TMI Blog1983 (4) TMI 294X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... td., Lathur. The petitioner states that it has capital investment in the industry to the tune of ₹ 19 lakhs, out of which the contribution by the partners is to the tune of ₹ 5,85,000/- and the rest of the capital is raised by the firm by taking loans from the Bank. 3. It is alleged that the reports were available to show that there is enough agricultural produce of raw material available for starting oil industry at Latur. It was stated that the climate is also very suitable in this part of the State, that is, Marathwada region, and this region, being backward has several disadvantages such as absence of skilled labour, lack of assured market and want of transport facilities. As the existing units in Lathur could not process the full arrival of the raw material, the petitioner states that they wanted to establish the said industry and conduct their business in this area. 4. It is stated that respondent No. 1 introduced a scheme named as Package Scheme of Incentives 1979 . This scheme is in continuation of the scheme earlier introduced by respondent No. 1 in 1964. The important grievance of the petitioner, as alleged in the petition, is that respondent No. 1 by i ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... te to the respondent on 18th of February, 1981. It is also stated that it has given the relevant details such as, possession of land, date of taking possession of the land, which is 31st July, 1980, and it has also obtained a no objection certificate on the same day. The petitioner has also obtained a provisional registration of small scale industry from the Director of Small Scale Industries on 19-4-1980. It is further stated that the registration of the petitioner has been made final on 17th May, 1982. The petitioner states that thereafter on 16th May, 1981, he obtained a sales tax registration certificate under the Central Sales Tax Act and further obtained a sales tax registration certificate under the Bombay Sales Tax Act on 29-5-1981. The petitioner states that thereafter a letter by respondent No. 2 came to be addressed to the General Manager, District Industries Centre, Osmanabad, calling upon him to send necessary papers to forward them to the Government. Then the petitioner has referred to a letter issued by the district Industries Centre, Osmanabad, dated 21-9-1981, wherein it is stated that there are about 63 oil mills in the district and the letter further mentions tha ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... 10th January, 1983, when the industry of the petitioner has already started its production. It is the case of the petitioner that he has submitted all documents necessary for the purpose of grant of eligibility certificate. However, respondents Nos. 1 and 2 have been in different and somehow or the other hostile to the petitioner and have not cared to process his application and have kept his application pending since January despite several reminders. 9. The petitioner further states that to his surprise, on 25th October, 1982, respondent No. 1 issued a letter by which respondent No. 1 asked all the General Managers of the District Industries Centres to scrutinise the proposals for setting upon the oil mills rigorously and directed them, especially by direction No. (3) that they should not issue the registration and eligibility certificate a matter of course unless they are satisfied that the conditions are fulfilled and there is scope for another oil mill in that area. Respondent No. 1 further directed that if it is revealed that there is no such scope, no registration should be made and in case of doubt, a reference be made to the Government with full data and for decision. T ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... s letter, the Government has declared its policy to encourage setting up to edible oil mills only on co-operative basis and that no new oil mills should be set up in the private sector unless and until a clearance certificate from respondent No. 3 is obtained. It is stated in this letter that in future the Regional Development Corporations and the General Managers of the District Industries Centre will refer the individual cases of oil mills pending with them and fresh applications for grant of final S.S.I. registration/eligibility certificate under the Package Scheme of incentives to the Corporation, that is, respondent No. 3, for getting clearance from it. By this letter, respondent No. 3 was directed to communicate its recommendations to the respective District Industries Centres/Regional Development Corporation after examining the case from the point of view of availability of raw material, market for oil and feasibility of installing additional capacity vis-a-vis existing capacity in the area. A copy of this letter was also endorsed to the respective Regional Development Corporations including Marathwada Development Corporations which is respondent No. 2 in this petition. We w ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e petitioner having completed all the initial, final and effective steps and commenced his production on 26th January, 1982 and obtained registration certificate on 17-3-1982, asking him now to bring again a no objection certificate is also an instance of mala fide. Then the petitioner, in one of the grounds, has specifically stated as follows :--- 3) That by imposing the new conditions by its letter dated 25-10-1982, respondent No. 1 is seeking to create