TMI Blog2018 (2) TMI 651X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... Pune Municipal Corporation (2014 (1) TMI 1643 - Supreme Court Of India) is not rendered in per incuriam. In view of the above, the judgment in Pune Municipal Corporation (supra) may have to be reconsidered by a larger bench, inasmuch as Pune Municipal Corporation (supra) was decided by a bench of three judges. The Registry is directed to place the papers before the Hon’ble Chief Justice of India for appropriate orders. Whether the conscious omission referred to in paragraph 11 of the judgment in Sree Balaji Nagar Residential Association v. State of Tamil Nadu, (2014 (9) TMI 941 - Supreme Court Of India) makes any substantial difference to the legal position with regard to the exclusion or inclusion of the period covered by an interim order of the Court for the purpose of determination of the applicability of Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act? - Held that:- The conscious omission referred to in paragraph 11 of the judgment in Sree Balaji (supra) does not make any substantial difference to the legal position with regard to the exclusion or inclusion of the period covered by an interim order of the Court for the purpose of determination of the applicability of Section 24(2) of the ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... 016, SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (C) No.15113 OF 2016, SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (C) No.16438 OF 2016, SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (C) No.15119 OF 2016, SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (C) No.15126 OF 2016, SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (C) No.15125 OF 2016, SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (C) No.15118 OF 2016, SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (C) No.15124 OF 2016, SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (C) No.15112 OF 2016, SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (C) No.11824 OF 2016, SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (C) No.15143 OF 2016, SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (C) No.15141 OF 2016, SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (C) No.15142 OF 2016, SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (C) No.15213-15217 OF 2017, SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (C) No.17324 OF 2016, SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (C) No.38368 OF 2016, SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (C) No.5182-5184 OF 2017, SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (C) No.23846 OF 2016, SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (C) No.23097 OF 2016, SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (C) No.19804-19805 OF 2016, SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (C) No.22127-22128 OF 2016, SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (C) No.21997-21998 OF 2016, W.P.(C) No.602 OF 2017 And SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (C) .. Diary No.24901 OF 2017 , For the Appearing Parties : Mr.P.S.Patwalia,ASG., Mr.B.K. Satija, AAG, Dr.Sudhir Bisla, Adv., Mr.Sanjay Kapur, AOR, Ms.Megha Ka ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... n of Pune Municipal Corporation Anr. v. Harakchand Misirimal Solanki [2014 (3) SCC 183] has been doubted. The main issue is interpretation of section 24 of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (for short, the Act of 2013 ) and section 31 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short, the Act of 1894 ). 2. In Yogesh Neema Ors. v. State of M.P. Ors. [S.L.P. [C] No.10742 of 2008] vide order of 12.1.2016, observing that other question, that may arise undoubtedly to be considered question Nos. IV and V have been referred. Following questions arises for consideration: I. What is the meaning of the expression paid'/ tender' in Section 24 of the Act of 2013 and section 31 of the Act of 1894? Whether non-deposit of compensation in court under section 31(2) of the Act of 1894 results into a lapse of acquisition under section 24(2) of the Act of 2013. What are the consequences of non-deposit in Court especially when compensation has been tendered and refused under section 31(1) of the Act of 1894 and section 24(2) of the Act of 2013? Whether such persons after refusal can take advantage of ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ade an award under section 11, he may take possession of the land, which shall thereupon vest absolutely in the Government, free from all encumbrances. (emphasis supplied) 6. Section 17 deals with special powers in cases of urgency. The same authorizes the Collector to take possession before passing of the award as provided in section 17(1) of the Act of 1894, and on taking possession of any land, such land shall thereupon vest absolutely in the Government, free from all encumbrances. Section 17 is extracted hereunder: 17. Special powers in case of urgency (1) In cases of urgency whenever the [appropriate Government], so directs, the Collector, though no such award has been made, may, on the expiration of fifteen days from the publication of the notice mentioned in section 9, subsection 1). [take possession of any land needed for a public purpose]. Such land shall thereupon [vest absolutely in the [Government], free from all encumbrances. (2) Whenever owing to any sudden change in the channel of any navigable river or other unforeseen emergency, it becomes necessary for any Railway Administration to acquire the immediate possession of any land for the maintenance of the ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... n 31, and where the amount so paid or deposited exceeds the compensation awarded by the Collector under section 11, the excess may, unless refunded within three months from the date of Collector's award, be recovered as an arrear of land revenue]. [(4) In the case of any land to which, in the opinion of the [appropriate Government], the provisions of sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) are applicable, the [appropriate Government] may direct that the provisions of section 5A shall not apply, and, if it does so direct, a declaration may be made under section 6 in respect of the land at any time [after the date of the publication of the notification] under section 4, sub-section (1). (emphasis supplied) Before taking possession of the land, it is necessary under Section 17(3A) to tender payment of 80% compensation unless prevented by some one or more of the contingencies mentioned in sub-section (2) of section 31, and where the Collector is so prevented, the provisions of section 31(2), except the second proviso, shall apply as they apply to the payment of compensation under that section. As required under section 17(3A) and section 17(3B), the amount paid or deposited under su ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... n the Court to which a reference under section 18 would be submitted: Provided that any person admitted to be interested may receive such payment under protest as to the sufficiency of the amount: Provided also that no person who has received the amount otherwise than under protest shall be entitled to make any application under section 18: Provided also that nothing herein contained shall affect the liability of any person, who may receive the whole or any part of any compensation awarded under this Act, to pay the same to the person lawfully entitled thereto. (3) Notwithstanding anything in this section the Collector may, with the sanction of the [appropriate Government] instead of awarding a money compensation in respect of any land, make any arrangement with a person having a limited interest in such land, either by the grant of other lands in exchange, the remission of land-revenue on other lands held under the same title, or in such other way as may be equitable having regard to the interests of the parties concerned. (4) Nothing in the last foregoing sub-section shall be construed to interfere with or limit the power of the Collector to enter into any arrangement with ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... s it clear that any person who has received the whole or any part of compensation awarded under the Act, shall still be liable to pay the same to a person who is lawfully entitled thereto. It is with the purpose as provided in section 31 when the amount is tendered it can be accepted under protest and still a reference can be maintained. In case awarded amount has been accepted without protest, reference cannot be maintained under section 18. 11. In case of incompetency of a person to alienate the land in question, amount has to be deposited in the reference court under section 31(2), and when money of such person is deposited in Court, court may order the money to be invested in the purchase of another land to be held under the like title and conditions of ownership, as the land, in respect of which, such money shall have been deposited, was held, or if such purchase cannot be effected forthwith, money can be invested in Government or other approved securities as the court shall think fit and has to be dealt with in accordance with the provisions contained in section 32. Section 33 deals with an investment of money deposited in other cases. 12. In case money is deposited in ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... er, and paid in such manner as it may consider will give the parties interested therein the same benefit the reform as they might have had from the land in respect whereof such money shall have been deposited or as near thereto as may be. 13. The provisions contained in section 34 deals with the exigencies where the amount of compensation is not paid or deposited on or before taking possession of the land. The Collector shall pay the amount awarded with interest thereon @ 9% from the time of so taking possession until it shall have been so paid or deposited; and if such compensation or any part thereof is not paid or deposited within one year from the date on which possession is taken, interest @ 15% per annum shall follow. Section 34 of 1894 Act is extracted hereunder: 34. Payment of interest - When the amount of such compensation is not paid or deposited on or before taking possession of the land, the Collector shall pay the amount awarded with interest thereon at the rate of (nine per centum) per annum from the time of so taking possession until it shall have been so paid or deposited: [Provided that if such compensation or any part thereof is not paid or deposited wi ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... determining compensation by the Collector. 16. Section 24 of the Act of 2013 deals with land acquisition process initiated under the Act of 1894, which shall be deemed to have lapsed in certain cases. With respect to acquisition, when award, under the Act of 1894, has not been passed, then, as per Section 24(1)(a) of the Act of 2013, all the provisions of the Act of 2013 relating to the determination of compensation shall apply; where, however, an award under section 11 of the act of 1894 has been made, then such proceedings shall continue,as per section 24(1)(b), under the Act of 1894, as if the said Act has not been repealed. 17. Section 24(2) begins with a non-obstante clause - as notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1). The provisions of sub-section (2) of section 24 shall, under the exigencies provided therein, have the overriding effect, i.e. in case of award, under Act of 1894, has been made five years or more prior to the commencement of the Act of 2013, but either the physical possession has not been taken, or compensation has not been paid, the said proceedings shall be deemed to have lapsed. The proviso to section 24(2) lays down when the award has b ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the date on which possession is taken, interest at the rate of fifteen percent. per annum shall be payable from the date or expiry of the said period of one year on the amount of compensation or part thereof which has not been paid or deposited before the date of such expiry. 20. It is apparent, from the provisions contained in section 77 of the Act of 2013, that, the expression used in section 77 that the Collector shall tender payment of the compensation to landowners/interested persons, and the obligation is to pay it to them by depositing the amount in their bank accounts unless prevented by exigencies provided in section 77(2), are akin to section 31(2) of the Act of 1894. 21. In proviso to section 24(2), expression used is compensation has not been deposited in the account of the beneficiaries, which may be deposited separately in treasury also; whereas, in section 77, of the Act of 2013 the deposit is required, in the bank account of beneficiaries, unless refused. The expression bank-account has not been used in section 31 of the Act of 1894 or in section 24(2) of Act of 2013. In proviso to section 24(2), the expression used deposited in account would mean ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... , shall be entitled to compensation in accordance with the provisions of this Act. 24. When we consider the provisions of section 24 of the 2013 Act, it is clear that in case of the award has not been passed then as per section 24(1)(a), compensation has to be determined under the Act of 2013. It is also clear that section 24(1)(b) provides that where an award under section 11 of the 1894 Act has been made, then such proceedings shall continue under the provisions of the said Act of 1894 as if it has not been repealed. However, in case physical possession of the land has not been taken, or the compensation has not been paid, the proceedings shall be deemed to have lapsed; and, in case of compensation with respect to a majority of landholdings has not been deposited in the account of the beneficiaries, then, all beneficiaries i.e. landowners shall be entitled to compensation in accordance with the provisions of the Act of 2013. 25. In section 24(2), the expression that has been employed is compensation has not been paid . The expression deposited , which occurs in the proviso to sub-section (2), has not been used in the main section 24(2). Its proviso uses the expression d ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... reference is sought, the amount is to be deposited in court where reference would be submitted otherwise it is to be deposited in the treasury.If the expression deposited , used in the proviso to section 24(2), and expression paid used in main section 24(2), are both taken as contained in expression paid i.e. the tender; and, on refusal it is deposited in court to make the payment complete; if expression deposited is included in expression payment under Section 24(2), inconsistency and repugnancy would be caused as between the proviso and the main sub-section; which has to be eschewed. The Court cannot add the word deposited to the expression paid / tender in Section 31 of Act 1894 or Section 24(2) of Act of 2013. 30. The proviso to section 24(2) of the 2013 Act deals with deposit' of compensation in treasury or with Land Acquisition Collector with respect to the majority of holding it does obviously contemplate that amount has not been paid' to landowners/ beneficiaries/ interested persons. Thus, when Scheme of entire section 24 is considered, the concept of paid' in the main section 24(2) is different than the deposit. If the deposit is includ ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... R 1962 SC 1500 has held in the context of section 33 of the Industrial Disputes Act where payment of one month's wages was necessary. It was held that the payment of one-month wages can always mean that the employer has tendered his wages and that would amount to payment for otherwise a workman could always make the section unworkable by refusing to take wages. The Court observed thus: 8. Let us now turn to the words of the proviso in the background of what we have said above. The proviso lays down that no workman shall be discharged or dismissed unless he has been paid wages for one month and an application has been made by the employer to the authority before which the proceeding is pending for approval of the action taken by the employer. It will be clear that two kinds of punishment are subject to the conditions of the proviso, namely, discharge or dismissal. Any other kind of punishment is not within the proviso. Further, the proviso lays down two conditions, namely (i) payment of wages for one month and (ii) making of an application by the employer to the authority before which the proceeding is pending for approval of the action taken. It is not disputed before us th ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... he wages to the employee. But if the employee chooses not to accept them, he cannot come forward and say that there has been no payment of wages to him by the employer, Therefore, though Section 33 speaks of payment of one month's wages, it can only mean that the employer has tendered the wages and that would amount to payment, for otherwise, a workman could always make the section unworkable by refusing to take the wages. In (1964) 2 SCR 104, 109 P.H. Kalyani v. M/s. Air France , the employer had offered one month's wages to the workman before the order of dismissal against him came into force. The offer was held to be sufficient compliance of the said condition laid down in the proviso, [(1955) 1 SCR 998] Management of Delhi Transport Undertaking v. Industrial Tribunal, Delhi was a case where the wages were remitted by money order but the workman purposely refused to receive them. It was held that the employer could not be said not to have complied with the condition laid down by the proviso. It is thus clear that the condition as to payment in the proviso does not mean that the wages have to be actually paid but if wages are tendered or offered, such a tender or offer w ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... would amount to payment. Thus, word paid does not mean actual payment to be made but whatever is possible for an incumbent to make the payment is only contemplated. Paid does not mean receipt or deposited in Court. There may be refusal to receive an amount in spite of its tender. Thus, in view of the decisions of this court in CIT Kerala (supra), N.B. Sanjana (supra) and J. Dalmia (supra), the provisions of section 24(2) have to be construed to mean tender of amount would mean payment as envisaged. 