TMI Blog1968 (3) TMI 119X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... rom the High Court certificates under Art. 133(1)(c) the State of Madhya Pradesh has filed these appeals. The State is challenging the correctness of the decision of the High Court to the extent it went against it. The respondents on their part, in addition to supporting the findings of the High Court which are in their favour, relied also on the other pleas taken by them before the High Court. As we are of the opinion that the impugned Act is either violative of Art. 31(2) or, in the alternative, Art. 19(1)(f) of the Constitution, we have not thought it necessary to go into the other contentions taken on behalf of the respondents. 2. Before the impugned Act was enacted, the State of Madhya Bharat which forms part of the new State of Madhya Pradesh, purported to abolish the cash grants payable by it by means of an executive order. That order was unsuccessfully challenged by Madhorao Phalke and others before the High Court. But in appeal this Court in Madhorao Phalke v. State of Madhya Bharat [1961] 1 SCR 957 quashed the order in question, holding that the grants in question were recognised by the kalambandis of 1912 and 1935 issued by the Rulers of Gwalior and those ka ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... f payment of compensation. Section 11 empowers the State Government to make rules for carrying out all or any of the purposes of the Act. Section 12 says that if any difficulty arises in giving effect to the provisions of the Act, the State Government may by order make such provisions not inconsistent with purposes of this Act as appears to be necessary or expedient for removing the difficulty. 4. In these appeals we are mainly concerned with the vires of s. 3 read with the definition of cash grant on s. 2(1). If section 3 read with s. 2(1) is held to be ultra vires of the Constitution, then the whole Act falls to the ground as the remaining sections of the Act are merely subsidiary or incidental provisions. Section 3 [ 3. Abolition of certain cash grants - (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any law, custom, usage, sanad or a decree or order of a court or other authority whatsoever, all cash grants shall be discontinued and cease to have effect from the commencement of this Act : Provided that where the grantee is a person specified in column (1) of the Table below the cash grant may, at the option of the grantee exercised in such man ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... loans given to the Rulers. Different considerations may arise if the grants abolished are gratuitous payments, grants in lieu of services to be rendered or other resumable grants. But as mentioned earlier, the definition of cash grants in s. 2(1) dose not make any distinction between the various types of cash grants. Hence, the said definition will have to stand or fall as a whole, there being no basis for severing some out of the several grants included therein. It is impermissible for this Court to rewrite that clause and confine the definition only to such of the cash grants which the legislature might be competent to abolish. (i) a grant of money for - (a) services of public temples, mosque or church; or (b) worship of public temples, mosque or church; or (c) reading puran in public temples; or (d) performing Kirtan in public temples; (ii) a grant of money to charitable or religious institutions; (iii) a grant of money or pension or annuity or special or perpetual annuity sanctioned under - (a) s. 5 of the Central Provinces and Bearar Revocation of Land Revenue Exemptions Act, 1948 (XXXV ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... an be acquired in the exercise of the power of eminent domain though the preponderance of opinion appears to be that it is impermissible. But so far as we are concerned, this question is concluded by the decisions of this Court. In State of Bihar v. Kameshwar Singh [1952] 1 SCR 889 this Court held that under Art. 31(2) of the Constitution, money and choses in action could not be acquired. Mahajan, J. (as he then was), speaking for the majority, after quoting with approval certain passages from Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, observed ( at pp. 943-44 of the Report) : It was not necessary to decide in this case whether under the compulsory acquisition power the State has the power to acquire choses in action or money, but it cannot be seriously disputed that such an acquisition amounts to a forced loan and that the desired result can be more appositely obtained in exercise of the police power of the State than of the power of eminent domain or compulsory acquisition of property and that compensation in such a case is the same amount of money that is being taken and in the case of a chose in action the amount of money that it would produce. In this situation it ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... 889 that the provision in question is invalid and is not protected by Art. 31(2). 11. From the above decisions it follows that choses in action and money could not acquired under Art. 31(2). If it is held that State by the exercise of its power of eminent domain can acquire choses in action and money belonging to its citizens, by paying a fraction of the money taken as compensation, the fundamental right guaranteed under Art. 19(1)(f) would be deprived of all its contents and that Article will cease to have any meaningful purpose. The power conferred under Art. 31(2) is not a taxing power. That power cannot be utilised for enriching the coffers of the State. It is true that the abolition of the cash grants would augment the resources of the State but that cannot be considered as a public purpose under Art. 31(2). If it is otherwise it would be permissible for the legislatures to enact laws acquiring the public debts due from the State, the annuity deposits returnable by it and provident fund payable by it by providing for the payment of some nominal compensation to the persons whose rights are acquired as the acquisitions in question would augment the resources of the ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... n of ours receives support from the ratio of the decisions of this Court in State of Bihar v. Kameshwar Singh [1952]1SCR889 and in Bombay Dyeing and Manufacturing Co. Limited v. State of Bombay [1958] S.C.R. 1122. wherein Venkatarama Aiyar, J. speaking for the Court, observed : Assuming that the correct position is what the respondents contend it is that the case falls within Art. 19(1)(f), the question that has still to be determined is whether the impugned Act could be supported under Art. 19(5). There was some discussion before us as to the scope of this provision, the point of the debate being whether the words 'imposing reasonable restriction' would cover a legislation, which not merely regulated the exercise of the rights guaranteed by Art. 19(1)(f) but totally extinguished them, and whether a law like the present one which deprived the owner of his properties could be held to fall within that provision. It was argued that a law authorising the State to seize and destroy diseased cattle, noxious drugs and the like, could not be brought within Art. 19(5) if the word 'restriction' was to be narrowly construed, and that accordingly the power to res ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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