TMI Blog1960 (12) TMI 88X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... cupied by the Rajputs. Subsequently when the Rajputs went there, they found their usual sitting place occupied by the cultivators and took that as an insult to them. Though they were invited by the pujari to sit in some other place, they refused to do so and went to a banyan tree which was at a short distance from the temple. There they held a brief conference and then returned to the temple armed with guns, swords and lathies. The Rajputs fired a few shots at the cultivators and also beat them with swords and lathies. As a result, 16 of the cultivators received injuries and of these 6 received gun-shot injuries, of which two persons, namely, Deena and Deva, succumbed to the injuries. Out of the remaining 14 injured persons, 3 received grievous injuries and the rest simple ones. Forty- three persons, alleged to have taken part in the rioting, were put up for trial before the Sessions Judge,, Merta, for having committed offences under s. 302, read with s. 149, and s. 148 of the Indian Penal Code. Five of the accused admitted their presence at the scene of occurrence but pleaded that after they had made their customary offerings at the temple and when they were returning they were at ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... s to compel its interference. In the circumstances we think it necessary to clarify the point. The scope of the powers of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal has been elucidated by the Privy Council in Sheo Swarup v. King-Emperor There Lord Russell observed at p. 404 thus: ........ the High Court should and will always give proper weight and consideration to such matters as (1) the views of the trial Judge as to the credibility of the witnesses, (2) the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused, a presumption certainly not weakened by the fact that he has been acquitted at his trial, (3) the right of the accused to the benefit of any doubt, and (4) the slowness of an appellate court in disturbing a finding of fact arrived at by a Judge who had the advantage of seeing the witnesses Adverting to the facts of the case, the Privy Council proceeded to state, ........ They have no reason to think that the High Court failed to take all proper matters into consideration in arriving at their conclusions of fact. These two passages indicate the principles to be followed by an appellate court in disposing of an appeal against acquittal and also the proper c ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ement with the observations of Lord Russell in Sheo Swarup's case ((1934) L.R. 61 I.A. 398.) as to matters a High Court would keep in view when exercising its power under s. 417 of the Criminal Procedure Code. If it had been so intended, this Court would have at least referred to Sheo Swarup's case ((1934) L.R. 61 I.A. 398.), which it did not. The same words were again repeated by this Court in Ajmer Singh v. The State of Punjab ([1953] S.C.R. 418.). In that case the appellate court set aside an order of acquittal on the ground that the accused had failed to explain the circumstances appearing against him. This court held that as the presumption of innocence of an accused is reinforced by the order of acquittal, the appellate court could have interfered only for substantial and compelling reasons. The observations made in respect of the earlier decisions applied to this case also. Mahajan, J., as he then was, delivering the judgment of the court in Puran v. State of Punjab (A I.R. 1933 S.C. 459.) again used the words very substantial and compelling reasons , but immediately thereafter the learned Judge referred to the decision of Sheo Swarup's case((1934) L.R. 61 I.A. ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... Court, after referring to an earlier decision of this Court, accepted the principle laid down by the Privy Council and, indeed, restated the observations of the Privy Council in four propositions. It may be noticed that the learned Judge did not use the words cc substantial and compelling reasons . In S. A. A. Biyabani v. The State of Madras(A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 645.), Jagannadhadas, J., after referring to the earlier decisions, observed at p. 647 thus: While no doubt on such an appeal the High Court was entitled to go into the facts and arrive at its own estimate of the evidence, it is also settled law that, where the case turns on oral evidence of witnesses, the estimate of such evidence by the trial court is not to be lightly set aside. The learned Judge did not repeat the so-called formula but in effect accepted the approach of the Privy Council. The question was again raised prominently in the Supreme Court in Aher Raja Khima , v. The State of Saurashtra([1955] 2 S.C.R. 1285.). Bose, J., expressing the majority view, stated at p. 1287 thus: It is, in our opinion, well settled that it is not enough for the High Court to take a different view of the evidence; there mu ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... Council but also must give its clear reasons for coming to the conclusion that the order of acquittal was wrong. The foregoing discussion yields the following results: (1) an appellate court has full power to review the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded; (2) the principles laid down in Sheo Swarup's case((1934) L.R. 61 I.A. 398.) afford a correct guide for the appellate court's approach to a case in disposing of such an appeal; and (3) the different phraseology used in the judgments of this Court, such as, (i) substantial and compelling reasons , (ii) good and sufficiently cogent reasons , and (iii) strong reasons are not intended to curtail the undoubted power of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal to review the entire evidence and to come to its own conclusion; but in doing so it should not only consider every matter on record having a bearing on the questions of fact and the reasons given by the court below in support of its order of acquittal in its arriving at a conclusion on those facts, but should also express those reasons in its judgment, which lead it to hold that the acquittal was not justif ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... sence of any particular accused, there should be an allegation against him about doing any overt act in the unlawful, assembly. By applying the said yardstick he held that none of the accused falling in the first group, which included appellants 7, 8 and 9, was guilty of the offences with which they were charged. Coming to the second category, with which we are not concerned in this appeal, the learned Sessions Judge again applied the test that an overt act should be proved against each of the accused and held that no case had been made out against them. Adverting to the third group, after noticing that 12 of the eye-witnesses were those who received injuries, the learned Sessions Judge applied another test for accepting their evidence. In effect and substance the test adopted by him was that an accused identified only by one witness and not proved to have done any overt act should be acquitted by giving him the benefit of doubt. Applying this test to the said witnesses he held that the said accused were not guilty. After considering the evidence in the aforesaid manner, he came to the following final conclusion: I cannot hold that the assembly of Rajputs had any common object ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ly, the learned Judges proceeded to consider the case of each accused. They adopted the following principle, based upon the decision of this Court in Abdul Gani v. State of M. P. (A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 31.): We quite recognise that in a case of rioting where two inimical factions are involved, exaggerations are bound to be made, and some innocent persons are likely to be falsely implicated; but all the same, it is the duty of the courts not to throw out the whole case by following the easy method of relying on discrepancies, and, where the case for the prosecution is substantially true, to find out if any of the accused participated, in the offence, and if their presence is established beyond all reasonable doubt, punish them for the offences committed by them. They found, on the evidence, that appellant 1, Sanwat Singh, who was present on the spot was a member of the unlawful assembly and had actually struck Sheonath with his sword as a result of which his three fingers were cut; that appellant 2, Dhan Singh, was one of the persons who took a leading part in the beating; that appellant 3, Mangej Singh, was undoubtedly one of the participants in the unlawful assembly; that appel ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... s, and, applying mechanical tests, refused to act upon their evidence. The High Court rightly pointed out that there was no reason why the voluminous evidence in support of the general case and why the evidence of the three witnesses, Goga, Chandra and Doongar Singh, should be rejected. The learned Judges of the High Court accepted their evidence, which conclusively established that the general case was true and that the appellants actually took active part in attacking the Jats with swords and lathies. In doing so, the learned Judges did not depart from any of the principles laid down by the Privy Council. Indeed, they interfered with the judgment of the Sessions Judge, as they came to the conclusion that, the said judgment, in so far as the appellants were concerned, was clearly wrong and contrary to the overwhelming and reliable evidence adduced in the case. The learned Judges of the High Court, in our opinion, approached the case from a correct perspective and gave definite findings on a consideration of the entire evidence. The question now is, whether the appellants have made out any case for interference with the judgment of the High Court under Art. 136 of the Constituti ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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