40. It is settled that a Court cannot add or subtract a word; the expression compensation has not been paid is used in section 24(2); it is not open to the court to add to these words, or to substitute the said expression with any further expression, such as deposit . In the Principles of Statutory Interpretation by G.P. Singh (14th edition), it has been observed that court has to avoid addition or substitution of the words. Thus, when the word paid is there, it is not open to adding deposited , particularly when the scheme of the Act of 1894 also contains different provisions in section 31(1) with respect to tender is payment, while section 31(2)deals with depo ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... rat Aluminium Company v. Kaiser Aluminium Technical Services Inc ., a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court rejected the contention that Part I of the Act was also applicable to arbitrations seated in foreign countries on the ground that in such a case certain words would have to be added to section 2(2), which would then have to provide that this part shall apply where the place of arbitration is in India and to arbitrations having its place out of India . This would amount to a drastic and unwarranted rewriting or alteration of the language of section 2(2), and it is not permissible for the Court to reconstruct a statutory provision. In this case, the Constitution Bench prospectively overruled the decision of a three-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court in Bhatia International v. Bulk Trading SA , which had held that provisions of Part I would apply to international commercial arbitrations held outside India unless the parties, by agreement, express or implied, exclude all or any of its provisions. x xxxx And, in construing section 14(f) of the U.P. Town Areas Act, 1914, which reads A tax on persons assessed according to their circumstances and property not exceeding such ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... annadham v. Jammulu Ramulu (2001) 7 SCC 71, P.K. Unni v. Nirmala Industries AIR 1990 SC 933, Crawford v. Spooner (1846) 6 Moore PC 1, Royal Trust Company v. Minister of Finance AIR 1921 PC 184, Padma Sundara Rao (dead) Ors. v. State of T. N. Ors. (2002) 3 SCC 533 has observed that what legislation wanted has been stated in the provision. The court cannot give extended meaning to the expression. It is not open to the Court to aid defective phrasing of the Act or to make up for the deficiencies. It is not open to the Court to recast, rewrite, or reframe the provision. The court cannot assume omission and add or amend words. Plain and unambiguous construction has to be given without addition and substitution of the words. The temptation of substituting words by explaining what it thought legislation is endeavoring is to be discouraged. Court has to consider what has been said and what has not been said. It is wrong and dangerous to proceed by substituting some other words for the words of the statute. When literal reading produces an intelligible result it is not open to read words or add words to statute. Making any generous addition to the language of the Act would not ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ncies as per section 31(2). 43. The word paid , in view of the different consequences of paid and deposited, has to be given different meaning from deposited . Otherwise, if it were the case that deposit is included in the payment , then there would have been no necessity of using two different expressions, in different provisions, carrying different consequences. Deposit made in the court cannot be said to be payment made to the landowner i.e. persons interested/beneficiaries. Thus, in case of deposit is directly made in the court without tender, it could not be said that it was tendered or paid. Deposit in court simply is the discharge of Collector s liability of making payment of interest as envisaged under section 34 of the 1894 Act, and no more; deposit in Court is not tender to landowner. Once the amount has been tendered and not accepted, obligation to pay is discharged, as envisaged under section 31(1); no penal consequences can follow and, the person who has refused to accept cannot be permitted to take an advantage of his own wrong, or in case his conduct is of filing litigations, delaying the passing of the award or obtaining stay of the proceedings; such ac ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... us, in discharging its interpretative function, to exercise the power to correct obvious drafting errors that can be done only in suitable cases where there is error of drafting. Before adding the word or omitting a word the court has to consider 3 matters : (1) the intended purpose of the statute or the provision in question, (2) that by inadvertence the draftsman and Parliament failed to give effect to that purpose in the provision in question, and (3) substance of the provision Parliament would have made, although not necessarily the precise words Parliament would have used, had the error in the Bill been noticed. As observed in Inco Europe Ltd. v. First Choice Distribution (a firm) by the House of Lords in (2000) 2 All ER 109 at 115. There is no accidental omission as to the concept of payment in section 24(2) or section 31(1) of the aforesaid Acts. Thus, it is not permissible to supply the word deposited to include in the expression payment . 49(a). Rule of literal construction lays down that words of a statute are first understood in their natural, ordinary or popular sense and phrases, and sentences are construed according to their grammatical meaning. The learned au ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... 9;s purpose or policy . For a modern statement of the rule, one may refer to the speech of LORD SIMON OF GLAISDALE in a case where he said: Parliament is prima facie to be credited with meaning what is said in an Act of Parliament. The drafting of statutes, so important to a people who hope to live under the rule of law, will never be satisfactory unless courts seek whenever possible to apply the golden rule of construction, that is to read the statutory language, grammatically and terminologically, in the ordinary and primary sense which it bears in its context, without omission or addition. Of course, Parliament is to be credited with good sense; so that when such an approach produces injustice, absurdity, contradiction or stultification of statutory objective the language may be modified sufficiently to avoid such disadvantage, though no further . The rules stated above have been quoted with approval by the Supreme Court . (emphasis supplied) 49(b). This Court, in Harbhajan Singh v. Press Council of India , AIR 2002 SC 1351, at 1354 has observed thus : Legislature does not waste its words. Ordinary, grammatical and full meaning is to be assigned to the words used wh ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... 1 SCC 760; B.R. Enterprises v. State of U.P., AIR 1999 SC 1867, p.1902 : (1999) 9 SCC 700 ( trade and business' in Article 298 have different meaning from trade and commerce' in Article 301); ShriIshal Alloy Steels Ltd. v. JayaswalasNeco Ltd., JT 2001 (3) SC 114, p. 119 : (2001) 3 SCC 609 : AIR 2001 SC 1161 (The words a bank and the bank in section 138 N.I. Act, 1881 do not have the same meaning); The Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Hansrajbhai v. Kodala, AIR 2001 SC 1832, p. 1842 : (2001) 5 SCC 175; KailashNathAgarwal v. PradeshiyaIndust and Inv. Corp. of U.P., 2003 AIR SCW 1358, p. 1365 : (2003) 4 SCC 305, p. 313. (The words proceeding and suit used in the same section construed differently); But in Paramjeet Singh Pathak v. ICDS Ltd, (2006) 13 SCC 322 : AIR 2007 SC 168 different view was taken therefore in Zenith Steel Tubes v. Sicom Ltd, (2008) 1 SCC 533 : AIR 2008 SC 451 case referred to a larger Bench; D.L.F. Qutab Enclave Complex Educational Charitable Trust v. State of Haryana, 2003 AIR SCW 1046, p. 1057: AIR 2003 SC 1648: (2003) 5 SCC 622 (The expressions at his own cost and at its cost , used in one section given different meanings) (emphasis supplied) ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ifferent words to be given different meaning as also the binding precedents of this Court, indicate that the expression deposited cannot be added to tender / paid , both carry different consequences under section 24, tender on lapse of acquisition/non-deposit higher interest under section 34 of the Act of 1894. 51(e). It is a settled proposition of law that when two different expressions have been used in section 24(2) of the Act of 2013, as well as in section 31 of the Act of 1894, i .e. paid to the landowners and deposited in the court , they both carry different meanings, and have to be interpreted as used in the respective contexts. It is not the expression used that deposit in the court is payment to landowners, neither it is used that amount deposited in the treasury is the payment to the landowners. The payment indicates the obligation to pay; and, deposit is made in the court or revenue treasury only upon happening of various exigencies as provided in Section 31, and there can be several other exigencies which are not covered under section 31(2) of the Act of 1894 and in the statutory rules/orders. 52. In section 24 of the Act of 2013, brooks no lethargy on t ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ve notice to the payees of such deposits, the Treasury in which the deposits specifying have been made. When the payees ultimately claim payment of sums placed in deposit, the amounts will be paid to them in the same manner as ordinary revenue deposits. The officer should, as far as possible, arrange to make the payments due in or near the village to which the payees belong, in order that the number of undisbursed sums to be placed in deposit on account of non-attendance may be reduced to a minimum. Whenever payment is claimed through a representative whether before or after deposit of the amount awarded, such representative, must show legal authority for receiving the compensation on behalf of his principal. (emphasis supplied) 55. The Karnataka Land Acquisition Rules 1965 were also framed under section 55 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. Similarly in the State of Kerala Rule 14(2) of the Land Acquisition (Kerala) Rules, 1990 were framed under section 55 of the Act of 1894 provided that the payment relating to an award shall be made or the amount credited to the court or Revenue deposit (Treasury) within one month from the date of award. 56. The state of Assam has also fr ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... lied) 57. Identical is the rule for Bihar and Orissa. Similar instructions have been issued by the other State Government so as to deal with public money. They have the force of law. The duty of the court is to harmonize rules with provision of Act. In State of West Bengal also similar rules had been framed under section 55 of the Act of 1894. 58. Standing Order No.28 issued in 1909 the State of Punjab is applicable to Delhi also, provides 5 modes of payment in Para 74 and 75 based on Government of India s orders, which are extracted hereunder: 74. Methods of making payments-There are five methods of making payments: (1) By direct payments, see paragraph 75(I) infra (2) By order on treasury, see paragraph 75(II) infra (3) By Money Order, see paragraph 75(III) infra (4) By cheque, see paragraph 75(IV) infra (5) By deposit in a treasury, see paragraph 75(V) infra 75. Direct payments (V) By treasury deposit-In giving notice of the award Under Section 12(2) and tendering payment Under Section 31(1) to such of the persons interested as were not present personally or by their representatives when the award was made, the officer shall require them to appear ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ns who are served notice Under Section 12(2) are not present personally at the time the award is delivered. Even though they may not appear at that stage, the officer shall require them to appear personally or by representatives by a certain date to receive payment of compensation awarded. It is only if they fail to appear after such an intimation, and if the officer, after further endeavours to secure their attendance, cannot so secure their attendance, that amounts due are to be paid to the treasury as revenue deposited payable to persons to whom they are due. It is clear, therefore, that sub-para (V), when read in its proper perspective, is not a separate mode of payment by itself as is contended by learned Counsel for the Appellants. It is a residuary mode of payment after all necessary efforts have been made by the authorities to secure the attendance of the persons entitled to compensation, and it is only after all such methods have failed that, as a last resort, the money is then to be deposited in the treasury. In any case, such deposit in the treasury is referable only to Section 31(1) and cannot ever be a substitute for deposit before the reference court as provided Under ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... it has to be deposited in court. It is not necessary to make tender of amount of compensation under Section 31(1) in the 3 latter exigencies provided in section 31(2) itself. The proviso to section 24(2) of the Act of 2013 does not envisage any of the exigencies as contemplated under section 31(2) it clearly deals with deposit of money before the Land Acquisition Collector or in the treasury with respect to majority of the holding as the State/authority who is acquiring the land or has acquired it, must have arrangement to pay the money to the landowners and in case such money has not been deposited with the Land Acquisition Collector or with the treasury or in any other permissible mode consequence enumerated in proviso to follow, regarding payment of higher compensation under the Act of 2013 to all land holders. In the Treasury also separate accounts are opened of the landowners and money is kept in such separate accounts. As is apparent from the standing order 28 of Punjab and the rules framed under section 55 of Act of 1894 by various State Governments in case the amount has been deposited as per the proviso to section 24(2) in the treasury or with the Land Acquisition Colle ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... lost, to ask for compensation. Authorities are not supposed to be on vigil so as to ascertain after lapse of so much time even after decades in new generation, who has received the compensation and who has not received the compensation. There is no such data readily available to them. Thus once by conduct, such landowners refuse to accept the land acquisition/compensation, so as to saddle liability on authority, they have to inform the outcome/ willingness to the concerned authorities to apply for payment and to show their readiness to accept. Same would be the position in case amount is deposited in court. They have to apply for its withdrawal. The obligation of authorities is at initial stage. At subsequent stage, unless and until there is willingness shown by landowners/interested persons to accept the compensation, authorities cannot presume that they would accept it and that landowners are not going to question acquisition in the higher forum and it is not open to the authorities to offer to them compensation time and again, once amount is deposited in treasury during the pendency of litigation. In case of landowner interdict, initial offer/ tender by refusal or otherwise by ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... to misuse that tantamounts to grossest abuse of the provisions of law to reopen such acquisitions and court has to thwart all such attempts at threshold and not to receive such cases even for consideration for a moment. We see development has taken place in the area that has been acquired, there have been several rounds of litigation which have been lost by landowners even up to this Court; thereafter some persons are filing cases on the basis of power of attorneys or sale deeds which are not permissible after land has vested in the State and purchase after issuance of notification under section 4 is illegal and void and no such right is given to such incumbents to re-open the whole gamut of issues and to even contend that acquisition has lapsed under the provisions of the 2013 Act. 66. The law as prevailed under the Act of 1894 never invalidated any land acquisition in the absence of amount being deposited in court since the time immemorial in most cases where reference is not sought, amount had been invariably deposited in the Treasury as provided in statutory rules framed under section 55 of Act of 1894 and other standing order issued by State Governments, and there were deci ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... intendment of the Act of 2013. Though it is a beneficial law to benefit the incumbents it cannot be interpreted to be a law which would be to invalidate concluded transaction as per prevailing law and divest the land which has vested in State, development has taken place, possession taken, awards passed, after litigation/several rounds of litigation lost and then land cannot be ordered to revert back. The law does not intend that effect, as it may be termed as arbitrary and beyond legislative competence. We have to prevent the misuse of provisions and avoid anomalous results. 