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TMI Blog1972 (9) TMI 154X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... nection with a case under Sec. 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act which had been registered against one K. R. Sharma, Superintending Engineer, with whom the appellant had been working as a Personal Assistant. The appellant was, however, enlarged on bail. About the same, time the appellant was suspended with effect from 13 December 1954 and certain departmental proceedings were started, against him. In November 1956 the appellant was served with a charge sheet under Rule 7.2 of the Punjab Civil Services (Punishment and Appeal) Rules, There, were, two distinct charges made against the appellant which will, for the sake of convenience, be described hereinafter as Charge No. 1(a) and Charge No. 1(b). Both the charges were based on allegations that the appellant had taken illegal gratification. We are not concerned for the purposes of this, appeal with the details of the charges. On 18 December 1956 the appellant submitted a reply to the chargesheet to which he added certain supplementary replies between MAY and July 195?. Government, it appears, appointed an Enquiry Officer as late as October, 1957. On 18 February 1958 the appellant was., reverted from the post of Executive Engin ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... had been found unsatisfactory by Government and that Government proposed to censure his conduct. Immediately upon receipt of the said "Show Cause notice" the appellant asked for a copy of the statement made by one S. D Khanna, Sub-Divisional Officer under Sec. 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The appellant justified his demand for a copy of S. D. Khanna's statement by reference to two facts. First, 'Charge No. 1(b) related to an alleged demand by the appellant for illegal gratification in the presence of S. D. Khanna and he was, therefore, entitled to have a copy of the statements made by Is. D. Khanna before the police and the magistrate. Secondly, the appellant pointed out, under the orders of the High Court he was expecting a copy of Khanna's statement to be supplied to him on 27 October 1966. He did not, however, receive a copy because the Government withdrew the chargesheet against him on 18 October 1966. If, therefore, by a fresh "Show Cause notice" the appellant was called upon to vindicate his earlier reply to th e chargesheet, he was, he claimed, entitled to a copy of the statement of S. D. Khanna. On 24 November 1966, however, Secreta ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... en censured by the Government inasmuch as the notice' was too vague to. enable him to give an effective reply. Secondly, it was contended that the order of 27 February 1967 which withheld from the appellant any payment in excess of the subsistence allowance he had drawn during the period of his suspension was liable to be struck down on the ground that it had been passed without giving him any opportunity to make a representation against it. We shall now deal with these contentions one by one. The appellant's complaint about the "Show Cause notice" of 26 October 1966 is one that has to be accepted as substantial. For a proper appreciation of the appellant's contention, the Memorandum containing the "Show Cause notice" may be set out in extenso It was in the following terms "Your explanation dated the 18th December, 1956, in reply to the statements of charges and allegations has been considered and found to be unsatisfactory. The President of India, after taking a lenient view, has tentatively decided to censure your conduct and also to place a copy thereof on your personal file. 2.Before the proposed punishment is inflicted, you are given an o ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ink that the appellant's explanation was unsatisfactory. It is to our mind essential for a "Show Cause notice" to- indicate the precise scope of the notice and also to indicate the points on which the officer concerned is expected to give a reply. We have no manner of doubt that the "Show Cause notice" in the instant case did not give the appellant any real ,opportunity to defend himself against the complaint that his previous explanation of 18 December 1956 had been unsatisfactory. 'The appellant did not, therefore, get any chance at all to show ,that he did not deserve a censure upon his conduct. We were told that since the appellant was aware of the charge and also aware of the reply he had given to the charges made against him, it was enough for Government to tell him that his answer was unsatisfactory. It was argued that since the "Show Cause notice" really pointed this out and mentioned that the very lenient sentence of censure upon the appellant's conduct was ,going to be imposed, there was nothing further that Government could be expected to do in this case. We have no hesitation in rejecting this contention made out on behalf of t ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... o the Government servant." It is clear that before passing an order under Rule 7.3, the authority concerned has to form an opinion as to whether the Government servant has been fully exonerated and, also, whether, in the case of suspension, the order of suspension waswholly unjustified. It was urged on behalf of the appellant that before the authority formed such an opinion, it was incumbent upon it to afford an opportunity to make suitable representations in thisbehalf. Reliance was placed upon the Judgment of this Court in M. Gopala Krishna Naidu v. State of Madhya Pradesh(1). The appellant in that case had been exonerated of the charges framed against him in a departmental enquiry. Government held, however, that the appellant's suspension and the departmental enquiry instituted against him "were not wholly. unjustified". The relevant order, after reinstating the appellant with effect from the date of the order and directing the appellant's retirement from the same date on the ground that he had already attained the age of superannuation contained a further direction that the entire period of the appellant's absence from duty should be treated as a pe ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... while-in the instant case the appellant has already, according to the High Court, received all reasonable opportunity to show cause against the punishment that has been meted out against him. With respect, we do not think that-there is any real difference in substance between the facts of the instant case and those in M. Gopala Krishna Naidu's(l) case. The appellant in the instant case did not really get an opportunity to defend himself against Charge 1 (b). It will be remembered that in this case also the Government abandoned the proceedings against the appellant with regard to Charge 1(b). Had the proceedings been completed, it is not altogether impossible that the appellant would have been exonerated also of that charge just as he had been exonerated of Charge 1 (a) earlier. To that extent the appellant did not get any opportunity to show that the suspension order against him had been unjustified and that he was, therefore, entitled to full pay and allowances. From this point of view there is really no difference between the instant case and the case of Gopala Krishna Naidu(1). Besides, the real ratio in M. Gopala Krishna Naidu's(l) case was that if an order affects the ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... n should be treated as period spent on duty and, also, what proportion of pay and allowances should be given to him. This decision cannot apply to the instant case for the simple reason that Government, by withdrawing the proceedings initiated against the appellant in (1) Civil Appeals Nos. 1561 and 1562 of 1965 decided by the Supreme Court on 6 October 1967. respect of Charge 1(b), made it impossible for the appellant to get himself fully exonerated. Since the appellant had been exonerated of Charge 1(a) and since Charge 1(b) was withdrawn, it is impossible for Government to proceed on the basis as if the appellant has not been fully exonerated or to assume that the order of suspension was one which was not wholly unjustified.In that view of the matter, we do not think that case of the State of Assam and Anr. v. Raghava Rajagopalachari (supra) can be of any assistance to the respondents. In the result this appeal succeeds. The judgment and order of the High Court- are set aside. The orders dated 27 February 1967 impugned in the appellant's petition before the High Court are quashed. The appellant will get the costs of this appeal as well as the costs incurred below. Appeal ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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