TMI Blog2017 (2) TMI 562X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... hat any person, not being a borrower, but owner of the property, totally unconnected with the debt, but his property at peril, would fall within the residuary clause (e) of Rule 13(2)(1) of the Rules, relatable to any other person, would not be a proper interpretation to the words, "any person", occurring in Rule 13(2)(1)(e) of the Rules. Indisputably, the writ petitioner has filed an application, under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act, 2002, challenging sale certificate and vide order, dated 14.03.2013, DRT-III, Chennai, has dismissed the same. As stated supra, the contention of the Bank that while preferring an application under Section 17(1) of the SARFAESI Act, 2002, the writ petitioner has paid the requisite court fee, has not been disputed. We have also extracted the heading, under which, the writ petitioner has pursued his further remedy, under Section 18 of the SARFAESI Act, which is an appeal. As per Rule 13 of the Rules, 2002, the amount of fee payable to an appeal to the appellate authority, against any order, passed by the DRT, the same has to be accompanied with the fees, provided at Clauses (a) to (d) to Rule 13(2)(1). In the light of the decisions and discussion, ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... absolute possession and enjoyment of the land in question. Mutation of revenue records has been done and patta has been issued by the revenue authorities, in original patta No.2930. Since 1991, he was employed in Africa and living there, he used to come to India once in two years. When he came to India, he visited the property on 20.5.2009 and shocked to know that the abovesaid property was auctioned by Indian Bank, Asset Recovery Management Branch, Chennai, the third respondent herein, for certain alleged dues of M/s.Blue Jaggers Estates Ltd. 4. The petitioner has further submitted that the third respondent- Bank, for certain alleged dues of M/s.Blue Jaggers Estates Ltd., had initiated proceedings under the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (hereinafter referred to as the SARFAESI Act ) and proposed to auction the entire layout in Harita Enclave in Tambaram. 5. Aggrieved by the auction conducted by the Bank, the petitioner has filed S.A.No.95 of 2009, before Debt Recovery Tribunal-III (In short DRT ), Chennai, on various grounds. The third respondent Bank has entered appearance and filed counter. Despite no ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... court fee, on or before 3.12.2014. As against the abovesaid order, the present writ petition has been filed. 9. Referring to second proviso to Section 18 of the SARFAESI Act, 2002, Mr.A.V.Arun, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submitted that the said provision obligates only the borrower to deposit with the Appellate Tribunal, 50% of the amount claimed by the secured creditor or as determined by the Debts Recovery Tribunal and not a person, other than the borrower. Reiterating that the petitioner is not a borrower, not claiming any right, under the mortgage, he submitted that DRAT has passed an erroneous order, dated 10.09.2014, on the grounds that a waiver application ought to have been filed. 10. Referring to Rule 13(2)(e) of the Security Interest (Enforcement) Rules, 2002 (hereinafter referred to as the Rules ) and a Hon'ble Division Bench order of this Court in W.P.No.9604 of 2009, dated 01.07.2009 [P.Valmoorthy v. Authorized Officer, United Bank of India], Mr.A.V.Arun, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the case of the petitioner would fall under the abovesaid clause, as interpreted by the Hon'ble Division Bench in W.P.No.9604 of 200 ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... been taken: PROVIDED that different fees may be prescribed for making the application by the borrower and the person other than the borrower. Explanation : For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that the communication of the reasons to the borrower by the secured creditor for not having accepted his representation or objection or the likely action of the secured creditor at the stage of communication of reasons to the borrower shall not entitle the person (including borrower) to make an application to the Debts Recovery Tribunal under this sub-section. (2) The Debts Recovery Tribunal shall consider whether any of the measures referred to in sub-section (4) of section 13 taken by the secured creditor for enforcement of security are in accordance with the provisions of this Act and the rules made thereunder. (3) If, the Debts Recovery Tribunal, after examining the facts and circumstances of the case and evidence produced by the parties, comes to the conclusion that any of the measures referred to in sub-section (4) of section 13, taken by the secured creditor are not in accordance with the provisions of this Act and the rules made