TMI Blog1991 (4) TMI 447X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... (Village Tank). It consists of 100 acres of which roughly 30 acres is covered by water spread area marked 'A' Schedule. 'B' Schedule consists of 70 acres (silted up area). The tank was dug in Fasli 1190 (1700 A.P.) Zamindar, Raja Manikya Rao made a grant of the land for digging the tank and its preservation, maintenance and repairs. It is the descendants' case that it is a private tank enjoyed by the 'grantee', N.L.S. as owner and thereafter the descendants and perfected the title by prescription. It was found as a fact by the High Court and the descendants are unable to persuade us from the evidence to differ from the findings that the tank is a public tank dug by the villagers and ever since and as of right they have been drawing the water from the tank for their use and for the cattle of the village. The descendants' plea and evidence adduced in support thereof that it is their private tank was negated by both the courts. The Trial Court found that the tank is a 'public trust', the appellants would be hereditary trustees and could be removed only by taking action under Section 77 of the A. P. Hindu Charitable and Religious Institutions ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... earned Senior Counsel for the descendants conceded that the descendant or N. L. S. have no exclusive personal right, title or interest in the tank and the appurtenant total land of 100 acres. In view of the entries of the Inams Fair Register for short 'I. F. R.', it is a public trust and not a public tank. Unless recourse is had to remove them from trusteeship under Section 77 of the Endowments Act, the appellants cannot be dispossessed. Since admittedly, N. L. S. and the descendants were enjoying the property till date of dispossession, presumption of the continuance of the enjoyment anterior thereto as owners could be drawn. The High Court thereby committed error of law in holding that the lands stood vested in the Gram Panchayat under the Act and that it is a public tank. In Civil Appeal No. 931 of 1977, it was further contended that since the grant of Ryotwari patta under the Inams Act had became final. Section 14 thereof bars the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to entertain the suit. Shri B. Kanta Rao, learned counsel for the Gram Panchayat contended that the finding of the High Court that the tank and the appurtenant land, namely, the plaint schedule property, as ' ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... nned the evidence. From these facts the first question emerges is whether the tank and the appurtenant land stood vested in Gram Panchayat. Section 64 of the Act reads thus : Vesting of common property or income in Gram Panchayat - Any property or income which by custom belongs to or has been administered for the benefit of the villagers in common, or the holders in common of village land generally or of land of a particular description or of lands under a particular source of irrigation, shall vest in the Gram Panchayat and be administered by it for the benefit of the villagers or holders aforesaid . Section 95 reads thus : Vesting of water works in Gram Panchayat - (1) All public watercourses, springs, reservoirs, tanks, cisterns, fountains, wells, ponds and other water works (including those used by the public such an extent as to give a prescriptive right to then use) whether existing at the commencement of this Act or afterwards made, laid or erected and whether made, laid or erected at the cost of the Gram Panchayat or otherwise for the use or benefit of the public, and also any adjacent land, not being private property, appertaining thereto shall vest in ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ontrol prescribed by the Govt. by rules. The Gram Panchayat also shall have the right to use the adjacent land appertaining thereto for planting trees and enjoying the usufruct thereof or for like purposes. Sub-section (3) gives overriding power to the Govt., by a notification published in the A.P. Gazette to define or limit the control or supervision by the Gram Panchayat or the Govt. may assume administration of any public source of water supply and public land adjacent and appertaining thereto. The only condition precedent thereto is prior consultation of the Gram Panchayat and to have due regard to any objections, if raised, by the Gram Panchayat and issue notification published in the Gazette resuming the water sources or the land etc. The word 'vest' clothes varied colours from the context and situation in which the word came to be used in a statute or rule. In Chamber's Mid- Century Disctionary at p. 1230 defined vesting in the legal sense 'to settle, secure, or put in fixed right of possession; to endow, to descend, devolve or to take effect, as a right'. In Black's Law Dictionary. 