TMI Blog2013 (10) TMI 1504X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... however wrote a separate minority judgment, however has concurred with majority, though for different reasons. In majority judgment, the CCI came to the conclusion that all the appellants had indulged in collusive bidding and had contravened the provisions of Section 3(3)(d) of the Competition Act (hereinafter called the Act ). It is also held that all the appellants had also violated the provisions of Section 3(3)(b) of the Act. One learned Member Shri R. Prasad, however, did not agree that these appellants had contravened the Section 3(3)(b), though he agreed that Section 3(3)(a) and 3(3)(d) of the Act was contravened. He, however, held that there was no applicability of Section 3(3)(b) in the matter and the appellants could not be penalised on that count. He, however, agreed with the quantum of penalties as ordered by the CCI, which was at 9% of the average three years' turnover of these three appellants. While in case of Excel Corp Care Limited, the penalty came to ₹ 63.90 crores, in case of Sandhya Organics Chemicals Pvt. Ltd., it came to ₹ 1.57 crores, while United Phosphorus Limited were awarded the penalty of ₹ 252.44 crores. Initially, as many as fou ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... roved Pest Control Operators and it could not be sold in open market. It was found that there were only four manufacturers of ALP, three of whom were the appellants and 4th was M/s. Agrosynth Chemicals Limited, though 19 manufacturers were granted the licence to manufacture ALP. It was found that these government agencies procuring the ALP tablets worth ₹ 40 crores annually. It was noted that the FCI had adopted the process of tender, which is normally a global tender. The concerned tender had two bid system, that is first techno commercial and then the financial bid. On the basis of the bids, the rate running contracts are executed with successful bidders. The DG found that there was also a Committee comprising of responsible officers for evaluation of technical and price bids. As per the practice, the lowest bidder (L-1) is invited by the Committee for negotiations and after negotiations, the Committee submits the report giving its recommendations and the contracts are awarded and after that the payment for the purchased tablets is released by the concerned regional offices. The DG reported the rates at which contracts were awarded to the four manufacturers. The DG has foun ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... nders considered by the DG and the pricing pattern definitely showed the practice of quoting identical pricing at times by all the three appellants or at some other times by two appellants including M/s. M/s. Agrosynth Chemicals Limited. The DG found the explanation offered to be of no consequence. The analysis also showed rising prices which were mostly attributed to the increase of the price by China during the Beijing Olympics. The DG however, came to the conclusion that even when the phosphorous prices had fallen, no reflection thereof was seen in the high prices quoted by the appellants. The DG also examined the costs structure of each company and found that there was nothing common in the cost structure of the appellants. The DG did not stop at that and also found that at the tender dated 08.05.2009 and also in the earlier tenders, there was a joint boycott at the instance of the appellants. The DG found that during the course of enquiry, the parties boycotted the e-tender issued by the FCI, which was invited in the March 2011 and was to be closed on 27.05.2011. The DG found that though M/s. Excel Corp Care Ltd. and M/s. Sandhya Organics Chemicals Pvt. Ltd. had explained thei ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... Agrosynth Chemicals since M/s. Agrosynth Chemicals have been exonerated and there is no appeal against them. However, we may use some facts of their response to support our conclusions. 6. M/s. Excel Corp Care Ltd. urged that the tenders floated earlier to 20th of May, 2009 (the day when Section 3 and 4 were activated) could not be taken into consideration. They also objected that in the letter dated 4th February, 2011 by FCI which was treated to be the information, there was no mention of 2011 tender and therefore, all the enquiry in respect of the boycott of that tender by the DG was without jurisdiction. 