TMI Blog1995 (8) TMI 324X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... a clerk in Engineering Fishing Project Division, Ratnagiri, was driving the jeep. The Respondent Nos. 1 to 3 filed their claim before the Motor vehicles Tribunal, claiming ₹ 4,00,000 as the compensation for the death of Vijay Singh. it was alleged that respondent was under the influence of liquor and was driving the jeep in a rash and negligent manner which resulted in the accident and death of Vijay Singh. It was also alleged that the said respondent was driving the jeep with the knowledge and consent of the appellant No. 3, the driver of the jeep, as such the appellants and respondent were jointly and severally liable to pay compensation for the accident. Vijay Singh, the deceased was then aged about 35 years and was earning ₹ 1400 to ₹ 2000 per month. In the written statement filed on behalf of the appellants, it was admitted that respondent was driving the jeep although he had no licence to drive the same. It was also admitted that he was under the influence of liquor. However, it was pleaded on behalf of the appellants that said respondent had snatched the keys of the jeep from the driver, appellant No. 3, and started driving the jeep from the office p ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... tion of the driver that he had consumed liquor on that day and because of that he permitted respondent to drive the vehicle that night. In this background, the Slate has to be held to be vicariously liable for the accident. Thereafter the High Court directed payment of ₹ 2,06.000 as the compensation along with 12% interest per annum payable from the date of the application till the date of deposit/realisation. The Stale Government, the driver and respondent were jointly and severally held liable to pay the same. The learned counsel appearing for the appellants took a stand that in the facts and circumstances of the present case, the State could not be held to be vicariously liable to pay the compensation for the acts of respondent who was just a clerk under the State Government and was neither authorised nor required to drive the jeep in question. The jeep had been put in custody of the driver who alone was entitled to drive the same. As respondent had forcibly snatched the keys from the driver and had caused the accident, the said respondent only should have been held to be liable for his act; his act could not bind the Stale because it could not be held that he was drivi ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... can be found that an employee was doing an unauthorised act in an unauthorised but not a prohibited way. The employer shall be liable for such act, because such employee was acting within the scope of his employment and in so acting done something negligent or wrongful A muster is liable even for acts which he had not authorised provided they are so connected with acts which he has been so authorised. On the other hand, if the act of the servant is not even remotely connected within the scope of employment and is an independent act, the master shall not be responsible because the servant is not acting in the course of his employment but has gone outside. In Saimond's Law of Torts (Twentieth Edition) at page 458 it has been said: ........On the other hand it has been held that a servant who is authorised to drive a motor-vehicle, and who permits an unauthorised person to drive it in his place, may yet be acting within the scope of his employment. The act of permitting another to drive may be a mode, albeit an improper one, of doing the authorised work. The master may even be responsible if the servant impliedly, and not expressly, permits an unauthorised person to drive th ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e vehicle was being used in the course of their business. As I understand the authorities, the employers escape liability if, but only if, the vehicle was, at the time of the negligent act, being used by the driver for the purpose of what has been called a frolic of his own. That is not this case. Here, at the material time, this vehicle was in fact being used in the course of the defendants business. It was further said at page 1005 : ............. If, as in Ricketts' case, and in the present case, the master puts the vehicle in the charge and control of his servant to be used for the purposes of the masters business, he thereby delegates to the servant his duty so to control it that it is driven with reasonable care while being used for that purpose; and an express prohibition upon allowing any other person lo drive it whilst being used for that purpose is no more than a direction as to the mode in which the servant shall perform the duty. It is a prohibition dealing with conduct within the sphere of employment. In respect of a contention that the driver to whom the vehicle had been entrusted for driving had no authority from employer to delegate the driving ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... cepted by this Court. The law as laid down by Lord Denning in Young v. Edward Box and Co. Ltd., already referred to i.e. the first question is to see whether the servant is liable and if the answer is yes, the second question is to see whether the employer must shoulder the servant's liability, has been uniformally accepted as stated in Salmond Law of Torts. 15th Ed., p. 606 in Crown Proceedings Act, 1947 and approved by the House of Lords in Staveley Iron Chemical Co. Ltd. v. Jones [1956] A.C. 62? and I.CI. Ltd. v. Shatwell, [1965] A.C. 656 From the facts of Pushpabai's case (supra), it will appear that one Purshottam Udeshi was travelling in a car which was driven the Manager of the first respondent company. The car dashed against a tree resulting in the death of purshottam. The widow and children of purshottam filed a claim for compensation. The High Court held that the respondent-company could not be held vicariously liable for the act of their driver in taking Purshottam as a passenger as the said act was neither in the course of his employment nor under any authority whatsoever. Therefore, the respondent-company was not liable to pay any compensation. It was po ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... a motor vehicle in a public place, unless there is in force relation to the vehicle by that person, a policy of insurance complying with the requirements of Chapter VIII. In view of sub-section (2) of Section 94 (sub-section (2) of Section 146 of Motor Vehicles Act, 1988), the said provision is not applicable to any vehicle owned by the Central or State Government and used for government purposes. Sub-section (3) vests power in the appropriate Government to exempt from the operation of sub- section (1) of Section 94 any vehicle even owned by any local authority of any transport undertaking. Section 94 of the old Act as well as Section 146 of the new Act requires that a policy of insurance must provide insurance against any liability to third parties incurred by the person using the vehicle. But there is no such requirement so far the vehicles owned by the Central or State Government are concerned and if the exemptions are granted from operation of sub-section (1) of Section 94 it is not incumbent even on the part of any local authority or any State transport undertaking to take out insurance policy providing insurance against any liability to third parties incurred by the person us ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... t of compensation within certain limits, ignoring the principle of fault. When even under the law of tort, courts have held that the employer is vicariously liable for an authorised act done in an unauthorised manner taking into consideration the interest of the victims of the accident, according to us, this approach is all the more necessary while judging the liability of the owner of the vehicle under the Statutory provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act. So far the facts of the present case are concerned, the High Court has rightly come to the conclusion, on basis of the pleadings and evidence on record, that it was the year ending day i.e. 31.3.1980 and the clerks and officers were required to work during night time. This direction had been given by the appellant No. 2 who was incharge of the office. It further appears that after normal working hours of the office, the employees had gone to their homes and were required to come back after taking dinner. The jeep was used for bringing such employees to the office. In this background, there is no escape from conclusion that jeep was being used in connection with the affairs of the State and for official purpose. The High Court ha ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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