5th Edition at p. 1401, the word 'vest', to give an imme ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... vested itself of its title to the property and transferred the same to the trust. The clauses in the agreement show that the Government had created the Trust as its agent not on permanent basis but as a convenient mode of having the scheme of improvement implemented by the Trust subject to the control of the Government. The word 'vesting' in Section 85 would signify that the water-courses and tanks, lands etc. used by the public to such an extent as to give a prescriptive right to their use are vested in the Gram Panchayat, and placed them under the control and supervision of the Gram Panchayat. It confers no absolute or full title. It was open to the Government, even after vesting, to place restrictions upon the Gram Panchayat in the matter of enjoyment and use of such tanks, and appurtenant lands etc. Sub-section (3) of Section 85 expressly makes the to assume the administration of any matter clear. It empowers the Government such tank or lands or to define or limit the control which is vested in the Gram Panchayat. Gram Panchayat being a statutory body is bound by the restrictions imposed by sub-section (3) of Section 85. The assumption of management by the Govt. woul ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ased on the Ryotwari patta granted under Section 3 of the Inams Act. Therefore, entries in I.F.R. bear great evidenciary value to ascertain their rights. In Arunachalam Chetty v. Venkatachalpathi Garu Swamigal AIR 1919 PC 62 at p. 65, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council considered the effect of the columns in the I.F.R. and held thus : It is true that the making of this Register was for the ultimate purpose of determining whether or not the lands were tax-free. But it must not be forgotten that the preparation of this Register was a great act of State, and its preparation and contents were the subject of much consideration under elaborately detailed reports and minutes. It is to be remembered that the Inam Commissioners through their officials made enquiry on the spot, heard evidence and examined documents, and with regard to each individual property, the Government was put in possession not only of the conclusion come to as to whether the land was tax-free, but of a statement of the history and tenure of the property itself. While their Lordships do not doubt that such a report would not displace actual and authentic evidence in individual cases, yet the Board, when s ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ely Vatticherukuru, one of the questions that arose was whether the patta granted in the individuals' names would be their individual property or for the endowment. The Division Bench held that though the pattas were obtained in the individuals' name, the trustees of an institution cannot derive personal advantage from the administration of the trust property. It was held that the grant of patta was for the maintenance of the trust. We approve that the law was correctly laid down. In (Crishnan Nair Boppudi Punniah v. Sri Lakshmi Narasimhaswamy Varu, by its trustees, 1963 (1) AWR 214, relied on by Shri Sitaramaiah, on the basis of the entries in I. F.R., the finding was that the grant was in favour of the individual burdened with service and not to an institution. Therefore, the ratio therein does not assist us to the facts in this case. Moreover, in view of the stand taken by Shri Sitaramaiah that the lands are not the private property of N. L. S. or his descendants but held by them as trustees, the grant of Ryotwari patta to the individuals by necessary implication, as a corollary, is of no consequence. The question then is whether the enjoyment of the usufruct by the d ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ident, Taluq Board, Narsapur 1913 (19) IC 727 (Mad)(DB), relied by Shri Sitaramaiah the finding was that the grant was to the plaintiffs' family subject to conditions of service. There right to take the usufruct of the trees therein was held to be for the benefit of the grantee. In that view its ratio cannot be applied to the facts in this case. In M. Srinivasacharyulu v. Pratyanga Rao, AIR 1921 Madras 467, one of the contentions raised was that since the produce was being enjoyed by the trustees for over many years for personal use, it must be construed that the trust was for personal benefit of archakas. It was repelled holding that it would be a dangerous proposition to lay down that if the trustees of the religious trusts have for many years being applying the income to their own personal use, the trust-deed must be construed in the light of such conduct. The decree of the trial court that the enjoyment was for the institution was upheld. The finding in Civil Appeal No. 931 of 1977, that since the endowment was the Dashabandam the descendants are entitled to the Ryatwari patta cannot be upheld. Dashabandam grant of land burdened with the service of a public nature was made ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... to the extent of two thirds share in the land and one third to the land-holder. If it was held by the institution, two third share would be to the institution and one third to the tenants. Section 3 grants right of permanent occupancy to the tenants in inam lands held by institutions. Section 9 prescribes procedure for eviction of the tenants having right of permanent occupancy. Section 10-A provides right to ryotwari patta to tenants in a Ryotwari or Zamindari village with the right of permanent occupancy, even in the lands, held under customary right etc. Section 12 fastens liability on the ryotwari pattadars to pay land assessment. Section 13 