hurdles and difficulties with a view to avoid granting of eligibility certificate under the unamended scheme. In this behalf, it i submitted that the petitioner has acted on the promise held out by respondent No. 1 in the unamended package scheme and further that the Petitioner had acted to its detriment by making large investments, by way of property, machinery, labour and raw materials. It is, therefore, submitted that the acts of respondent No. 1 amount to breach of its promise and that respondent No. 1 is barred by the principle of promissory estoppel from going back on its promise and committing a breach thereof. We have specially quoted this ground only to show that the whole basis of this petition is based on the a ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... does not create any right whatsoever in favour of the petitioner. It is stated that according to Clause 4.6 of the said scheme, no right or claim for any incentive under the scheme is deemed to have been conferred by the scheme merely by virtue of the fact that the unit has fulfilled on its part conditions of the scheme. The incentives under the scheme cannot be claimed as a matter of right unless the letter of intent/eligibility certificate has been issued under the scheme by the implementing agency concerned and the unit has complied with the stipulations/conditions of the letter of intent/eligibility certificate. The return further states that in view of this position, the condition raised in paragraph 2 of the petition is incorrect and it is stated that the petitioner is not entitled to any relief. 19. Then in paragraph 5 of the return, admitting the other contentions as being relating to the other respondents, it is further stated that apart from the sovereign function, the state Government is required to promote healthy industrial growth to the State and after the implementation of the, package scheme of 1979, the Government started receiving representations particularly ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... t, and returned them with the remarks that neither the Government was competent under the law to delegate its functions to it nor were they competent to process the applications. In the result, it appears that the directions issued by respondent No. 1 in letter dated 1st December, 1982 to respondent No. 3 to process the applications after scrutinising the various proposals given by units seems to have been frustrated by the very reply letter dated 30-12-1982 of respondent No. 3. Therefore, in the return the Government had to concede that the policy of procedure will be adopted after its revision in respect of disbursement of incentives to oil industry and that respondent No. 3 has no connection with the policy which was underlined in letter of respondent No. 1 dated 1-12-1982. 21. Then the return goes on to State that it was not the mala fide intention of the Government and the allegations in that behalf were denied by saying that the State had no intention to delay the issue of the eligibility certificate, but the bona fide intention was to ensure that the benefits are conferred on legitimate units. The return ends with paragraph 10 replying only 13 paragraphs of the petition. ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... y denied and the rejoinder also refers to certain defects in the affidavit filed by respondent No. 1 to which we will refer later. 25. In short, in rejoinder the petitioner has repeated his own grievance which is already stated in the petition. There is a further affidavit filed by the petitioner in reply to the affidavit of respondent No. 2. This is also by way of repeating his own grievance earlier stated and it is not necessary to set out the details of this affidavit. There is a formal affidavit on record replying tot he affidavit of respondent No. 3, which also need not be considered. 26. During the hearing of this petition, again respondent No. 2 filed an affidavit dated 28th March, 1983. In this affidavit, respondent No. 2 explained as to in what manner there was some delay in filing the documents by the petitioner' especially with regard to the filing of the extract of the production register, which was filed on 8th April, 1982. Respondent No. 2 in his affidavit says that the petitioner has filed the extract of the production register relating to dal mill and not relating to oil mill. It is stated in this affidavit by respondent No. 2 that extract of production re ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the foundation of the right claimed by the petitioner in this petition. 28. The scheme is called Dispersal of Industries-Package Scheme of Incentive.... and the Government of Maharashtra in Industries, Energy and Labour Department by its resolution dated 5th January, 1980, has introduced this scheme. The Preamble of the scheme is as follows :--- In order to achieve dispersal of industries outside the Bombay-Thana-Pune belt, Government has been giving, since 1964, to the industrial units coming up in the developing areas of the State, a package of incentives comprising mainly the refund of sales tax, relief in electricity tariff, octroi, etc. The scheme was reviewed by the Government from time to time and with effect from August 1, 1976, a package Scheme of Graded Incentives (hereinafter referred to as the 1976, Scheme ), was sanctioned by Government Resolution, Industries. Energy and Labour Department No. IDL 7076/6212(5)/IND. 8, dated the 18th January, 1977. The period of the 1976 Scheme expired