaration relating to 1459 bighas 18 biswas was made on December 26, 1968. Another Notification under Section 4 of the Act was published on December 3, 1971 for acquisition of land in Village Nangal Dewat for a public purpose, namely - Development of Palam Airport. A declaration under Section 6 of the Act was made with respect to the said lands on July 16, 1972. The case of the appellants is that the matter remained pending for a considerable period and it appears from various documents which have been brought on record that the lands acquired were really for the benefit of the International Airport Authority of India (IAAI). Reliance is placed on a Resolutio ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... on Collector. On December 23, 1986 a Notification was issued under Section 4 of the Act for acquisition of land for a public purpose, namely for rehabilitation of the persons displaced or affected due to the expansion/development of the Palam Airport. The lands mentioned therein are in village Malikpur Kohi Rangpuri. Since the challenge to the acquisition failed and the appellants were not provided alternative sites under the rehabilitation package, they approached the High Court for relief which, as noticed earlier, has been refused by the High Court. It will, however, be necessary to deal with each writ petition separately since the facts of each case are different as also the pleas raised therein. APPEAL ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) No. 6093 OF 2003 The appellants before us are the son and daughter of Late Balraj Khullar. The lands in question in village Mahipalpur measuring 23 bighas and 18 biswas (approximately 5 acres) devolved upon the appellants after the death of their father. Late Balraj Khullar had constructed a factory over the lands in question in the year 1955 which went into production later after obtaining registration on July 27, 1960. He carried on the busin ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... filed the review petition being Review Petition No. 42 of 1996 before the High Court in which several fresh grounds were also urged but the said review petition was dismissed by the High Court by its order of May 24, 1996 observing that the new points sought to be raised in the review petition had not been pleaded in the original writ petition. The High Court also rejected the contention of the petitioners that on discovery of new facts a review petition was maintainable. No appeal was preferred against the order dismissing the review petition and hence the proceeding initiated by filing of C.W.P. No. 1550 of 1983 challenging the acquisition proceeding got a quietus by dismissal of the review petition by the High Court. Apparently, therefore, the petitioners cannot be permitted to challenge the same acquisition proceeding. However, the petitioners filed another writ petition, being Writ Petition No. 2672 of 1986 again questioning the acquisition proceeding. The said writ petition was dismissed by order dated July 4, 1996. It appears from the record that the point sought to be urged in the aforesaid writ petition was that the acquisition proceeding was bad for non compliance with ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the IAAI as was evident from the Resolution of the Delhi Development Authority dated September 10, 1981. The appellants, therefore, admit that they had knowledge of the fact that the land was to be utilized by the IAAI for its own purposes, which according to the appellants, was not a part of the planned development of Delhi. Such being the factual position, the father of the appellants who filed Writ Petition No. 1550 of 1983 ought to have challenged the acquisition on the ground of non compliance with the provisions of Chapter VII of the Act since all the relevant facts were within his knowledge. He not having done so, we do not find that the High Court was in error in holding that the writ petition was barred also by the principle of constructive res judicata. The question which survives consideration is whether in view of the public purpose declared in the Notification under Section 4 of the Act, the lands can be utilized for any other public purpose. While considering this question it would be useful to remember that the Notification under Section 4 of the Act was issued in January, 1965 and the declaration made in the following year. The IAAI came into existence in Decemb ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... t is conceded by the learned Counsel that the construction of the District center for commercial purpose itself is a public purpose. No doubt it was sought to be contended in the High Court that in a housing scheme, providing facilities for commercial purpose is also one of the composite purpose and that, therefore, acquisition was valid in law. However, the contention was rejected by the High Court. We need not go to that part. Suffice it to state that it is a well-settled law that land sought to be acquired for public purpose may be used for another public purpose. Therefore, when the notification has mentioned that the land is sought to be acquired for housing scheme but it is sought to be used for District center, the public purpose does not cease to be public purpose and the nomenclature mentioned in the notification under Section 4(1) as housing scheme cannot be construed to be a colourable one. The notification under Section 4(1) could not have been quashed on the ground that the land is sought to be used for District center, namely, for commercial purpose. It is obvious that the lands acquired for a public purpose should serve only the public purpose of providing facilities ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... all times to come cannot be taken. A particular scheme may serve the public purpose at a given point of time but due to change of circumstances it may become essential to modify or substitute it by another scheme. The requirements of the community do not remain static; they indeed, go on varying with the evolving process of social life. Accordingly, there must be creative response from the public authority, and the public scheme must be varied to meet the changing needs of the public. At the best for the respondent, it can be assumed that in 1967 when the resolution in his favour was passed, the acquisition of the land was not so urgently essential so as to call for his dispossession. But for that reason it cannot be held that the plots became immune from being utilised for any other public purpose for ever. The State or a body like the Municipal Council entrusted with a public duty to look after the requirements of the community has to assess the situation from time to time and take necessary decision periodically. We, therefore, hold that the Resolution dated 13- 2-1967 was not binding on the Municipal Council so as to disable it to take a different decision later. In