gives exclusive power of jurisdiction to Tehsildar, the Revenue Court and the Collector to try the suit as per the procedure as of a Civil Court under the Civil Procedure Code. Section 14 of the Inams Act reads thus : Bar of jurisdiction of Civil Courts:- No suit or other proceedings shall be instituted in any Civil Court to set aside or modify any decision of the Tahsildar, the Revenue Court, or the Collector under this Act, except where such decision is obtained by misrepresentation, fraud or collusion of parties . Section 14-A a ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... re not suited to the needed expeditious dispensation. The adjudicatory system provided in the new forums is cheap and rapid. The procedure before the Tribunal is simple and not hide bound by the intricate procedure of pleadings, trial, admissibility of the evidence and proof of facts according to law. Therefore, there is abundant flexibility in the discharge of the functions with greater expedition and inexpensiveness. In order to find out the purpose in creating the Tribunals under the statutes and the meaning of particular provisions in social legislation, the Court would adopt the purposive approach to ascertain the social ends envisaged in the Act, to consider scheme of the Act as an integrated whole and practical means by which it was sought to be effectuated to achieve them. Meticulous lexographic analysis of words and phrases and sentences should be subordinate to this purposive approach. The dynamics of the interpretative functioning of the Court is to reflect the contemporary needs and the prevailing values consistent with the constitutional and legislative declaration of the policy envisaged in the statute under consideration. In Deena v. Union of India (1984) 1 SCR ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... r upon existence of some particular fact. Such a fact is collateral. To the actual matter which the Tribunal has to try and the determination whether it existed or not is logically temporary prior to the determination of the actual question which the Tribunal has to consider. At the inception of an enquiry by a Tribunal of limited jurisdiction, when a challenge is made to its jurisdiction, the Tribunal has to consider as the collateral fact whether it would act or not and for that purpose to arrive at some decision as to whether it has jurisdiction or not. There may be Tribunal which by virtue of the law constituting it has the power to determine finally, even the preliminary facts on which the further exercise of its jurisdiction depends; but subject to that, the Tribunal cannot by a wrong decision with regard to collateral fact, give itself a jurisdiction which it would not otherwise had. Except such tribunals of limited jurisdiction when the statute not only empowers to enquire into jurisdictional facts but also the rights and controversy finally it is entitled to enter on the enquiry and reach a decision rightly or wrongly. If it has jurisdiction to do right, it has jurisdictio ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e and the Civil Court's jurisdiction to try the dispute was barred. Despite the fact that no express exclusion of the Civil Court's jurisdiction was made under the Act it was held that very provision setting up an hierarchy of judicial tribunals for the determination of the questions on which the applicability of the Act depends was sufficient in most cases to infer that the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts to try the same was barred. Accordingly, it was held that the jurisdiction of the Settlement Officer and the Tribunal by necessary implication was exclusive and that the Civil Courts are barred from trying or retrying the question once over. The decisions of the Settlement Officer and of the Tribunal were held final and conclusive. In Dhulabhai v. State of M. P. (1968) 3 SCR 662 another Constitution Bench reviewed the entire case law on the question of maintainability of civil suit and laid down seven propositions. Propositions 1 and 2 are relevant, which read thus : (1) Where the statute gives a finality to the orders of the special Tribunals the Civil Court's jurisdiction must be held to be excluded if there is adequate remedy to do what the Civil Courts no ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... was held at p. 207 C-D that the Act intended to protect ryots and not to leave them in wilderness. When the Act provides machinery in Section 56(1)(c) to discover who the lawful ryot of a holding was, it was not for the Court to denude the Act of all meaning and by confining the provision to the bounds of Sections. 