TMI Blog1977 (3) TMI 175X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the result that we will have to consider now in this judgment the full scope of Article. 226, as substituted by the 42nd Amendment and of Section 58 of that Amendment Act. 2. We may also point out that none of the above cases is under Article. 227 and so much so, no arguments have been advanced on the scope of Article. 227 of the 42nd Amendment. We are not, therefore, expressing any opinion on that particular provision. 3. It must be noted at the outset that the 42nd Amendment Act has not merely added to Article. 226 a new clause here or deleted an old clause there. Instead, by virtue of Section 38 of the Act a new Article. 226 is substituted. Further, some new articles have also been added which have great impact on the scope of Article. 226. Section 58 of the Amendment Act is not made a part of Constitution but has been enacted by the Parliament as a separate provision for pending petitions under Article. 226. Patently it is transitory provision laying down the guidelines according to which petitions pending on the appointed day viz., 1st February 1977 should be disposed of. The new Article. 226 Clause (1) starts with a non-obstante clause. It says that ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ll not consider the Constitutional validity of any Central law in any proceedings under that Article.. It may be immediately noticed that Article. 226-A reiterates what is provided under Article. 131-A. These are the specific exclusions from the High Court's jurisdiction under Article. 226. 5. Further, two new Articles - Article. 323-A and Article. 323-B - are introduced in the Constitution by Section 46 of the Amendment Act. Article. 323-A provides for the Constitution of Administrative Tribunal and enables the Parliament to make laws providing for the adjudication of service matters by Administrative Tribunals. Likewise, the appropriate legislature is empowered under Article. 323-B to make laws providing for adjudication or trial by Tribunals of disputes, complaints or offences with respect to all or any of the matters specified in Clause (2) thereof. If and when such laws are made Clause 2(d) of Article. 323-A and Clause 3(d) of Article. 323-B enable the Parliament or appropriate legislature to provide for the exclusion of the jurisdiction of all Courts, except the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Article. 136, with respect to the disputes ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... icle. is different from Clause (1) of old Article. 226 only in two respects. The first is in regard to the feature that the power under Article. 226 is now subject to the provisions of Article. 131-A and Article. 226-A, to which aspect we have already adverted. The second point of departure is that the words and for any other purpose in former Clause (1) are now absent in Clause (1) or for that matter, in the entirety of the Article.. Excepting in these two respects, Clause (1)(a) is the same as the old Clause (1) word by word. Therefore, it is not necessary to decide the nature of the writs, directions or orders which can be issued and against whom or which authorities they can be issued. The Parliament evidently intended to retain the law as it has stood and, as it has been construed and laid down by the Supreme Court and several High Courts in this behalf. 8. The main point of departure from the old Article. is the inclusion of sub-cls. (b) and (c) in Clause (1). They have been obviously introduced in the place of the words for any other purpose . It is manifest that by introducing sub-cls. (b) and (c) the Parliament decided to specify the delineate regions of ju ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ed in sub-cls. (a), (b)and (c) of Clause (1) do not cover the entire arena of the jurisdiction under Article. 226. What is stated in those sub-cl. is only illustrative of the power under Article. 226. This idea is illustrated by pointing out that aspects like violation of natural justice, any order being ultra vires, or any order suffering from lack of jurisdiction or being vitiated by error apparent on the face of the record are not mentioned anywhere in Article. 226. These omissions do not mean that the High Court cannot exercise writ jurisdiction under Article. 226 if any proceedings are vitiated by any of the features stated above. It has been consequently urged that none of the principles of writ jurisdiction have been given up by the Parliament. That is why the Parliament deliberately chose to retain the power of the High Court to issue all kinds of writs, directions and orders which were being issued so far. The word 'illegality' occurring in sub-cl. (c), it was stressed before us, is capable of taking in all that was contained in the words for any other purpose . It has even been argued that despite Article. 