67. The court has to be cautious and duty-bound to prevent such misuse of the provisions of law and to make the purposive interpretation, considering the experience and after-effect of decisions. At the same time we have to forward the intendment and spirit of the provisions of the Act of 2013 to benefit farmers, at the same time, not to thwart the entire development which has taken place or to burden the Exchequer with such liability which is not contemplated in the Act of 2013 and invalidate acquisitions that have taken place in 1912, 1950s and 1960s onwards and have attained finality, as are sought to b ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... es of natural Justice were violated because the right of the appellant to have his own evidence recorded was denied to him and further that the material which was gathered behind his back was used in determining his guilt. In support of these contentions, a number of rulings are cited chief among which are State of Bombay v. NurulLatif Khan 1966 2 L.L.J.595 State of Uttar Pradesh and another v. C.S. Sharma 1969 1 L.L.J. 509 and Union of India v. T.R. Varma 1958 2L.L.J.259 There is no doubt that if the principles of natural Justice are violated and there is a gross case, this Court would interfere by striking down the order of dismissal; but there are cases and cases. We have to look to what actual prejudice has been caused to a person by the supposed denial to him of a particular right. 70. In Sunil Kumar Banerjee v. State of West Bengal, (1980) 3 SCC 304, it was observed: 3. ......It may be noticed straightaway that this provision is akin to Section 342 of the Criminal Procedure Code of 1898 and Section 313 of the Criminal Procedure Code of 1974. It is now well established that mere non-examination or defective examination Under Section 342 of the 1898 Code is n ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ment of compensation is clearly culled out in section 34. There is a liability for payment of interest. This court in Delhi Development Authority v. Sukhbir Singh Ors . [(2016) 16 SCC 258], has considered modes of payment in section 31(1) and has held in Para 18 quoted above that deposit in the treasury is residuary mode of payment under section 31(1) of Act of 1894. 72. This court has considered the question of effect of non-deposit in Hissar Improvement v. Smt. Rukmani Devi Anr ., AIR 1990 SC 2033 and observed that in case of compensation is not being paid or deposited in time in court before taking possession of the land, Collector has to deposit the amount awarded in section 31 failing which he is liable to pay interest as provided in section 34. The Court has observed: 5. It cannot be gainsaid that interest is due and payable to the landowner in the event of the compensation not being paid or deposited in time in court. Before taking possession of the land, the Collector has to pay or deposit the amount awarded, as stated in Section 31, failing which he is liable to pay interest as provided in Section 34. 6. In the circumstances, the High Court was right ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... s . (1997) 10 SCC 77, this Court has held that liability to pay interest under section 34 arises from the date of taking possession. 76. Thus, when the Act of 1894 provides the consequence of non-deposit in the in Court. In our opinion deposit in Treasury is permissible mode of deposit under the proviso to section 24(2) and within the purview of main section 24(2), the word paid could not have been taken to include the deposit , it is contemplated in proviso only, and in case with respect to the majority of holding the amount is not deposited in the account of beneficiary/landowner in case award has been passed before five year or more then acquisition would not lapse however all beneficiary/landowners would become entitled to higher compensation as provided in the Act of 2013. The expression deposited in the account of landowners would not mean deposited in the court as envisaged in Section 31(2) of the old Act, action as permissible as per the financial instructions having statutory or administrative orders having force of law as well as under the Rules framed by various State Governments in exercise of power under section 55 of Act of 1894 can always be taken. In vario ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... spute with the said proposition, and the same has been followed by this Court umpteen number of times. However, the consistent practice that has been followed in land acquisition cases is that it is only when reference is sought, and the amount has not been paid for one or other reason as per section 31(2), that the amount is deposited in the court to which the reference would be submitted, and not otherwise. The action is as per rules. The amount of compensation, qua the incumbents/landowners who have not sought the reference, is ordinarily deposited in treasury, by opening accounts in their separate names; the same is apparent from the forms, rules framed under section 55 of 1894 Act and various statutory orders issued by various State Governments. Section 31(2) cannot be said to be covering all the exigencies of depositing amount. It was not necessary for various other exigencies to deposit the amount in the Court. Particularly in view of the Government rules and instructions in financial matters which were binding and consistently followed by making the deposit in treasury for more than 100 years since 1894. WHETHER SECTION 24(2) DIVESTS THE STATE OF LAND 79. The questi ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... nt estate other than the natural expiration of those estates that are prior to it in possession; and second, that it be theoretically possible to identify who would get the right to possession if the interest should become a present estate at any time. Thomas F. Bergin 8. Paul C. Haskell, Preface to Estates in Land and Future Interests 66-67 (2d ed. 1984). In Webster's Dictionary, it is defined as: vested adj. [pp. of vest ] 1. Clothed; robed, especially in church vestments. 2. in law , fixed; settled; absolute; not contingent upon anything: as, a vested interest. 81(a). In State of Punjab v. Sadhu Ram, 1996 (7) JT 118, this Court has laid down that when possession is taken by the Government after passing of the award and compensation has been paid, right, title and interest of the owner stand extinguished. Government becomes absolute owner of the said land. No one can claim any title/equitable title by remaining in possession thereafter. This Court has observed: 3. The learned Judge having noticed the procedure prescribed in disposal of the land acquired by the Government for public purposes has held that the said procedure was not followed for surrende ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ge the legality of acquisition proceedings. This Court has laid down thus: 2. Shri P.P. Rao, learned senior counsel for the petitioner, contends that the petitioner had no knowledge of the acquisition proceedings; as soon as it came to know of the acquisition, it had challenged the validity of the acquisition proceedings and, therefore, it furnishes cause of action to the petitioner. He further contends that the writ petition could not be dismissed on the ground of laches but was required to be considered on merits. We find no force in the contention. Any encumbrance created by the erstwhile owner of the land after publication of the notification under Section 4(1) does not bind the State if the possession of the land is already taken over after the award came to be passed. The land stood vested in the State free from all encumbrances under Section 16. In Gunnukh Singh and Ors. v. The State of Haryana JT (1995) 8 SC 208, this Court has held that a subsequent purchaser is not entitled to challenge the legality of the acquisition proceedings on the ground of lack of publication of the notification. In Y.N. Garg v. State of Rajasthan [1996] 1 SCC 284 and SnehPrabha v. State of U.P ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... edly will be told that laches close the gates of the Court for him to question the legality of the notification under Section 4(1), declaration under Section 6 and the award of the Collector under Section 11. (emphasis supplied). 81(c). In Market Committee v. Krishan Murari (1996) 1 SCC 311 award was passed, possession was taken; it was observed that the land vests in the Government free from all encumbrances. In PuttuLal (dead) by LRs. v. State of U.P. Anr . (1996) 3 SCC 99, possession had been taken and compensation paid to the owner. It was held that land vests in the State free from all encumbrances. Consequently, State becomes absolute owner and is entitled to file suit for possession. 81(d). The word vest has been considered by this Court in Fruit and Vegetable Merchants Union v. Delhi Improvement Trust , AIR 1957 SC 344, to mean that the property acquired becomes the property of the Government without any condition or limitation either as to title or possession. Thus when there is absolute vesting in the State it is vesting along with possession and thereafter a person who remains in possession is only a trespasser not in rightful possession. Vesting cannot ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... or in a trust, do not necessarily mean that ownership has passed to any of them. 81(e). In Mosammat Bibi Sayeeda v. State of Bihar (1996) 9 SCC 516, the concept of vest has been discussed thus: 17. The word vested is defined in Black s Law Dictionary (6th Edn.) at p. 1563 as: Vested; fixed; accrued; settled; absolute; complete. Having the character or given the rights of absolute ownership; not contingent; not subject to be defeated by a condition precedent. Rights are vested when right to enjoyment, present or prospective, has become property of some particular person or persons as present interest; mere expectancy of future benefits, or contingent interest in property founded on anticipated continuance of existing laws, does not constitute vested rights. In Webster s Comprehensive Dictionary , (International Edn.) at p. 1397 vested is defined as: [L]aw held by a tenure subject to no contingency; complete; established by law as a permanent right; vested interests. In State of W.B. v. Suburban Agriculture Dairy Fisheries (P) Ltd. , the question was whether after the abolition of the estate under the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 195 ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... 81(f). In J. S. Yadav v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2011) 6 SCC 570, this Court has observed: 20. The word 'vested' is defined in Black's Law Dictionary (6th Edition) at page 1563, as: vested; fixed; accrued; settled; absolute; complete. Having the character or given the rights of absolute ownership; not contingent; not subject to be defeated by a condition precedent.' Rights are 'vested' when right to enjoyment, present or prospective, has become property of some particular person or persons as present interest; mere expectancy of future benefits, or contingent interest in property founded on anticipated continuance of existing laws, does not constitute vested rights. In Webster's Comprehensive Dictionary (International Edition) at page 1397, 'vested' is defined as : Law held by a tenure subject to no contingency; complete; established by law as a permanent right; vested interest. (See Mosammat Bibi Sayeeda and Ors. etc. v. State of Bihar and Ors. etc. AIR 1996 SC 1936 at SCC p.527, para 17) 21. The word vest is normally used where an immediate fixed right in present or future enjoyment in respect of a property is create ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... (2) of the Act of 2013. 84. There are various decisions which have been rendered inter se parties declining the challenge to land acquisition. It has been held in the previous judgments that the land is vested in the State and acquisition has been legally made and possession has been taken and such incumbents are responsible for not receiving compensation. Now those judgments are sought to be get rid of under the subsequent legislation, particularly under section 24 of the Act of 2013. 85. In relation to the maxim nemo debet bis vexari pro una et eadem causa , which means that it is a rule of law that a man should not be twice vexed for one and the same cause, Broom, in Legal Maxims, has discussed thus: When a party to litigation seeks improperly to raise again the identical question which has been decided by a competent Court, a summary remedy may be found in the inherent jurisdiction which our Courts possess of preventing an abuse of process. Thus, the provisions of section 24 cannot be interpreted by ignoring and overlooking the previous verdicts. What has been held in them is binding and rights cannot be taken away. When issues raised within section 24 have alr ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... our learned brother Untwalia, J., in regard to delivery of 'symbolical' and 'actual' possession under Rules 35, 36, 95 and 96 of Order XXI of the CPC, is not necessary for the disposal of the present appeals' and we do not wish to subscribe to what has been said by our learned brother Untwalia, J., in that connection, nor do we wish to express our assent with the discussion of the various authorities made by him in his judgment. We think it is enough to state that when the Government proceeds to take possession of the land acquired by it under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, it must take actual possession of the land since all interests in the land are sought to be acquired by it. There can be no question of taking 'symbolical' possession in the sense understood by judicial decisions under the CPC. Nor would possession merely on paper be enough. What the Act contemplates as a necessary condition of vesting of the land in the Government is the taking of actual possession of the land. How such possession may be taken would depend on the nature of the land. Such possession would have to be taken as the nature of the land admits of. There can be no hard a ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ay not be possible to take physical possession of each and every parcel of the land and it would be sufficient that symbolic possession is taken by preparing an appropriate document in the presence of independent witnesses and getting their signatures. Even subsequent utilization of a portion of acquired land for public purpose was still sufficient to prove taking possession. This Court in Banda Development Authority (supra) has considered various decisions and laid down thus: 37. The principles which can be culled out from the above-noted judgments are: i) No hard and fast rule can be laid down as to what act would constitute taking of possession of the acquired land. ii) If the acquired land is vacant, the act of the concerned State authority to go to the spot and prepare a panchnama will ordinarily be treated as sufficient to constitute taking of possession. iii) If crop is standing on the acquired land or building/structure exists, mere going on the spot by the concerned authority will, by itself, be not sufficient for taking possession. Ordinarily, in such cases, the concerned authority will have to give notice to the occupier of the building/structure or the pe ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... is only an offer on behalf of the State. If compensation was accepted without protest, it binds such party but subject to Section 28A. Possession of the acquired land would be taken only by way of a memorandum, Panchanama, which is a legally accepted norm. It would not be possible to take any physical possession. Therefore, subsequent continuation, if any, had by the erstwhile owner is only illegal or unlawful possession which does not bind the Government nor vested under Section 16 divested in the illegal occupant. Considered from this perspective, we hold that the High Court was not justified in interfering with the award. 