55 and 56(1)(a) and (b) on the ground of contextual interpretation. Interpretation of a statute, contextual or otherwise must further and not frustrate the object of the statute. It was held that the civil suit was not maintainable and approved the Full Bench judgment of 5 Judges of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh in T. Munuswami Naidu v. R. Venkaia Reddy, AIR 1978 Andhra Pradesh 200 (FB). The same view was reiterated in O. Chenchulakshmamma v. D. Subramanya Reddy (1980) 1 SCR 1006 and held that the order of the Addl. Settlement Officer was final insofar as the dispute between the rival claimants to the ryotwari patta was concerned and not liable to be questioned in any Court of law. In A. Bodayya v. L. Ramaswamy (dead) by LRs. (1984) Supp SCC 391, while reiterating the ratio in both the judgments, Desai, J. speaking for a Bench of 3 Judges held that under Estate Aboli ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... r and not an appeal; and (III) that by Madras Amendment, Section 64-C was deleted. It was unfortunate that it was not brought to the notice of the Court that the purpose of Estate Abolition Act was not solely for the purpose of collecting the revenue to the State. The Act had its birth from a long drawn struggle carried on by the ryots in Madras Presidency for permanent ryotwari settlement of tenures and grant of permanent occupancy rights and the Indian National Congress espoused their rights and passed resolution at Arvadi Session to make a legislation in that regard. The recovery of revenue was only secondary. In. Syamala Rao v. Sri Radhakanthaswami Varu (1984) 1 AP LJ 113 a Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court to which one of us (K.R.S., J.) was a member considered the historical background, the purpose of the Act and the scheme envisaged therein in extenso and held that the preamble of the Estate Abolition Act was to repeal the permanent settlements, the acquisition of the rights of the landholders is in Estates and introduction of the ryotwari settlement therein; under Section 1(4) by issuance of the notification the pre-existing rights shall cease and determined; ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... 763 the question was whether the civil suit to recover damages and for ejectment of the ryoti lands belonging to the temple was barred. The findings were that the lands were rytoi lands and that the tenant acquired the occupancy rights, but the lease was granted in excess of 5 years. It was contended that it was a transfer without permission of the Endowment department. While upholding that the lands were ryoti lands and the tenant acquired occupancy rights, this Court disagreeing with the High Court, held that there was no transfer and that the tenant is liable to pay the arrears of rent and the suit was maintainable. In Sri Vedagiri Lakshmi Narasimha Swami Temple v. Induru Pattabhirami Reddy (1967) 1 SCR 280, the contention raised was that Section 93 of the Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1951 was a bar to maintain suit for rendition of accounts and recovery thereof against the ex- trustees. This Court repelling the contention and held that the suit for rendition of accounts was not expressly or by necessary implication barred the jurisdiction of the Civil Court under Section 93. In Shree Raja Kandregula Srinivasa Jagannadha Rao Panthulu Bahadur Garu v. Stat ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... authority against the imposition of penalty. The Act in terms does not bar the employers from instituting a suit. In those circumstances, it was held that the legislature did not intend to exclude the jurisdiction of the Civil Court. The ratio in K. Chintamani v. G. Annamnaidu (1974) 2 SCR 655, also does not assist Gram Panchayat for the reason that the decree therein originally granted became final. Subsequently it was sought to be reopened in a later suit. Under those circumstances the civil suit was held to be maintainable notwithstanding the provisions contained under the Estate Abolition Act. Thus we have no hesitation to hold that the ratio in all these cases are clearly distinguishable and render little assistance to the Gram Panchayat. The scope, ambit and operation of the Inams Act was considered by P. Jaganmohan Reddy, J. (as he then was) in D. V. Raju v. B. G. Rao, 1961 (2) A WR 368 and held that the paramount object of the legislature was to protect the tenant in occupation and is sought to be achieved by making effective orders of eviction made by the Civil Court either in execution or otherwise. It further prohibits the institution of any suit or proceeding in a Ci ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... findings. It was subject to appeal and revision and certiorari under Article 226. The decisions of the Revenue Tribunal, are final and conclusive between the parties or persons claiming right, title or interest through them. The trick of pleadings and the camouflage of the reliefs are not decisive but the substance or the effect on the order of the Tribunal under the Inams Act are decisive. The civil suit except on grounds of fraud, misrepresentation or collusion of the parties is not maintainable. The necessary conclusion would be that the civil suit is not maintainable when the decree directly nullifies the ryotwari patta granted under Section 3 of the Inams Act. Under the Gram Panchayat Act the statutory interposition of vesting the tank and the appurtenant land in the Gram Panchayat made it to retain possession, control and supervision over it, though the Gram Panchayat unlawfully took possession. The need to grant decree for possession in favour of the Gram Panchayat is thus redundant. The suit of the descendants normally to be decreed on the finding that ryotwari patta under Section 3 of the Inams Act was granted in their favour and that they were unlawfully dispossessed. Si ..... 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