37 writs can be sought and issued even to enforce directi ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... any order, rule, regulation, bye-law, or other instrument made thereunder, or (c) for the redress of any injury by reason of any illegality in any proceedings by or before any authority under any provision referred to in sub-cl. (b) where such illegality has resulted in substantial failure of justice. In addition to the enforcement of any fundamental right, these are the grounds on which a writ, direction or order can now be issued. These grounds other than the enforcement of any of the fundamental rights are classified into two divisions, the first one being covered by sub-cl. (b) and the second one by sub-cl. (c). The broad classification under the two sub-cl. appears to be that sub-cl. (b) applies where there is a contravention of a provision of a substantive law while sub-cl. (c) applied where there is an illegality in proceedings before authorities. However, mere contravention of a provision of substantive law and an illegality in any proceedings by themselves are not sufficient for the issuance of a writ. Only those contraventions of law which have caused to a person, an injury of a substantial nature could provide basis for issuing a writ, direc ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... notice issued, that causing of substantial injury is certain to follow or is imminent, then certainly it would be a case where injury of a substantial nature existed. Let us illustrate this by referring to a notice to a Co-operative Society managing Committee to show cause why it should not be superseded. If on an examination of the contents of the notice and the circumstances attending on the issuance of such notice the Court is satisfied that the supersession has been practically decided upon and that the notice was merely a formal compliance with the statutory requirement, then clearly the Court can treat it as a case of substantial injury. Needless to observe that a writ petition can be entertained and a writ can be issued only of the other requirements of Art. 226 are satisfied. What we are trying to point out at this juncture is that a mere threat should not always be excluded from the category of injury of excluded from the category of injury of a substantial nature . The Court will have to examine each case in the light of its circumstances and facts. 13. Even in regard to procedural requirements which come under the ambit of sub-cl. (c) some of them may be s ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... rson. These are considerations common to both sub-cls. (b) and (c). 16. Then taking up sub-cl. (b) it applies when there has been a contravention of any provision of Constitution other than the provision in Part III thereof (this exclusion in sub-cl.(b) of the contravention of the provisions in Part III is because that is already provided in sub-cl. (a) or any provision of any enactment or Ordinance, or any order, rule, regulation, bye law or other instrument made thereunder. Lengthy arguments have been addressed before us in regard to the scope of the words any order . It was said that since the word 'any' precedes the word 'order' they should be construed as taking in within their sphere not merely statutory orders but also executive orders or instructions. A number of decisions of the Supreme Court and the High Courts have been placed before us to show that on several occasions the Courts have exercised their extraordinary jurisdiction when there has been contravention of executive orders or directions. Dharakast rules and rules relating to admission into colleges etc., have been cited as illustrations in regard to which Courts have interfered under ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... actment or Ordinance have the force of law. It is, therefore, reasonable to understand that the words 'made thereunder' govern not merely the words 'other instrument' immediately preceding them, but also any order, rule, regulation and bye-law'. If they are made under the Constitution or any enactment or Ordinance and if there is a contravention of them resulting in substantial injury, then it would be a ground for issuing a writ. Otherwise, the Parliament would not have used the word 'other' before the expression 'instrument made thereunder'. That word brings out the intention of the Parliament that any order, rule, regulation, bye-law are in the nature of instruments made under the Constitution any enactment or Ordinance. Since all of them belong to one genus the word 'other' has been used before the expression 'instrument'. That is to say, an order, rule, regulation or bye-law made under the Constitution any enactment or Ordinance are in the nature of instruments. 18. We may here usefully refer to what the learned author Craies has said in his book on Statute Law (seventh edition) at pages 302 and 303: ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... are afraid we cannot accept this contention. The words used 'made thereunder' and not 'made in exercise of the powers conferred by the Constitution'. The natural meaning of the words 'made thereunder' is that any order, rule, regulation, bye-law or instrument, should be one which it made directly under the Constitution any enactment or Ordinance. For example a control order issued under the Essential Commodities Act is an 'order' made under an enactment. Likewise, rules, regulations, bye-laws made by the rule-making authority clearly under the provisions and for the purposes of the enactment are rules, regulations, bye-laws made under the Constitution. That is why it is called 'delegated legislation' and the orders, rules, regulations, bye-laws made in that fashion are also given the status of law. It would be doing violence to the language, if administrative instructions given by the executive authority are considered as instructions 'made under' Art. 73 or Art. 162 of the Constitution. 20. There are many instances where the Supreme Court has explained the scope of the power under Arts. 73 and 162 of the Constitution. We ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e or Ordinance, they can certainly be questioned. But then, that challenge would come under sub-cl. (a) or the first limb of sub-cl. (b) because an action thereon would be for enforcement of a fundamental right or on a complaint of contravention of any other provision of the Constitution or a provision of any enactment or Ordinance. 