TMI Blog1975 (10) TMI 115X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... have been brought to this Court and not the other two. Since the Division Bench of High Court has disposed of all the 15 Letters Patent appeals by a common judgment, to avoid confusion in the statement of facts we think it better to state in a chart form the number of the Civil Appeal, the corresponding number of the L. P. A. and the name of the Government servant concerned. At the outset it may be stated that the respondent in Civil Appeal No. 521 Dasaundi Ram is dead and that appeal has abated on that account. Bhagwan Singh, respondent in Civil Appeal No. 519 does not seem to be in service any longer and nobody has appeared in this Court on his behalf. Out of the remaining 11 respondents we were informed at the Bar, that the 7 respondents in Civil Appeals 522 to 527 and 529 have since retired from service. Only 4 of the respondents in Civil Appeals 518, 520, 528 and 530 are still in service. 2. Respondents Balbir Singh, Surmukh Singh, Dasaundi Ram. Jagdish Singh, Surat Singh, Kartar Singh and Gurbux Singh were promoted and appointed on officiating basis as Sub-Divisional Officers in the Punjab Public Works Department (Buildings and Roads Branch) on various ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... lause in the proviso appended thereto. The High Court then referred to the Punjab Service of Engineers, Class II P.W.D.(Buildings and Roads Branch) Rules, 1965 (for brevity, Class II 1965 Rules). The said Rules came into force from February 19, 1965. The stand on behalf of the State of Punjab in the High Court was : (1) that the 1942 Rules did not govern the cases of the respondents as the said Rules applied to class I service consisting of Assistant Executive Engineers and officers of higher ranks only; (2) that the respondents had to be taken in P.S.E. Class II service in accordance with Rule 6(5)(b) of Class II 1965 Rules read with paragraph 1(d) of Appendix 'G' of the said Rules, in consultation with the Punjab Public Service Commission : (3) that since the Commission did not find them suitable for being admitted to that service, they were reverted to their substantive rank in accordance with the terms and conditions of their service and not by way of punishment. 5. The High Court made a comparative study of 1942 Rules, 1960 Rules and Class II 1965 Rules and came to the conclusion that the officiating Sub-Divisional Officers, as the respondents were, not being As ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... Court has rightly come to the conclusion that their reversion was not hit on account of the non-compliance with the provisions of Article 311(2) of the Constitution or any Rules governing the disciplinary action.. The reversion was not by way of punishment. This aspect of the matter is now squarely covered by the decision of this Court in Shamsher Singh v. State of Punjab (1974)IILLJ465SC 7. A few new points were urged on behalf of the respondents in the Letters Patent appeals. They were not allowed to be raised except the one which eventually succeeded and the Letters Patent appeals were allowed on the basis of that point. 8. The decision of the High Court as respects the application of the 1942 Rules to the cases of the respondents and the order of reversion not being hit by the alleged non-compliance with Article 311(2) of the Constitution could not be seriously challenged before us. We agree with the view expressed by the Division Bench. It is not necessary to repeat all that has been said by the High Court in that regard. We now proceed to consider the only substantial question which falls for determination in these appeals. 9. The erstwhile State of Punj ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... unicated the order to the officers concerned as per his Memo No. 8 E/47/ Re-org/11670-710 E dated 30-10-1966. The respondents, however, seem to have received the orders on or after 1-11-1966. The question for consideration is whether the view of the High Court that the orders being administrative in nature were not laws within the meaning of the Act and hence were not saved by Section 88 is correct and whether they remained ineffective and inoperative because they were not communicated to the respondents before 1-11-1966. 