TMI Blog2010 (10) TMI 1160X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ter 31.10.1988 as pointed out by learned senior counsel for the respondents, the declarants cannot avail the said benefit since even, according to them, they were not in possession as on 31.10.1988. The benefit of G.O. Ms. No. 733 may be available if the declarants were in possession and up to 31.10.1988 and possession was taken by the Government subsequent thereto. As rightly observed by the High Court, G.O. Ms. No. 217 cannot be interpreted as entitling the declarants to claim benefit of exemption even in cases where they were not in possession as on 31.10.1988. The same was handed over to the Mandal Revenue Officer, Sherlingampally, even prior to that, the said land was allotted to Hyderabad Urban Development Authority vide G.O. Ms. No. 5013 dated 19.12.1980. Admittedly, the said Government Order was not challenged by the appellants. In those circumstances, the appellants cannot be allowed to take the benefit of G.O. Ms. No. 733 since this is not merely a case where the appellants were dispossessed but the property was transferred initially in favour of Hyderabad Urban Development Authority and later to APIIC for utilizing the same to set up IT Park Project. We are satisfied tha ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... and Regulation) Act, 1976 (hereinafter referred to as `the ULC Act') came into force on 17.02.1976. The owners, through their GPA, filed declarations under Section 6(1) of the ULC Act under a mistaken impression that the ULC Act was applicable to their land, though the same was inapplicable for the reason that the land in question was agricultural land and the same was not included in the Master Plan as on the date of commencement of the ULC Act. On 01.07.1977, draft statements under Section 8(1) of the ULC Act together with notice under Section 8(3) were served inviting objections to the draft statement prepared under Section 8(1) of the ULC Act but no orders were passed on any of the declarations. On 06.12.1979 25.01.1980, final statements under Section 9 were issued declaring the surplus area by each of the declarant. On 16.09.1980 30.01.1980, the Competent Authority issued notification under Section 10(1) of the ULC Act. (b) By G.O. Ms. No. 391 MA, dated 23.06.1980, the Master Plan as on 17.02.1976 was amended and the land in Survey No. 83 was included in the Second Master Plan which came into force w.e.f. 29.09.1980 vide Government Memo No. 1439-UC.I/80-2, dated 10. ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... 12.1996 in which this Court issued notice and ordered status quo regarding possession be maintained. On 06.11.2001, a three Judge Bench of this Court disposed of all the appeals, i.e. State of Andhra Pradesh and Ors.v. N. Audikesava Reddy and Ors. reported in (2002) 1 SCC 227. In view of the law declared by this Court, the Competent Authority is now statutorily bound to compute the land afresh, in accordance with the provisions of the Act and in the light of the law declared in Audikesava Reddy's case (supra). (f) The State Government, in exercise of its powers under Section 23 of the ULC Act, issued G.O. Ms. Nos. 455 and 456 dated 29.07.2002 and decided to allot the excess land to third parties who were in occupation of such excess land on payment of prescribed regularization charges and as per the conditions set out in the said G. Os. On 28.11.2003, by way of a representation, the owners requested the Competent Authority to compute the holdings afresh in terms of the law declared by this Court in Audikesava Reddy's case (supra). The owners also stated in their representations that they themselves would like to retain the excess land in their occupation by paying the re ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... venue (UC II) Department, dated 13.02.2006 and other proceedings and prayed for quashing of the same with a direction to the official respondents to consider their claim for grant of exemption under various Government Orders, namely, G.O. Ms. No. 733 Revenue (UC II) Department dated 31.10.1988 as clarified in G.O. Ms. No. 217 Revenue (UC II) Department dated 18.04.2000, G.O. Ms. No. 455 Revenue (UC I) Department dated 29.07.2002 and G.O. Ms. No. 456 Revenue (UC I) Department, dated 29.07.2002. The High Court, by a common judgment and final order dated 17.01.2007, dismissed all the writ petitions filed by the appellants herein. Against the common order, the appellants have preferred these appeals by way of special leave petitions before this Court. 3. Heard Mr. K. Rajendra Chowdhary, learned senior counsel for the appellants in all the appeals, Mr. L. Nageshwar Rao, learned senior counsel for the State of Andhra Pradesh, Mr. G.E. Vahanvati, learned Attorney General for India, Mr. Rakesh Dwivedi, and Mr. Ranjit Kumar, learned senior counsel for Andhra Pradesh Industrial Infrastructure Corporation (APIIC) R-4 and Mr. A.K. Ganguly, Mr. P.S. Patwalia and Mr. Basavaprabhu S. Patil, le ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... culture. Explanation.