22. Now coming to sub-cl. (c). broadly stated, it would apply to illegalities in proceedings. The words under any provision referred to in sub-cl. (b). occurring therein refer and govern proceedings by or before any authority . That is to say, the illegality will have to occur in any proceeding by or before any authority provided under any provision of the Constitution, any enactment, Ordinance or under any order, rule, regulation, bye-law made under the Constitution or enactment or Ordinance. If a particular proceeding before a certain authority is provided by any provision referred to in sub-cl. (b)and if any illegality resulting in substantial failure of justice occurs therein, the matter comes under sub-cl. (c). The illegality in order to attract sub-cl.(c) need not necessarily be in the course of the proceedings before the concerned ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... here is illegality of any nature in the proceeding it comes under this sub-cl. Further, if in the proceedings the principles of natural justice have been violated, that could also be 'illegality' provided the particular statute under which the proceedings have been taken by the authority concerned specifically excludes the application of the principles of natural justice. Unless there is such express exclusion or exclusion by necessary intendment, it must be taken that the principles of natural justice would apply to all proceedings before authority. Several times if these principles are violated it would result in grave miscarriage of justice causing substantial injury to persons. Therefore, it can be safely concluded that unless a particular statute or provision of law specifically or by necessary implication excludes the application of the principles of natural justice, it would be 'illegality' if in the proceedings any principle of natural justice has been violated and if it has resulted in substantial failure of justice. Needless to say that each case will have to be tested in the light of its own facts. 24. Clause (2) of the new Article. 226 is ve ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... Some other counsel have pointed out that Section 9 of the Civil Procedure Code does not create a right but lays down only a procedure and therefore a suit could not be said to be 'other remedy' provided under any other law. It was also sought to be pointed out that a suit is not a public law remedy while Article. 226 deals only with public law remedy. Even if a suit is considered to be another remedy available to the aggrieved person, the Court cannot straightway refuse to entertain a writ petition if any itself the material facts can be found and decided by the High Court. The decision of the Supreme Court in Century Spinning Manufacturing Co. Ltd. v. Ulhasnagar Municipality, [1970] 3 SCR 854 was mentioned in this connection. It was also pointed out that the word 'remedy' by itself postulates that it should be adequate and efficacious. 'Remedy' was said to be a particular relief sought, while redress is general in connotation. Therefore the 'other remedy' should be real and not illusory. 'Law' means only statutory law and if a statute itself provides for filing a suit to get a redress, that could become 'other remedy', since it is ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... n efficacious one. He also submitted that suit in certain cases could be another remedy. When the statute, the breach of which is complained of, itself provides for another remedy, a writ petition is barred. He referred to the decisions of the Supreme Court in State of Madhya Pradesh v. Bhailal Bhai [1964] 6 SCR 261 (supra), Orient Paper Mills v. Union of India, 1973 ECR 1(SC) and that of the Madras High Court in In re Thippaswami, AIR 1952 Mad 112 . Learned standing counsel also contended that the Government could object to the maintainability of the writ petition even at the stage of final disposal since it could not intervene at the admission stage. Learned Advocate-General appearing for the State endeavoured to construe the word 'such redress' as the redress postulated by Clause (b) or (c). He pointed out that the concept of sufficiency, efficacy and speediness does not come into the picture in view of new Clause (3). The mere existence of a remedy is sufficient. The objection to the maintainability of the writ petition can be raised at any stage of the writ petition. Suit is not ruled out as an alternative remedy. Law in force takes in common law also. 27. ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... nd sub-cl. (c), then it cannot be considered to be a bar. A suit by itself cannot be ruled out as another remedy available. The 'other remedy' stated in Clause (3) is a remedy provided for by or under any other law for the time being in force. A suit cannot be excluded from this wide amplitude of the 'other remedy'. We seek support to this view from State of Madhya Pradesh v. Bhailal Bhai ( [1964] 6 SCR 261 ) (supra), Thamsingh v. Superintendent of Taxes, [1964] 6 SCR 654 and Tata Engineering and Locomotive Co., Ltd, v. Asst. Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, [1967] 2 SCR 751 . 