11. Under the Act certain territories were carved out from the appointed day from the then existing. State of Punjab Under Sections 3 and 4 were formed the State of Haryana and the Union Territory of Chandigarh. The territories mentioned in Section 5 were added to the then Union territory of Himachal Pradesh. The balance was to remain in the State of Punjab Under Section 6 Sections 3 to 6 occur in Part II of the Act. Part III deals with the representation in the Legislatures and allocation of sitting members etc. Part IV concerns the making of the existing High Court as the common High Court for Punjab, Haryana and Chandigarh. Part V is headed Authorisatio ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ately before the appointed day. 12. Law is defined in Clause (g) of Section 2 of the Act to say: 'law includes any enactment, ordinance, regulation, order, bye-law, rule, scheme, notification or other instrument having, immediately before the appointed day, the force of law in the whole or in any part of the existing State of Punjab We agree with the High Court that the impugned orders in question were not law within the meaning of Section 2(g) and hence were, in terms, not saved by Section 88. We think the High Court is right when it says: Section 88 appears to have been introduced as a matter of abundant caution. In my opinion, mere splitting up of the territories of Punjab into four successor States would not ipso facto result in the abrogation or repeal of the laws which were immediately in force before the appointed day in those territories. There is nothing in the 1966 Act, not even in Section 88, which expressly or by necessary intendment repeals the laws which were in force immediately before the appointed day in the territories of the former Punjab. Those laws derived their force de hors the 1966 Act. The first part, of Section 88 is merel ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... placed upon the decisions of this Court in Rajvi Amar Singh v. State of Rajasthan [1958]1SCR1015 and Narsingh Pratap Singh Deo v. State of Orissa [1964]7SCR112 . Bose, J. delivering the judgment of the Court in the former case had said at page 230 of AIR: Now it is well established that when one State is absorbed in another, whether by accession, conquest, merger or integration, all contracts of service between the prior Government and its servants automatically terminate and thereafter those who elect to serve in the new State, and are taken on by it, serve on such terms and conditions as the new State may choose to impose. This is nothing more, (though on a more exalted scale), than an application of the principle that underlines the law of Master and Servant when there is a change of masters. The said principle is not applicable to the case on hand as it is not a case of absorption of one State in another by accession, conquest, merger or integration. It would be chaotic if this principle were to be applied to the case of re-organization of States in the same country. In the case of Raj Kumar N.P. Singh Deo (supra) a question arose as to whether the sanad granted ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e the said officer had come to know on 28th May, 1951 about the dismissal order. This date was taken to be the date of communication. Shelat, J. has considered the earlier cases of this Court including the one in S. Pratap Singh v. State of Punjab (1966)ILLJ458SC . In paragraph 16 of the judgment the law laid down is: It will be seen that in all the decisions cited before us it was the communication of the impugned order which was held to be essential and not its actual receipt by the officer concerned and such communication was held to be necessary because till the order is issued and actually sent out to the person concerned the authority making such order would be in a position to change its mind and modify it if it thought fit. But once such an order is sent out, it goes out of the control of such an authority, and therefore, there would be no chance whatsoever of its changing its mind or modifying it. In our view, once an order is issued and it is sent out to the concerned government servant, it must be held to have been communicated to him, no matter when he actually received it. Applying the principles of law aforesaid we find in this case that the orders went ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... horn of the complications of other facts if the Inquiry Officer was appointed by the Commissioner of a Division which was a part of the undivided State and on re-organisation becomes a part of the new State, the disciplinary proceedings started earlier can undoubtedly be continued and concluded without a fresh order of starting a disciplinary proceeding. 18. We, therefore, hold that the view taken by the High Court that the orders were still-born and in effective because they were received by the respondents on or after 1-11- 1966 is not correct. 19. After careful consideration we have arrived at the conclusion that the impugned orders of re version dated October 28, 1966 were valid. About 9 years have passed since then and some complications have arisen during this period. Admittedly, after the High Court judgment, all the respondents were officiating in the higher posts. At the time of the hearing of these appeals, we were given to understand at the Bar that none of the respondents was reverted pursuant to the impugned order. We asked the parties to ascertain the correct position and file their statements. On behalf of the Government we have been informed that they ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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