on July 31, 1979... Government had under consideration the question of revising and integrating these schemes and making them more broad-based and effective so as to speed up ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... will be final and binding on the eligible unit. The last Clause 2.1(iii) is actually mentioned in the Scheme as 2.1(ii), but since the Counsel for the petitioner stated that it is (iii), we have taken it to be (iii). Clause 2.2, is not necessary for our purpose. Thereafter, there is Clause 2.3 under the heading Effective Steps , and it runs as under: 2.3. For the purposes of the 1979, Scheme, effective steps will comprise initial effective steps and final effective steps. Thereafter, there is recital as to which shall be the initial effective steps and which shall be the final effective steps, followed by some explanations. We have here to state that there now is another explanation which runs in the following terms :--- II. Based on the documentary evidence led by the eligible unit in this regard, the Implementing Agency shall determine the date on which all the effective steps, both initial and the final, are completed. The decision of the Implementing Agency in this regard shall be final and binding. Then the Scheme proceeds with Existing Unit , Explanation/Diversification , Fixed Assets , Gross Fixed Capital Investment , etc. and other explanations. Th ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ted is 10th January, 1983. Thereafter, Clause 4.6 provides as follows : 4.6. No right or claim for any incentive under this Scheme shall be deemed to have been conferred by the Scheme merely by virtue of the fact that the unit has fulfilled on its part the conditions of the Scheme. The incentives under the Scheme cannot be claimed unless the Letter of Intent/Eligibility Certificate has been issued under the Scheme by the Implementing Agency concerned and the unit has complied with the stipulations/conditions of the Letter of Intent/Eligibility Certificate. 30. Part 5 of the said Scheme details the benefits, which are available to the petitioner and other similarly situated persons, who follow the Scheme and fulfil the conditions of the Scheme. As the petitioner falls in Group D mentioned in Clause 5.3, the period of eligibility to have the benefits will be of nine years. We are not referring to the benefits given under the Scheme, because it is undisputed that the benefits are in the form of sales tax exemption, electricity tariff refund and interest-free loans, etc. It is not disputed that such benefits are available to the eligible unit under the scheme and, therefore, we ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... would be useful to refer to Halsbury's Laws of England, Fourth Edition, Volume 16, to have an authenticated definition of the principle of promissory estoppel. It is stated at page 1017 of the said Book as under in respect of the principle of promissory estoppel :--- 1514. Promissory estoppel. When on party has, by his words or conduct, made to the other a clear and unequivocal promise or assurance which was intended do affect the legal relations between them and to be acted on accordingly, then, once the other party has taken him at his word and acted on it, the one who gave the promise or assurance cannot afterwards be allowed to revert to heir previous legal relations as if no such promise or assurance had been made by him, but the must accept their legal relations subject to the qualification which he himself has so introduced. This doctrine, which is derived form a principle of equity enunciated in 1877, has been the subject of considerable recent development and is still expanding. It differs from estoppel in pais in that the representation relied upon need not be one of present fact. The doctrine cannot create any new cause of action where none existed before, ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ,471.73 np., but the Deputy Director in the office of the Textile Commissioner, Bombay, issued to the respondents an Import Entitlement Certificate for ₹ 1,99,459 only. The respondents under Article 226 of the Constitution moved a petition before the High Court of Punjab praying for a writ or an order directing the Union of India and other concerned officers to issue a licence permitting import of certain raw materials of value of ₹ 3,04,012.73 np. The High Court held that the respondents were entitled to the issue of licence as prayed for. In appeal by the Union of India and others to the Supreme Court , J.C., Shah, J., (as he then was), observed as follows (at page 726) :--- We hold that the claim of respondents is appropriately founded upon the equity which arises in their favour as a result of the representation made on behalf of the Union of India in the Export Promotion Scheme, and the action taken by the respondents acting upon that representation under the belief that the Government would carry out the representation made by it. On the facts proved in this case, no ground has been suggested before the Court for exempting the Government from the equity arisin ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... form may be enforced against it in appropriate cases in equity..... In this case, learned Counsel for the petitioner also faintly suggested that this case is also an authority to hold that the petitioner may not be restrained from substantiating his right to obtain the eligibility certificate and his right in equity can be granted by this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution, although there is no direct discussion on this point in both the judgment of the Supreme Court. 