7. It was also urged by M/s. Excel Corp Care Ltd., opponent No. 2, that the supplies under the tender were already completed by May, 2010 and therefore by getting an enquiry instituted on the basis of such tender FCI was abusing its dominant position. It was further urged by them that the Director General by himself could not have investigated into the facts which were not directed by the Commission under Section 26(1) and that is what the DG has done by inquiring into the tender of 2011. The increase in price was also tried to be justified on the basis of the increase in ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ring the cartel was also criticised and objected to. 8. Almost similar was the reply of OP-3, United Phosphorous Limited, on the question of 2011 tender and its consideration by the DG. It was pleaded that no opportunity was made available to it for inspecting the investigation records. It was urged that since the other ones like Excel Crop Core Limited and Sandhya Organic Chemicals Pvt. Limited were the competitors and therefore there was no question of any agreement with them. OP-3 had justified the identical pricing by pleading that the rate finalized in the tender of CWC in the beginning of the particular year is considered to be the bench mark for the other tenders for that year and therefore there is likelihood of identical pricing. The charge of entry barrier was also refuted on the ground that there were rigid and strict conditions of licensing and the entry barrier was therefore attributed to the legislative acts. It was tried to justify in the others tenders, UPL-OP -3 had quoted different rates, for example for the tender floated in the year 2006, UPL had quoted the price of ₹ 200 per kg. The price rise was also for the same reason given by OP No. 2. Similar obj ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ders as well. It was pointed out that the tenders floated during 2007 and 2009 decided in the information as evidence to the fact that the opposite parties had been acting as a cartel even on earlier occasion due to which informant-FCI had to pay unusually higher prices. The reliance by the opponents on the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in All-India Organisation of Chemists and Druggists Association reported in (2002) 2 CTJ 4 (SC) (MRTP) was also criticised on the ground that the facts was different and so was the scope. The FCI also objected to the reliance to the note-sheets of the FCI which were reflected on pages 268-272 of the DG's report and urged that note-sheet could not be looked by the Courts since that is the views expressed by the individuals and nothing to do with the legal submissions. It was urged that in this case the issue was not merely parallel pricing but the issue of identical pricing and concerted bidding which was evident from the fact that in certain years all the manufacturers have chosen not to bid. It was urged that besides this there were other factors to draw a conclusion of cartel by the opponent parties. The FCI specifically refuted the co ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... CCI to enquire into the so called collusive bidding. A reliance was placed on the reported ruling in the case of M/s. Gulf Oil Corporation Ltd. Vs. Competition Commission of India Ors. reported in : 2013 COMPLR 0409 (COMPAT) where it was observed that their pre-Act behaviour could not be taken into consideration even for the purpose of penalty. This argument was opposed by the Senior Counsel Shri Virmani appearing for the FCI and also by Shri Balaji Subramanian, learned counsel appearing for the CCI. The first contention raised by Shri Virmani was that it was not as if the provision of Section 3 was not known to the appellants on 8.5.2009 when the bids were submitted. The learned Senior counsel was at pains to point out that the Section was very much there on the Statute Book but had only not been notified. The learned counsel, however, carried his argument further that the gravamen of the allegation against the appellants as was found by the CCI was the agreement amongst the appellants which directly or indirectly resulted in the bid rigging or collusive bidding. In that, the learned counsel argues that, therefore, it is not only the date of offering the bids which is relevant ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ged in identical or similar production or trading of goods or provision of services, which has the effect of eliminating or reducing competition for bids or adversely affecting or manipulating the process for bidding. Therefore, the words 'manipulating the process for bidding' assume a very great importance. Its not only the act of offering an identical price which is complained of. What is complained of, is the act of bid rigging or the act of collusive bidding, which understood in the light of the language of explanation, has resulted firstly in eliminating or reducing competition for bids or secondly adversely affecting or manipulating the process for bidding. The argument put forth by Shri Virmani as also Shri Bala Subramanian is undoubtedly correct. In this behalf the CCI has also recorded a finding in paragraph 7.13 that 8.5.2009 is not the crucial date but even 1.6.2009 and 17.6.2009 are equally crucial. This discussion would mean that the illegality of collusive bidding or rigging the bidding which commenced on 8.5.2009 was continued thereafter on 1.6.2009 and 17.6.2009 also. The negotiation of prices with the lowest bidder, and in this case all the three appella ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... re would be no question of dearth of jurisdiction on the part of the CCI to firstly order the investigation into the matter and also to inquire itself into the complained illegality. 