87(e). In Balmokand Khatri Educational and Industrial Trust v. State of Punjab (1996) 4 SCC 212 it was observed that it is difficult to take physical possession of land under compulsory acquisition. The normal rule of taking possession is drafting the Panchnama in the presence of Panchas, is accepted mode of taking possession of land. This Court observed: 4. It is seen that the entire gamut of the acquisition proceedings stood completed by April 17, 1976, by which date possession of the land had been taken. No doubt, Shri Parekh has contended that ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... cluding the Appellant's land and possession thereof could not have been taken without giving notice to the landowners. That apart, it was humanly impossible to give notice to large number of persons on the same day and take actual possession of land comprised in various survey numbers (total measuring 214 Acres 5 Kanals and 2 Marlas). This Court has laid down that since the land was lying fallow with no crop on it, the Tehsildar going on the spot and inspecting the land was enough to constitute taking possession. No notice was required to be given to the occupant of the land. 87(h). In Sita Ram Bhandar Society, New Delhi v. Lieutenant Governor, Government of NCT, Delhi Ors . (2009) 10 SCC 501, this Court observed that when possession is to be taken of large tract of land then it is permissible to have possession by drawing Panchnama. 87(i). In Om Prakash Verma Ors. v. State of Andhra Pradesh Ors. (2010) 13 SCC 158, this Court observed: 85. As pointed out earlier, the expression `civil appeals are allowed' carry only one meaning, i.e., the judgment of the High Court is set aside and the writ petitions are dismissed. Moreover, the determination of ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... sible mode . (emphasis supplied) 87(k). However, view has been taken in Velaxan Kumar v. Union of India Ors. (2015) 4 SCC 325 that actual physical possession is required to be taken and the court has seen the photographs to hold that possession was not taken. The view taken in Velaxan Kumar (supra) cannot be said to be correct and in accordance with law. Drawing of Panchnama is the accepted mode of taking possession and once Panchnama has been drawn in the presence of witnesses, in case Panchnama has been signed by official witnesses as to its correctness as there is presumption of correctness of the official act under section 114 of the Act of 2013. A photograph cannot show actual/ legal possession much less proof of possession as person may enter/re-enter by committing trespass to have photographed. That would not negate the proceedings held for taking possession and drawing panchnama. 87(l). In Raghbir Singh Sehrawat (supra) also the observations have been made that it was not possible to take possession of the entire land in a day, cannot be accepted. The State is not going to put their own persons/ police/ or other officials to possess the land. Thus the m ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... thereafter taking possession in presence of independent witnesses and in spite of refusal by the owner did not mean that possession of the has not been taken. If acquisition is of a large tract of land, it would not be possible to take physical possession of each and every parcel of such land. Taking symbolic possession, by preparing an appropriate document, in presence of independent witnesses, was sufficient. Where urgency clause was invoked and substantial portion of land was acquired or utilized in furtherance of the particular public purpose, taking of possession was presumed. Utilization of a major portion of acquired land for public purpose was itself sufficient to prove taking over possession. 89. We find that in Velaxan Kumar versus Union of India [(2015) 4 SCC 325], the Court held that Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act being a benevolent provision, even though possession had been taken, but if due procedure was not followed and, the photographs showed that the landowners were in possession, the proceedings would lapse. Such a view, in our opinion, is contrary to the settled law as referred to in Banda Development Authority (supra). The same will, accordingly, stand o ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... m at this belated juncture, it would place the Estate Authority in a position in which it would not be reasonable to place them; and that in such cases, lapse of time and delay are one of the most material considerations. The Court s observations in Mahavir s case (supra) are extracted hereunder: 15. In U.P. State Jal Nigam Anr. v. Jaswant Singh Anr . (2006) 11 SCC 464 this court has observed that in determining whether there has been delay so as to amount to laches in case petitioner/claimant is aware of the violation of the right, where a remedy by his conduct tantamount to waiver of it or where, by his conduct or neglect, though not waiving the remedy, he has put the other party in a position in which it would not be reasonable to place him if the remedy were afterwards to be asserted. In such cases lapse of time and delay are most material. Upon these considerations rests the doctrine of laches. 16. The Constitution Bench of this court in Rabindranath Bose Ors. v. Union of India Ors. (1970) 1 SCC 84 has observed: 32 we are of the view that no relief should be given to petitioners who, without any reasonable explanation, approach this Court under Article 3 ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... tion 10(4A) prescribing a time limit of six months, should be interpreted as reviving all stale and dead claims. 30. The object of Section 10(4A) is to enable workmen to apply directly to the Labour Court for adjudication of disputes relating to termination, without going through the laborious process of seeking a reference under Section 10(1) of ID Act. The Legislative intent was not to revive stale or non-existing claims. Section 10(4A) clearly requires that a workman who wants to directly approach the Labour Court should do so within six months from the date of communication of the order. Then come the words or the date of commencement of the Industrial Disputes (Karnataka Amendment) Act, 1987, whichever is later . The reason for these words is obvious. In cases where the cause of action arose prior to 7.4.1988, some additional time had to be provided to make the provisions effective. Let us take the example of a workman who had received the termination order on 10-10-1987. If Section 10(4A), which come into effect on 7.4.1988, had merely stated that the application had to be filed within six months from the date of communication, he had to file the application before 10- ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... of 90 days after the application. The position is settled by the decision of this Court in The Addl. Spl. Land Acquisition Officer, Bangalore v. Thakoredas, Major and Ors., AIR 1994 SC 2227 It was held: 3. Admittedly, the cause of action for seeking a reference had arisen on the date of service of the award under Section 12(2) of the Act. Within 90 days from the date of the service of notice, the respondents made the application requesting the Deputy Commissioner to refer the cases to the Civil Court under Section 18. Under the amended sub-section 3(a)of the Act, the Deputy Commissioner shall, within 90 days from September 1, 1970 make reference under Section 18 to the Civil Court which he failed to do. Consequently, by operation of subsection 3(b) with the expiry of the aforestated 90 days, the cause of action had accrued to the respondents to make an application to the Civil Court with a prayer to direct the Deputy Commissioner to make a reference. There is no period of limitation prescribed in subsection 3(b) to make that application but it should be done within limitation prescribed by the Schedule to the Limitation Act. Since no Article expressly prescribed the limitati ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... nstant case, qua the re-opening of stale claims under section 24 of the 2013 Act, no Johnny come lately can be permitted to assert that he is in possession (claiming that physical possession has not been taken away from him), when such assertion has not been made for decades together. Such claims would not be revived after the person has slept over them; the courts must not condone sudden wakefulness from such slumber, especially in relation to claims over open pieces of land, and even houses/structures, when the person may have illegally reentered into the possession or may have committed trespass. Thus, for the aforesaid reasons, such claims cannot be entertained or adjudicated under section 24 of the 2013 Act. 98. In our considered opinion section 24 cannot be used to revive the dead or stale claims and the matters, which have been contested up to this Court or even in the High Court having lost the cases or where reference has been sought for enhancement of the compensation. Compensation obtained and still it is urged that physical possession has not been taken from them, such claims cannot be entertained under the guise of section 24(2). We have come across the cases in w ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... and V have been referred to in Yogesh Neema Ors. v. State of M.P. Ors . (supra) by this Court relating to correctness of the decision in Shree Balaji Nagar Residential Association v. State of Tamil Nadu (supra) and conscious omission referred in para 11 of the said judgment makes any substantial difference to the legal position with regard to the exclusion or inclusion of the period covered by an interim order of the Court and applicability of the principle of actus curiae neminem gravabit and its effect on Section 24(3) of Act of 2013. 102. In Yogesh Kumar Ors. v. State of M.P. , this Court has doubted the correctness of decision in Shree Balaji Nagar Residential Association (supra) in which this Court has observed: 11. From a plain reading of Section 24 of the 2013 Act, it is clear that Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act does not exclude any period during which the land acquisition proceedings might have remained stayed on account of stay or injunction granted by any Court. In the same Act, the proviso to Section 19(7) in the context of limitation for publication of declaration under Section 19(1) and the Explanation to Section 69(2) for working out the market ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... r Ors. v. State of Madhya Pradesh and Ors . while referring the matter to the larger Bench has observed that in Union of India Anr. v. Shiv Raj (supra), there is no view expressed on the question whether the period during which the award had remained stayed, should be excluded for the purpose of consideration of the provisions of section 24(2) of the Act of 1894. A doubt has been expressed as to the correctness of the decision in Shree Balaji (supra) on the ground that it is an established principle of law that the act of court cannot be construed to cause prejudice to any of the contesting parties in litigation which is expressed in the maxim actus curiae neminem gravabit . EFFECT OF INTERIM ORDER OF A COURT 103. It was contended on behalf of the landowners that there was interim stay only with respect to obtaining the possession and not with respect to payment of compensation. Thus compensation ought to have been paid. While raising aforesaid submission the basic concept of acquisition under 1894 Act is ignored and overlooked as right to receive compensation is a statutory right and that comes into being only when the Government takes possession of the proper ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ion under Section 6 vis-a-vis the writ petitioners therein. The question thus arise for consideration is: whether the stay obtained by some of the persons who prohibited the respondents from publication of the declaration under Section 6 would equally be extendible to the cases relating to the appellants? We proceed on the premise that the appellants had not obtained any stay of the publication of the declaration but since the High Court in some of the cases has, in fact, prohibited them as extracted hereinbefore, from publication of the declaration, necessarily, when the Court has not restricted the declaration in the impugned orders in support of the petitioners therein, the officers had to hold back their hands till the matters are disposed of. In fact, this Court has given extended meaning to the orders of stay or proceeding in various cases, namely, Yusufbhai Noormohmed Nendoliya v. State of Gujarat and Anr. AIR1991SC2153;Hansraj Jain v. State of Maharashtra and Ors. (1993) 4 JT 360; Sangappa Gurulingappa Sajjan v. State of Kamataka and Ors. (1994) 4 SCC 145; Gandhi Grah Nirman Sahkari Samiti Ltd. Etc. Etc. v. State of Rajasthan and Ors.JT(1993) 3 194; G. Narayanaswamy Reddy ( ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... , while referring to Atma Ram Mittal v. Ishwar Singh Punia (1988) 4 SCC 284, had observed: 17. It was argued that the words 'commencement of this Act' should be construed to mean the date on which the moratorium period expired and the Act became applicable to the demised buildings. Such a view would require this Court to give different meanings to the same expression appearing at two places in the same section. The words 'on the date of commencement of this Act' in relation to the pendency of the suit would mean 15th July 1972 as held in Om Prakash Gupta (supra) but the words 'from such date of commencement' appearing immediately thereafter in relation to the deposit to be made would have to be construed as the date of actual application of the act at a date subsequent to 15th July 1972. Ordinarily the rule of construction is that the same expression where it appears more than once in the same statute, more so in the same provision, must receive the same meaning unless the context suggests otherwise Besides, such an interpretation would render the use of prefix 'such' before the word 'commencement' redundant. Thirdly such an interpre ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... cts the procedure is presumed to be retrospective unless amending act provides otherwise. We have carefully looked into new substituted section 15 brought in the parent Act by Amendment Act 1995 but do not find it either expressly or by necessary implication retrospective in operation which may affect the right of the parties on the date of adjudication of suit and the same is required to be taken into consideration by the appellate Court. In Shanti Devi (Smt) and another vs. Hukum Chand AIR 1996 SC 3525 this Court had occasion to interpret the substituted section 15 with which we are concerned and held that on a plain reading of section 15 it is clear that it has been introduced prospectively and there is no question of such section affecting in any manner the judgment and decree passed in the suit for pre-emption affirmed by the High Court in the second appeal. We are respectfully in agreement with the view expressed in the said decision and hold that the substituted Section 15 in the absence of anything in it to show that it is retrospective, does not affect the right of the parties which accrued to them on the date of suit or on the date of passing of the decree by the Court of ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... t it is necessary so to do in the interests of justice. 37. We are inclined to take this view also because there has to be some amount of certainty or definiteness in matters of limitation relating to criminal offences. If, as stated by this Court, taking cognizance is application of mind by the Magistrate to the suspected offence, the subjective element comes in. Whether a Magistrate has taken cognizance or not will depend on facts and circumstances of each case. A diligent complainant or the prosecuting agency which promptly files the complaint or initiates prosecution would be severely prejudiced if it is held that the relevant point for computing limitation would be the date on which the Magistrate takes cognizance. The complainant or the prosecuting agency would be entirely left at the mercy of the Magistrate, who may take cognizance after the limitation period because of several reasons; systemic or otherwise. It cannot be the intention of the legislature to throw a diligent complainant out of the court in this manner. Besides it must be noted that the complainant approaches the court for redressal of his grievance. He wants action to be taken against the perpetrators of c ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... SUS: 108. It was urged that there was casus omissus while not excluding the period of interim stay in the provisions of section 24. While Parliamentary Committee discussed the matter, Delhi Government has put forward its case that the period spent during the stay should be excluded and such provision be inserted in section 24. Later on, by way of Ordinance it was to be incorporated as the second proviso, the Ordinance has lapsed. It was also urged that it is a case of casus omissus as wherever the legislature wanted exclusion of stay period in section 19(7) of the Act of 2013, specific provision has been made for exclusion of the period spent during the currency of stay and injunction order. Section 19 of the new Act corresponds to section 6 of the Act of 1894. It was also urged that there is also a provision made in the Explanation appended to section 69(2) to exclude the period spent during the stay/injunction. Section 69 deals with determination of amount of compensation to be awarded and interest thereupon. 