thereunder, and require restora ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ribunal: (1) Any person aggrieved by any order made by the Debts Recovery Tribunal under Section 17, may prefer an appeal along with such fee, as may be prescribed to the Appellate Tribunal within thirty days from the date of receipt of the order of Debts Recovery Tribunal: PROVIDED that different fees may be prescribed for filing an appeal by the borrower or by the person other than the borrower: PROVIDED FURTHER that no appeal shall be entertained unless the borrower has deposited with the Appellate Tribunal fifty per cent of the amount due from him, as claimed by the secured creditors or determined by the Debts Recovery Tribunal whichever is less: PROVIDED ALSO that the Appellate Tribunal may, for the reasons to be recorded in writing, reduce the amount to not less than twenty five percent of debt referred to in the second proviso. 14. What is challenged in S.A.No.95 of 2009, is the proceedings initiated by the Bank, against the schedule property, under the SARFAESI Act, 2002, including the sale certificate, dated 13.01.2009, on the grounds, inter alia, that no notice was given to the writ petitioner, under the SARFAESI Act, 2002, including the offer given to o ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ed 20.09.2008. Possession was also taken and then issued the Sale Notice, dated 30.09.2008. Applicant is a subsequent purchaser. No where in the application it is specifically stated that the purchase was made with the knowledge or consent of the mortgagee. His sale was never brought to the notice of the respondent. According to the learned counsel for the respondent, SARFAESI proceedings initiated by the bank was already challenged by the borrower by way of filing S.A.No.221 of 2007 and the S.A., was also dismissed on merits. Then, Sale Certificate was issued and the property was sold in public auction. No step was specifically challenged by the applicant herein. The relief sought in the applicant is not specific. Under these circumstances, the applicant is not entitled to get any order as prayed for. The mortgage can be enforced and any encumbrance created after the creation of the mortgage will only be subservient to the mortgage. Point is found accordingly. 16. During the course of hearing of the present writ petition, Mr.A.V.Arun, learned counsel for the petitioner fairly admitted that the Court fee affixed on interim applications, pending disposal of the application, unde ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... person ₹ 200 2 Appeal to the Appellate Authority against any order passed by the Debt Recovery Tribunal under section 17 Same fees as provided at clauses (a) to (e) of serial number 1 of this rule 18. From the proceedings of DRAT, dated 03.01.2014, it could be deduced that when an appeal under Section 18 of the SARFAESI Act, was filed, the petitioner has paid some court fee. Along with RA(SA)No.49 of 2013, the petitioner has filed I.A.No.442 of 2013, for interim injunction. During the course of the proceedings, when the Bank raised a plea that Court fee has not been paid and that the Tribunal cannot entertain an appeal, vide proceedings, dated 10.09.2014, the appellate Tribunal has ordered as follows: It is seen that deficit Court fee has to be paid and also the waiver application has to be filed. Therefore, time is given to the appellant to pay the deficit court fee and also the waiver application upto 03.12.2014, failing which, this RA(SA) shall stand automatically dismissed. 19. In the interim application in I.A.No.442 of 2013, the Appellate Tribunal has ordered as fol ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e varies depending upon the amount of debt. 23. We have already placed on record, the submissions of Mr.A.V.Arun, learned counsel for the petitioner that in respect of an interim application, the fee charged by the DRT or DRAT, as the case may be, is the same, ie., ₹ 200/-. Rule 13(2) of the abovesaid Rules, makes it clear that in case of an application to a Debt Recovery Tribunal, under sub-section (1) of section 17 against any of the measures referred to in sub-section (4) of section 13, by the borrower or an aggrieved person, other than the borrower, the amount of fee payable, varies depending upon the amount debt, but if, for any other application by any person, the amount of fee payable is ₹ 200/-, which means that under Section 17 of the Act, there could be a main application and incidental or connected application/s, for any interim prayer. 