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TMI Blog1973 (12) TMI 4X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... court requiring the income-tax department to produce in court the records relating to the income-tax of M/s. Dagi Ram Pindi Lall for the years 1964-65 to 1971-72. The Income-tax Officer, district II (XI), New Delhi, sent a letter, dated November 1, 1972, to the court claiming that the said records relating to M/s. Dagi Ram Pindi Lall were privileged under section 137 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, in view of the decision of H.R. Khanna J. (as his Lordship then was) in Daulat Ram v. Som Nath. The Income-tax Officer, however, sent the records in a sealed cover through an inspector in compliance with the summons of the court. The plaintiff again applied for and obtained summons requiring the Income-tax Officer to produce the income-tax records relating to M/s. Horizon Industrial Products (P.) Ltd. and Bishamber Nath Kaul. By a letter, dated January 4, 1973, the Income-tax Officer, Companies' Circle VIII, New Delhi, claimed privilege under section 138 of the Income-tax Act, 1961. It was submitted in the letter that no disclosure of information regarding income-tax pertaining to income-tax assessees could be made, and that if any information was required the party should apply to the Com ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... at are involved in the questions referred to us, it is necessary to refer to the relevant provisions in the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, and the Income-tax Act, 1961 Sub-sections (1) and (2) of section 54 of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, provided as under: "54. Disclosure of information by a public servant.-(1) All particulars contained in any statement made, return furnished or accounts or documents produced under the provisions of this Act, or in any evidence given, or affidavit or deposition made, in the course of any proceedings under this Act other than proceedings under this Chapter, or in any record of any assessment proceeding, or any proceeding relating to the recovery of a demand, prepared for the purposes of this Act, shall be treated as confidential, and notwithstanding anything contained in the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), no court shall, save as provided in this Act, be entitled to require any public servant to produce before it any such return, accounts, documents or record or any part of any such record, or to give evidence before it in respect thereof. (2) If a public servant discloses any particulars contained in any such statement, return, accounts ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ntained in any statement made, return furnished or accounts or documents produced under the provisions of this Act, or in any evidence given, or affidavit or deposition made in the course of any proceedings under this Act, other than proceedings under Chapter XXII, or in any record of any assessment proceeding, or any proceeding relating to recovery of a demand, prepared for the purposes of this Act, shall be treated as confidential, and notwithstanding anything contained in the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), no court shall, save as provided in this Act, be entitled to require any public servant to produce before it any such return, accounts, documents or record or any part of any such record, or to give evidence before it in respect thereof. (2) No public servant shall disclose any particulars contained in any such statement, return, accounts, documents, evidence, affidavit, deposition or record. . . . ." "138. Disclosure of information respecting tax payable.-Where a person makes an application to the Commissioner in the prescribed form and pays the prescribed fee for information as to the amount of tax deter mined as payable by any assessee in respect of any assessmen ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... der." It has to be noted that by the changes so made, the declaration of the confidential nature of the documents, the prohibition against a court requiring any public servant to produce such documents or to give evidence before it in respect thereof, and the prohibition against a public servant making a disclosure of any particulars in the said documents, which were provided in section 137 have all been omitted. The scope of the provision in section 138 which came into force with effect from April 1, 1962, was enlarged by sub-section (1) of the substituted section 138. While under the previous section 138 a person could make an application for information as to the amount of tax determined as payable by an assessee, under sub-section (1) of the substituted section 138 a person could make an application for "any information" relating to any assessee. Also, while under the previous section 138, the Commissioner was to be satisfied that there were no circumstances justifying a refusal to furnish the information asked for, under sub-section (1) of the substituted section 138 he was to be satisfied that it was in the public interest to furnish the information asked for and his decisi ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the Board or any other income-tax authority specified by it by a general or special order in that behalf to furnish or cause to be furnished information relating to any assessee to such officer, authority or body as was mentioned in the clause. Coming now to the questions referred to the Full Bench, the first of them is as regards the position of law relating to privilege prior to April 1, 1964. As pointed out by Mr. B. N. Kirpal, learned counsel for the income-tax department, in dealing with