-For the purpose of this clause and Clause (q),- (A) agriculture includes horticulture, but does not include- (i) raising of grass, (ii) dairy farming, (iii) poultry farming, (iv) breeding of live-stock, and (v) such cultivation, or the growing of such plant, as may be prescribed; (B) land shall not be deemed to be used mainly for the purpose of agriculture, if such land is not entered in the revenue or land records before the appointed day as for the purpose of agriculture: Provided that where on any land which is entered in the revenue or land records before the appointed day as for the purpose of agriculture, there is a building which is not in the nature of a farm-house, then, so much of the extent of such land as is occupied by the building shall not be deemed to be used mainly for the purpose of agriculture: Provided further that if any question arises whether any building is in the nature of a farm-house, such question shall be referred to the State Government and the decision of the State Government thereon shall be final; (C) notwithstanding anything contained in Clause (B) of this Explanation, land shall not be deeme ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... nt-State in those writ petitions was that the land in Survey No. 83 was not agricultural land since the same was within the urban agglomeration, the land has to be treated as Vacant Land and therefore the ULC Act is applicable with effect from 17.02.1976, even if the said land is not included in the Master Plan existing as on 17.02.1976. 7. The appellants in their earlier writ petitions, i.e. W.P. No. 18385 of 1993 and 238 of 1994 specifically averred and contended that the land in the said Survey No. 83 was mainly used for the purpose of agriculture . By order dated 27.07.1994 and 06.10.1994 in those writ petitions, learned Single Judge recorded that the land in Survey No. 83 was agricultural land . The Division Bench in Writ Appeal No. 918 of 1994 confirmed the finding of the learned single Judge that the land was mainly used for the purpose of agriculture. After quoting conclusion of the Division Bench in W.A. No. 918 of 1994, it was contended that there were concurrent findings on the question whether the land in Survey No. 83 was agricultural land as the same was mainly used for agriculture and the owners filed declarations under misconception. Mr. Rajendra Chowdhary, ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the ULC Act. In support of the above claim, learned Attorney General and other senior counsel relied on various judgments to show that once the decision of the High Court is set aside by this Court, it is not open to contend that a particular aspect or argument was not considered by this Court. Atia Begum's case 9. Before considering the ultimate order and the ratio laid down in Audikesava Reddy's case (supra), we will briefly notice the facts of Atia Begum's case (supra) and the question involved therein. In that case the question was regarding the quantification of vacant land. The Competent Authority had declared that the appellant had 19,813.83 sq m of vacant land in Aligarh in excess of the ceiling limit but the District Judge reduced the area of the excess land to 6738.23 sq m. The order of the District Judge was challenged by both i.e. the owner and the State by filing writ petitions in the High Court. The owner's writ petition was dismissed and that of the State was partly allowed. In appeal before this Court, the owner sought restoration of the order of the District Judge which had been set aside by the High Court on the interpretation of the provi ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... become vacant land by any reason whatsoever, the date on which such land becomes vacant land; (iii) where any notification has been issued under Clause (n) of Section 2 in respect of any area in a State in which this Act is in force, the date of publication of such notification. Audikesava Reddy's case 10. Now, we have to see the entire discussion and ultimate order passed in Audikesava Reddy's case (supra). A bench of three Hon'ble Judges in Audikesava Reddy's case after narrating the factual position in Atia Begum's case (supra) and after analyzing the issues, allowed those appeals. Since the entire argument rests with the ultimate decision in Audikesava Reddy's case, it is but proper to refer all the relevant paragraphs. 11. If the expression commencement of the Act is read with reference to the aforesaid Explanation, the area of doubt about the correctness of the decision of Atia Begum case becomes very narrow e.g. a few observations therein which are these: (SCC p.549, para 4) Just as the holder of the land cannot by his subsequent actions reduce the area of the vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit, the authorities too cannot by ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... d 16 from time to time as and when land acquires the character of a vacant land. Obligation to file statement under the Act arises when a person comes to hold any vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit, which date necessarily may not be 17-2-1976. It would all depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. 14. Accordingly, we hold that the master plan prepared as per law in force even subsequent to enforcement of the Act is to be taken into consideration to determine whether a particular piece of land is vacant land or not and, to this extent, Atia Begum is not correctly decided. 