24. Paragraph 9 of the judgment in W.P.No.9604 of 2009, dated 01.07.2009 [P.Valmoorthy v. Authorized Officer, United Bank of India], strongly relied on by Mr.A.V.Arun, learned counsel for the petitioner, is extracted hereunder: 9. A perusal of the provisions makes it clear that the expression debtor includes gu ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... rced, without the intervention of the court or tribunal, by such creditor in accordance with the provisions of this Act. Sub-section (2) of Section 13 enumerates first of many steps needed to be taken by the secured creditor for enforcement of security interest. This sub-section provides that if a borrower, who is under a liability to a secured creditor, makes any default in repayment of secured debt and his account in respect of such debt is classified as nonperforming asset, then the secured creditor may require the borrower by notice in writing to discharge his liabilities within sixty days from the date of the notice with an indication that if he fails to do so, the secured creditor shall be entitled to exercise all or any of its rights in terms of Section 13(4). Subsection (3) of Section 13 lays down that notice issued under Section 13(2) shall contain details of the amount payable by the borrower as also the details of the secured assets intended to be enforced by the bank or financial institution. Sub-section (3-A) of Section 13 lays down that the borrower may make a representation in response to the notice issued under Section 13(2) and challenge the classification of his a ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ing of a financial asset by secured creditors, no individual secured creditor shall be entitled to exercise any or all of the rights under sub-section (4) unless all of them agree for such a course. There are five unnumbered provisos to Section 13(9) which deal with pari passu charge of the workers of a company in liquidation. The first of these provisos lays down that in the case of a company in liquidation, the amount realised from the sale of secured assets shall be distributed in accordance with the provisions of Section 529-A of the Companies Act, 1956. The second proviso deals with the case of a company being wound up on or after the commencement of this Act. If the secured creditor of such company opts to realise its security instead of relinquishing the same and proving its debt under Section 529(1) of the Companies Act, then it can retain sale proceeds after depositing the workmen s dues with the liquidator in accordance with Section 529-A. The third proviso requires the liquidator to inform the secured creditor about the dues payable to the workmen in terms of Section 529-A. If the amount payable to the workmen is not certain, then the liquidator has to intimate the estim ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... n 45 days from the date on which action is taken under that sub-section. By way of abundant caution, an Explanation has been added to Section 17(1) and it has been clarified that the communication of reasons to the borrower in terms of Section 13(3-A) shall not constitute a ground for filing application under Section 17(1). Sub-section (2) of Section 17 casts a duty on the Tribunal to consider whether the measures taken by the secured creditor for enforcement of security interest are in accordance with the provisions of the Act and the Rules made thereunder. If the Tribunal, after examining the facts and circumstances of the case and evidence produced by the parties, comes to the conclusion that the measures taken by the secured creditor are not in consonance with sub-section (4) of Section 13, then it can direct the secured creditor to restore management of the business or possession of the secured assets to the borrower. On the other hand, if the Tribunal finds that the recourse taken by the secured creditor under sub-section (4) of Section 13 is in accordance with the provisions of the Act and the Rules made thereunder, then, notwithstanding anything contained in any other law f ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ds other application in Rule 13(2)(1)(e), and the word application under Section 17(1) of the SARFAESI Act and in Rule 13(2)(1)(a), have to be given the same meaning, then there is no reason, as to why, the legislature, in Rule 13(2)(1)(e), has used the word, other . 29. Meaning of the word other , as per the Oxford Dictionary, is Used to refer to a person or thing that is different or distinct from one already mentioned or known; additional; alternative of two; those not already mentioned. In Chamber's Dictionary, the word other refers to second; alternate; different; different form or not the same as the one in question (often with than); nor the same; remaining; additional; one of two. In Cambridge Dictionary, the word other means, as well as the thing or person already mentioned; used at the end of a list to show that there are more things, without being exact about what they are; different from the thing or person already mentioned. 