29. Care must be taken to clarify another aspect. Mere existence of what is called 'another remedy' provided under the same law for the time being in force cannot always be said to be a remedy which is capable of giving such redress as is provided under sub-cl. (b) or sub-cl. (c). The other remedy provided under other law shall not be illusory. That should be real. We may give an example to bring home this aspect. Supposing there is an appeal provided against the decision of a particular authority under a statute, the breach of which is complained of. But if it is manifes ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... is sufficient compliance with Clause (4) . It was also pointed out that under the Civil Procedure Code Government Pleader is constituted an agent of the Government and therefore service of the papers on the Government Pleader is service on the party. But this position no more obtains in view of the recent amendment to the Civil Procedure Code which also came into force on 1-2-1977. Section 141 Civil Procedure Code says that the procedure provided in the code in regard to suits shall be followed as far as it can be made applicable, in all proceedings in any Court of Civil Jurisdiction. Now by virtue of the new amendment to the Civil Procedure Code, an explanation is added to this Section which says that any proceeding under Article. 226 of the Constitution does not come within the meaning of the word 'proceedings' occurring in Section 141. Therefore, it is no more possible to say, relying on the procedure of the Civil Procedure Code, that service on the learned Government Pleader is service on the Government which is generally the party against whom a writ petition is filed. 31. Furthermore Clause (4) patently seeks to introduce a rule that interim orders shall ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... 32. It is true that in some writ petitions not only the Government authority or authorities constituted under the law are parties, but also private persons are impleaded as respondents, for instance, motor transport cases, village officers cases. If a writ petition is filed against them also, they must also have been furnished with the material papers and have been afforded an opportunity to be heard in the matter. It was argued that such private persons are not parties against whom a writ is sought and therefore they need not be furnished with copies. We are unable to accept this contention in an unqualified manner. We have already referred to motor transport cases, village officers cases etc. In such matters the relief really is against the private person and not the Government, though in pursuance of the order given by the High Court a public authority will have to conduct itself. But the really affected party on account of such interim order in such cases would be the private person. Therefore, such persons, whose rights and positions would be affected by an interim order, would be parties who should also be furnished with material documents before any interim order is ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ays would not automatically continue the operation of the interim order. The Court must further, before the expiry of a period of fourteen days, pass another order continuing the operation of the earlier interim order. Clause (5) thus demonstrates not only that the requirements of sub-cl. (b) and sub-cl. (c) of Clause (4) are mandatory, but also that the power of passing interim orders in writ petitions is now very much circumscribed. Hypothetical questions were raised by some learned counsel as to what should happen if the party against whom the petition has been filed, cannot be served before the expiry of the fourteen days or if he evades to take notice. It was also suggested that such difficulties could be got over by filing fresh applications seeking an exceptional order under Clause (5) . It is not necessary to adjudicate upon all these hypothetical contingencies which may arise before Courts. The Court will and shall deal with the situations as they arise in the light of these provisions of Article. 226. Suffice it to say that even though the requirements of Clause (4) are not satisfied the Court can still pass an interim order as an exceptional measure, if it is satisfied t ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... 58. Special provisions as to pending petitions under Article. 226. - (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Constitution, every petition made under Article. 226 of the Constitution before the appointed day and pending before any High Court immediately before that day (such petition being referred to in this Section as a pending petition) and any interim order (whether by way of injunction or stay or in any other manner) made on, or in any proceedings relating to such petition before that day shall be dealt with in accordance with the provisions of Article. 226 as substituted by Section 38. (2) In particular, and without prejudice to the generality of the provisions of Sub-section (1), every pending petition before a High Court which would not have been admitted by the High Court under the provisions of Article. 226 as substituted by Section 38 if such petition had been made after the appointed day, shall abate and any interim order (whether by way of injunction or stay or in any other manner) made on, or in any proceeding relating to, such petition shall stand vacated; Provided that nothing contained in this Sub-section shall aff ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ed day' means the date on which Section 38 comes into force. Sub-section (1) starts with a non-obstante clause that it will have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the Constitution. It provides for dealing with petitions made under Article. 226 of the Constitution before the appointed day and pending before any High Court immediately before that day. Such petitions alone are referred to as pending petitions. The explanation to the Section says that the appointed day means the day on which Section 38 comes into force. It is under Section 38 that the new Article. 226 is substituted in the place of the old one. It has been declared now that Section 38 would come into force on and from 1st February, 1977. The word used here is 'made' while the word 'admitted' is used in Sub-section (2). We have already noted that in Clause (3) of Article. 