15. In these matters, however, we are not concerned with the question as to the consequences of filing of a statement by a person under a wrong impression that the vacant land held by him is in excess of ceiling limit if it was not so when he filed a statement. This aspect is left open to be decided in an appropriate case. 16. Before concluding, we wish to place on record our deep appreciation for the able assistance rendered by Mr. Raju Ramachandran, Senior Advocate, who on our request very readily agreed to assist the Court as amicus curiae. 17. For the aforesaid reasons, CAs Nos. 38 ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ent jurisdiction is in essence a part of the rule of law on which the administration of justice, so much emphasised by the Constitution, is founded and a judgment of the High Court under Article 226 passed after a hearing on the merits must bind the parties till set aside in appeal as provided by the Constitution and cannot be permitted to be circumvented by a petition under Article 32. An attempted change in the form of the petition or the grounds cannot be allowed to defeat the plea as was observed at SCR p. 595 of the reported judgment, thus: (SCR p. 595) We are satisfied that a change in the form of attack against the impugned statute would make no difference to the true legal position that the writ petition in the High Court and the present writ petition are directed against the same statute and the grounds raised by the petitioner in that behalf are substantially the same. The decision in Forward Construction Co. v. Prabhat Mandal (Regd.), Andheri, further clarified the position by holding that an adjudication is conclusive and final not only as to the actual matter determined but as to every other matter which the parties might and ought to have litigated and have had ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... d deliberately and consciously hence, binding upon them. He also submitted that the judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court in the earlier round of litigation being judgment dated 04.12.1996 delivered in Writ Appeal No. 918 of 1994 had merged into the judgment of this Court in Audikesava Reddy's case (supra) hence, reliance could not be placed by the appellants herein on any observations made or finding returned therein. He also submitted that in view of the judgment of this Court in Audikesava Reddy's case (supra) which was a judgment inter partes, it was no longer open to the appellants to seek re-computation of land holdings with reference to the date of extension of the Master Plan to the lands in issue. 16. The submissions made by the appellants about the decision of this Court in Audikesava Reddy's case (supra) are mis-conceived in law and were rightly rejected by the Division Bench in the impugned judgment. It was highlighted that on the basis of the declaration made under the ULC Act, the erstwhile owners of the land in issue had got released from the authorities an area of 99.17 acres of land that had been declared as excess land under the Land Refo ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... G.O. Ms. No. 5013 dated 19.12.1980. By notification dated 24.01.1981 issued under Section 10(3) of the ULC Act, the surplus land would be deemed to have been acquired by the State Government and the same shall vest absolutely in the State Government free from all encumbrances. On 21.02.1981, the application for exemption was filed under Section 20 of the ULC Act by GPA holder of declarants and Chanakyapuri Cooperative Housing Society which was rejected by the State Government. By notice dated 26.02.1981 issued under Section 10(5) of the ULC Act, the Competent Authority asked the declarants to vacate and deliver possession of the land. Application for release of land admeasuring 99.17 acres declared as excess land under the Land Reforms Act was rejected by the Land Reforms Tribunal by order dated 19.04.1982. Against the said rejection, an appeal was filed in 1983 before the Land Reforms Tribunal being L.R.A. No. 6 of 1983. By order dated 22.09.1984, the Land Reforms Appellate Tribunal allowed L.R.A. No. 6 of 1983 and remanded to the Land Reforms Tribunal for fresh disposal. On remand, application for release of land admeasuring 99.17 acres declared as excess land under the Land Refo ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... d by him is in excess of the ceiling limit. Inasmuch as the case of the appellants is that the lands regarding which declaration was filed by them was not vacant land at all, they would not be covered by the observations made by this Court in para 15 as aforesaid since the same is ex-facie intended to cover only such cases where the factum of the land in issue being vacant land is admitted. But thereafter, a submission was made that the vacant land declared to be excess land was in fact not excess land. 20. Equally, reliance placed by the appellants upon the observations and findings reached in the judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court in the earlier round of litigation which culminated in the judgment of this Court in Audikesava Reddy's case (supra) regarding lands in issue having been agricultural lands, the prayer of extension of the Master Plan thereto is also mis-conceived and unsustainable. As pointed out by learned senior counsel for the respondents by virtue of special leave petition filed against the judgment dated 04.12.1996 delivered in Writ Appeal No. 918 of 1994 as also the judgment dated 28.10.1994 delivered in Writ Appeal No. 1220 of 1994, finality ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... a) cannot