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TMI Blog2019 (11) TMI 1332X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... stated that at the time of filing appeal, the respondent (appellant herein) has only filed the stay application and not the application for condonation of delay. On going through the case records and the order dated 19.09.2018 passed by the Tribunal, we find that such order was not passed based on any application filed by the appellant. Since, upon appreciation of the facts on record, the Tribunal has held that there is no delay in filing the appeal before the Tribunal, we do not find any justifiable reason to entertain the prayer made by Revenue in the present miscellaneous application. Accordingly, the miscellaneous application (ROM) filed by Revenue is dismissed. 3. The issue involved in this appeal lies in a narrow compass. According ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ntertained by the appellate authority. The relevant paragraphs in the said judgment are extracted herein below: "6. At this juncture, it is relevant to take note of Section 35 of the Act which reads as follows : "35. Appeals to Commissioner (Appeals). - (1) Any person aggrieved by any decision or order passed under this Act by a Central Excise Officer, lower in rank than a Commissioner of Central Excise, may appeal to the Commissioner of Central Excise (Appeals) [hereafter in this Chapter referred to as the Commissioner (Appeals)] within sixty days from the date of the communication to him of such decision or order : Provided that the Commissioner (Appeals) may, if he is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient caus ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 35 makes the position crystal clear that the appellate authority has no power to allow the appeal to be presented beyond the period of 30 days. The language used makes the position clear that the legislature intended the appellate authority to entertain the appeal by condoning delay only upto 30 days after the expiry of 60 days which is the normal period for preferring appeal. Therefore, there is complete exclusion of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The Commissioner and the High Court were therefore justified in holding that there was no power to condone the delay after the expiry of 30 days period." 5. In view of above, we do not find any infirmity in the impugned order passed by the learned Commi ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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