TMI Blog1998 (6) TMI 25X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... y any other person interested in such immovable property, within forty-five days from the date of such order : Provided that the Appellate Tribunal may, on an application made in this behalf before the expiry of the said period of forty-five days or, as the case may be, thirty days, permit, by order, the appeal to be presented within such further period as may be specified therein if the applicant satisfies the Appellate Tribunal that he has sufficient cause for not being able to present the appeal within the said period of forty-five days or, as the case may be, thirty days." The proviso to section 269G(1) of the Act specifies the period of limitation for filing an appeal to the Appellate Tribunal, the Appellate Tribunal being the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal constituted under section 252 of the Income-tax Act. The appeal contemplated under this section is against an order directing the acquisition of property, which in the opinion of the competent authority, had been sold at an undervaluation. The authority, has held that the apparent consideration for which the property had been sold by the appellant, who is a lady of 65 years of age, did not represent the fair market valu ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... order or 30 days from the date of service, whichever is later ; (2) Prove to the satisfaction of the Tribunal that the applicant had sufficient cause for not being able to present the appeal within the said period of 45 days, or, as the case may be, 30 days." The Tribunal thus though vested with the power to extend the time for filing of the appeal may exercise that power only on the applicant complying with the two conditions laid down in the proviso and not otherwise. The normal period of limitation is specified in the two clauses (a) and (b) of section 269G(1) of the Act. The extension of' that period is provided for only when the person seeking that extension satisfies the conditions laid down in the proviso, and not otherwise, The power conferred on the Tribunal becomes available for being exercised only if the application for the extension of time is filed before the expiry of the period of limitation prescribed in clause (a) of section 269G(1) of the Act. This proviso in contrast to the periods of limitation specified in the other provisions of the Act requires the intending appellant to approach the Tribunal even before the expiry of the period of limitation, and sati ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... itation Act are applicable for the purpose of enabling the Tribunal to condone the delay in filing the appeal. Counsel did not dispute the fact that the nature of the power conferred on the Tribunal under the proviso is one of extending the period of limitation, and not that of condoning the delay. Counsel, however, contended that the substantive power conferred on the Tribunal being that of extension of time for filing the appeal, the procedural part for invoking that power is only to be regarded as directory and not mandatory. His further submission was that in case of any doubt, an interpretation which would advance the ends of justice must be preferred to an unjust result which may be the end-product of a literal interpretation of the terms of the proviso. Mr. Subramaniam, learned senior counsel for the Revenue, on the other hand, submitted that Parliament consciously made a distinction between the general power conferred on the Appellate Tribunal to condone the delay in filing the appeals before it, for which provision is made under section 255 of the Act ; that the language employed in the proviso to section 269G of the Act is crystal clear and can, by no means, be regarded ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... must be held to have the power to grant stay as incidental or ancillary to its appellate jurisdiction. The proposition recorded by the court was that the Appellate Tribunal was not a court, though it exercised judicial powers. Its power to grant stay was recognised not on account of the fact that it is a court, but, because it exercised appellate jurisdiction. The distinction between the Appellate Tribunal and the court has been well brought out in the judgment of Mr. Chief Justice P. N. Bhagwati (as he then was) in the case of CIT v. Western India Engineering Co. Ltd. [1970] 77 ITR 165 (Guj). We are in respectful agreement with what has been held therein viz., that every judicial forum or quasi-judicial forum exercising judicial powers is not a court, and the further observation therein that all Tribunals are not courts, though all courts are Tribunals, and that the court in the strict sense is a Tribunal constituted by the State as a part of the ordinary hierarchy of courts of law invested with the State's inherent judicial power. As observed by Hidayatullah J., in the case of Harinagar Sugar Mills v. Shyam Sunder Jhunjhunwala [1961] 31 Comp Cas 387 (SC), courts are a part of t ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ility of section 29(2) of the Limitation Act. It was held by the apex court that those conditions were in fact satisfied, and that section 5 of the Limitation Act applied to appeals before that authority. The power under that special enactment had been conferred on the regular civil courts. The appellate authority therein was a court in the normal hierarchy of courts set up by the State. The apex court held that the powers under the special law were exercised by the civil court, that the special law did not exclude the application of the provisions of sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act. That the civil