TMI Blog2018 (4) TMI 1424X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... charge fees in terms of section 234E of the act even prior to 1st June, 2015. We are not inclined with the contention of the ld. counsel that CPC was not authorized to levy u/s. 234E of the act, we are also not affirmed with his view that the order passed u/s. 154 was bad in law. - Decided against assessee. - ITA Nos. 2129 to 2143/Ahd/2016 - - - Dated:- 23-3-2018 - Shri Rajpal Yadav, Judicial Member And Shri Amarjit Singh, Accountant Member For The Revenue : Shri V.K. Singh, Sr. D.R. For The Assessee : Shri P.M. Mehta And Shri G.M. Thakor, A.R. ORDER PER : AMARJIT SINGH, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER:- These fifteen appeals filed by assessee for A.Y. 2013-14 to 2015-16, arise from order of the CIT(A)-8, Ahmedabad dated 13-06-2016, in proceedings under section 154 of the Income Tax Act, 1961; in short the Act . 2. The assesee has raised following grounds of appeal:- ITA No. 2129/Ahd/2016 1. On the facts and in the circumstances of the appellant's case, the Ld. CIT(A) erred in not considering the 2nd ground of appeal before him challenging the validity of the impugned order u/s. 154. 2. On the facts and in the circumstances ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... tted that the impugned demand was raised u/s. 234E of the act vide intimation dated 3rd Sep, 2014 whereas the provision of section 200A of the act did not authorize the officer to levy fees u/s. 234E of the act. On the other hand, the ld. departmental representative supported the order of the lower authorities. 6. We have heard both the sides and perused the material on record carefully. We have noticed that the CPC had issued intimation u/s. 200A wherein fees u/s. 234E of the act was levied at ₹ 16600/-. The assessee has filed rectification application u/s. 154 of the act. The CPC has passed the impugned order u/s. 154 dated 16th June, 2015 wherein the interest part was deleted but the demand u/s. 234E of the act was retained. We have also perused the above cited judicial pronouncements of Co-ordinate Benches referred by the learned counsel. During the course of appellate proceedings before us, we find that the Co-ordinate Benches of ITAT in the above cited decisions has decided the issue in favour of the assessee by following the decision of the ITAT in the case of Wonder Waves Entertainment Pvt. Ltd. vs. DCIT, CPC, TDS-Ghaziabad in ITA No. 2143 to 2146/Ahd/2015 for asse ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... picture that emerges is that prior to 01.07.2012, the Act contained a single provision in section 272A providing for penalty in case of default in filing the statements in terms of section 200 or proviso to section 206C. Such penalty was prescribed at the rate of ₹ 100 for every day during which the failure continued. With effect from 01.06.2012, three major changes were introduced in the Act. Section 234E as introduced for the first time to provide for charging of fee for late filing of the statements. Such fee would be levied at the rate of ₹ 200/- for every day of failure subject to the maximum amount of tax deductible or collectible as the case may be. Section 271H was also introduced for the first time for levying penalty for failure to furnish the statements. Such penalty would be in the range of ₹ 10,000/- and ₹ 1 lakh. No penalty would be imposed if the tax is deposited with fee and interest and the statement is filed within one year of the due date. With addition to these two provisions prescribing fee and penalty respectively, clause (k) of sub-section (2) of section 272A became redundant and by adding a proviso to the said section, this effect wa ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... and at best provides for a mechanism for processing and computing besides other, fee payable under section 234E for late filing of the statements. 20. Even in absence of section 200A of the Act with introduction of section 234E, it was always open for the Revenue to demand and collect the fee for late filing of the statements. Section 200A would merely regulate the manner in which the computation of such fee would be made and demand raised. In other words, we cannot subscribe to the view that without a regulatory provision being found for section 200A for computation of fee, the fee prescribed under section 234E cannot be levied. Any such view would amount to a charging section yielding to the machinery provision. If at all, the recasted clause (c) of sub-section (1) of section 200A would be in nature of clarificatory amendment. Even in absence of such provision, as noted, it was always open for the Revenue to charge the fee in terms of section 234E of the Act. By amendment, this adjustment was brought within the fold of section 200A of the Act. This would have one direct effect. An order passed under section 200A of the Act is rectifiable under section 154 of the Act and ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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