30. In the process of interpreting a statute or a provision, it should also be kept in mind that it is the duty of the Court to conceive and perceive the true intention of the Legislature and in the words of Hon'ble ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... selves precise and unambiguous, then no more can be necessary than to expound those words in their natural and ordinary sense. The words themselves so alone in such cases best declare the intent of the lawgiver. (iii) In Nairin v. University of St. Andrews reported in 1909 AC 147, the Hon'ble Apex Court held that, Unless there is any ambiguity it would not be open to the Court to depart from the normal rule of construction which is that the intention of the Legislature should be primarily gathered from the words which are used. It is only when the words used are ambiguous that they would stand to be examined and construed in the light of surrounding circumstances and constitutional principle and practice. (iv) In Ram Rattan v. Parma Nand reported in AIR 1946 PC 51, the Hon'ble Mr. Justice S.R.Das, held as follows: The cardinal rule of construction of statutes is to read the statutes literally, that is, by giving to the words their ordinary, natural and grammatical meaning. If, however, such a reading leads to absurdity and the words are susceptible of another meaning, the Court may adopt the same. But if no such alternative construction is possible, ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... al construction is more consistent with the alleged object and policy of the Act. The words used in the material provisions of the statute must be interpreted in their plain grammatical meaning and it is only when such words are capable of two constructions that the question of giving effect to the policy or object of the Act can legitimately arise. When the material words are capable of two constructions, one of which is likely to defeat or impair the policy of the Act whilst the other construction is likely to assist the achievement of the said policy, then the courts would prefer to adopt the latter construction. It is only in such cases that it becomes relevant to consider the mischief and defect which the, Act purports to remedy and correct. (x) In Attorney-General v. HRH Prince Ernest Augustus of Hanover reported in (1957) 1 All.ER 49, Lord Somervell of Harrow has explained unambiguous, as unambiguous in context . (xi) In M.Pentiah v. Veeramallappa reported in AIR 1961 SC 1107, the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed : Where the language of a statute, in its ordinary meaning and grammatical construction leads to, a manifest contradiction of the a ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ss there be some strong and obvious reason to the contrary. But the rule adverted to is subject to this condition, that however plain the apparent grammatical construction of a sentence may be, if it be properly clear from the contents of the same document that the apparent grammatical construction cannot be the true one, then that which, upon the whole, is the true meaning shall prevail, in spite of the grammatical construction of a particular part of it. And substantially the same opinion is expressed by Lord Selborne in Caledonian Ry, v. North British Ry. (1881) 6 AC 114 (222):-- The mere literal construction of a statute ought not to prevail if it is opposed to the intentions of the legislature as apparent by the statute, and if the words are sufficiently flexible to admit of some other construction by which, that intention can be better effectuated. Again Lord Fitzgerald in Bradlaugh v. Clarke, (1883) 8 AC 354 at p. 384 observed as follows:-- I apprehend it is a rule in the construction of statutes that in the first instance the grammatical sense of the words is to be adhered to. If that is contrary to, or inconsistent with, any expressed intention or declared purpose of ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ( xviii) In Union of India v. Sankalchand Himatlal Sheth reported in 1977 (4) SCC 193, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as follows: What is true of the interpretation of an ordinary statute is not any the less true in the case of a constitutional provision, and the same rule applies equally to both. But if the words of an instrument are ambiguous in the sense that they can reasonably bear more than one meaning, that is to say, if the words are semantically ambiguous, or if a provision, if read literally, is patently incompatible with the other provisions of that instrument, the court would be justified in construing the words in a manner which will make the particular provision purposeful. That, in essence is the rule of harmonious construction. (xix) If the words are precise and unambiguous, then it should be accepted, as declaring the express intention of the legislature. In Ku.Sonia Bhatia v. State of U.P., and others reported in 1981 (2) SCC 585 = AIR 1981 SC 1274, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that a legislature does not waste words, without any intention and every word that is used by the legislature must be given its due import and significance. ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... its breath unnecessarily. Just as Parliament is not expected to use unnecessary expressions, Parliament is also not expected to express itself unnecessarily. Even as Parliament does not use any word without meaning something, Parliament does not legislate where no legislation is called for. Parliament cannot be assumed to legislate for the sake of legislation, nor can it be assumed to make pointless legislation. Parliament does not indulge in legislation merely to state what it is unnecessary to state or to do what is already validly done. Parliament may not be assumed to legislate unnecessarily. Again, while the words of an enactment are important, the context is no less important. For instance, the fact that general words are used in a statute is not in itself a conclusive reason why every case falling literally within them should be governed by that statute, and the context of an Act may well indicate that wide or general words should be given a restrictive meaning (see Halsbury, 4th edn. Vol. 44 para 874). (xxii) In Nyadar Singh v. Union of India reported in AIR 1988 SC 1979, the Hon'ble Apex Court observed that ambiguity need not necessarily be a grammatical am ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... und out from the scheme of the Act. (xxvii) In Indian Dental Association, Kerala v. Union of India reported in 2004 (1) Kant. LJ 282, the Court held that, The cardinal rule for the construction of Acts of Parliament is that they should be construed according to the intention expressed in the Acts themselves. The object of all interpretation is to discover the intention of Parliament, but the intention of Parliament must be deduced from the language used , for it is well-accepted that the beliefs and assumptions of those who frame Acts of Parliament cannot make the law. If the words of the statute are themselves precise and unambiguous, then no more can be necessary than to expound those words in their ordinary and natural sense. Where the laguage of an Act is clear and explicit, the Court must give effect to it, whatever may be the consequences, for in that case the words of the statute speak the intention of the Legislature. Where the language is plain and admits of but one meaning, the task of interpretation can hardly be said to arise. The decision in a case calls for a full and fair application of particular statutory language to particular facts as found. It ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... on the Reading of Statutes in Essays on Jurisprudence , Columbia Law Review, p. 51.) 16. It is true that this Court in interpreting the Constitution enjoys a freedom which is not available in interpreting a statute and, therefore, it will be useful at this stage to reproduce what Lord Diplock said in Duport Steels Ltd. v. Sirs [(1980 (1) All.ER 529] (All ER at p. 542 c - d ): It endangers continued public confidence in the political impartiality of the judiciary, which is essential to the continuance of the rule of law, if judges, under the guise of interpretation, provide their own preferred amendments to statutes which experience of their operation has shown to have had consequences that members of the court before whom the matter comes consider to be injurious to the public interest. 19. In D.R. Venkatachalam v. Dy. Transport Commr. [1977 (2) SCC 273] it was observed that courts must avoid the danger of a priori determination of the meaning of a provision based on their own preconceived notions of ideological structure or scheme into which the provision to be interpreted is somewhat fitted. They are not entitled to usurp legislative function under the ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... t the words do not mean what they say lies heavily on the party who alleges it must advance something which clearly shows that the grammatical construction would be repugnant to the intention of the Act or lead to some manifest absurdity. (xxxiii) In Visitor Amu v. K.S.Misra reported in 2007 (8) SCC 594, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that, It is well settled principle of interpretation of the statute that it is incumbent upon the Court to avoid a construction, if reasonably permissible on the language, which will render a part of the statute devoid of any meaning or application. The Courts always presume that the legislature inserted every part thereof for a purpose and the legislative intent is that every of the statute should have effect. The legislature is deemed not to waste its words or to say anything in vain and a construction which attributes redundancy to the legislature will not be accepted except for compelling reasons. It is not a sound principle of construction to brush aside words in a statute as being in apposite surplusage, if they can have appropriate application in circumstances conceivably within the contemplation of the statute. (xxxiv) ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... 