34. The third case which was relied upon by learned Counsel for the petitioner was (M/s. Motilal Pandampat Sugar Mills Co. Ltd. v. The State of Uttar Pradesh and others, . This was a judgment delivered by the Division Bench of the Supreme Court and in this case the Supreme Court has enunciated the principle of promissory estoppel. We will not burden this judgment with the detailed narration given by the Supreme Court. Suffice it to say that the doctrine of promissory estoppel has been completed elaborated by the Supreme Court and the scope of this doctrine has been made sufficiently wider. It is stated in this judgment and it was heavily relied upon the learned Counsel for the petitioner that doctrine ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... public interest in the Government (sic) and cannot hold it liable for carrying out the promise made by it to the citizen. If the public interest suffers or, is likely to suffer, by carrying out the promise, then the Court will have to decide which way the equity lies. However, it has also been observed by the Supreme Court that the Court would not act on the mere ipse dixit of the Government, for it is the Court which has to decide and not the Government whether the Government should be held exempt from liability. It is also stated that ex parte appraisement of the circumstances of the Government alone will not be a sufficient answer for the Court to hold Government exempt from the applicability of the principle promissory estoppel, that is to say, the Government is not the sole judge of its own case in repudiating the promise. The Government cannot claim to be exempt from the liability to carry out promise of some indefinite and undisclosed ground of necessity or expediency. 36. The enunciation of the principle of promissory estoppel made in these judgment has been again reviewed by the Supreme Court in its an other decision in (M/s. Jit Ram Shiv Kumar and others v. The State ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e justified in changing the terms of the agreement to the prejudice of the other party on special considerations such as difficult foreign exchange position or other matters which have a bearing on general interest of the State. 37. Then, in paragraph 40 of the said judgment, the Supreme Court has examined the case of Moti Lal Padampat Sugar Mills Co. (P) Ltd. cited (supra) and it is especially stated that in that case, the question as to when the doctrine of promissory estoppel would be attracted against the Government validly confirming what has been consistently stated by the Supreme Court with some qualifications. It is stated thus : ....there can be no promissory estoppel against the exercise of legislative power and the legislature cannot be precluded from exercising its legislative functions by resort to the doctrine of promissory estoppel... When the Government owes a duty to the public to act differently, promissory estoppel could not be invoked to prevent the Government from doing so. The doctrine cannot be invoked for preventing the Government from acting in discharge of its duty under the law. The Government would not be bound by the acts of its officers and age ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... that case. Learned Counsel for the petitioner heavily relied on this case, because in this case, large sums of money were invested relying on the assurance of the Government and benefits under the scheme were also given in 1977. It was represented that doctrine of promissory estoppel is applicable and, therefore the Government was directed not to apply certain resolutions, which were passed in the year 1979. Learned Counsel for the petitioner, relying on all these cases, contended, bearing the observations of the Supreme Court and to the Gujarat High Court, in mind that in the present case also the petitioner stands in the similar position, like the one, which is disclosed by the judgments, which are cited above. In our opinion, after having gone carefully through all the judgments, including the judgment of the Supreme Court in Jit Ram's case, it is not possible to hold that these cases have gone into the particular provisions of the particular schemes as were challenged before the courts and which were considered by the courts. Even the latest authority of the Gujarat High Court, which was cited by learned Counsel for the petitioner, does not describe the actual terms of the ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... hat the U.P. Finance Corporation being convinced by the clear and categorical assurance given by the 4th respondent that the Vanaspati factory of the appellant would be entitled to exemption from sales tax for a period of three years from the date of commencement of production, had sanctioned financial assistance to the appellant and the appellant was going ahead with the project in full speed to enable it to start production at the earliest. It is against this background that this principle came to be enunciated by the Supreme Court and it is borne out by the facts in this case appearing in paragraph 3 where there is a specific reference to the fact that the 4th respondent by his letter, on behalf of the State Government, gave an assurance that the appellant would be exempt from liability of payment of sales tax for a period of three years. It is relying on this specific assurance