226 the bar is against 'entertainment' of a writ petition. Thus Article. 226 and Section 58, in between themselves, deal with different aspects of dealing with a writ petition. The word 'made' used in Sub-section (1) when read in contradistinction with the expressions 'admitted' and ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... would abate if they do not stand the test of the new Article. 226. While dealing with pending petitions, the Court will have to see whether the writ petitions would have been admitted under the provisions of the new Article. 226. If the Court is satisfied that they could have been admitted, it would proceed to consider the writ petition on its merits in the light of the new Article. 226. If, on the other hand, it is of the opinion that the writ petition could not have been admitted under the new Article. 226, then the writ petition would abate. When a writ petition abates, any interim order made therein would stand vacated. 42. The proviso to Sub-section (2), however, says that the abatement of a writ petition will not affect the right of the petitioner to seek the relief under any other law for the time being in force. It goes further and says that in computing the period of limitation for pursuing the other remedy, the time spent in the High Court for seeking relief under Article. 226 shall be excluded. This provision is obviously made in the interests of justice to see that the other remedies available to the petitioner are not barred because his writ petition has a ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... for such execution, by the Government, or any corporation owned or controlled by the Government has already been passed in a pending petition, it will stand vacated. If the pending writ petition itself has abated under Sub-section (2), then there is no need to apply the provisions of Sub-section (4). 45. There is another ticklish problem which arises in connection with Section 58. This question is whether it would apply to writ appeals pending on the appointed day or writ appeals which have been filed or will be filed challenging the orders disposing of writ petitions before the appointed day. The learned counsel for the petitioners and the appellants contended that Section 58 does not apply to such writ appeals. The provisions of Section 58 have only very limited retrospective effect confined to the petitions which have been made and are pending on the appointed day. If the writ petition has already been finally disposed of before the appointed day. Section 58 has no application since it does not make any provision in respect of such matters. On the other hand, it was argued for the Government that the provisions of Section 58 would apply to pending writ appeals as w ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ending appeals against the decisions of the High Courts under Article. 226, then it would have provided for appeals pending before the Supreme Court as well. It would be preposterous, in our opinion, to construe Section 58 as affecting writ appeals pending in the High Courts, while not affecting similar appeals pending before the Supreme Court. The same consideration would apply to applications for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court against the decisions of the High Courts under Article. 226. 47. Moreover, if it were to be construed that Sub-section (1) applies to pending writ appeals and leave applications, then it must necessarily follow that Sub-section (2) also would apply to writ appeals. In such an eventuality writ appeals arising out of writ petitions which would not have been admitted under the provisions of the new Article. 226 must be held to have abated. Such a conclusion would have a very startling result, the result of wiping out the decision of the High Court which has already been rendered in the writ petition. It is well established that no legislation can wipe out a judicial pronouncement though it may remove the defects pointed out by such pronounce ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... me an appeal was maintainable to the Federal Court if the valuation was above ₹ 10,000/-. Thereafter, the Federal Court was abolished and the Supreme Court was constituted and the necessary value for appeal was raised to ₹ 25,000. The majority of the Court held that the legal pursuit of a remedy of suit, appeal and second appeal are really but steps in a series of proceedings all connected by an intrinsic unity and are to be regarded as one legal proceeding. The right of appeal is not a mere matter of procedure but is a substantive right. The right of appeal is a vested right and such a right to enter the superior Court accrues to the litigant and exists as on and from the date the lis commences and although it may be actually exercised when the adverse judgment is pronounced, such right is to be governed by the law prevailing at the date of the institution of the suit or proceeding and not by the law that prevails at the date of its decision or at the date of the filing of the appeal. This vested right of appeal can be taken away only by a subsequent enactment if it so provides expressly or by necessary intendment and not otherwise. Further, S. R. Das, C. J. who delive ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... is not sufficient to declare merely that the decision of the Court shall not bind, for that is tantamount to reversing the decision in exercise of judicial power which the Legislature does not possess or exercise. A Court's decision must always bind unless the conditions on which it is based are so fundamentally altered that the decision could not have been given in the altered circumstances. Proceeding further Sarkaria, J. stated: The first test to be applied is whether the Amending Act so radically altered the conditions on which the said decrees proceed, that they would not have been passed in the altered circumstances. The point is that the law which was the basis of the decision must be altered and then, the foundation failing, the binding value of the decision fails when the non obstante clause is superadded. The second principle was stated in the words of Bowen, L.J. in Reid v. Reid (1886) 31 Ch D 402 at page 408 thus: A section in a statute which is to a certain extent retrospective, we ought to nevertheless to bear in mind the maxim that is, except in special cases, the new law ought to be construed so as to i ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... as to take away or impair an existing right or create a new obligation or impose a new liability otherwise than as regards matter of procedure. If the enactment is expressed in language which is fairly capable of either interpretation, it ought to be construed as prospective only. Therefore it follows that even if the other interpretation that S. 58 affects writ appeals also can be given only that interpretation which gives prospective effect only will have to be adopted. 57. However, the learned Advocate General and the learned standing counsel for the Central Government urged that after all a writ appeal is a continuation of a writ petition and what could be done in a writ appeal would be nothing but a rehearing of the petition. Therefore when S. 58 speaks of pending petitions, that expression necessarily takes in writ appeals also. This argument appears to us to be unacceptable. There is no reason why the Parliament did not refer to pending writ appeals also in S. 58, when it specifically referred to pending writ petitions and interim orders. The omission becomes more significant when the Parliament clearly referred to appeals as well as cross appeals in Cl. (5) of ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... pra). As in Lachmeshwar v. Keshwar Lal (AIR 1941 FC 5(supra) in this case also there was a new debt law affecting substantive rights retrospectively, commencing after the judgment of the trial Court, Section 6 of the Act therein conferred specific retrospective effect of the prospective effect of the provision saying that they shall apply to all suits pending on or instituted after the commencement of the Act. Hidayatullah, J. ( as he then was) held that they would apply even to matters which were pending in appeal. Learned counsel for the Government sought to seek support from the opinion of the Court that appeal was merely a continuation of the suit and therefore by analogy he argued that the writ appeal is nothing but a re-hearing of the writ petition. But there are more than one distinguishing feature in Dayavati's case ( [1966]3SCR275 )(supra). Section 6 of the Amending Act there was specifically made for giving retrospective effect to all matters pending and which may be instituted after the commencement of the Act. The intendment of the Legislature was patent that it should affect all pending matters. Further it conferred a valuable right to relief which was made availab ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ich was not barred under the law existing at the date when the suit was instituted or to revive a right which had already become barred. All those rules are subject to one condition and that is that the Legislature has not shown a contrary intention either in express words or by necessary implication. The third of the cases is another Full Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court. Once again under the Control of Rent and Eviction Act a new relief was brought into existence during the pendency of an appeal and that relief was given in appeal. Again this is giving a substantive relief declared by the Legislature to a citizen even at the stage of appeal. 62. In Mula v. Godhu [1970]2SCR129 (supra) the amended section was held to be plain and comprehensive enough to require an appellate Court to give effect to the substantive provisions of the Amending Act whether the appeal before it is one against a decree granting premption or one refusing that relief. There, the Supreme Court was of the opinion that the language of the amended provision was plain that the appellate Court also should give effect to the substantive provisions of the Amending Act. 63. We are ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... , learned counsel for the petitioner contended relying on Mohd. Yakub v. State of J. K., 1968CriLJ977 that a rule is not law but has only force of law. Therefore, these rules cannot be called Central Law. We cannot agree. It is well settled that the expression 'law' embraces within its ambit 'statutory rules'. It is next contended that the rules made under the proviso to Art. 309 cannot be statutory rules. Once again the contention is untenable. It has been long accepted that the rules made by the President or the Governor under Art. 309 have the force of law and will be in force until the appropriate Parliament or Legislature makes laws in this behalf. Therefore, these rules are certainly central laws. 66. W.P. Nos. 250/77 relates to an industrial dispute. It was argued that under S. 10 the Government had discretion whether to refer a dispute or not to the Industrial Tribunal. Therefore, the possibility of a dispute being raised before the Industrial Tribunal cannot be considered to be 'other remedy' within the meaning of Cl. 3 of Art. 226. We cannot accede to this contention. The Industrial Disputes Act has provided a clear remedy for adjudi ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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