Bhagat ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e is no change of public purpose for which the acquired land is being utilized, the acquisition cannot be invalidated on that ground. The purpose for which the lands are being utilized by a governmental agency is also a public purpose and as we have noticed earlier, would come within the ambit of the public purpose declared in Section 4, Notification. Therefore, the acquisition cannot be challenged on the ground that the acquired lands are not being utilized for the declared public purpose. Having regard to the facts of the case it cannot be contended, nor has it been contended, that the Notification under Section 4, of the Act was issued mala fide. We, therefore, find no merit in the appeal arising out of SLP (C) No. 6093 of 2003 and the same is accordingly dismissed. APPEAL ARISING OUT OF SLP) No. 6384/2003 In this appeal the lands belonging to the appellant in village Mahipalpur were notified for acquisition under Section 4, of the Act on January 23, 1965 A declaration under Section 6 followed on December 7, 1966. Ultimately an Award was pronounced under Section 11 of the Act on September 19, 1986. Thereafter the appellant filed Civil Writ Petition No. 2003 of 1986 befo ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... with the acquisition so far as the validity of the Notifications under Sections 4, and 6 was concerned. It accordingly dismissed the writ petition as withdrawn but with liberty to file a fresh petition for claiming any alternative site, if it had any such right. Whereafter the petitioner filed the instant writ petition on March 7, 2003. In the instant petition as well the acquisition proceedings were challenged but the same was dismissed by the High Court on March 26, 2003. The High Court noticed the order passed by the Court earlier on February 18, 1987 and also the fact that the writ petition was being filed after a lapse of 16 years. It did not entertain the challenge to the Notifications issued under Sections 4, and 6 of the Act since challenge to the aforesaid Notifications stood rejected by order of February 18, 1987. It noticed the earlier common judgment delivered in the writ petitions preferred by other appellants in this batch of writ petitions and held that the inordinate delay in filing the writ petition challenging the validity of the Notifications was not condonable. It then proceeded to consider the submission urged on behalf of the appellant that in any event it ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e development of Palam Airport. It was submitted by Mr. Andhyarujina, leaned senior counsel appearing for the appellant Ravi Khullar in appeal arising out of SLP No. 6093 of 2003 that in view of the Notification of December 23, 1986 the appellants are entitled to the benefit of rehabilitation in view of the acquisition of their lands for the expansion/development of the Palam airport. According to him the lands which were subject matter of Notification under Section 4, dated January 23, 1965 for the planned development of Delhi were owned by the appellants over which they had been carrying on business of ceramic industries for over 15 years. It is his contention that a Notification under Section 4, of the Act was issued on December 23, 1986 for acquisition of lands in village Malikpur Kohi Rangpuri measuring 713 bigha and 0.2 biswa for the rehabilitation of those displaced or affected due to the expansion/development of Palam airport. He, therefore, submitted that regardless of the fact that their lands were acquired under a different Notification than the lands of Ravi Khullar, in view of the issuance of the Notification dated December 23, 1986, it made no difference since all ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ttee the industries were classified in three groups. The appellants fell in the first category, namely - those who had a turnover of ₹ 15 lakhs and above with an area of 5 acres in their possession on ownership basis. The Committee recommended that they be allowed 25000 sq. yards each. The Committee also made its recommendations with regard to other two categories of industries and assessed that the total requirement of land would be about 20.86 acres if such allotments were to be made. It also noticed the fact that the aforesaid factories were located over an area of 25.70 acres. No document has been produced to show that the recommendations contained in the said survey report were at any time accepted by the Government. The appellants also relied upon the letter written by the Secretary, Civil Aviation, to the Lieutenant Governor of Delhi on September 15, 1986 wherein a view was firmly expressed that in the overall interest of security and development of Delhi Airport, the industrial structures in Mahipalpur and Nangal Dewat area need to be acquired immediately. The letter also stated that the IAAI will be willing to accept the suggestion for provision of land for land, ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... y related to allotment of alternative sites for residence of the displaced persons and not for relocation of an industry. The respondents on the other hand relied on atleast 3 documents and contended that at no time any decision was taken to allot alternative sites with a view to relocate the displaced industrial units. The first document is the Minutes of the Meeting held by the Lieutenant Governor of Delhi on June 16, 1982 to consider issues connected with acquisition of lands in village Nangal Dewat etc. for the International Airport Authority of India (IAAI). At the meeting were present the Lieutenant Governor of Delhi and officers of the concerned department; the Vice Chairman of the Delhi Development Authority and its officers as also the representatives of the Municipal Corporation of Delhi; Ministry of Tourism and Civil Aviation and IAAI. The relevant part of the Minutes reads as under: After further discussions, Lt. Governor directed that in the special circumstances obtaining in Delhi, there was no alternative to IAAI undertaking the responsibility for the rehabilitation of the village abadi. The cost of rehabilitation would have to be borne by IAAI over and above ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... Secretary, Delhi Administration on July 30, 1991 regarding acquisition of land for IAAI. The Minutes disclose that the representatives of the various departments put forwards their points of view and though the Delhi Administration suggested that the agency for which the land was being acquired should pay not only for the land but also for meeting cost of rehabilitation of the concerned industrial units, the Ministry of Civil Aviation, Government of India, was not agreeable to pay any amount over and above the cost of land and super-structures. Paragraph 3.1 of the Minutes is relevant which reads as follows: Reverting to the specific