17. It was seriously canvassed by the learned counsel appearing for the appellants that the Competition Act is not retrospective in operation and therefore, only the facts after 20th May, 2009 when Section 3 and 4 were notified could be considered. It was very seriously argued that unless there are words in the statute sufficient to show the intention of the legislature to affect the existing rights, it is deemed to be prospective on the principle nova constitution futuris formam imponere debet non-praeteitis . A long list of Hon'ble Supreme Court cases relied upon by the learned counsel were cited, which are:- (a) Keshvan v. State of Bombay, AIR 1951 SC 128 (b) Janardan Reddy v. State, AIR 1951 SC 124 (c) Mahadeolal Kanodia v. Administrator General of West Bengal, AIR 1960 SC 936 (d) State of Bombay v. Vishnu Ram Chandra, AIR 1961 SC 307 (e) Rafiquennessa (MST) v. Lal Bahadur Chetri AIR 1964 SC 1511 (f) Arjan Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1970 SC 70 ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... had effect of wiping out the identical pricing offered by the three appellants. The argument is clearly incorrect for the simple reason that firstly it has to be held that there was no hiatus after 8.5.2009 and the bidding process did continue even after 8.5.2009. If that interpretation is given to the term bidding process appearing in Section 3(3) explanation then the rigour of the argument goes away. The negotiations were undoubtedly pursuant to the tender floated by the FCI and in terms of the NIT conditions. It could not be held that the reduction in rates wiped out the tender and that it amounted to an independent transaction. The negotiations were undoubtedly the part of the bidding process as would be clear from the tender notice and therefore nothing depended upon the negotiations during which also the appellants offered identical prices of ₹ 386/- per kg. 20. It was tried to be suggested that FCI got them to reduce their bids uniformly by ₹ 2/- and therefore there was a uniform price after negotiations. This argument is clearly incorrect and is not borne out from the letters submitted by the three appellants after negotiations. Photocopies of the letters we ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... reement complained of had come to an end. We do not see how the ratio in the above case is applicable to the present facts. It is obvious that even up to 4.2.2011 the appellants had been continuing their anti-competitive activities with regard to the dealings with the FCI and other State Corporations. It must be stated that the complaint by the FCI from its very language in the letter dated 4.2.2011 is not even specific to any transaction. The contention raised in this behalf must be rejected. 24. It was also urged that the Director General as well as the CCI had ignored the fact that the officer of the FCI had themselves made noting in their internal files and had justified the price and had also specifically noted that there was no cartel activity amongst the three appellants. In the first place the notings in the files hardly impress us, for those notings were the individual opinions of the officer making them. We have gone through those notings at the instance of the learned counsel appearing for the appellants and we have the clear opinion that those notings would be inconsequential inasmuch as it was not for the particular officer to decide whether the activities of the th ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... that even in 2008 tender floated by Central Warehousing Corp. there has been identical pricing of ₹ 450 between Excel Crop Care Ltd. and Sandhya Organics. Same thing has happened in the tender floated by UP State Warehousing Corp and Punjab State Civil Supplies Corp as also Central Warehousing Corp. where the prices quoted by Excel Crop Care and United Phosphorous are identical. At Sl. No. 9 it is seen that there was identical pricing in the case of tender floated on 15.6.2009 between Excel Crop and Agrosynth Chemicals Ltd. So far so good however in as many as 7 tenders thereafter also, there is a clear cut example of identical pricing by the three appellants as also in case of Agrosynth. In tender of the Central Warehousing dated 13.7.2010 all the three appellants have quoted identical pricing. It is reported by the DG in his report that when all these things were put to the three representatives they had no sufficient and satisfactory answer to the aspect of identical pricing which not only started from the pre Act period of 2007 but continued with impunity right upto 2011 that is even after Section 3 and Section 4 were notified and thus activated. In our opinion even if we ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... basis of the order passed by the Commission under Section 26(1). Our attention was also invited to sub-section (3) of Section 26 under which the Director-General, on receipt of direction under sub-section (1) is to submit a report of its findings within such period as may be specified by the Commission. The argument of the parties is that if on the relevant date when the Commission passed the order, even the tender notice was not floated, then there was no question of Direction General going into the investigation of that tender. It must be noted at this juncture that under Section 