TMI Blog1990 (12) TMI 36X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ioner took the view, following the decision of the Gujarat High Court in Kasturbhai Lalbhai v. R. K. Malhotra, ITO [1971] 80 ITR 188, that an audit objection cannot constitute information within the meaning of section 147(b) of the Act and, therefore, the reopening of the assessment was not valid. However, on merits, it was held that the exemption under section 54B(ii) of the Act was available not only in respect of individuals, but also in respect of Hindu undivided families. On further appeal by the Revenue before the Tribunal, the Tribunal held that the reopening of assessment under section 147(b) of the Act was valid as the decision in Kasturbhai Lalbhai's case [1971] 80 ITR 188 (Guj) was reversed by the Supreme Court in R. K. Malhotra, ITO v. Kasturbhai Lalbhai [1977] 109 ITR 537. On the question whether the expression "assessee" occurring in section 54B of the Act will take within its ambit a Hindu undivided family, the Tribunal, following the reasoning in its order in 1. T. A. No. 417/Mds/1975-76 dated September 25, 1975, held that the assessee, though a Hindu undivided family, was entitled to the benefit under section 54B(ii) of the Act. That is how, at the instance of the ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ny other land for use for agricultural purposes. The expression employed while referring to the user of the capital asset is "used by the assessee or a parent of his" for agricultural purposes. The question now is whether the words "assessee or a parent of his" would apply to a Hindu undivided family. The Tribunal referred to its earlier order in I. T. A. No. 417/Mds/1975-76 dated September 25, 1975, which is annexure D to the stated case. Therefrom, it is seen that the assessee in that case was Hindu undivided family and the matter had been dealt with in relation to sale of building and land appurtenant thereto for the purpose of claiming the benefit of exemption falling under section 54 of the Act. The Tribunal had referred to, the definition of "assessee" and "person" occurring in section 2(7) and 2(31) of the Act and construed those expressions as prima facie including a Hindu undivided family also. Referring to the language employed in section 54 of the Act, the Tribunal interpreted the expression "was being used by the assessee or a parent of his mainly for the purpose of his own or the parent's own residence" occurring therein, as making a provision for a hard case as when t ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... should be interpreted in the manner indicated by the definition, even when the user of such expression had been made in a sense and context different from that set out in the definition. Reference may usefully be made in this connection to the following observations of the Supreme Court in Vanguard Fire and General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Fraser and Ross, AIR 1960 SC 971, 974 ; [1962] 30 Comp Cas (Ins.) 13, 17 (SC). "It is well-settled that all statutory definitions or abbreviations must be read subject to the qualification variously expressed in the definition clauses which created them and it may be that even where the definition is exhaustive inasmuch as the word defined is said to mean a certain thing, it is possible for the word to have a somewhat different meaning in different sections of the Act depending upon the subject or the context. That is why all definitions in statutes generally begin with the qualifying words similar to the words used in the present case, namely, unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context. Therefore, in finding out the meaning of the word 'insurer' in various sections of the Act, the meaning to be ordinarily given to it is that giv ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the word "his" employed, can have reference only to a living person like an individual and not to an entity or person like a Hindu, undivided family. The user by the parent, which would also qualify for claiming the benefit of section 54B would be inapplicable to a case where the assessee is none other than an individual. In other words, when the meaning of the word "assessee" used is ascertained from the meaning of the words associated with it, it is clear from the company the word "assessee" keeps, that what had been contemplated is only an individual and not a Hindu undivided family. We may also observe that the reasoning of the Tribunal, in this case, is based upon an interpretation of section 54 of the Act and the words "used by the assessee or a parent of his mainly for the purpose of his own or his parent's own residence" had been interpreted as contemplating only the case of an assessee who is an individual and not a Hindu undivided family or a firm : vide Rowji Sojpal v. CIT [1957] 31 ITR 721 (Bom) ; K. I. Viswambharan and Bros. v. CIT [1973] 91 ITR 588 (Ker) [FB] and Shrigopal Rameshwardas v. Addl. CIT [1979] 119 ITR 980 (MP). We are relieved of the necessity of making a ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... case (108 Eng. Reports 741 ; [1827] 7B C 314), one of the contentions raised was that an appeal at the instance of a corporation was not maintainable, as a corporation was incompetent to enter into a recognizance. While dealing with this objection that the provision for appeal against levy of rates did not intend to include corporations, Bayley J. pointed out that he should pause before saying that a corporation is not competent to enter into a recognizance, for, a corporation may appoint an attorney for variety of purposes and they may do so for the purpose of entering into a recognizance. It is thus seen that the corporation was also considered as a person capable of entering into a recognizance through an attorney for that purpose. Bayley J. also proceeded to consider the position on the assumption that the corporation cannot enter into a recognizance and, with reference to that, it was stated that that part of the clause which confers right of appeal applies to all persons capable of appealing and that the other part of the clause, which requires a recognizance to be entered into, applies only to those persons, who are capable of entering into a recognizance, but is inapplica ..... 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