question of acquiring land under the above said five industrial units the Chief Secretary remarked that linking obligation of re-location with the acquisition of their land would not be advisable as neither DDA nor Delhi Administration could undertake such an obligation especially as units were now required to shift out of UT of Delhi. The Delhi Administration could at best assist in the allotment of the land by the concerned states. The affected units should therefore be discouraged from expecting any special concession. At the same time it would ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... , namely - for rehabilitation of the persons displaced or affected due to the expansion/development of the Palam airport. Learned counsel appearing for the State contended that this public purpose has been achieved and the persons who were displaced from village Nangal Dewat in view of the acquisition of their lands for the development of Palam airport have been allotted plots in village Rangpuri for their residence. There is nothing in the Notification which obliges the State to provide equal alternative site to the industries for their rehabilitation. We find substance in the stand of respondents. CIVIL APPEAL ARISING OUT OF SLP) No. 6095 of 2003 In this appeal apart from other questions which have been raised in this batch of appeals, a question of limitation has been raised. It is submitted on behalf of the appellant that the award made by the Collector in the instant case was barred by limitation under Section 11A of the Act inasmuch as it was not made within a period of 2 years from the date of the publication of the declaration after excluding the period during which an order of stay granted by the High Court operated. The facts are not in dispute and since this ple ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... icitor General, had to be excluded in calculating the period of 2 years. Thus after excluding the aforesaid period the award should have been pronounced on or before February 18, 2003. However, the award was pronounced on March 1, 2003. Ex facie, therefore, the award having not been made within the period prescribed by Section 11A of the Act, the entire proceeding for acquisition of the land lapsed on February 18, 2003, the last date for pronouncement of the award. The learned Additional Solicitor General, however, submitted that the judgment in the writ petition was pronounced on February 13, 2003 and an application was made for certified copy of the same on February 14, 2003. The certified copy was ready on February 27, 2003. It is his contention that the period between February 14, 2003 and February 27, 2003 must be excluded and if that period is excluded, time to make the award was available upto March 4, 2003 whereas the award was pronounced on March 1, 2003. He submitted that the period taken by a public authority to obtain the authentic copy of the order, which is evidence of the contents thereof, must in all cases be excluded and the period taken to obtain a certified co ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... f status quo. In the absence of any provision in the Land Acquisition Act for exclusion of time taken to obtain a certified copy of the judgment of the High Court, the Land Acquisition Collector, ought to have proceeded to make the award having come to know that the writ petition filed by the appellant had been rejected by the High Court. In the matter of computing the period of limitation three situations may be visualized, namely - (a) where the Limitation Act applies by its own force; (b) where the provisions of the Limitation Act with or without modifications are made applicable to a special statute; and (c) where the special statue itself prescribes the period of limitation and provides for extension of time and or condonation of delay. The instant case is not one which is governed by the provisions of the Limitation Act. The Land Acquisition Collector in making an award does not act as a Court within the meaning of the Limitation Act. It is also clear from the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act that the provisions of the Limitation Act have not been made applicable to proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act in the matter of making an award under Section 11A of the A ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ermit the Court to read words into Section 11A of the Act so as to enable it to read Section 12 of the Limitation Act into Section 11A of the Land Acquisition Act. The judgments cited at the Bar are also of no help to the respondents. In Shakuntala Devi Jain (supra) this Court held that an appeal is incompetent unless the memorandum of appeal is accompanied by a certified copy of the decision. It condoned the delay in that case giving the benefit of Section 5 of the Limitation Act in the facts and circumstances of the case. The applicability of the Limitation Act was not in dispute in that case. In N. Narasimhaiah and Ors. (supra) the order under Section 17(4) of the Land Acquisition Act dispensing with the enquiry under Section 5A was quashed by the court with liberty to the State to proceed further in accordance with law. In such circumstances it was held that running of the limitation should be counted from the date of the order of the court received by the Land Acquisition Officer. The limitation prescribed in Clause (ii) of the first proviso to Sub-section (1) of Section 6 would apply to publication of declaration under Section 6(1) afresh. If it was published within one ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... parently applying the well-settled legal maxim - Actus curiae neminem gravabit : an act of the Court shall prejudice no man. In substance what was done therein was to necessitate afresh calculation of the statutory period from the date of receipt of the copy of the order of the Court. Granting of further time than the one stipulated in law in a given case as a sequel to the decision to carry out the dictates of the Court afresh is not the same as curtailing the statutory period of time to stultify an action otherwise permissible or allowed in law. Consequently, no inspiration can be drawn by the respondents in this case on the analogy of the said decision. In our view the principle laid down in this judgment is of no help to the respondents and if at all it supports the contention of the appellant that the period of limitation prescribed cannot be curtailed by order of the Court. As a necessary corollary it cannot be extended contrary to the statutory provisions. We have, therefore, no doubt in holding that so far as the acquisition of the lands belonging to Palam Potteries is concerned, the proceedings lapsed for failure of the Collector to make an award within the prescribed ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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