109. We have gone through the Minutes of the Parliamentary Committee; it has simply noted the views of the concerned Government/authorities. The report of the ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... were not considered. Thus, they cannot be said to be laying down the correct law. 111. The landowners placed reliance on a decision of this Court, rendered in Padma Sundara Rao (Dead) Ors. v. State of Tamil Nadu Ors. , (2002) 3 SCC 533, in which this court considered casus omissus and observed: 12. The rival pleas regarding re-writing of statute and casus omissus need careful consideration. It is well settled principle in law that the Court cannot read anything into a statutory provision which is plain and unambiguous. A statute is an edict of the legislature. The language employed in a statute is the determinative factor of legislative intent. The first and primary rule of construction is that the intention of the Legislation must be found in the words used by the Legislature itself. The question is not what may be supposed and has been intended but what has been said. Statutes should be construed not as theorems of Euclid . Judge Learned Hand said, but words must be construed with some imagination of the purposes which lie behind them . (See Lehigh Valley Coal Co. v. Yensavage 218 FR 547). The view was reiterated in Union of India and Ors. v. Filip Tiago De Gama of ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ble result , said Danckwerts, L.J., in Artemiou v. Procopiou (1966 1 QB 878), is not to be imputed to a statute if there is some other construction available . Where to apply words literally would defeat the obvious intention of the legislation and produce a wholly unreasonable result we must do some violence to the words and so achieve that obvious intention and produce a rational construction. [Per Lord Reid in Luke v. I.R.C. 1966 AC 557 where at p. 577 he also observed: this is not a new problem, though our standard of drafting is such that it rarely emerges .] 16. The plea relating to applicability of the stare decisis principles is clearly unacceptable. The decision in K. Chinnathambi Gounder (supra) was rendered on 22.6.1979 i.e. much prior to the amendment by 1984 Act. If the Legislature intended to give a new lease of life in those cases where the declaration under Section 6 is quashed, there is no reason why it could not have done so by specifically providing for it. The fact that legislature specifically provided for periods covered by orders of stay or injunction clearly shows that no other period was intended to be excluded and that there is no scope for provid ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... in Union of India v. Sicom Limited Ors. (2009) 2 SCC 121. This court has observed that the statutory provision would prevail upon the common law principles thus: 9. Generally, the rights of the crown to recover the debt would prevail over the right of a subject. Crown debt means the debts due to the State or the king; debts which a prerogative entitles the Crown to claim priority for before all other creditors. [See Advanced Law Lexicon by P. Ramanatha Aiyar (3rd Edn.) p. 1147]. Such creditors, however, must be held to mean unsecured creditors. Principle of Crown debt as such pertains to the common law principle. A common law which is a law within the meaning of Article 13 of the Constitution is saved in terms of Article 372 thereof. Those principles of common law, thus, which were existing at the time of coming into force of the Constitution of India are saved by reason of the aforementioned provision. A debt which is secured or which by reason of the provisions of a statute becomes the first charge over the property having regard to the plain meaning of Article 372 of the Constitution of India must be held to prevail over the Crown debt which is an unsecured one. 10. I ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... in the Court called for its approval- the maxim 'expressiouniusestexclusioalterius' has been pressed upon us. I agree with what is said in the Court below by Wills J, about this maxim. It is often a valuable servant, but a dangerous master to follow in the construction of statutes of documents. The exclusio is often the result of inadvertence or accident, and the maxim ought not to be applied, when its application having regard to the subject matter to which it is to be applied, leads to inconsistency or injustice. In my opinion, the application of the maxim here would lead to inconsistency and injustice, and would make Section 14(1) of the Act of 1920 uncertain and capricious in its operation. (emphasis supplied) 116. In Assistant A.C.E., Calcutta versus National Tobacco Co. Ltd. of India Ltd , (1972) 2 SCC 560, it was held: 30. The question whether there was or was not an implied power to hold an enquiry in the circumstances of the case before us, in view of the provisions of Section 4 of the Act read with Rule 10-A of the Central Excise Rule, was not examined by the Calcutta High Court because it erroneously shut out consideration of the meaning and appli ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ions. Further, it is also observed, that repeatedly, successive writ applications have also been filed by the persons who have purchased the property after issuance of notification under section 4 and, in some instances, even after passing of the award, possession taken and when the land has absolutely vested in the State Government, that such persons are calling into question the land acquisition. We have come across several cases when the challenges to acquisition have been negatived right up to this court but, undeterred by the same, fresh round of litigation is, thereafter, started again, with the cause again being agitated either by the same persons or by some other such purchasers. It has come to our notice that now, after the coming into force of the Act of 2013, unsavory attempts are being made to grossly misuse the process of law by moving such petitions, and asserting therein that though they themselves might not have accepted the compensation, and have refused to accept the same, but, since it has not been paid to them , by making deposit in court, or they have remained in the actual possession of the land, though Panchnama of taking possession might have been drawn, as ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e open Court upto 16.5.1995 till 4.15 P.M. (working hours of the Court) in the manner prescribed by Rule 6 (supra) either to the Judge or the Bench as the case may be to save the period of limitation. That, however, was not done. However, we cannot ignore that the situation in the present case was not of the making of the appellant. Neither the designated election Judge before whom the election petition could be formally presented in the open Court nor the Bench hearing civil applications and motions was admittedly available on 16.5.1995 after 3.15 P.M., after the Obituary Reference since admittedly the Chief Justice of the High Court had declared that the Court shall not sit for the rest of the day after 3.15 P.M. Law does not expect a party to do the impossible-Impossible nulla obligation est--As in the instant case, the election petition could not be filed on 16.5.1995 during the Court hours, as far all intent and purposes, the Court was closed on 16.5.1995 after 3.15 P.M. 119. In Mohd Gazi v. State of Madhya Pradesh (2000) 4 SCC 342 this court has laid down thus: 6. In the facts and circumstances of the case the maxim of equity, namely, actus curiae neminem grava ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... excuse him (t) : and though impossibility of performance is, in general, no excuse for not performing an obligation which a party has expressly undertaken by contract, yet when the obligation is one implied by law, impossibility of performance is a good excuse. Thus in a case in which consignees of a cargo were prevented from unloading a ship promptly by reason of a dock strike , the Court, after holding that in the absence of an express agreement to unload in a specified time there was implied obligation to unload within a reasonable time, held that the maxim lax non cogit ad impossibilia applied, and Lindley, L.J., said: We have to do with implied obligations, and I am not aware of any case in which an obligation to pay damages is ever cast by implication upon a person for not doing that which is rendered impossible by causes beyond his control . (emphasis supplied) 122. In HUDA v. Babeswar Kanhar (2005) 1 SCC 191 this court has held: 5. What is stipulated in Clause-4 of the letter dated 30.10.2001 is a communication regarding refusal to accept the allotment. This was done on 28.11.2001. Respondent No. 1 cannot be put to loss for the closure of the office of HUDA on ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... it appears that the performance of the formalities prescribed by a statute has been rendered impossible by circumstances over which the persons interested had no control, like the act of God, the circumstances will be taken as a valid excuse. Where the act of God prevents the compliance of the words of a statute, the statutory provision is not denuded of its mandatory character because of supervening impossibility caused by the act of God. (Sec Broom's Legal Maxims 10th Edition at pp. 1962-63 and Craies on Statute Law 6th Ed. p. 268) . (emphasis supplied) 124. In Standard Chartered Bank v. Directorate of Enforcement, AIR 2005 (2) SC 2622, this court held that there is an acceptable legal maxim that law does not compel a man to do that which cannot possibly be performed impotentia excusat legem . Basic principle of law is that law compels no impossibility. It was urged that in case the landowners create such circumstances, which renders impossible performance of the statutorily prescribed formalities, such landowners couldn t take advantage of their own act or wrong. 125. In our opinion, the maxims regarding the impossibility of performance of an act may not be ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... dvantage of his own wrong is, in principle, closely allied to the maxim, ex dolo malo non oritur action, which is likewise of general application, and will be treated of hereafter in Chapter IX. The latter maxim is, indeed, included in that above noticed; for it is clear, that since a man cannot be permitted to take advantage of his own wrong, he will not be allowed to found a claim upon his own iniquity: nemo ex proprio dolo consequitur actionem; and, as before observed, frustra legis auxilium quaerit qui in legem committit (g) DOCTRINE OF ACTUS CURIAE NEMINEM GRAVABIT. 128. Coupled with aforesaid maxim we have to consider applicability of maxim actus curiae neminem gravabit to the question. In the book titled Selection of Legal Maxims by Herbert Broom, the author about the said maxim has observed: This maxim is founded upon justice and good sense; and affords a safe and certain guide for the administration of the law (b). In virtue of it, where a case stands over for argument on account of the multiplicity of business in the Court, or for judgment from the intricacy of the question, the party ought not to be prejudiced by that delay, but should be a ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... actus curiae neminem gravabit comes to the rescue of the opposite party who has suffered due to interim order and was unable to take steps. The principle that the act of the court shall prejudice no one is clearly applicable in such a case. The court is under an obligation to undo a wrong done to a party by the act of the court and to make restitution under inherent powers. Thus any undeserved or unfair advantage gained by a party invoking the jurisdiction of the court must be neutralized, as institution of litigation cannot be permitted to confer any advantage on a suitor from the delayed action by the act of the court. Nor it was so contemplated by Section 24 of Act of 2013. It is not the policy of law that those who are litigating, obtained interim orders though ultimately their claim may not be tenable. Gain due to delay or tainted act is not permissible and sufferance of person who has abided by law is not permissible. The provisions of section 24 aim only at expeditious disposal of acquisition authorities, lethargy of authorities for five years or more is not tolerated by legislature the provision does not provide cover or protect such situation of pendency at lit ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... eld that no one can suffer from the act of the court and in case an interim order has been passed and petitioner takes advantage thereof and ultimately petition is found to be without merit and is dismissed, the interest of justice requires that any undeserved or unfair advantage gained by a party invoking the jurisdiction of the court must be neutralized. 131(d). This Court in Mahadeo Savlaram Shelke v. Pune Municipal Corporation (1995) 3 SCC 33 has observed that the court can under inherent jurisdiction ex debito justitiae has a duty to mitigate the damage suffered by the defendants by the act of the court. Such action is necessary to put a check on abuse of process of court. 131(e). In Amarjeet Singh v. Devi Ratan Ors. (2010) 1 SCC 417 this Court in Ramakrishna Verma has held that no person can suffer from the act of court and unfair advantage of interim order must be neutralized, the court observed: In Ram Krishna Verma v. State of U.P. , this Court examined the similar issue while placing reliance upon its earlier judgment in Grindlays Bank Ltd. v. ITO, (1980) 2 SCC 191, and held that no person can suffer from the act of the Court and in case an interi ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... they cannot be allowed to retain the benefit earned by them under the interim orders of the Court. The High Court has rightly held the appellants liable to be placed in the same position in which they would have been if this Court would not have protected them by issuing interim orders . All that the State Government is demanding from the appellants is the price of the minor minerals. Rent, royalty or tax has already been recovered by the State Government and, therefore, there is no demand under that Head. No penal proceedings, much less any criminal proceedings, have been initiated against the appellants. It is absolutely incorrect to contend that the appellants are being asked to pay any penalty or are being subjected to any penal action. It is not the case of the appellants that they are being asked to pay a price more than what they have realised from the exports or that the price appointed by the respondent State is in any manner arbitrary or unreasonable .. (emphasis supplied) 131(g). The principle Actus Curia Neminem Gravabit is essence of administration of law and good sense. It has been considered in A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak and Ors ., AIR 1988 SC 1531 ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... 6th February 1984 as mentioned hereinbefore without conscious awareness of the exclusive jurisdiction of the Special Courts under the 1952 Act and that being the only procedure established by law, there can be no deviation from the terms of Article 21 of the Constitution of India. That is the only procedure under which it should have been guided. By reason of giving the directions on 16th February 1984 this Court had also unintentionally caused the appellant the denial of rights under Article 14 of the Constitution by denying him the equal protection of law by being singled out for a special procedure not provided for by law. When these factors are brought to the notice of this Court, even if there are any technicalities this Court should not feel shackled and decline to rectify that injustice or otherwise the injustice noticed will remain forever a blot on justice. It has been said long time ago that Actus Curiae Neminem Gravabit - an act of the Court shall prejudice no man. This maxim is founded upon justice and good sense and affords a safe and certain guide for the administration of the law. 104. This being the apex Court, no litigant has any opportunity of approaching any ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ven certain offences such as Section 384 or 465 of the Indian Penal Code, which have lesser punishment may have serious social consequences. Provision is, therefore, made for condonation of delay. Treating date of filing of complaint or date of initiation of proceedings as the relevant date for computing limitation under Section 468 of the Code is supported by the legal maxim 'actus curiae neminem gravabit' which means that the act of court shall prejudice no man. It bears repetition to state that the court's inaction in taking cognizance i.e. court's inaction in applying mind to the suspected offence should not be allowed to cause prejudice to a diligent complainant. Chapter XXXVI thus presents the interplay of these three legal maxims. Provisions of this Chapter, however, are not interpreted solely on the basis of these maxims. They only serve as guiding principles. (emphasis supplied) 132. Landowners have also placed reliance on Suptd. of Taxes, Dhubri Ors. v. Assam Jute Supply Ltd Ors. (1976) 1 SCC 766: 17. The first contention on behalf of the State that it became impossible for the State to issue notice under Section 7(2) of the New Act within ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... plated under section 7(2) of the said Act. The case turned on its own facts. 