the said question, the following situations or aspects require to be considered, viz.: (a) where the documents, records, etc., in respect of which privilege is claimed were filed by an assessee or a third party before April 1, 1962, with effect from which date the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, was repealed, in respect of assessment years up to and including the assessment year 1961-62 in proceedings for the said assessment years taking place under the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922; (b) where the documents, records, etc., were filed by an assessee or a third party after April 1, 1962, but before April 1, 1964, in respect of assessment years up to and including the assessment year 1961-62 in pr ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... by a person, only as to the amount of tax determined as payable by any assessee in respect of any assessment made on or after April 1, 1960, if he was satisfied that there were no circumstances justifying its refusal. The question then is whether the confidential nature of the aforesaid documents, records, etc., and the prohibition against their being required by a court to be produced or evidence thereof to be given as well as the liability of a public servant to be punished for disclosure of the particulars contained in the documents, records, etc, continued to subsist even after April 1, 1962, with effect from which date the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, had been repealed and the Income-tax Act, 1961, came into force. As regards the effect of repeal of an enactment, section 6(c) of the General Clauses Act, 1897, provides as under: "6. Where this Act, or any Central Act or regulation made after the commencement of this Act, repeals any enactment hitherto made or hereafter to be made, then, unless a different intention appears, the repeal shall not- ... (c) affect any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued or incurred under any enactment so repealed." As poi ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... id privilege could not be affected because of the repeal of section 54 of the Act of 1922, in view of the plain language of clause (c) of section 6 of the General Clauses Act." The learned judge also referred to and agreed with the view taken in S. V. Ramakrishna Mudaliar's case. In Tulsiram Sanganaria v. Smt. Annibai, Grover J. observed at page 672 that section 54 made it "obligatory" on the officials and other servants of the income-tax department to treat as confidential the records and documents mentioned in sub-sections (1) and (2) thereof. But a different view was taken by a Division Bench of the High Court of Madras (Veeraswami and Krishnaswamy Reddy JJ.), in the case of Ve. V. Sivagami Achi. The learned judges took the view that section 54 of the Income-tax Act, 1922, did not create any right, privilege, obligation or liability which could be properly regarded as having been acquired, accrued or incurred. The learned judges observed that the declaration in section 54 was not from the point of view of any particular individual, and such a declaration did not confer a right or impose an obligation on any specified person. They added that no particular person could by virtu ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... Sivagami Achi, we are unable to agree with their view. No doubt, the declaration in section 54 that the documents mentioned therein shall be treated as confidential was not from the point of view of any particular individual. But, in the context and on a plain reading of the section, it seems to us to be clear that the documents were required to be treated as confidential by every one concerned including the authorities before whom they were filed. The persons concerned and, particularly, the said authorities were thus placed under an obligation to treat the documents as confidential. Also, as pointed out by Venkataraman J. in S. V. Ramakrishna Mudaliar's case, the declaration of the confidential nature and the prohibition against disclosure were enacted in public interest to enable a full and true disclosure to be made by the assessee or a third party required to file documents or furnish information to the income-tax authority. The assessee or the third party could, therefore, insist that the documents filed or the information furnished by him should be regarded as confidential and the documents or information should not be disclosed. In that view, a right to resist the producti ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... y a holder in fee simple of lands granted by the Crown. Section 2 of the Act of 1884, under which the former Act was repealed, contained a proviso which read as under: "Provided always that notwithstanding such repeal- .. .... (b) all rights accrued and obligations incurred or imposed under or by virtue of any of the said repealed enactments shall subject to any express provisions of this Act in relation thereto remain unaffected by such repeal." It was contended on behalf of Abbott that although section 22 of the Act of 1861 was repealed and there was no corresponding provision in the Act of 1884, yet the saving proviso to section 2 of the Act of 1884 enabled him still to make an additional conditional purchase as if section 22 remained in force. The argument was that under the repealed enactment he had a right to make the additional conditional purchase, that it was a " right accrued " at the time Act of 1884 was passed, and that notwithstanding the repeal it remained unaffected by such repeal. Rejecting the said contention, the Privy Council observed at page 431 that the power to take advantage of an enactment may without impropriety