18, the Commission has the duty to eliminate practices having adverse effect on competition and to promote and sustain competition. It is also required to protect the interests of the consumers. There can be no dispute about the proposition that the Director General on his own cannot act and unlike the Commission, the Director General has no suo-moto power to investigate. That is clear from the language of Section 41 also, which suggests that when directed by the Commission, the Director General is to assist the Commission in investigating into any contravention of the provisions of the Act. Our attentio ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ut it was generally complained that the appellants had engaged in the anticompetitive behaviour. When we consider the language of the order passed by the CCI under Section 26(1) dated 23.04.2012 the things becomes all the more clear to us. The language of that order is clearly broad enough to hold, that the Director General was empowered and duty bound to look into all the facts till the investigation was completed. If in the course of investigation, it came to the light that the parties had boycotted the tender in 2011 with pre-concerted agreement, there was no question of the DG not going into it. We must view this on the background that when the information was led, the Commission had material only to form a prima-facie view. The said prima-facie view could not restrict the Director General, if he was duty bound to carry out a comprehensive investigation in keeping with the direction by CCI. In fact the DG has also taken into account the tenders by some other corporations floated in 2010 and 2011 and we have already held that the DG did nothing wrong in that. In our opinion, therefore, the argument fails and must be rejected. 29. This takes us to the special feature about the ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... t clear to FCI by a letter that it could not take part in the tender by offering its price bids. Dr. Vijay Kr. Aggarwal raised a novel plea that in fact as per the tender conditions M/s. Sandhya Organics Chemicals Pvt. Ltd. did not qualify to take part in the tender as it did not have the capacity to produce and supply 75MTs of ALP every month. Dr. Aggarwal pressed in service a certificate issued by the authorities certifying that the monthly capacity of M/s. Sandhya Organics Chemicals Pvt. Ltd. was only 25 tones. On this basis Dr. Aggarwal seriously contends that M/s. Sandhya Organics Chemicals Pvt. Ltd., appellant in Appeal No. 80 of 2012 cannot be faulted for not taking part in the tender. 31. Firstly considering the dates of alleged letters written by M/s. Excel Crop and M/s. Sandhya Organics Chemicals Pvt. Ltd. one wonders as to how is it that it dawned upon the appellant M/s. Excel Crop to write a letter only on the last day. Nothing has been brought before us about as to what transpired between the so called meeting between M/s. Excel Crop official and Shri Sandip Sharma, DGM (Purchase). M/s. Excel Crop is happily silent even about the date of that meeting. In so far as t ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ts are established the only irresistible conclusion is that all the three appellants engaged themselves in boycotting the tenders though they were the only manufacturers besides M/s. Agrosynth Chemicals Limited in India of ALP and were constantly supplying the ALP over the years. This is nothing but bid rigging prohibited under Section 3(3)(d) of the Act. In our opinion, the Director General and CCI were absolutely correct in that behalf. 33. We were taken through the conditions of 2011 tender. Shri Srinivasan complained against some of the conditions, but we do not think those conditions could be such as would be enough to take a decision to forsake the tender for the supply of 600 metric tones. After all, all these concerns were engaged in the business of supply of ALP tablets and were the only manufacturers in the country. They were also aware of the acute need on the part of FCI for safeguarding the stored food-grains. It could have been the matter of simple calculation that a total boycott would bring FCI on their knees and the FIC being helpless in the matter, would give the orders for supply to all the concerned manufacturers at the negotiated price as dictated by them. ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e different distances and locations, for the supplies to be made, there was absolutely no explanation on identical pricing. The identical pricing on one or two occasions though raises strong suspicion, may not be enough to draw the inference of the concerted agreement, but when is repeated constantly with odd figures and without any reasonable explanation for the same, would only draw an inference of a pre-concerted agreement. 