TMI Blog1992 (8) TMI 290X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... , 6 a rule of Court but set aside the award in respect of items Nos. 2 and 5. The rejection of the claim under items Nos. 3 and 7 was not challenged before him. On item 8, he held that the arbitrators could not have awarded future interest upto the date of payment of the amounts awarded. The contractors filed an appeal before the Division Bench and the State preferred a memorandum of cross-objections. Both the appeal and the cross-objections were dismissed by the Division Bench. Hence the present two appeals. 3. The contractors are aggrieved by the High Court's order on three of the claims made by them: Amount Item Subject Claimed Awarded NO. ₹ 1,26,376.62 Dewatering of piers, by more than one pump payment Interest on the total amount of ₹ 1,26,376.62 9% p.a. 6% p.a. from date (6.12.68) of claim reference remaining unpaid at to date of payment or decree, whichever is earlier. 2 Rs.2,39,204.67 Refund of Toll Tax 5 Rs.2,49,595.39 ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ch of the Court in Secretary, Irrigation Department of Orissa v. G.C. Roy (1991) 6 J.T. 349. Though the said decision deals with the power of the Arbitrator to award interest pendente lite, the principle of the decision makes it clear that the arbitrator is competent to award interest for the period commencing with the date of award to the date of decree or date of realisation, whichever is earlier. This is also quite logical for, while award of interest, for the period prior to a arbitrator entering upon the reference is a matter of substantive law, the grant of interest for the post-award period is a matter of procedure. Section 34 of Code of Civil Procedure provides both for awarding of interest pendente lite as well as for the post-decree period and the principle of Section 34 has been held applicable to proceedings before the arbitrator, though the section as such may not apply. In this connection, the decision in Union of India v. Banoo Steel Furniture (P) Ltd. may be seen as also the decision in Gujarat Water Supply and Sewage Board v. Unique erectors which upholds the said power though on a somewhat different reasoning. We, therefore, think that the award on item No.8 shoul ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... he award recited the contract between the parties and referred in terms to certain conditions of the contract namely Clauses 26, 30 and 32; though these clauses are not set out in full, they must, I think, be taken to be incorporated. which represent a line of approach which has been specifically deviated from by our Courts. 10. In our opinion, there is great force in the contentions urged by learned Counsel. The High Court has set aside the award on the above items on the ground that there is an error apparent on the face of the award. This is clearly incorrect. The award is a non-speaking one and contains no reasoning which can be declared to be faulty. The scope of the Court's jurisdiction in interfering with non-speaking award on the above ground is extremely limited. The rule of limitation in this respect was enunciated by the Judicial Committee almost seven decades ago in Champsey Bhara and Co. v. Jivraj Balloo Spinning and Weaving Co. Ltd. L.R. 1922-50 I.A. 324, in words which have been consistently and uniformly followed and applied in all subsequent decisions. Lord Dunedin said, after noting with disapproval certain attempts to extend the area of the court's ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... urt interfere. 12. In going further and proceeding to consider the terms of the contract and their interpretation, the High Court was influenced by the decision in Absalom Ltd. v. Great Western (London) Garden Village Society Ltd. (1933) A.C. 592. The ratio of this decision has been discussed and explained by the Court of Appeal in Glacoma Costa Fu Andrea v. British Italian Trading Co. Ltd. (1962) 2 A.E.R. 53 and more recently by this Court (in a decision to which one of us was a party) in Sudarsan Trading Co. v. Govt. of Kerala . That decision, therefore, could not have been taken aid of to fault the award. 13. There is, however, apart from the existence of an error apparent on the face of the award , another angle from which a non-speaking award can be considered by the Court and, if necessary, interfered with. This ground for impeaching a non-speaking award and its limitations have been explained by this Court in the Sudarsan Trading Co, case earlier referred to. Sabyasachi Mukherjee J. (at p. 685 of [1989] 1 S.C.R.) enunciated the rule and its limitation thus: An award may be remitted or set aside on the ground that the arbitrator in making it, had exceeded his jurisd ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... when, actually, what they were embarking upon was in interpretation of the contract and a criticism of the arbitrator's approach thereto. It is clear that this is what has happened in the present case also. We have already mentioned that the High Court has not rested its decision on any question of the arbitrator having exceeded his jurisdiction or travelled beyond the contract; it has clearly held it to be a case of error apparent on the face of the award . In our view, the case cannot be brought within the scope of the excess of jurisdiction rule either. 14. We would like to add that we have also heard arguments on the scope of the relevant clauses of the contract. It seems to us that the clauses are not so clear or unambiguous as to warrant an inference that the interpretation placed on them by the arbitrators is totally unsustainable. C1ause 19 does not, as the High Court has said, seem to prohibit the use of more than one pump for dewatering the well. It permits the pneumatic sinking of well in addition to sinking of wells by dredging methods and we are not aware whether any dewatering would have been necessary in this process. This is purely a technical matter and w ..... 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