be sustained. He further pointed out that the last portion in the said paragraph shows that what this Court laid down was that the principle contained in the doctrine of merger is not of universal application. Whatever may be, it is clear that once special leave has been granted, any order passed by this Court thereafter, would be an appellate order and would attract the applicability of the doctrine of merger. The above view is supported in the very same Kunhayammed and Ors. (supra) which reads: 41. Once a special leave petition has been granted, the doors for the exercise of appellate jurisdiction of this Court have been let open. The order impugned before the Supreme Court becomes an order appealed against. Any order passed thereafter would be an appellate order and would attract the applicability of doctrine of merger. It would not make a difference whether the order is one of reversal or of modification or of dismissal affirming the order appealed against. It would also not make any difference if the order is a speaking or non-speaking one. Whenever this Court has felt inclined to apply its mind to the merits of the order put in issue before it though it may be in ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... scretionary jurisdiction disposing of petition for special leave to appeal. The doctrine of merger can therefore be applied to the former and not to the latter. (iv) An order refusing special leave to appeal may be a non-speaking order or a speaking one. In either case it does not attract the doctrine of merger. An order refusing special leave to appeal does not stand substituted in place of the order under challenge. All that it means is that the Court was not inclined to exercise its discretion so as to allow the appeal being filed. (v) If the order refusing leave to appeal is a speaking order, i.e., gives reasons for refusing the grant of leave, then the order has two implications. Firstly, the statement of law contained in the order is a declaration of law by the Supreme Court within the meaning of Article 141 of the Constitution. Secondly, other than the declaration of law, whatever is stated in the order are the findings recorded by the Supreme Court which would bind the parties thereto and also the court, tribunal or authority in any proceedings subsequent thereto by way of judicial discipline, the Supreme Court being the Apex Court of the country. But, this does not a ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ught to our notice that by an agreement dated 09.08.1974, the lands in issue were sold by the owners to a society, namely, Chanakyapuri Cooperative Housing Society which got a layout plan sanctioned on 20.10.1975 by Raidurg Gram Panchayat for construction of houses on the said lands. These materials clearly show that the lands were not agricultural lands even prior to declaration filed under Section 6 of the ULC Act by the owners in 1976. Any land not being agricultural land and falling within an urban agglomeration, constitutes vacant land as defined in Section 2(q) of the ULC Act. The lands in issue, therefore, constitute vacant land on the date of filing of declaration under Section 6 of the ULC Act by the owners in 1976. As per Section 6 of the ULC Act, declaration was required to be filed in respect of vacant land, such declaration was correctly filed by the owners hence, subsequent extension of master plan to the lands in issue on 23.06.1980 has no relevance to the validity of the declaration made in 1976 or to the proceedings initiated under the ULC Act pursuant to such declaration. It is not in dispute that the proceedings under the ULC Act were not challenged by the owners ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... he extinguishing of all rights, title and interests including easementary rights when the title vests in the State. Thus, free from encumbrances means vesting of land in the State without any charge or burden in it. Thus, State has absolute title/ownership over it. 12. In Satendra Prasad Jain and Ors. v. State of U.P. and Ors. AIR 1993 SC 2517, this Court held that once land vests in the State free from all encumbrances, it cannot be divested. The same view has been reiterated in Awadh Bihari Yadav and Ors. v. State of Bihar and Ors. (1995) 6 SCC 31; U.P. Jal Nigam, Lucknow v. Kalra Properties (P) Ltd. Lucknow and Ors. AIR 1996 SC 1170; Pratap and Anr. (Supra); Chandragauda Ramgonda Patil and Anr. v. State of Maharashtra and Ors. (1996) 6 SCC 405; Allahabad Development Authority v. Nasiruzzaman and Ors. (1996) 6 SCC 424; State of Kerala and Ors. v. M. Bhaskaran Pillai and Anr. AIR 1997 SC 2703; M. Ramalinga Thevar v. State of Tamil Nadu and Ors. (2000) 4 SCC 322; Printers (Mysore) Ltd. v. M.A. Rasheed and Ors. (2004) 4 SCC 460; Bangalore Development Authority and Ors. v. R. Hanumaiah and Ors. (2005) 12 SCC 508; and Government of Andhra Pradesh and Anr. v. Syed Akbar AIR 2 ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... udgment of the Division Bench of the High Court and the parties cannot claim that certain issues have been kept open or untouched. In support of the above claim, learned Attorney General heavily relied on the decree drafted by the Registry. The relevant portion of the decree is as follows: ..... while holding that the Master Plan prepared as per law in force even subsequent to enforcement of the Urban Land (Ceiling Regulations) Act, 