be termed a "right", but "the mere right ( ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... quit, the tenant acquired a right to compensation for disturbance under section 11. The decision in Abbott's case was distinguished at page 428 as follows: "This is not like the case which was cited to us (Abbott's case ) in argument where the tenant's right depended upon some act of his own. Here, it depends upon the act of the landlord--namely, the giving of a notice to quit in view of a sale--in which event the section itself confers a right to compensation subject to the tenant complying with the conditions therein specified, and so far as it was possible to comply with them down to the time when the section was repealed he did in fact comply with them." Thus, as stated earlier, even if the declaration and the prohibition in section 54 are regarded as being general or abstract, as soon as the documents were filed by an assessee or a third party before the concerned officer the provisions in section 54 applied to them and the declaration and the prohibition ceased to be general or abstract and became concrete and specific, with the result that a right accrued to or was acquired by the assessee or the third party, and an obligation was incurred by the officer concerned in respe ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... est Bengal, on December 3, 1949. On an application by the decree-holder, the court which passed the decree transferred the decree to the court of the Additional District judge at Morena in the then State of Madhya Bharat for execution. The judgment--debtor resisted the execution on the ground that the transferee court had no jurisdiction to execute the decree as it was that of a foreign court and had been passed ex parte. The transferee court accepted that contention and dismissed the execution petition on December 29, 1950. On April 1, 1951, the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act (II of 1951) came into force, and as a result of that amendment the Indian Code of Civil Procedure was extended to the former State of Madhya Bharat as well as to various other places. Meanwhile, the decree-holders appealed against the order of the transferee court to the High Court of Madhya Pradesh which allowed the appeal. On further appeal by the judgment-debtor to the Supreme Court, the order of the transferee court was restored. The Supreme Court held that the transfer order by the Bankura court was without jurisdiction as on that date the Indian Code of Civil Procedure did not apply to the Mor ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... non-executability of the decree must, firstly, be a right and, secondly, it must be a right that had accrued from the provisions of the repealed law, and that it was difficult to consider the non-executability of the decree in Madhya Bharat as a vested right of the judgment-debtors. The learned judge pointed out that the non-executability in question pertained to the jurisdiction of certain courts and not to the right of the judgment-debtors, that the relevant provisions of the Civil Procedure Code in force in Madhya Bharat did not confer the right claimed by the judgment-debtors, that all that had happened in view of the extension of the Indian Code to the whole of India in 1951 was that the decrees which could have been executed only by courts in British India have been made executable in the whole of India, and that the change made was one relating to procedure and jurisdiction. It was further pointed out by the learned judge that before the Indian Civil Procedure Code was extended to Madhya Bharat, the decree in question could have been executed either against the person of the judgment-debtors if they had happened to come to British India or against any of their properties si ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ot merely procedural, and the section only required the court not to exercise the jurisdiction normally vested in it. It was just a restraint on the existing jurisdiction of the court. The learned counsel cannot, therefore, derive any assistance from the decision. We have already referred to the decisions in Hamilton Gell's case and Abbott's case and pointed out that the said decisions in fact support the view taken by us. The case of Ogden Industries Pvt. Ltd., referred to in the decision of the Supreme Court, is also in no way against the view taken by us. Section 5 of the English Workers' Compensation Act, 1958, provided for compensation at certain rates for personal injury suffered by an employee in the course of his employment. By an Amendment Act of 1965, the benefits payable to the dependants of a deceased worker were increased. After the said Amendment Act came into force, a worker suffered pulmonary oedema from which he died. His dependents claimed compensation under the Act of 1953. The question arose whether compensation should be paid under the increased rates introduced by the Amendment Act, or whether the rights of the dependants and the liabilities of the employer u ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... In our opinion, it is not a mere interest that he acquired or that has accrued to him. Even as explained by Salmond, an interest is merely an advantage to be enjoyed by the assessee, while a right is one which ought not to be taken away from him by others. Further, section 54, as explained earlier, imposed an obligation on the officer concerned before whom the documents are tiled by an assessee or a third party, and the obligation thus imposed creates a corresponding right in the assessee to resist the production and disclosure of the documents in contravention of the obligation. In this connection, the