133. Reliance has also been placed in this regard on Neeraj Kumar Sainy Ors. v. State of UP Ors. , (2017) SCC Online SC 258, wherein this court has observed: 31. It is noticeable from the aforesaid passage that the interpretation was made in accordance with the Code and the legal maxim was taken as a guiding principle. Needless to say, it is well settled in law that no one should suffer any prejudice because of the act of the court. The authorities that we have referred to dealt with the different factual expositions. The legal maxim that has been taken recourse to cannot operate in a vacuum. It has to get the sustenance from the facts. As is manifest, after the admissions were over as per the direction of this Court, the Appellants, who seemed to have resigned to their fate, woke up to have control over the events forgetting that the law does not assist the non-vigilant. One cannot indulge in luxury of lethargy, possibly nurturing the feeling that forgetting is a virtue, and thereafter, when the time has slipped through, for it waits for none, wake up and take shelter under the maxim actu ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ch a situation, and whether such period is to be excluded from within the purview of Section 24 of the Act of 2013, where the authorities have been, during the interregnum of a litigation, brought at the instance of landowner/beneficiary, restrained by the act of the court, interdicting the steps which would have been taken by the authorities but for such an interim order or conduct of the litigant. 137. In case of possession could not be taken, or compensation could not be paid or deposited, due to cover of courts order or conduct of landowner, such cases provision of lapse cannot be invoked. Section 24(2), a policy of the law is not to benefit a litigant or confer undeserving benefit by involving in the lis and to reap fruits on the basis of possession on illegal basis without any right and often lis is filed in land acquisition cases one after the other and intendment of law is not to treat law-abiding incumbents differently. Operation of law and beneficial provisions of law in the Act of 2013 are not meant to benefit litigants and to permit them to reap the fruits of unworthy or frivolous litigation; and, if there is any merit in such a lis, the challenge therein must ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... s referring to compensation for injury done. Often, the result in either meaning of the term would be the same. ..... Unjust impoverishment, as well as unjust enrichment, is a ground for restitution. If the defendant is guilty of a non-tortuous misrepresentation, the measure of recovery is not rigid but, as in other cases of restitution, such factors as relative fault, the agreed upon risks, and the fairness of alternative risk allocations not agreed upon and not attributable to the fault of either party need to be weighed. The principle of restitution has been statutorily recognized in Section 144 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Section 144 of the C.P.C. speaks not only of a decree being varied, reversed, set aside or modified but also includes an order on par with a decree. The scope of the provision is wide enough so as to include therein almost all the kinds of variation, reversal, setting aside or modification of a decree or order. The interim order passed by the Court merges into a final decision. The validity of an interim order, passed in favour of a party, stands reversed in the event of final decision going against the party successful at the interim stage ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e Court of appeal, but the act of the Court as a whole from the lowest court which entertains jurisdiction over the matter up to the highest Court which finally disposes of the case . This is also on the principle that a wrong order should not be perpetuated by keeping it alive and respecting it, A.A. Nadar v. S.P. Rathinasami, (1971) 1 MLJ 220 . In the exercise of such inherent power the Courts have applied the principles of restitution to myriad situations not strictly falling within the terms of Section 144. 28. That no one shall suffer by an act of the court is not a rule confined to an erroneous act of the court; the 'act of the court' embraces within its sweep all such acts as to which the court may form an opinion in any legal proceedings that the court would not have so acted had it been correctly apprised of the facts and the law. The factor attracting applicability of restitution is not the act of the Court being wrongful or a mistake or error committed by the Court; the test is whether on account of an act of the party persuading the Court to pass an order held at the end as not sustainable, has resulted in one party gaining an advantage which it would not hav ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... on is virtually a common law principle and it is a remedy against unjust enrichment or unjust benefit. The core of the concept lies in the conscience of the Court which prevents a party from retaining money or some benefit derived from another which he has received by way of an erroneous decree of Court. Such remedy in English Law is generally different from a remedy in contract or in tort and falls within a third category of common law remedy which is called quasi-contract or restitution. 62. If we analyze the concept of restitution one thing emerges clearly that the obligation to restitute lies on the person or the authority that has received unjust enrichment or unjust benefit (See Halsbury's Laws of England, Fourth Edition, Volume 9, page 434). 63. If we look at Restatement of the Law of Restitution by American Law Institute (1937 American Law Institute Publishers, St. Paul) we get that a person is enriched if he has received a benefit and similarly a person is unjustly enriched if the retention of the benefit would be unjust. Now the question is what constitutes a benefit. A person confers benefit upon another if he gives to the other possession of or some other inte ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... Ors. v. State of U.P. and Ors. (1992) 2 SCC 620 this Court observed as under: The 50 operators including the Appellants/ private operators have been running their stage carriages by blatant abuse of the process of the court by delaying the hearing as directed in JeevanNathBahl's case and the High Court earlier thereto. As a fact, on the expiry of the initial period of grant after Sept. 29, 1959, they lost the right to obtain renewal or to ply their vehicles, as this Court declared the scheme to be operative. However, by sheer abuse of the process of law, they are continuing to ply their vehicles pending hearing of the objections. This Court in Grindlays Bank Ltd. v. Income-tax Officer - [1990] 2 SCC 191 held that the High Court while exercising its power under Article 226 the interest of justice requires that any undeserved or unfair advantage gained by a party invoking the jurisdiction of the court must be neutralised. It was further held that the institution of the litigation by it should not be permitted to confer an unfair advantage on the party responsible for it. In the light of that law and in view of the power under Article 142(1) of the Constitution this Court, w ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... , Court may appoint Receiver and direct the person who is holding over the property to act as an agent of the Receiver with a direction to deposit the royalty amount fixed by the Receiver or pass such other order which may meet the interest of justice. This may prevent further injury to the Plaintiff in whose favour decree is passed and to protect the property including further alienation. 174. In Padmawati v. Harijan Sewak Sangh CM (Main) No. 449 of 2002 decided by the Delhi High Court on 6.11.2008, the court held as under: 6. The case at hand shows that frivolous defences and frivolous litigation is a calculated venture involving no risks situation. You have only to engage professionals to prolong the litigation so as to deprive the rights of a person and enjoy the fruits of illegalities. I consider that in such cases where Court finds that using the Courts as a tool, a litigant has perpetuated illegalities or has perpetuated an illegal possession, the Court must impose costs on such litigants which should be equal to the benefits derived by the litigant and harm and deprivation suffered by the rightful person so as to check the frivolous litigation and prevent the people ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... party concerned is relegated to the position which existed prior to the filing of the petition in the Court which had granted the stay. Grant of stay does not automatically amount to extension of a statutory protection. 188. In a relatively recent judgment of this Court in Amarjeet Singh and Ors. v. Devi Ratan and Ors. (2010) 1 SCC 417 the Court in para 17 of the judgment observed as under: (SCC pp.422-23) 17. No litigant can derive any benefit from mere pendency of case in a court of law, as the interim order always merges in the final order to be passed in the case and if the writ petition is ultimately dismissed, the interim order stands nullified automatically. A party cannot be allowed to take any benefit of its own wrongs by getting an interim order and thereafter blame the court. The fact that the writ is found, ultimately, devoid of any merit, shows that a frivolous writ petition had been filed. The maxim actus curiae neminem gravabit, which means that the act of the court shall prejudice no one, becomes applicable in such a case . In such a fact situation the court is under an obligation to undo the wrong done to a party by the act of the court. Thus, any undes ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... uriae neminem gravabit ' i.e. an act of Court shall prejudice no man is an important one. The maxim is founded upon justice and good sense, and affords a safe and certain guide for the administration of the law , said Cresswell J. in Freeman v. Tranah (12 C.B. 406). An unintentional mistake of the Court which may prejudice the cause of any party must and alone could be rectified. The maxim of equity, namely, actus curiae neminem gravabit : an act of court shall prejudice no man, is founded upon justice and good sense which serves a safe and certain guide for the administration of law. The other relevant maxim is, lex non cogit ad impossibilia: the law does not compel a man to do what he cannot possibly perform. The law itself and its administration is understood to disclaim as it does in its general aphorisms, all intention of compelling impossibilities, and the administration of law must adopt that general exception in the consideration of particular cases. (See: M/s U.P.S.R.T.C. v. lmtiaz Hussein (2006 (1) 800 380), ShaikhSalim Haji Abdul Khayumsab v. Kumar and Ors. (2006 (1) SCC 46), Mohammod Gazi v. State of M.P. and others (2000(4) SCC 342) and Gursharan Singh ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ge, obligation, liability, penalty, forfeiture or punishment as aforesaid, and any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced, and any such penalty, forfeiture or punishment may be imposed as if the repealing Act or Regulation had not been passed. 144. Thus, section 6 of the General Clauses Act provides that unless a different intention appears, the repeal shall not revive anything not in force. Section 6(b) provides that it would not affect any previous operation of any enactment so repealed or anything duly done or suffered thereunder. Section 6(e) provides that it will not affect any investigation, legal proceedings or remedy in respect of any such right, privilege, obligation, liability, penalty, forfeiture or punishment unless different intention appears, and any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted, or continued or enforced, and any such penalty, forfeiture or punishment may be imposed as if the repealing Act or Regulation had not been passed. The provisions of section 6 clearly save such proceedings and pending litigation has to be decided only on the basis of 1894 Act except as provided specific ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... r Section 26 over and above the compensation determined by the Collector/Land Acquisition Officer under Section 11 subsists until it is deposited into court. Propriovigore in case of further enhancement of the compensation on appeal under Section 54 to the extent of the said enhanced excess amount or part thereof, the liability subsists until it is deposited into court. The liability to pay interest ceases on the date on which the deposit into court is made with the amount of compensation so deposited. As held earlier, the computation of the interest should be calculated from the date of taking possession till date of payment or deposit in terms of Section 34 or deposit into court in terms of Section 28, as the case may be. 145(c). The question in aforesaid decisions was only with respect to liability to pay interest from the date of taking possession till the amount is paid or deposited. The decisions are only authority with respect to payment of interest under section 34 read with section 31. In Prem Nath Kapur (supra), the main question was how the appropriation of amount deposited towards cost price, an additional amount of interest has to be made. In that context a thr ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... dy discussed there is no discussion in said case with respect to the impact of the interim order of stay or litigation which has prevented the authorities from taking action in Shiv Raj (supra). 145(g). In Magnum Promoters Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India Ors . (2015) 3 SCC 327, Shree Balaji Nagar Residential Association (supra) and Pune Municipal Corpn . (supra) had been followed, for the reasons mentioned above, and apart from that, it was found by the court that possession of the building was not taken and the record did not indicate that it was ever taken. 145(h). In Karnail Kaur Ors. v. State of Punjab Ors . (2015) 3 SCC 206 the Amendment Ordinance to amend the Act of 2013 came up for consideration. The second proviso to section 24(2) to be introduced in Act was held to be prospective in operation. The correctness of the decision need not be further examined as the Ordinance itself has lapsed and for various other reason, we are of opinion that law, as it stands, has to be examined. In Karnail Kaur (supra), reliance was mainly placed upon Shree Balaji Nagar Residential Association (supra), Pune Municipal Corpn. (supra), Bharat Kumar (supra) and Bimla Devi ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ontained in section 24(1)(a) of the Act of 2013. There is no dispute with the proposition. 145(l). In Sharma Agro Industries v. State of Haryana Ors. , (2015) 3 SCC 341, decisions of this Court in Pune Municipal Corpn. (supra), Bimla Devi (supra), Shree Balaji Residential Association (supra) and Shiv Raj (supra) have been followed. It proceeds on the same reasoning as that of Pune Municipal Corpn . (supra). 145(m). In Pawan Kumar Aggarwal v. State of Punjab Ors . (2016) 7 SCC 614, decision in Karnail Kaur (supra) has been followed. In that case, there is not much discussion. Only the fact has been mentioned that the appellant has not been dispossessed, as such protection under section 24(2) was available. PRINCIPLE OF PER INCURIAM : 146. The concept of per incuriam signifies those decisions rendered in ignorance or forgetfulness of some inconsistent statutory provisions, or of some authority binding on the Court concerned. In order words, the concept means that a given decision is in disregard of the previous decisions of the Court itself, or that it was rendered in ignorance of the terms of an applicable statute or of a rule having the force ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ome authority binding on the Court concerned, so that in such cases some part of the decision or some step in the reasoning on which it is based, is found, on that account to be demonstrably wrong. See Morelle v. Wakeling [1955] 1 All E.R. 708. Also, see State of Orissa v. The Titaghur Paper Mills Co. Ltd. [1985]3SCR26 . We are of the opinion that in view of the clear provisions of Section 7(2) of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1952 and Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution, these directions were legally wrong. 47. In support of the contention that a direction to delete wholly the impugned direction of this Court be given, reliance was placed on Satyadhvan Ghoshal v. Deorajini Devi [1960] 3 SCR 590 . The ratio of the decision as it appears from pages 601 to 603 is that the judgment which does not terminate the proceedings, can be challenged in an appeal from final proceedings. It may be otherwise if subsequent proceedings were independent ones. (emphasis supplied) 147(c). In State of Uttar Pradesh v. Synthetics and Chemicals Ltd ., (1991) 4 SCC 139, as to per incuriam this court has observed: 40. 'Incuria literally means 'carelessness'. In practi ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... . (Vide: Tribhovandas Purshottamdas Thakkar v. Ratilal Motilal Patel and Ors . AIR 1968 SC 372; Sub-Committee of Judicial Accountability v. Union of India and Ors . (1992) 4 SCC 97; and State of Tripura v. Tripura Bar Association and Ors . (1998) 5 SCC 637). 18. In Rajasthan Public Service Commission and Anr. v. Harish Kumar Purohit and Ors. (2003) 5 SCC 480, this Court held that a bench must follow the decision of a coordinate bench and take the same view as has been taken earlier. The earlier decision of the coordinate bench is binding upon any latter coordinate bench deciding the same or similar issues. If the latter bench wants to take a different view than that taken by the earlier bench, the proper course is for it to refer the matter to a larger bench. 