36. It was also urged by the learned counsel that in some of the tenders, these three appellants had not offered identical price bids. That may be so, however, on several occasions, the three appellants had quoted identical rates and their bids given to some other organisations. Therefore, that argument must fail. 37. Shri R. Srinivasan also relied on a judgment of European Court of Justice ( ECJ ) in A. Ahistrom Osakeyhito v. Commission, ([1993] ECR 1 1307) ( Wood Pulp ). The observation relied upon was where parallel behaviour can be explained by nature of the market, conscious parallelism is not sufficient evidence to justify a charge of cartelization . In our opinion, the reliance is wholly uncalled for, for the reason that the parallel behaviour o ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... g the concept of trade practice as elaborated by the Supreme Court in Hindustan Lever Ltd. vs. MRTP AIR 1977 SC 1285 the learned Member has come to a correct finding that submitting identical price bids amounted to a practice for the purpose of Section 3(3) of the Act and that the appellant not having discharge their onus. It could be deduced that there was consultation inter se between the appellant before quoting the identical price. We, therefore, approve the separate order passed by Shri Prasad. However, we do not agree that in this case the provisions of Section 3(3(b) would not be attracted. In boycotting the tender in 2011, the appellants clearly created limitation on supply. The finding given by the CCI is correct in that behalf. We also approve the order of Shri Prasad that there was a contravention of Section 3(3)(a) of the Act inasmuch as there was certainly an activity of determining the sale price of ALP tablets. 42. This takes us to the question of the penalty which was very seriously argued by the appellants. The first criticism against the order regarding the penalty was that there was no discussion whatsoever nor any justification as to why the Commission was im ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... insignificant. He points out that while the total turn over for the year 2009 was ₹ 2,738.98 Crores and the total turnover of ALP tablets including all domestic and export sales was ₹ 84.99 crores and the total turn over of ALP in that year for the domestic market was a mere ₹ 23.33 crores. He also asserts that insofar as the total amount of supplies of ALP to FCI in the year 2009-10 was concerned it was merely ₹ 8.49 crores which was merely 0.3% of the total turnover of the company. He wonders as to how the exorbitant penalty of ₹ 252.44 crores be imposed against the appellant in respect of the supply of ALP tablets to FCI for a total price of ₹ 8.49 crores in the year 2009-10. Shri Ravinder Narain also brought to our notice a decision of the Competition Appeal Court of South Africa in the case of Southern Pipeline Contractors anr. vs. The Competition Commission and pointed out that Section 59 of the Competition Act of 1998 of South Africa provided for maximum penalty of 10% of the annual turn over in that. He relied on sub-section (2) of the Act. He then invited our attention to paragraphs 51 to 53 of the judgment which dealt with the questi ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... re the VAT and in other taxes. 46. In point 22 of the guidelines provides that it should be determined whether or not the infringement is implemented. 47. In point 36, it is provided that in certain cases the Commission may even imposes symbolic fine. 48. Now speaking about the OFT Guidelines. In paragraph 1.3 speaks about the guidance as to the circumstances in which in determining a penalty the OFT may taken into account the effect of an infringement in another member State. 49. In paragraph 1.6, it is provided that firstly it would be the task to determine whether the financial penalty should be imposed at all. In Chapter 2 the steps for determining the level of a penalty is set out in which paragraph 2.7 defines the relevant turn over. It is defined that as the turnover of the undertaking in the relevant product market and the relevant geographic market affected by the infringement in the undertaking last business year . 50. Like Section 27(b) paragraph 2.8 provides that the starting point for determination should not exceed 10% of the relevant turnover. In step 2 reference is made to the duration of the infringement as a relevant factor to adjust the amount det ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... o in Section 59(2), being annual turnover. There is thus some uncertainty as to the precise meaning of 'turnover'. However, section 59(3) refers on more than one occasion to 'the contravention', in particular, in dealing with the nature, duration, gravity and extent 'of the contravention', the loss or damage suffered as a result of the 'contravention' the market circumstances in which 'the contravention' took place and the level of profit derived from 'the contravention'. Thus there is a legislative link between the damage caused and the profits which accrue from the cartel activity. The inquiry, in terms of section 59 (30, appears to envisage that consideration be given to the benefits which accrue from the contravention: that is to amount to affected turnover. By using the baseline of affected turnover, the implications of the doctrine of proportionality that is between the nature of the offence and benefit derived therefrom, the interests of the consumer community and the legitimate interests of the offender can be taken more carefully into account and appropriately calibrated. 