given by a responsible officer of the State Government, the Supreme Court has observed in that case that the basis of the doctrine of promissory estoppel is the interposition of equity and equity has always, true to form, stepped in to mitigate the rigours of strict law. It is against this background tha ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... is Court in a decision (Excise Commr. U.P. Allahabad v. Ram Kumar, , after examining the case-law on the subject observed that 'it is now well settled by a catena of decisions that there can be no question of estoppel against the Govt. in exercise of its legislative, sovereign or executive powers'. The earlier decisions of this Court in N. Ramanatha Pillai v. State of Kerala, ..... A.I.R. 1973 S.C. 2V41, and (State of Kerala v. Gwalior Rayon Silk Manufacturing (Wvg.) Co. Ltd.,.... were followed. It may, therefore, be stated that the view of this Court has been that the principle of estoppel is not available against the Government in exercise of legislative, sovereign or executive power. 42. Then the learned Government Pleader relied on the judgement of the Supreme Court in Excise Commissioner, U.P. Allahabad, etc. etc. v. Ram Kumar etc. etc., . It is true that all these cases have been formerly referred to by us in this judgement. However, a reference would be necessary to the observations of the Supreme Court made in this judgment at Head Note B on page 2237. The Supreme Court observed :--- It is now well settled that there can be no question of estoppel against th ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... of the scheme referred to in 1968 S.C. 718. In our opinion, the provisions of the scheme considered in A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 718 are jumble of provisions and they are of legislative character and they are not of executive character. They contained such unequivocal assurances which can be even enforceable on the ground of violation of Constitution if not adhered to and this fact has been also stated in the judgment. In view of the absence of the particulars of the schemes, which were discussed in the various judgments, cited before us, we have no alternative but to look at the provisions of the scheme under consideration and to interpret them in this particular case. 44. In this connection learned Counsel for the petitioner, first of all relied on the provisions of the scheme as a whole stating that the definition clause appearing at Clause II itself gives a right to the petitioner to claim the eligibility certificate, if he produced the kind of evidence mentioned in Clause 2.1 of the scheme. He also relied on Clause 1.2 stating that the scheme is to remain in force till March 31, 1983 and he has completed all the initial, final and effective steps under the scheme before that date. I ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ow that the petitioner has completed all initial and final steps under the scheme and nothing remains to be done by the petitioner in order to be entitled to the issue of the eligibility certificate. However, respondent No. 1 has further created an obstacle in the way of the Petitioner and that obstacle is in the form of the letter dated 25-10-1982, as we have shown earlier, which contains direction to respondent No. 3 and demands further clearance certificate from respondent No. 3 and learned Counsel for the petitioner contended that in view of the clear reply of respondent No. 3 in this case that the said Corporation is unable to process the application received by it, now, the Government's stand that clearance certificate at the hands of respondent No. 3 is necessary may amount to dishonesty and hostility to the petitioner. Therefore, in view of this clear position that respondent No. 3 is unable to process the application of the petitioner, the Government's insistence still on the further scrutiny of the petitioner's application is highly objectionable and relying in this letter, learned Counsel for the petitioner contended that the petitioner has got every right to ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... de by the State and having further acted thereon cannot now be defeated to their hopes which have crystallised into rights, thanks to the application of the doctrine of promissory estoppel. Therefore, it is not open to the State, according to the law laid down by this Court, to back-track. We, therefore, direct the State to implement EX. P-1, and confer such rights and benefits as are promised thereunder in entirety..... Relying on these observations, it was contended that it would be inequitable and almost contrary to the said judgment of the Supreme Court if the petitioner is not given the relief claimed by him in this petition. 45. It is true that the judgment of the Supreme Court was dealing with the transfer of the departmental employees to another department, which was created under a scheme sponsored by the Government and it contained certain promises. In that particular case the departmental employees on the basis of the promises contained in the scheme had actually gone to the other department and the Supreme Court rightly held that in view of the law which was laid down by the Supreme Court, and we suppose the law relating to promissory estoppel which we have earli ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... 