149. It was contended on behalf of the landowners that since the decisions of Pune Municipal Corporation as well as of Shivraj case (supra) are of Three Judges bench then propriety requires that the case should be referred to a Larger Bench. With respect to Shivraj (supra) it is apparent that no view has been expressed by the Division Bench making reference itself, as observed that upon reading the decision of ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... estion of taking possession or payment of compensation as per provisions contained in section 24(2). The provisions contained in section 24 could not be said to be applicable after quashing/lapse of the proceedings. Thus, when the provisions of section 24 were not attracted to the fact situation of the case in Pune Municipal Corporation (supra), the decision cannot be said to be an authority on a question which, in fact, did not arise for consideration of this court. Thus, the decision rendered on a question which was not germane to the case cannot be said to be a binding precedent it is obiter dicta and thus has to be ignored. 151. When the High Court has quashed the land acquisition in Pune Municipal Corporation (supra), as we have held that period of interim stay has to be excluded once the High Court has quashed the land acquisition in case it was illegally quashed, the maxim actus curiae neminem gravabit would come to the rescue for the acquiring body and it could not have said that acquisition had lapsed, thus there was no lapse under section 24(2). There was no question of taking possession or payment of compensation once the acquisition had been quashed. This c ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... t is the meaning of expression paid' as per various binding decisions of this court when the obligation to pay is complete as held in Straw Board Manufacturing Co. Ltd., Saharanpur v. Gobind (supra), Management of Delhi Transport Undertaking v. The Industrial Tribunal, Delhi Anr . (supra), Indian Oxygen Ltd. v. Narayan Bhoumik (supra) and the Benares State Bank Ltd. v. The Commissioner of Income Tax, Lucknow, (supra) and other decisions were not placed for consideration. 8. The binding decisions of the court as to the consequence of non-deposit in Hissar Improvement v. Smt. Rukmani Devi Anr . (supra), Kishan Das Ors. v. State of U.P. Ors . (supra) and Seshan Ors. v. Special Tehsildar Land Acquisition Officer, SPICOT, Pudukkottai (supra) etc. were not placed for consideration while deciding the case. 9. The maxim nullus commodum capere potest de injuria sua propria i.e. no man can take advantage of his own wrong of filing litigation and effect of refusal to receive compensation was not placed for consideration while deciding the aforesaid case. 10. There is no lapse of acquisition due to the non deposit of amount under the provisions of A ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... nt of compensation has been unconditionally tendered and it is refused, that would amount to payment and the obligation under section 31(1) stands discharged and that amounts to discharge of obligation of payment under section 24(2) of the Act of 2013 also and it is not open to the person who has refused to accept compensation, to urge that since it has not been deposited in court, acquisition has lapsed. Claimants/landowners after refusal, cannot take advantage of their own wrong and seek protection under the provisions of section 24(2). Q. No. II :- The normal mode of taking physical possession under the land acquisition cases is drawing of Panchnama as held in Banda Development Authority (supra). Q. No. III :- The provisions of section 24 of the Act of 2013, do not revive barred or stale claims such claims cannot be entertained. Q. No. IV :- Provisions of section 24(2) do not intend to cover the period spent during litigation and when the authorities have been disabled to act under section 24(2) due to the final or interim order of a court or otherwise, such period has to be excluded from the period of five years as provided in section 24(2) of the Act of 2013. The ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ead) through LRs. Ors.). To understand the real controversy to be determined in this question, it is better to have the facts set out in brief, as hereunder: The Indore Development Authority ( the IDA ), acquired land for the purpose of constructing a Ring Road and Link Road on the outskirts of Indore city. A notification under Section 4 (1) read with Section 17 (1) of the Land Acquisition Act, of 1894 (for brevity 1894 Act ) was issued on 23.12.1994. The compensation was deposited by the IDA with the Land Acquisition Collector. The landowners were informed to collect it, but they refused and did not take the compensation. Enquiry under section 5A was dispensed with. Declaration under section 6 was published on 17.3.1995 under the 2013 Act. Award was passed by the LAO on 14.03.1997. W.P. No.1182 of 1997 was filed seeking quashing of the acquisition proceedings. It was allowed on 28.8.1998 holding that the scheme lapsed on expiry of three years, and that enquiry under section 5A was illegally dispensed with. Letters Patent Appeal No.480 of 1998 was preferred before the Division Bench and on 29.01.2000 an order of status quo was passed. The LPA was dismissed as not m ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e no award under section 11 of the said Land Acquisition Act has been made, then, all provisions of this Act relating to the determination of compensation shall apply; or b) where an award under said section 11 has been made, then such proceedings shall continue under the provisions of the said Land Acquisition Act, as if the said Act has not been repealed. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), in case of land acquisition proceedings initiated under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (1 of 1894), where an award under the said section 11 has been made five years or more prior to the commencement of this Act but the physical possession of the land has not been taken or the compensation has not been paid the said proceedings shall be deemed to have lapsed and the appropriate Government, if it so chooses, shall initiate the proceedings of such land acquisition afresh in accordance with the provisions of this Act: Provided that where an award has been made and compensation in respect of a majority of land holding has not been deposited in the account of the beneficiaries, then, all beneficiaries specified in the notification for acquisition under section 4 of t ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ernate . - (1) If any money shall be deposited in Court under sub-section (2) of the last preceding section and it appears that the land in respect whereof the same was awarded belonged to any person who had no power to alienate the same, the Court shall- (a) order the money to be invested in the purchase of other lands to be held under the like title and conditions of ownership as the land in respect of which such money shall have been deposited, was held, or (b) if such purchase cannot be effected forthwith, then in such Government or other approved securities as the Court shall think fit; and shall direct the payment of the interest or other proceeds arising from such investment to the person or persons who would for the time being have been entitled to the possession of the said land, and such moneys shall remain so deposited and invested until the same be applied- (i) in the purchase of such other lands as aforesaid; or (ii) in payment to any person or persons becoming absolutely entitled thereto. (2) In all cases of moneys deposited to which this section applies, the Court shall order the costs of the following matters, including therein all reasonable charges ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ded that as the landowners did not appear on the notified date to accept compensation and did not file an application for a reference under Section 18 of the 2013 Act, the State deposited the compensation amount in the Treasury. The Court, on examining the rival contentions, interpreted Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act in light of Section 31 of the 2013 Act to hold that where the landowners do not accept compensation pursuant to the Collector s award, the compensation is paid only when it is deposited in Court . If compensation is not deposited in Court in such a case, it will not be considered as having been paid as per Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act, and the acquisition proceedings lapse (provided that the award was made five years or more prior to the commencement of the 2013 Act). The relevant paragraphs are extracted hereunder, 17. While enacting Section 24(2), Parliament definitely had in its view Section 31 of the 1894 Act. From that one thing is clear that it did not intend to equate the word paid to offered or tendered . But at the same time, we do not think that by use of the word paid , Parliament intended receipt of compensation by the landowners/persons inte ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... date on which the deposit into court is made with the amount of compensation so deposited .. Pune Municipal Corporation (supra) also relied on Ivo AgneloSantiamo Fernandes v. Government of Goa, (2011) 11 SCC 506 , which interpreted Section 34 of the 2013 Act in light of Prem Nath (supra) to hold that interest accrues on a deposit in the revenue account of the State until such compensation amount is deposited in Court. It held thus, 22. In the light of the abovesaid principle, we are of the view that the contentions of the respondents cannot be accepted. The Act requires that the interest be deposited in court, and the same has been upheld in Prem Nath Kapur (supra). 23. In the present case, the respondents did not deposit the amount in court, but in their revenue account and utilized the same. Even if the respondent State does pay the compensation to the claimants directly, and the same is not collected, the respondent State cannot then keep the said money with itself and utilize it. In such cases, after a reasonable period, if the claimants do not come forward to collect compensation, then it should be deposited in court by the State. Allowing the State to keep th ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... and compensation had neither been paid nor deposited before the appropriate forum. It stated as follows, 7. In our opinion though the award has been passed by the Land Acquisition Collector, they have not taken the physical possession of the land and have not paid the compensation to the appellant or had deposited the said compensation before an appropriate forum. The same rationale was adopted in Bimla Devi Ors. v. State of Haryana, (2014) 6 SCC 583 . In Vijay Latka v. State of Haryana, (2016) 12 SCC 487 , this Court extended the ratio of Pune Municipal Corporation (supra) to mean that the land owner is not required to come and receive the payment in cases of compulsory acquisition. It held as follows, 5. The contention of the learned counsel appearing for the respondents is that whoever approached the Haryana Urban Development Authority or the competent authority has been paid compensation and since the appellants failed to approach the quarters concerned for the compensation, they cannot be granted any relief. We find this contention difficult to appreciate. When a land is compulsorily acquired, it is for the requisitioning authority to make the payment and does ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ender has been outlined by this Court in Tata Cellular v. Union of India, (1994) 6 SCC 651 as follows, 69. A tender is an offer. It is something which invites and is communicated to notify acceptance. Broadly stated, the following are the requisites of a valid tender: 1. It must be unconditional. 2. Must be made at the proper place. 3. Must conform to the terms of obligation. 4. Must be made at the proper time. 5. Must be made in the proper form. 6. The person by whom the tender is made must be able and willing to perform his obligations. 7. There must be reasonable opportunity for inspection. 8. Tender must be made to the proper person. 9. It must be of full amount. 14. We are not entitled to read the words into an Act of Parliament unless clear reason for it is to be formed within the four corners of the Act itself. However, a statute is to be read as a whole. A statute has to be understood by making construction on all the parts together and not of one part only by itself. Every clause in a statute is to be construed with reference to the context and other clauses of the Act,as far as possible, to make a consistent enactment of the whole sta ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... acquisition. It would be sufficient if the compensation is deposited in respect of minimum holdings in the account for saving the acquisition. Since the proviso to sub-section 2 of Section 24 does not envisage lapsing of acquisition, even if the payment is not made but is deposited that too with regard to the beneficiaries of a minority of holdings, the same would lead to the inevitable conclusion that the word payment as found in sub-section 2 of Section 24 has a strong link or co-relation with the word deposit . A reading of sub-section 2 of Section 24 along with the proviso would make it clear that even if the compensation in respect of minority of the land holdings is deposited in the account of such minority beneficiaries, the acquisition does not lapse. At the most, every land-loser is entitled to the higher compensation as per the provisions of the 2013 Act. Since the proviso does not refer to the words payment of compensation and as the main provision i.e. sub-section 2 of Section 24 does not refer to the word deposit , the only interpretation that is possible is that, if either deposit is made in the Treasury in the name of minority holders or payment is made at lea ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ent of compensation will make State liable to pay interest as prescribed. In other words, in case the Collector does not deposit the amount of compensation in Court as contemplated under Section 31(2) of the 1894 Act, at the most the persons interested may be entitled to interest of 9% or 15% as the case may be. Such act of Collector depositing the amount in the Treasury and such act of Collector in not depositing the amount in Court as mandated in sub-section 2 of Section 31 may not result in extreme consequence of lapsing of acquisition. 18. Article 283(1) of the Constitution of India mandates that matters pertaining to custody of the Consolidated Fund of India and the Contingency Fund of India, the payment of moneys into such Funds, the withdrawal of moneys therefrom, the custody of public moneys other than those credited to such Funds received by the Government of India etc. shall be regulated by law made by the Parliament.Article 283(2) of the Constitution of India mandates that similar matters of the States Consolidated funds etc. are to be regulated by law made by the State Legislatures. States have framed rules pursuant to Article 283(2) of the Constitution of Ind ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... em, intimating also that no interest will be allowed, to them if they fail to appear. If they do not appear, and do not apply for reference to the Civil Court under Section 18, the officer shall after any further endeavour to secure their attendance that may seem desirable, cause the amounts due to be paid into the Treasury as Revenue deposits payable to the persons to whom they are respectively due and vouched for in the accompanying form (marked E). The officer shall also give notice to the payees of such deposits, the Treasury in which the deposits specifying have been made. .. . The Uttar Pradesh Rules for the Payment of Compensation for Land Taken Up Under the Land Acquisition Act I of 1894 read as follows, 6. In giving notice of the award under section 12(2) and tendering payment under section 31(1) to such of the persons interested as were not present personally or by their representatives when the award was made, the special officer shall require them to appear personally or by representatives by a certain date, to receive payment of the compensation awarded to them intimating also that no interest will be allowed to them if they fail to appear. If they do not appea ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ensation awarded to them, intimating also that no interest will be allowed to them if they fail to appear, if they do not appear and do not apply for a reference to the civil court Under Section 18, the officer shall after any further endeavours to secure their attendance that may seem desirable, cause the amounts due to be paid to the treasury as revenue deposited payable to the persons to whom they are respectively due and vouched for in the Form marked E below. The officer shall also give notice to the payees of such deposits, specifying the treasury in which the deposit has been made. .. 