learned counsel referred to pages 7 and 8 of the New Jurisprudence by P. B. Mukharji where the learned author dealt with the concept of rights. It is, however, not necessary to consider the same at length in the view taken by us regarding the scope and effect of the provisions in section 54 of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922. The learned counsel also referred to the decision in Arbon v. Anderson, where it was observed by Goddard L.J. that the question as to when the breach of a duty imposed by statute confers a right of action on an individual depends upon the scope and language of ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the Income-tax Act, 1961. This aspect has been considered in some decisions. In O. P. Aggarwal, Income-tax Officer v. State, a Division Bench (S. B. Capoor and. J. S. Bedi JJ.) of the High Court of Punjab held at page 170 that : " "...... there is nothing in the Income-tax Act, 1961, which manifests an intention that the protection from and prohibition of disclosure of assessment records as afforded by section 54 would not be applicable to assessments which had been completed before the 1st day of April, 1962, which was the date on which the Income-tax Act, 1961, came into force." We are in respectful agreement with the view taken by the learned judges for the reason that there was in fact a clear indication in the Income-tax Act, 1961, that the legislature was careful to keep the protection from and prohibition of disclosure alive and subsisting with regard to assessments completed before April 1, 1962, as is apparent from the re-enactment of the provisions in sub-sections (1) and (2) of section 54 of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, in almost identical terms of sub-sections (1) and (2) of section 137 of the Income-tax Act, 1961. We may add that the same position obtains even ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ose any intention of the legislature to destroy the effect of section 54, and that by enacting section 137 in the new Act the legislature's clear intention was to preserve intact the object of section 54 of the old Act. This discussion also supports the view taken by us. In Chandrasekhara Mandian v. Income-tax Officer, K. Sadasivan J. held that the effect of section 54 of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 has been preserved, after its repeal, by section 6(c) of the General Clauses Act, 1897, and that the repealing Act did not disclose any intention of the legislature to destroy the effect of section 54 of the old Act. The learned judge added that, on the other hand, the intention, as was evident from the enactment of section 137 in the new Act, was to preserve intact the object of section 54 of the old Act. In that view, he held that certain returns relating to the years 1957 to March 31, 1964, filed before the Income-tax Officer by the plaintiff in a suit could not be summoned by the court in view of the protection under section 54 of the Indian Income-tax Act of 1922 and section 137 of the Income-tax Act, 1961. This decision also supports the view expressed by us. In P. Kandiah T ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... Court observed that section 297 was meant to provide as far as possible for all contingencies which may arise out of the repeal of the 1922 Act, and section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, would not apply because section 279(2) specifically evidenced an intention to the contrary. As observed by Ramaswami J. in Third Income-tax Officer, Mangalore v. M.Damodar Bhat, at page 813, the Supreme Court held in Kalawati Devi Harlalka's case that: "....... section 6 of the General Clases Act will not apply in respect of those matters where Parliament had clearly expressed its intention to the contrary by making detailed provisions for similar matters mentioned in that section." Again, in T. S. Baliah v. T. S. Rangachari, the same learned judge observed at page 794 that his observation quoted above was the ratio of the decision in Kalawati Devi Harlalka's case. It will thus be seen that the decision was based on the fact that the issuance of notices under section 33B fell within the specific provision in section 297(2)(a), and it was not concerned with the proposition under consideration by us, namely, whether the confidential nature of the documents, etc., filed in proceedings for asse ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... n nor privilege or right which could be properly regarded as having been incurred, acquired or having accrued and, therefore, section 6(c) of the General Clauses Act was not attracted to the omission of section 137. We have already indicated our disagreement with the said view of the learned judges. It is sufficient to note in the present context that so far as the existence of any contrary intention in section 138 is concerned, the view of the learned judges was that there was no such contrary intention. In Daulat Ram's case, H. R. Khanna J. referred with approval to the view taken by Venkataraman J. in S. V. Ramakrishna Mudaliar's case regarding sub-sections (1) and (2) of section 138 of the Act of 1961, and held at page 785 that even after the repeal of section 137, the legislation did not reveal an intention to destroy the privilege which had accrued in respect of documents filed at the time section 54 of the Act of 1922 was enforced. Similarly, in Raghubir Saran's case 8 R. L. Gulati J. observed at page 487 that: "The mere omission of a section does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that it was the intention of the legislature to do away with the rights and obligations ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... b-sections (1) and (2) of section 54 or under sub-sections (1) and (2) of section 137. Also, as pointed out by Venkataraman J. in S. V. Ramakrishna Mudaliar's case, with which H.R. Khanna J. agreed at pages 785 and 786 in Daulat Ram's case, the mere fact that the discretion was exclusively given to the Commissioner of Income-tax under sub-section (1) of section 138 does not necessarily mean an intention to destroy the rights and obligations already acquired, accrued or incurred. The provision in section 138(2) also shows only that when the Central Government issues a notification, there would be a prohibition in respect of the documents specified therein. Therefore, in the absence of a contrary intention in section 138, it has to be held that the aforesaid rights and obligations in respect of documents, records, etc., filed prior to April 1, 1962, continued to subsist even after April, 1964, by virtue of the provision in section 6(c) of the General Clauses Act. Mr. Watel contended that the, provisions in sections 54 and 137, particularly in so far as they related to the power of the court to summon the records of income-tax authorities pertaining to assessees/parties before the c ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the assessee or the party that filed the documents, has since been made subject to the power given to the Commissioner. Mr. Watel argued also that while under section 54 of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, there was an absolute ban against the court requiring the production of the documents, records, etc., or evidence thereof to be given, section 137(5) lifted the ban imposed by section 54 so far as voluntary disclosure by the assessee who filed the documents, and to that extent the jurisdiction of the court was restored. We do not think so. The provision in section 137(5) would no doubt apply to documents, records, etc., filed after April 1, 1962. But, so far as documents, records, etc., filed prior to April 1, 1962, which we are now considering in dealing with question 1(a) are concerned, the absolute prohibition in section 54 applies to them subject of course to the exceptions in section 54(3), and the right or obligation acquired, accrued or incurred cannot be said to have been destroyed by reason of the provision in section 137(5). In this connection, Mr. Watel referred to the decision in Income-tax Officer, Central Circle 1, Madras v. P. Ramaratnam, in which it was held by S ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... o the making of the application and not to the making of the assessment, that consequently a person could apply after April 1, 1960, under section 138(1)(b) for information even in respect of documents, records, etc., filed when section 54 was in force, that section 138(1)(b) thus implied an intention contrary to the provision in section 6(c) of the General Clauses Act, and so the said section 6(c) was not attracted, with the result that the prohibition in section 54 did not subsist in respect of documents filed when section 54 was in force, i.e., filed prior to April 1, 1962, and that a court could, therefore, require the production of the said documents, records, etc., or evidence thereof to be given. The contention cannot be accepted. In the first place, the words "on or after the 1st day of April, 1960", on a plain reading of the clause seem to refer to the making of the assessment rather than to the making of the application. Secondly, the provision in section 138(1)(b) was not introduced for the first time. The previous sections 59B, 138 and 138(1) also contained a similar provision though of a smaller ambit April 1, 1960, Was the date on which section 59B was added by amendm ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... bility of a public servant to punishment for disclosure of 'any particulars contained in such documents, etc., laid down in section 54(2) remained unaffected and continued to subsist notwithstanding the repeal of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, the enactment of the Income-tax Act, 1961, and the amendments of sections 137 and 138 on April 1, 1964, and April 1, 1967. Coming now to question 1(b) which relates to documents, records, etc., filed by an assessee or a third party after April 1, 1962, but before April 1, 1964, in respect of assessment years up to and including 1961-62 in proceedings for the said assessment years taking place under the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, it has to be noted that with effect from April 1, 1962, the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, had been repealed and the Income-tax Act, 1961, had come into force, and even though the documents, records, etc., were filed after April 1, 1962, they were filed in assessment proceedings taking place under the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922. Therefore, the provisions in sections 54 and 59B apply, and the position in law is the same as in the case of documents, records, etc., dealt with in question 1(a). As regards question 1( ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... 