4], it was observed, that interpretation is best which makes the textual interpretation match the contextual. Speaking for the Court, Chinappa Reddy, J. noted the importance of rule of contextual interpretation and held:- Interpretation must depend on the text and the context. They are the bases of interpretation. One may well say if the text is the texture, context is what gives the colour. Neither can be ignored. Both are important. That interpretation is best which makes the textual interpretation match the contextual. A statute is best interpreted when we know why it was enacted. With this knowledge, the statute must be read, first as a whole and then section by section, clause by clause, phrase by phrase and word by word. If a statute is looked at, in the context of its enactment, with the glasses of the statute-maker, provided by such context, its scheme, the sections, clauses, phrases and words may take colour and appear different than when the statute is looked at without the glasses provided by the context. With these glasses we must look at the Act as a whole and discover what each section, each clause, each phrase and each word is meant and designed to say as to f ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... me other place in that provision. (xxxvii) In Satheedevi v. Prasanna reported in (2010) 5 SCC 622, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as follows: 12. Before proceeding further, we may notice two well-recognised rules of interpretation of statutes. The first and primary rule of construction is that the intention of the legislature must be found in the words used by the legislature itself. If the words used are capable of one construction, only then it would not be open to the courts to adopt any other hypothetical construction on the ground that such hypothetical construction is more consistent with the alleged object and policy of the Act. The words used in the material provisions of the statute must be interpreted in their plain grammatical meaning and it is only when such words are capable of two constructions that the question of giving effect to the policy or object of the Act can legitimately arise-Kanai Lal Sur v. Paramnidhi Sadhukhan [AIR 1957 SC 907] 13. The other important rule of interpretation is that the court cannot rewrite, recast or reframe the legislation because it has no power to do so. The court cannot add words to a statute or read words whi ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... cting provisions of the same statute, but its preamble, the existing state of the law, other statutes in pari materia, and the mischief which I can, by those and other legitimate means, discern that the statute was intended to remedy. (All ER p. 53 I) (XL) In V.L.S.Finance Ltd., v. Union of India reported in 2013 (6) SCC 278, at Paragraph 18, the Hon'ble Supreme Court, held as follows: As is well settled, while interpreting the provisions of a statute, the court avoids rejection or addition of words and resort to that only in exceptional circumstances to achieve the purpose of Act or give purposeful meaning. It is also a cardinal rule of interpretation that words, phrases and sentences are to be given their natural, plain and clear meaning. When the language is clear and unambiguous, it must be interpreted in an ordinary sense and no addition or alteration of the words or expressions used is permissible. As observed earlier, the aforesaid enactment was brought in view of the need of leniency in the administration of the Act because a large number of defaults are of technical nature and many defaults occurred because of the complex nature of the provision. (XLI) ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... operative Societies, AIR 1998 SC 703 ). At Paragraph 45, the Hon'ble Supreme Court considered the decision made in Rohitash Kumar v. Om Prakash Sharma reported in 2013 (11) SCC 451, wherein, the Hon'ble Supreme Court, at Paragraphs 27 to 29, held as follows: 27. The Court has to keep in mind the fact that, while interpreting the provisions of a Statute, it can neither add, nor subtract even a single word A section is to be interpreted by reading all of its parts together, an d it is not permissible, to omit any part thereof. The Court cannot proceed with the assumption that the legislature, while enacting the Statute has committed a mistake; it must proceed on the footing that the legislature intended what it has said; even if there is some defect in the phraseology used by it in framing the statute, and it is not open to the court to add and amend, or by construction, make up for the deficiencies, which have been left in the Act 28. The Statute is not to be construed in light of certain notions that the legislature might have had in mind, or what the legislature is expected to have said, or what the legislature might have done, or what the duty ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... creditor shall take over the management of such business of