20. The Punjab Standing Order No. 28 of 1909 was considered by this Court in the case of Sukhbir Singh (supra) , wherein it was observed that the said Standing Order provides for five modes of payment of compensation. The last one, namely, the payment of compensation into the Treasury, is for cases where the landowners fail to appear to receive their compensation. When such payment is made into the Treasury, the landowners for whom the deposits are made are required to be served with a notice of the deposits as well as the Treasury in which such deposits are made. The same provision wi ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ndbook issued by the Government of U.P.). Rule 10 of the above Rules states that: 10. All payments into Court for deposit under the Act should be made by means of cheques in favour of the presiding officer of the Court, payable by order of the Court to credit of Civil Court Deposits. The cheques should be accompanied by receipts in triplicate in form D, duly filled up, of which one will be retained by the Court for record, and the other two returned duly signed to the Collector. The amounts deposited in the Court will be charged off as expenditure in the public works accounts of the Collector, and the ultimate payments to the persons interested under the award shall be arranged for by the Court under the rules for the payment of Civil Court Deposits. Thus, it is not the position that a deposit in Court is the only legal form of deposit under the 1894 Act. Compensation was being credited to the Treasury in the past, even after the same was deposited in Court. Thus, the issue where the compensation is deposited is a matter of procedure. 24. When the State Rules and High Court rules permit deposits in the Treasury, it falls to reason that under the scheme of the 1894 Act, f ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... on have been used to describe the instance where the State gives landowners their compensation. Both signify an obligation of the State. As per Section 31(1), compensation must be paid to the landowners. As per Section 31(2), if the landowners do not consent to receive compensation, the State shall deposit it in Court. It is often that when a beneficiary does not appear to collect compensation, the State has to depositthe compensation in the Treasury as per the relevant State Rules. But that does not mean that the State has shirked its obligation to compensate the affected persons. It may not always be the case that persons who do not appear on the appointed date are refusing to accept compensation. It may also be that such affected persons had consented to receive compensation, but simply could not appear or could not be traced for some reason or the other. There may be thousands of such beneficiaries. In such a case, the Collector cannot hand over compensation to each beneficiary in person, but also cannot keep the money with him. He has to keep it in the Treasury. In fact, the State Rules have been framed to give notice to the landowners that their compensation has been deposite ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... Per incuriam is a Latin term which means through lack of care or through inadvertence (of a judicial decision) wrongly decided, mainly because the judges were ill-informed about the applicable law.The word incuria literally means carelessness . A decision is rendered per incuriam if it is made through some mistake, or under a misapprehension as to a decision or a dictum of a judge, which is the result of a material oversight. A decision, judgment or verdict can be rendered per incuriam if given without considering any provisionin a statute which was not brought to the notice of the court or if it is not possible to reconcile its ratio with that of a previously pronounced judgment of a co-equal or larger bench; or if the decision of a High Court is not in consonance with the views of the Supreme Court. A judgment that was decided perincuriam does not have to be followed as precedent by a court. 33. The doctrine has been examined at length by us. As per A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak, (1988) 2 SCC 602 , the doctrine of per incuriam is defined as follows: 42. per incuriam are those decisions given in ignorance or forgetfulness of some inconsistent statutory provis ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... t be said that there is non-consideration of the effect of the Rules. 36. I may hasten to add here that in the case of Sukhbir Singh (supra) , the Court did consider the effect of the Rules framed by Delhi, Punjab and Haryana Governments. But the conclusion rendered in Sukhbir Singh (supra) was in conformity with the judgment in Pune Municipal Corporation (supra) . 37. The judgment in Pune Municipal Corporation (supra) is the first judgment on the issue in question by a three-Judge Bench of this Court. Hence, it cannot also be concluded that the decision in Pune Municipal Corporation (supra) is not in consonance with the relevant line of decisions rendered by this Court earlier.Having gone through the judgment in Pune Municipal Corporation (supra) , it cannot be said that the said judgment is through want of care or inadvertence. 38. In view of the discussion made supra, I conclude that I respectfully differ with the judgment in Pune Municipal Corporation (supra) and agree with the conclusion reached by my learned brothers. However, I may not subscribe to the views of my learned brothers that the judgment in Pune Municipal Corporation (supra) is rendered per ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... s required to extend the Inpun rehabilitation site. Section 4 notification was issued on 07.11.2007 for 17.52 hectares of land, but the remaining land could not be acquired due to the objections of the land owners (appellants therein). By an order of the Commissioner on 15.11.2007, permission was granted to the Collector to invoke urgency clause under Section 17 of the Act for 11.04 hectares of land and the properties thereon. A declaration for this land was issued on 26.11.2007. The landowners filed writ petitions questioning the acquisition of the lands. The Single Judge dismissed these writ petitions on 14.01.2008. The High Court held that rehabilitation of displaced persons was a prerequisite to submerging any of the villages in the dam. Thus, such a situation did indeed warrant urgency under Section 17 (1); further, there was an apprehension that the acquisition of land would get delayed by the operation of S. 5A; that there was clear application of mind to the invocation of the urgency clause. The High Court thus dismissed the writ appeals. Being aggrieved, the landowners appealed to this Court. Pending appeal, the 2013 Act came into force. 42.A two-judge bench of th ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... of law on the subject elaborately discussed by this Court in the case of Padma Sundara Rao v. State of T.N. [(2002) 3 SCC 533]. 12. Even in the Land Acquisition Act of 1894, the Legislature had brought about amendment in Section 6 through an Amendment Act of 1984 to add Explanation 1 for the purpose of excluding the period when the proceeding suffered stay by an order of the court, in the context of limitation provided for publishing the declaration under Section 6(1) of the Act. To a similar effect was Explanation to Section 11A which was added by Amendment Act 68 of 1984. Clearly the Legislature has, in its wisdom, made the period of five years under Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act absolute and unaffected by any delay in the proceedings on account of any order of stay by a court. The plain wordings used by the Legislature are clear and do not create any ambiguity or conflict. In such a situation, the court is not required to depart from the literal rule of interpretation. 46. In Padma Sundara Rao v. State of Tamil Nadu,(2002) 3 SCC 533 this Court held that a Court cannot supply casus omissus into Section 6 of the 1894 Act. After the High Court quashes a declaration ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... tretched to have the time period run from date of service of High Court's order. Such a view cannot be reconciled with the language of Section 6(1 ). If the view is accepted it would mean that a case can be covered by not only clauses (i) and/or Clause (ii) of the proviso to Section 6(1 ), but also by a non-prescribed period. Same can never be the legislative intent. 15. Two principles of construction one relating to casus omissus and the other in regard to reading the statute as a whole appear to be well settled. Under the first principle a casus omissus cannot be supplied by the Court except in the case of clear necessity and when reason for it is found in the four corners of the statute itself but at the same time a casus omissus should not be readily inferred and for that purpose all the parts of a statute or section must be construed together and every clause of a section should be construed with reference to the context and other clauses thereof so that the construction to be put on a particular provision makes a consistent enactment of the whole statute. This would be more so if literal construction of a particular clause leads to manifestly absurd or anomalous result ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... spect to such lapsing, the Government of India, Ministry of Urban Development, Delhi Division, came up with a circular dated 14.3.2014 wherein on the basis of the legal opinion of the Solicitor General of India, it has been clarified as under: 3. Interpretation of five years period: With regard to this issue viz. interpretation of five years period two situations have been envisaged in cases where the acquisition has been initiated under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 viz., (1) parties whose lands have been acquired have refused to accept the compensation and (2) parties whose lands have been acquired having just parted with physical possession of the land. However, in both the above situations, as on 1.1.2014, the period of 5 years would not have ended and in such cases, the advisory seeks to clarify that the new law shall apply only if the situation of pendency continues unchanged for a period that equals to or exceeds five years. In my view, it should be further clarified that in none of the cases the period of five years would have elapsed pursuant to an award made under Section 11 from the date of commencement of the Act and that the benefit of Section 24(2) wi ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ed in the case of Karnail Kaur (supra) wherein a two-Judge bench of this Court relied on the above discussed cases to reject the contention of the Solicitor General that the State was being prejudiced. It did so as follows, 20. The learned Solicitor General has also placed reliance upon A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak [(1988) 2 SCC 602] in support of his legal submission that in the said case the majority view of this Court have succinctly laid down that the elementary rule of justice is that no party should suffer by mistake/action of the Court. What the court does ought not prejudice a litigant and therefore, respondents herein shall not be made to suffer or be deprived of their right by the reliance being placed by the landowners upon Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act due to the interim orders of the High Court and this Court as they have been in possession of the acquired land. The above contentions of the learned Solicitor General cannot be accepted by us as the said principle of law laid down by this Court in the above referred case has no application to the fact situation on hand in view of the clear statement of law laid down by this Court in the above referred cases after ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... counsel for the appellants, contended that the award was made on 22.3.1983 though the acquisition was made in September 1976. Therefore, the appellants should be compensated by payment of interest @ 12 per cent per annum. In support of his contention, he placed reliance on the decision of this Court in Ram Chand v. Union of India (1994) 1 SCC 44 and in particular on paragraph 16 of the judgment. It is seen that in Ram Chander's case even after the dismissal of the writ petitions by this Court in Aflatoon v. Lt. Governor of Delhi [(1975) 4 SCC 285], no action was taken by the Land Acquisition Officer to pass the award. Thus, till 1980-81 no award was made in respect of any of the acquisitions. Under these circumstances, this Court had directed the Government to pay interest @ 12 per cent on the amount awarded to compensate the loss caused to the appellants therein. In this case, it is seen that though the notification was issued in September 1976, the writ petitions came to be filed in the High Court immediately thereafter in 1977 and obviously further proceedings were stayed. Accordingly, the Land Acquisition Officer delayed the award. After the dismissal of the writ petitions, ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... eads to manifestly absurd or anomalous results which could not have been intended by the Legislature; where, to apply words literally would defeat the obvious intention of the legislation and produce a wholly unreasonable result, we must feed something to the provision so as to achieve the obvious intention and produce rational construction. 54. Casus omissus means an omitted case. When a statute or an instrument of writing undertakes to foresee and to provide for certain contingencies, and through mistake, or some other cause, a case remains to be provided for, it is said to be a casus omissus . 55. I do not see why casus omissus cannot be supplied by the Court when the parameters for supplying such casus omissus have been met. There is no bar much less absolute bar on the Court s jurisdiction to supply casus omissus . If there is necessity, such omission can be inferred. The grammatical and ordinary sense of the words in the statute must be adhered to unless it would lead to absurdity, repugnance or inconsistency with the rest of the instrument. One of the earliest cases that discussed supplying casus omissus in cases of necessity was CIT v. National Taj Traders, ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e whole statute. This would be more so if literal construction of a particular clause leads to manifestly absurd or anomalous results which could not have been intended by the Legislature. An intention to produce an unreasonable result , said Danckwerts L.J. in Artemiou v. Procopiou [1966 1 QB 878] is not to be imputed to a statute if there is some other construction available. Where to apply words literally would defeat the obvious intention of the legislation and produce a wholly unreasonable result we must do some violence to the words and so achieve that obvious intention and produce a rational construction, (Per Lord Reid in Luke v. I.R.C.-1968 AC 557 where at p. 577 he also observed: this is not a new problem, though our standard of drafting is such that it rarely emerges.) 56. This was followed almost verbatim in Padma Sundara Rao (supra) .It must be emphasized that the Constitution Bench in Padma Sundara Rao (supra) held that casus omissus may be supplied when there is clear necessity and when reason for it is found in the four corners of the statute itself . This means that while casus omissus must not be readily inferred, all the parts of a statute or ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ed to take advantage of his own fault of delaying action. The Court should not permit a litigant to perpetuate the illegality by abusing the legal process. It is the duty of the Court to ensure that dishonesty or any attempt to abuse the legal process must be effectively curbed and the Court must ensure that there is no wrongful, unauthorised or unjust gain for anyone by abusing of the process of the Court. No one should be permitted to use the judicial process for earning undeserved gains for unjust profits. The Courts constant endeavour should be to ensure that everyone gets just and fair treatment. 58. Actus curiae neminemgravabit , or the principle that an act of Court cannot prejudice any of the parties, is a settled principle of law. In A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak and Anr., ( 1988) 2 SCC 602 , by majority this Court held that the elementary rule of justice is that no party should suffer by a mistake or an action of the Court. Shri Kishan Das (supra) applied this principle to land acquisitions. 59. It is often the case in proceedings against land acquisitions that the affected parties seek an interim stay of the acquisition proceedings until the matter has a ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... m stay for the purposes of calculating five years under Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act. In other words, the period of five years must necessarily exclude such period of stay orders. Conclusion: 63. The questions posed by the references stand answered by me as follows: I QUESTION NO. 1 : The acquisition proceedings do not lapse if the amount is deposited in the Treasury and such fact is made known to the claimants by the competent authority as required in law. Only interest is attracted, in case if the deposit is not made in Court. Consequently, I am unable to persuade myself to agree with the outcome of Pune Municipal Corporation (supra) . However, according to me the judgment in Pune Municipal Corporation (supra) is not rendered in per incuriam . In view of the above, the judgment in Pune Municipal Corporation (supra) may have to be reconsidered by a larger bench, inasmuch as Pune Municipal Corporation (supra) was decided by a bench of three judges. The Registry is directed to place the papers before the Hon ble Chief Justice of India for appropriate orders. II QUESTION NO. 2 AND QUESTION NO. 3 : For the aforementioned reasons, I am unable to persuade mys ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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