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1980 (3) TMI 267

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..... lication under Section 91 of the Punjab Land Revenue Act (as applied to Delhi) for setting aside the sale. Section 91 provides for making an application to set aside a sale at any time within 30 days from the date of the sale. The plea of the Respondent No. 1 was that she had come to know of sale only on 9.2.1972 and Therefore there was sufficient reason for the Lt. Governor to condone the delay and entertain the application. She had sought to invoke Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 read with Section 17 of the Punjab Land Revenue Act (to be called the Act) for this purpose. The Lt. Governor however, took the view that Limitation Act was not applicable to such an application before him and Therefore he had no power to condone the delay, even if the delay was sufficiently explained. The learned Judge however) has held that Section 5 of the Limitation Act 1963 was applicable and there was power to admit the application after the period prescribed under Section 91 and he Therefore by the impugned order remitted the matter back to the Lt. Governor for consideration on merits. The auction purchaser being aggrieved has filed this appeal. The respondent No. 1 invoked Section 5 of the .....

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..... r the Representation of Peoples Act, resort to the Limitation Act was not permissible. The court posed the problem that when the First Schedule of the Limitation Act prescribes no time limit for a particular appeal, but the special law prescribes a time limit to it, can it not be said that under the First Schedule of the Limitation Act an appeal can be filed at any time, but the special law by limiting it provides for a different period ? While the former permits the filing of an appeal at any time, the latter limits it to the prescribed period. It is, Therefore, different from that prescribed in the former. The court approved the observation of Chhagla, C.J. in: AIR1953Bom35 Canara Bank Ltd. Bombay v. Warden Ins. Co. Ltd. Bombay, that if the First Schedule to the Limitation Act omits laying down any period of limitation for a particular appeal and the special law provides a period of limitation, then to that extent the special law is different from the Limitation Act. The court after referring to the other case law ultimately held that the position was that Section 29(2) would apply even to a case where a difference between the special law and the Limitation Act arose by omiss .....

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..... inal) courts alone in order that the provision of Section 5 can be applied is not warranted by the provisions of the various special laws and the Limitation Act. With respect the opinion of Vishwanath Iyer, J. commends to us more than the opinion of other learned Judges, in Kerala case. A similar argument that in an appeal filed before a Rent Control Tribunal which was a persona designata. Section 29(2)(a) could not be invoked to apply the Limitation Act) was rejected in: AIR1954Cal520 Imperial Bucket Co. v. Smt. Bhagwati Basak, and the court observed that in the plain meaning the word suit or appeal refer to any suit or appeal being filed in a court or before a persona designata and that the words inclusive of suit, appeal or application specified by a prescribed local law do not justify the words in adding the words, to court , and Section 29 of the Limitation Act was Therefore held to be available. This view was followed by 0m Parkash J.C. in Mehar Chand and others v. Twarsoo and others, to hold that the word application will include an application made to a persona designata and that the applicability of Section 29(2) was not restricted to applications which were made to .....

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..... borne out from the language or the scheme of the statute. (8) We may note that the provision of the Limitation Act have been applied in computing the period of limitation under a special law like the U.P. Sales Tax Act; see(1976(4) Supreme Court Cases 464) The Commissioner of Sales Tax U. P. v. M/s. Madan Lal Das Sons, Bareilly. In that case the revision under Section 10 of the Sales Tax Act was filed beyond the prescribed period of one year. The assessee however claimed the benefit of Section 12(2) of the Limitation Act for excluding the time spent in obtaining a copy of the appellate order. The argument that the U.P. Sales Tax Act constituted the complete code in itself and that the Limitation Act cannot be applied was rejected by the court which after referring to Section 29(2) of the Act stated, there can be no manner of doubt that the U.P. Sales Tax Act answers to the description of a special or local law. According to Sub-section(2) of Section 29 of the Limitation Act, reproduced above, for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any application by special or local law the provisions contained in Section 12(2) inter alias shall apply in so far .....

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..... pplicable. But that has now been changed by Section 29(2) providing that in those like cases the provisions contained in Sections 4 to 24 of Limitation Act shall apply. Section 5 of the Limitation Act thus would become applicable by its own force. (10) In the alternative if Section 5 was to be held inapplicable on the ground that the Limitation Act was not applicable to application filed under the Punjab Land Revenue. Act it will still not avail the appellant. The reason is that if as urged by the appellant the Limitation Act is not applicable, on the same parity of reasoning Section 3 of the Limitation Act would similarly be inapplicable. In that view there would be no statutory compulsion to dismiss the petition filed beyond 30 days under Section 91 of the Land Revenue Act. The only consequence would be that if the application is filed beyond 30 days and the delay is unreasonable and there is no proper Explanation given for it the authority may refuse to entertain it. But there is no mandate in law that because the application is filed beyond 30 days it cannot be entertained after that period. Each case would have to be decided on its own peculiar facts. This is because there .....

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