the borrower which is relatable to the security for the debt. (c) appoint any person (hereafter referred to as the manager), to manage the secured assets the possession of which has been taken over by the secured creditor; (d) require at any time by notice in writing, any person who has acquired any of the secured assets from the borrower and from whom any money is due or may become due to the borrower, to pay the secured creditor, so much of the money as is sufficient to pay the secured debt. 32. As per Section 17(1) of the Act, any person (including borrower), aggrieved by any of the measures, referred in sub-Section (4) of Section 13, taken by the secured creditor or his authorised officer, may make an application, along with such fee, as may be prescribed to the Debts Recovery Tribunal. At this juncture, this Court deems it fit to consider, as to how, Courts have interpreted the meaning of the word, any , in the statutes. (i) In Ashiq Hasan Khan v. Sub-Divisional Officer, Sadar, Monghyr reported in AIR 1965 Patna 446, a learned Single Judge of the Patna High Court, with reference to the word, ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ted in AIR 1996 SC 550, the Supreme Court held that, The words `any ' and `potential' are significant. Both are of wide amplitude. The word `any' dictionarily means; one or some or all', In Black's Law Dictionary it is explained thus, word `any' has a diversity of meaning and may be employed to indicate `all' or `every' as well as `some' or `one' and its meaning in a given statue depends upon the context and the subject- matter of the statute . The use of the word `any' in the context it has been used in clause (o) indicates that it has been used in wider sense extending from one to all. 33. We have noticed that in W.P.No.9604 of 2009, dated 01.07.2009 [P.Valmoorthy v. Authorized Officer, United Bank of India], a Hon'ble Division Bench has held that the petitioner therein was an aggrieved person. Therefore, the main condition to be satisfied for preferring an application, under Section 17(1) of the SARFAESI Act, 2002, is that the applicant must be an aggrieved person. Expression any person employed in Section 17(1) of the Act and Rule 13(2) of the Security Interest (Enforcement) Rules, 2002, can have reference, only to ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... sion is used, unless the context differs. In relation to a challenge against the measures taken by the secured creditor, the expression any person used in Section 17(1) of the SARFAESI Act, 2002 and the rules, framed thereunder, can have only the same meaning. What is referred to in Rule 13(2)(1)(e) of the Security Interest (Enforcement) Rules, 2002, is any other application and not any other person . 38. In A.L.Shah v. The Authorised Officer, State Bank of Hyderabad, Pondicherry reported in 2016(2) CTC 593 : 2016 (2) LW 81 : 2016 (2) MLJ 274 : AIR 2016 MAD 98 : 2016 (2) MWN (Civil) 113, the petitioner therein, claiming himself to be the lawful owner of the subject property, filed three applications under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act, 2002, before the Debt Recovery Tribunal-I, Chennai, questioning the legality and validity of the notices, issued under Section 13(4) of the SARFAESI Act, 2002, by the respondent Bank, on the ground that the second respondent therein had mortgaged the property in question without having legal title over the property in question. 39. In O.S.No.7 of 2006, the leanred III Additional District Judge, Puducherry, vide judgment and decree, dated ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... is payable in respect of the property, as the value of the fee is determined on the basis of the amount of debt recoverable and the provisions do not distinguish between borrower and guarantor or any other person, claiming to be aggrieved by the action of the bank for recovery of its money. Amicus Curiae has contended that the petitioner therein is liable to pay the court fee as specified under Rule 13(2)(1)(c) and (d) of Rules 2002, depending on the amount of debt due. 44. After considering the rival submissions and taking assistance of the Amicus Curiae, decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Tara Chand and others Vs. Gram Panchayat, Jhupa Khurd and others reported in 2012 (13) SCC 269 and Jagdish Singh v. Heeralal reported in 2014 (1) SCC 479, at Paragraphs 26 to 30, in A.L.Shah's case (cited supra), a Hon'ble Division Bench, held as follows: 26 In the case on hand, we are concerned with the fee payable by the petitioner. Indisputably, the petitioner was neither borrower nor guarantor, but any other person under the SARFAESI Act. Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act does not distinguish between borrower, guarantor or any other person, who is aggrieved by ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... n A.L.Shah's case (cited supra), The word, any person has to be understood in the context that was intended by the legislature with respect to the tenancy Act, keeping in mind the purpose for which, the statute was enacted. The provisions of the Act, thus, have to be construed to achieve the purpose of its enactment. The Court has to adopt a constructive approach not contrary to attempted objective of the enactment. The Court must examine and give meaning to the said words, in view of the statute of which it is a part, considering the context and the subject of the said statute. (Vide: Shri Balaganesan Metal v. M.N.Shanmugham Chettry Ors., AIR 1987 SC 1668; and Sahakari Sakhar Karkhana Ltd., v. Collector of Central Excise, Pune (2003) 3 SCC 506). 46. In P.Valmoorthy v. Authorized Officer, United Bank of India], rendered on 01.07.2009, the Hon'ble Division Bench, at Paragraph 10, held that, It is well settled proposition of law that payment of Court Fees being a fiscal measure, the provision would be strictly construed and if there is any scope for any doubt, it should be interpreted in favour of the subject rather than in favour of the state. (See St ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... n 1994 Supp (1) SCC 280, the Hon'ble Apex Court held that the object oriented approach, however, cannot be carried to the extent of doing violence to the plain meaning of the Section used by rewriting the Section or substituting the words in the place of actual words used by the legislature. (ii) In Dadi Jagannadham v. Jammulu Ramulu reported in (2001) 7 SCC 71, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that, 13. We have considered the submissions made by the parties. The settled principles of interpretation are that the court must proceed on the assumption that the legislature did not make a mistake and that it did what it intended to do. The court must, as far as possible, adopt a construction which will carry out the obvious intention of the legislature. Undoubtedly if there is a defect or an omission in the words used by the legislature, the court would not go to its aid to correct or make up the deficiency. The court could not add words to a statute or read words into it which are not there, especially when the literal reading produces an intelligible result. The court cannot aid the legislature s defective phrasing of an Act, or add and mend, and, by construction, ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e to the case on hand and that if this Hon'ble Court desires to deviate from the same, the matter requires reference to a larger bench of this Court, we are not inclined to accept the said contention, for the reason that the expression any person occurring in Section 17(1) of the SARFAESI Act, 2002, has been explained by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Satyavati Tondon's case (cited supra) and followed in Jagdish Singh's case (cited supra) and it is also a well settled law that when there is a subsequent decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, on the point of law, the same is binding on this Court and there is no need to follow the judgment of a co-ordinate bench, which had no occasion to consider the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, explaining what, any person , occurring in Section 17(1) of the SARFAESI Act, 2002, means. 51. Yet another reason, as to why, we are not inclined to accept the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that when there are two decisions, on the point of law, the judgment rendered at a later point of time, proximate and which has considered the decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court, will prevail over th ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... nch decision of Allahabad High Court in U.P. State Road Transport Corporation v. State Transport Appellate Tribunal, U.P., Lucknow and Ors. (AIR 1977 Allahabad 1), held that, 12. It is noteworthy that the Supreme Court's decision in Mysore State Transport Corporation is later in time. Even if there is some conflict in the two Supreme Court decisions, we have to follow the law as declared in the later case of Mysore State Transport Corporation. (iv) In Vasant Tatoba Hargude and Ors. v. Dikkaya Muttaya Pujari (AIR 1980 Bom. 341), it is held that in case of conflict between earlier and later decisions of Supreme Court, each consisting of equal number of Judges, later decision prevails. A Full Bench of Karnataka High Court (Five Judge Bench) in Govindanaik G. Kalaghatigi v. West Patent Press Company Limited and Anr. (AIR 1980 Karnataka 92), at Paragraph 5, held that- If two decisions of the Supreme Court on a question of law can not be reconciled and one of them is by a Larger Bench while the other is by a Smaller Bench, it is earlier or later in point of time, should be followed by High Courts and other Courts. However, if both such Benches of the Supreme Court c ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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