1962, but before April 1, 1964, in respect of assessment years up to and including assessment year 1961-62, in proceedings for the said assessment years taking place under the Income-tax Act, 1961, the declaration of their being of confidential nature and the prohibition against a court requiring any public servant to produce before it any such document, etc., or to give evidence before it in respect thereof laid down in section 137(1), and the prohibition against a public servant disclosing any particulars contained in any such documents, records, etc., laid down in section 137(2) remained unaffected and continued to subsist notwithstanding the omission of section 137 and the amendments of section 138 on April 1, 1964, and April 1, 1967. Coming next to question 1(d), it has to be noted that it relates to documents, records, etc., filed by an assessee or a third party after April 1, 1962, but before April 1, 1964, in respect of assessment years 1962-63 and 1963-64 in proceedings for the said assessment years taking place under the Income-tax Act, 1961. The position of law regarding the said documents, records, etc., is the same as in the case of documents, records, etc., dealt wi ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... and either section 138(1) and (2) as substituted by the Finance Act (No. 5 of 1964) or section 138(1)(a) and (b) and (2) as substituted by the Finance Act (No. 20 of 1967) was in operation. Therefore, section 138(1) and (2) as substituted by the Finance Act (No. 5 of 1964) or section 138(1)(a) and (b) and (2) as substituted by the Finance Act (No. 20 of 1967) applied according as the documents, records, etc., were filed between April 1, 1964, and April 1, 1967, or were filed after April 1, 1967. In either case, there was no longer any declaration of the confidential nature or a prohibition against the court or a prohibition against a public servant as in section 54 of the 1922 Act or section 137 of the 1961 Act. There were only the provisions in section 138(1) and (2) as substituted in 1964 or in section 138(1)(a) and (b) and (2) as substituted in 1967, which empowered the Commissioner under the former, and the Board also under the latter, to furnish or cause to be furnished information as provided in the said sections. The legal position in a case where documents were filed after April 1, 1964, has been considered in some decisions. In Nazir Mohammad's case, an application was f ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... icated that the legislature thought that it was no more necessary to keep the records of assessment by the income-tax department relating to an assessee as confidential, and the bar with regard to the production of any part of the assessment records was removed as far as the courts were concerned. With respect, we are unable to agree. It is true that a civil court has power under the general law for summoning documents or records relevant to the case before it. But, that power has to be subject to the provision in a special statute like the Income-tax Act. The Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, by section 54 thereof, declared such documents, records, etc., as confidential and prohibited a court from requiring the production of such documents, records etc., and from requiring evidence thereof to be given before it. It also made the disclosure of any particulars of any such documents, records, etc., by a public servant punishable with imprisonment and/or fine. Later, in 1960, the legislature, by adding section 59B, relaxed the provisions to a limited extent by empowering the Commissioner of Income-tax to furnish or cause to be furnished information only as to the amount of tax determined ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... lly open to the Commissioner on receiving the summons to consider whether the production/furnishing of the documents, records, etc., would be in the public interest, and submit the same to the court in answer to the summons. The above view seems to be correct and proper in view of two other considerations. When, by omitting section 137, the legislature has removed the confidential nature of the documents, records, etc., as well as the ban on a court and on a public servant, can the same be brought in a circuitous way under section 138(1)(b) ? In our opinion, it cannot be so done. Also, under section 138(1)(b), complete discretion has been given to the Commissioner of Income-tax to furnish or cause to be furnished the documents, records, etc., or any information therein in case he is satisfied that it is in the public interest so to do, and not to furnish in case he is not satisfied. Can that be set at naught by filing a suit and getting summons issued by the court for the production of the documents, records, etc., or for the furnishing of any information therein? If it can be so done, it would obviously frustrate the object of the provision in section 138(1)(b). Further, though t ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... nswer to question 2(b) is that when a party to a proceeding in a court applies for summoning any documents, records, etc., from the income-tax authorities, the court may summon the said documents, records, etc. But, on receipt of the summons, it is open to the Commissioner of Income-tax to consider the matter as provided under section 138(1)(b), and decide whether it would be in the public interest to produce or furnish the documents, records, etc., summoned for, and submit his view to the court in answer to the summons. In case, he is satisfied that the production, etc., would not be in the public interest, his decision is final and the court to which the said decision is communicated cannot question the same. As regards questions 2(c) and 2(d), the answers are the same as our answer to question 2(b). The third question referred to the Full Bench is: "What is the effect of the production of certified copies relating to income-tax assessment records, and how far certified copies can be admitted in evidence?" Mr. S. L. Bhatia, learned counsel for the plaintiff, sought to argue under the first part of the question that " if any party had obtained certified copies of his own docum ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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