55. He pointed out that the OFT guidelines also per ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... larly true as the CCI is an adjudicatory body as declared by two Supreme Court judgments. The role as an adjudicatory body would cover all the aspects of hearing and deciding. 60. There can be no dispute that where harsh financial penalties are inflicted the reasons become all the more necessary. 61. All the learned counsels very seriously canvass the question of relevant turn over . The argument that the appellants, United Phosphorous Ltd. and M/s. Excel Crop Limited, are the multi product companies was not seriously disputed by Shri Balaji Subramanian, learned counsel for the CCI. We have no reason not to accept that factor. As regards the arguments based on EU and OFT guidelines, we are of the opinion that those guidelines are undoubtedly relevant in arriving at the issue of deciding upon the turn over. However, those guidelines cannot be treated as be all and end all in the matter and would have to be considered in the light of the facts of each case. We, however, accept the contention that in the circumstances of this case the relevant turn over should be considered in case of the two appellants who are multi product companies. To that extent we generally agree with the ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... efinite finding regarding the turn over of ALP tablets. However, we do not agree with Shri Ravinder Narain who insists on restricting the relevant turn over to the sale only in the domestic market. In fact, it is the whole turnover regarding the ALP Tablets, which will be liable to be considered. Similar is the case of M/s. Excel Crop. It is only at the appellate stage M/s. Excel Crop has chosen to give the figures regarding their turn over relating to the production of ALP Tablets. While arriving at a conclusion about the relevant turn over it would be open to the authorities like CCI to rely on the general principles expressed in those guidelines regarding the method of calculation etc. However, it should be an endeavour of the authorities to apply those principles not mechanically or blindly but after carefully considering the factual aspects. Such factual aspects could include the financial health of the company, the necessity of the product, the likelihood of the company being closed down on account of unreasonable harsh penalty etc. At the same time the authorities would be well advised in considering the general reputation and the other mitigating factors like the first time ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... that with the healthy and higher competition ultimate consumer would be benefited. In the second tender which was boycotted, considering the necessity of the product, FCI had to purchase the product at the increased rate of 499/- per kg. from all the appellants. Considering the volume of requirement of several hundreds tonnes, this was a huge increase resulting in adversely affecting the competition substantially. A collective and deliberate boycott always affects the competition, same is the case of identical prices. If the parallel prices had not been offered or if the second tender was not boycotted (undoubtedly as a result of the concerted agreement) there could have been much lower prices ultimately benefitting the have nots of the society. 65. We have to take into account also the factor that these tablets were for the preservation of the food-grains which usually go up to the consumers through Public Distribution System. We need not stress upon the fact that it is the have-nots of the society who are the beneficiaries of the Public Distribution System. If no timely supply is made of these tablets the millions of tonnes of the stored food-grains could be destroyed or becom ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... penalty at ₹ 1.57/- crores, on the basis of their total turnover. M/s. Sandhya Organic Chemicals (P) Ltd. is relatively a small enterprise. We also noted that M/s. Sandhya Organic Chemicals (P) Ltd. had raised a plea that they could not have taken part in the second tender since their production capacity was only 25 metric tonnes a month as per the certificate issued on November 29, 1995 by National Small Industries Corporation Limited (A Government of India Enterprises). Though, we had not accepted that plea, it will have to be considered that their production capacity is also not comparable to the production capacity and the size of the other two appellants. We would, therefore, chose to reduce their penalty to the 1/10th of the penalty awarded by the CCI. Their penalty would therefore come to ₹ 15.70/- lakhs. In the result, therefore, the finding by the CCI in respect of breach of the provisions of Competition Act is confirmed and the appeals are dismissed. However, the penalties would be modified to the extent we have ordered in the earlier paragraphs. All the three appeals are disposed of on these lines. Pronounced in open Court on 29th day of October, 2013 - ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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