2.2 Chapter II of the said rules must be taken to mean that if the unit has completed all the stipulated requirements and has gone in production, the authority under the scheme is bound of follow the scheme and give the eligibility certificate forthwith. It was also contended by him that the word 'may' must be interpreted as 'shall' and the implementing agency, instead of 'may', must be taken to be under an obligation that it 'shall' grant the eligibility certificate on fulfilment of all the requirements. And, for this purpose, learned Counsel for the petitioner relied on the judgment of the Privy Counsel, cited (supra), and especially on the observations made by the learned Lords of the Privy Council at page 144, which are as follows :--- ...When a capacity or power is given to a public authority, there may be circumstances which couple with the power a duty to exercise it. To use the language of Lord Cairns in the case of Julius v. The Bishop of Oxford, 5 A.C. 214-49... 'There may be something in the nature of the thing empowered to be done, something in the object for which it is to be done, something in the conditions under which it i ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... r claim for any incentives under this scheme shall be deemed to have been conferred by the scheme merely by virtue of the fact that the unit has fulfilled on its part the conditions of the scheme. He further contended that the incentives under the scheme cannot be claimed unless the letter of intent/eligibility certificate has been issued under the scheme by the implementing agency concerned and the unit has complied with the stipulations/conditions of the letter of intend/eligibility certificate. Now, in order to interpret the provisions of this scheme it cannot be said that we have any assistance from any other authority and, therefore, we have to interpret this scheme unaided by any precedent. This is a scheme, which is unique in its nature, in the sense that it is a unilateral declaration under which certain assurances were given by the Government. The word 'scheme' which is used will have to be understood in this background. The title of the said scheme is Package Scheme of Incentives . The word 'package' means Bundle of things packed, parcel; box etc. in which goods are packed... (The Concise Oxford Dictionary, Sixth Edn. 790). In the context of this scheme ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... provisions of Clauses 4.5 and 4.6. The provisions contained under this heading application for eligibility beginning from Clauses 4.4 to 4.6 will have to be read as a whole. Intention of the scheme will have to be understood not in isolation of these provisions, but by uniting these three provisions together. As we have shown above, the very concept of the scheme is that there is a unified concept throughout the scheme. If such a concept is present throughout, it is not possible to construe the provisions as done by learned Counsel as being in existence. If this concept is taken into consideration, it is not possible to separate Clauses 4.4 and 4.5 from Clause 4.6. Therefore, the contention advanced by learned Counsel for the petitioner that he is claiming only eligibility under Clause 4.5 and not claiming any benefits under Clause 4.6 and what is denied to him is only the claim for eligibility under Clause 4.5 is not acceptable to us and , therefore, we reject the same. 48. Immediately then, we go to the interpretation of Clause 4.6. This is a clause which introduced a fiction. The clause says that no right or claim for any incentives under this scheme shall be deemed to hav ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... right or claim will be conferred on any unit even if such a right came into existence. Even if a right is accrued, the import of the words seems to be that fulfilling of the conditions will not entitle the unit to claim any right whatsoever including the right to claim the incentive or any claim for incentive. If these words are taken to mean as has been held by us, then it is clear that the fiction as introduced by Clause 4.6 introduced only with a purpose that no such existence or accrual of a right to any person is contemplated and this is indicated by the clear words in the scheme in this case. In view of this clear position, though learned Counsel for the petitioner, contended that all the things, which are required to be under the scheme, have been fulfilled by him, we are unable to grant any assistance on the basis of the principle of promissory estoppel, which was pressed before us. We have also carefully considered all the authorities cited before us. We are not to burden this case for the simple reason that the principle of promissory estoppel invoked by the petitioner is not in dispute. Assuming that the principle of promissory estoppel is attracted and available to the ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... date is to be done by the implementing agency is indicative of the fact that the power vested in the implementing agency is given by the terms of the scheme, which it has to follow in all the cases. The power which is given by the terms of the scheme cannot be said to be exercised depending on the facts of each case, but it is unilateral power. If the implementing agency is to act differently in respect of different units, this will lead to a very anomalous situation, in that, there will be several units, which units will be able to satisfy the requirements at a particular date or different dates, which cannot be said to be the intention at all. The very fact that the implementing agency is to determine the date is applicable to all units and in view of this uniformity, which is apparent from Clause 2.3. Explanation II, we find it difficult to accept the submission that the implementing agency has no power to alter the date or to determine the date, which are given by the concerned (sic) while fulfilling their steps. 