1976 is to be taken into consideration to determine whether a particular piece of land is vacant land or not, and while leaving open the question as to the consequences of filing of a statement by a person under a wrong impression that the vacant land held by him is in excess of ceiling limit if it was not so when he filed a statement, to be decided in an appropriate case and for the reasons recorded in its Judgment DOTH in allowing the appeal and the resultant appeal ORDER: 1. THAT the Judgments and Orders dated 28th October, 1994 and the 4th December, 1996 of the Division Bench of the High Court of Judicature of Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad in Writ Appeal Nos. 1220 and 918 of 1994 respectively, and also Judgments and Orders dated 6th October, 1 ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the same be decided in an appropriate case, which necessarily means that this Court was not inclined to go into the three questions, namely, whether the land in Survey No. 83, Raidurg (Panmaqtha) village was agricultural or not, whether such declarations were filed on 16.09.1976, on a wrong impression and whether the proceedings under Sections 8, 9 and 10 of the ULC Act are valid, having already declared in Para 13 that the date of commencement of the ULC Act qua the land in Survey No. 83, would be the date on which the said land was included in the second Master Plan that is, on 29.09.1980 when the owners were obligated to file declarations under Section 6 of their holdings and as such the statutory obligation to deal with such declarations also would commence only from the date of filing fresh declarations after 29.09.1980 (date of commencement of the Act). While winding up his reservation about the decree, he submitted that this Court in Audikesava Reddy's case (supra) expressly did not go into the question of validity of the proceedings taken by the Competent Authority under Sections 8, 9 and 10 of the ULC Act on the earlier declarations filed in September, 1976 under a mis ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... s are allowed can have only one meaning and the meaning is that the judgment of the High Court is set aside and the writ petitions are dismissed. In view of the same, there is no occasion for making any correction even suo motu and that too after a lapse of nine years from the date of the judgment. 27. To meet the above contentions, learned Attorney General has made an elaborate argument by drawing our attention to the decree prepared by the Registry. In fact, we also summoned the original decree drafted by the Registry. A judgment comprises three segments (i) the facts and the point at issue; (ii) the reasons for the decision and (iii) the final order containing the decision. Order XX CPC requires a judgment to contain all the issues and findings or decision thereon with the reasons therefor. The judgment has to state the relief allowed to a party. The preparation of decree follows the judgment. The decree shall agree with the judgment. The decree shall contain, inter alia, particulars of the claim and shall specify clearly the relief granted or other determination of the suit. The very obligation cast by the Code that the decree shall agree with the judgment spells out an obli ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... a decision of the High court which has been set aside by the Supreme court is a nullity. In view of the peculiar controversy, we read the judgment in Audikesava Reddy's case carefully, particularly, paras 13 to 17 and we are satisfied that the decision of this Court has been correctly drafted by the Registry in the form of a decree and there is no ambiguity as claimed by learned senior counsel for the appellants. 32. Learned Attorney General submitted that a judgment rendered by this Court cannot be collaterally challenged as is sought to be done by the appellants in these appeals. For the said proposition, he relied on the following: In Hunter v. Chief Constable (1982) 1 A.C, Diplock LJ delivering his speech in the House of Lords enunciated the doctrine of `Collateral attack on a judgment and observed thus: The abuse of process which the instant case exemplifies is the initiation of proceedings in a court of justice for the purpose of mounting a collateral attack upon a final decision against the intending plaintiff which has been made by another court of competent jurisdiction in previous proceedings in which the intending plaintiff had a full opportunity of conte ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... fter granting leave decides the appeal finally by recording reasons. Such order can truly be said to be a judgment to which Article 141 of the Constitution applies. Likewise, the doctrine of merger also gets attracted. All orders passed by the courts/authorities below, therefore, merge in the judgment of this Court and after such judgment, it is not open to any party to the judgment to approach any court or authority to review, recall or reconsider the order. 