courts were not exercising powers under the special statute as persona designata and, therefore, the provisions of section 29(2) of the Limitation Act were applicable to the proceedings arising under the special law. Though some of the observations made in that judgment appear to be at variance with the observations made in the case of Baliram Waman Hiray (Dr.) v. Justice B. Lentin [1989] 176 ITR 1 (SC), having regard to the fact that the Supreme Court (see CIT v. Walchand and Co. P. Ltd. [1967] 65 ITR 381 (SC) and ITO v. M. K. Mohammed Kunhi [1969] 71 ITR 815 (SC)) has specific ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... course of the judgment that the power under the rent control laws were being exercised by judicial officers who normally functioned as courts. The term "other proceedings", it was observed would include and embrace proceedings under the special and local laws. We cannot read that judgment to have laid down that the Limitation Act applies to all forums whether or not courts. The ratio of that decision is that the Limitation Act applies to proceedings in the courts when they discharge the powers conferred on them by the Rent Control Act, and no more. Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act refers to special or local laws which prescribe a period of limitation different from the period prescribed in the Schedule, and which do not expressly exclude the application of sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act. It is evident that what is dealt with under that provision is the period of limitation specified in a special or local law, and not the adjudicatory forum before which the dispute is brought and is to be adjudicated. The Limitation Act is only concerned with the period of limitation, and when the period prescribed in the Act is different from that prescribed in a special or local law u ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... urt before the expiry of the period of limitation, and seek extension of time for filing the appeal. The High Court held that to a proceeding under section 269H of the Act, the Limitation Act applied, that the High Court had the power to condone the delay in filing the appeal, that power being traceable to section 5 of the Limitation Act. It is beyond any doubt that the High Court is a court and would certainly satisfy the requirements of the Limitation Act for the purpose of extending the provisions of sections 4 to 24 of the Act in proceedings before the High Court. The Appellate Tribunal, however, cannot be equated to the High Court and as held by us, the Appellate Tribunal cannot be treated as a court. We, therefore, do not see any inconsistency on this score in the rulings referred to by counsel for the Revenue, and this decision relied upon by counsel for the appellant. We may at once notice here that in this decision, the High Court also construed the terms of the proviso to section 269H of the Act, and held that notwithstanding the fact that an application for extension of the limitation could be made under the proviso only before the expiry of 60 days, the proviso itself w ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... t. After having so ascertained the legislative intention, if it is found that effect cannot be given to that intention by a literal construction. it is at that stage that the court would be required to consider whether something needs to be read into that provision or as stated by the Supreme Court "some violence" needs to be done to the language employed in order to bring about a just result which conforms to the legislative intent. The proviso to section 269G has been extracted, and set out in the earlier part of this judgment. The literal construction thereof has also been dealt with. The legislative intent is manifest. The proviso departs from the scheme employed elsewhere in the Act for the purpose of enabling the affected party to invoke the appellate forum and the circumstances in which the appellant can seek the delay in approaching the forum condoned. The proviso does not provide for condonation of delay as rightly stressed by learned counsel for the Revenue. What it does is to enable the Tribunal to extend the period of limitation. That power is not a power vested in it for being exercised suo motu in the interest of justice, as the proviso does not provide for it. It i ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ld not justify the period of limitation being extended when the Sales Tax Act which prescribed that period (lid not provide for such extension, and the Limitation Act was inapplicable to the proceeding before the authority constituted under the Act. The fact that the statutory provision is harsh by itself would not constitute a ground for ignoring the legislative intent and the court proceeding to ignore any part of the provision. The facts of this case also are not such as to persuade the court to hold that any grave injustice has been caused to the petitioner. The petitioner, though a lady of 65 years, cannot be said to have become infirm because of age. It is not her case that she was ill and unable to comprehend what was going on around her. She has herself received the order of the competent authority. The fact that she did not choose to consult her auditor or advocate in time cannot be regarded as having subjected her to a very unjust treatment, as anyone who is not sufficiently vigilant is liable to suffer the consequences of such lack of vigilance, whether under this provision or under any other provision of any statute, which prescribes a period of limitation. The Trib ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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