50. Then, there is another reason which also supports our view. In the definitions, in Clause 2.1(iii), although it is described as (ii), it is stated that the deci ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... id to be conditioned by the provisions of the scheme and, therefore, it is not possible to say that the moment a unit fulfils certain requirements, the eligibility certificate must be issued. This will lead to a very anomalous situation, in that, the scheme will be nothing but a slot machine, out of which, once a unit completes its final and effective steps, a certificate in the form of an eligibility certificate will come forth for that unit. 52. There is another reason, which is to be taken into consideration while interpreting Clause 4.6. The beginning of this cause is no right or claim for any incentive . The words no right or claim for any incentive are used. Word 'no' is an adjective here. It means not any. If we read this clause in this fashion, it will mean that not any right or claim shall be deemed to have been conferred. In view of this strong negative adjective 'no' used in this scheme, it is not possible to construe the clear words of this clause to mean to accrue any right in the petitioner, which can be enforced in a Court of law. It is true that we are interpreting this scheme. We may repeat that the scheme is an elastic word. It is a very flex ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... f this eligibility certificate and entitlement certificate. At Rule 2.5 of the rules, we find that prior to the grant of an eligibility certificate under the 1979 scheme, the eligible unit has to execute an agreement to the satisfaction of the implementing agency which may be deemed necessary covering the covenants, conditions, stipulations, and in conformity with the requirements of the 1979 scheme. From the above provisions, it appears that the implementing agency is yet to function till it grants eligibility certificate after scrutinising various documents and after satisfying itself that the unit has competed not only the initial and final steps under the heading effective steps but has also performed all the formalities and conditions, such as production of documents as provided by Clause 2.5 of the rules. In view of these provisions of the scheme, it is not possible for us to accept the contention advanced by learned Counsel for the petitioner that a legal right arises in favour of the petitioner the moment he completes the initial and final steps under the scheme. 55. As we have reached the conclusion that no right arises in favour of the petitioner, we have not thought ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... tion to bring a certificate on the petitioner unit, it should be held that the said letter had denied the petitioner a claim to get the eligibility certificate and therefore, there is violation of Article 19(1)(g). We may immediately refer to (C.K. Chutan v. The State of Kerala and others, . The case deals with a permission to be given to a contractor. The contractor, who was milk supplier to the Government, had been supplying milk for twenty years and after twenty years, he claimed a renewal of that contract. The Supreme Court, while considering the case has, while disposing of both the arguments under Articles 19 and 14 which were raised before it said :--- ....The breach of the contract, if any, may entitle the person aggrieved to sue for damages or in appropriate cases, even specific performance, but he cannot complain that there has been a deprivation of the right to practise any profession or to carry on any occupation, trade or business, such as in contemplated by Article 19(1)(g).... It was also said in that case that if more than two persons or units apply for certificate such as been in this case and certain units are granted the certificate, there cannot be said ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ce when it cannot be said that the Government is acting under any law. Article 14 also protects the citizens from discrimination. In a case like this where certain units are granted entitlement certificate relying on the general representations contained in a scheme, it would be impossible to contend that because certain other units are denied those certificates, a discrimination within the meaning of Article 14 arises. The facts, which are required to be proved for basing a case under Article 14 are necessary to be first set out in the petition. Except the fact that certain units have been granted the certificate and in the same region they have been granted the eligibility certificate, no other facts are brought out to make out a case of arbitrary action on the part of the Government so as to attract it under Article 14. Article 14 commands the State not to act discriminatory and it is not an Article which confers any right on citizens like Article 19. Having regard to these facts, it cannot be said that the action of the Government can be challenged on the ground that it is violative of Article 14. Proceedings of a writ petition are summary proceedings and unless the factual bas ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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