36. Regarding the doctrine of merger, once the appeal of the State was allowed in Audikeshava Reddy's case the net result was that the High Court judgment which held that the proceedings under the ULC Act were vitiated stood merged in the decision of this Court in Audikeshava Reddy. The logical sequitor of this is that the writ petitions filed by the appellants are deemed to be dismissed. In Kunhayahmed (supra), a three Judge Bench of this Court while elucidating the doctrine of merger held that once `leave' is granted while exercising jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of India, the doors of the appellate jurisdiction are opened. It does not matter whether reasons are given or not. The doctrine of m ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... s because of new views that they may entertain of the law of the case, or new versions which they present as to what should be a proper apprehension by the Court of the legal result either of the construction of the documents or the weight of certain circumstances. If this were permitted, litigations would have no end except when legal ingenuity is exhausted. It is a principle of law that this cannot be permitted and there is abundant authority reiterating that principle. As rightly observed by the High Court, what is utmost relevant is the final judgment of the superior Court and not the reasons in support of that decision. Apart from the legal position and the effect of allowing of the appeals and dismissing the writ petitions by this Court, the contention with regard to the land being agricultural land was raised in the writ petitions which were the subject matter of the appeals filed in this Court. In these proceedings, the State categorically took the stand that the lands are not agricultural. It was brought to our notice that the present appellants as respondents in the earlier round did not urge this plea before this Court and no such arguments were advanced before this C ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... udgment of the High Court is set aside and writ petitions are dismissed and the determination of ceiling already made remains intact and undisturbed. 41. The appellants contended that the High Court had recorded a finding that the land is agricultural and the State had taken up a ground saying that the land was not agricultural land and was a vacant land but that point was not pressed before this Court in Audikesava Reddy's case, hence to that extent the High Court judgment would operate with binding effect in view of principles of constructive res judicata. We accept that principle of res judicata/constructive res judicata is applicable to the writ proceedings. However, in the present case, the Division Bench finding with respect to nature of land in a writ petition filed by purchasers does not survive after appeals of the State were allowed and after this Court refused to go into the question of filing of statements by owners under a wrong impression. If this Court wanted the nature of land to be separately considered then it would have done so or remanded the matter. However, paragraph 15 of Audikesava Reddy's case shows a clear intent to leave the declaration of the ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... iven possession by the owners and possession was also given to Golden Hill Construction Corporation and thereafter it was given to the purchasers, the fact remains that the owners are not in possession. In view of the same, the finding of the High Court that the possession was taken by the State legally and validly through a Panchnama is absolutely correct and deserves to be upheld. 44. It is relevant to point out the conduct of the appellants in the previous proceedings which were highlighted by learned senior counsel for the State as well as APIIC. They are: a) The appellants themselves described the land in Survey No. 83 as grazing land in their declarations filed under Section 6(1); b) The appellants filed declarations under the Land Reforms Act subjecting the land to the jurisdiction of the Tribunal; c) filing declarations under the ULC Act treating the land in Survey No. 83 as vacant land; d) the transaction of agreement of sale entered into between GPA and Chanakyapuri Cooperative Housing Society; e) Owners and Society filed applications for exemptions which were rejected; f) Chanakyapuri Society pursued its remedies against such rejection of exemption ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... 8 and possession was taken by the Government subsequent thereto. As rightly observed by the High Court, G.O. Ms. No. 217 cannot be interpreted as entitling the declarants to claim benefit of exemption even in cases where they were not in possession as on 31.10.1988. The same was handed over to the Mandal Revenue Officer, Sherlingampally, even prior to that, the said land was allotted to Hyderabad Urban Development Authority vide G.O. Ms. No. 5013 dated 19.12.1980. Admittedly, the said Government Order was not challenged by the appellants. In those circumstances, the appellants cannot be allowed to take the benefit of G.O. Ms. No. 733 since this is not merely a case where the appellants were dispossessed but the property was transferred initially in favour of Hyderabad Urban Development Authority and later to APIIC for utilizing the same to set up IT Park Project. We are satisfied that the appellants are not entitled to claim benefits under G.O. Ms. No. 733. It is also clear from G.O. Ms. No. 455 and 456 dated 29.07.2002 that occupation/possession is sine qua non for the allotment of surplus lands. 47. Various third parties have filed separate applications by way of I.As in these ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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