TMI Blog2020 (7) TMI 19X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ted on the basis of pragmatism, and that is how the law is required to interpreted. The interpretation so assigned by us is not only in consonance with the letter and spirit of rule 34(5) but is also a pragmatic approach at a time when a disaster, notified under the Disaster Management Act 2005, is causing unprecedented disruption in the functioning of our justice delivery system. See DCIT vs. JSW Limited [ 2020 (5) TMI 359 - ITAT MUMBAI ]DCIT vs. JSW Limited [ 2020 (5) TMI 359 - ITAT MUMBAI ] Even without the words ordinarily , in the light of the above analysis of the legal position, the period during which lockout was in force is to excluded for the purpose of time limits set out in rule 34(5) of the Appellate Tribunal Rules, 196 ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... tion rendered by the assessee in support of him case seems to be genuine. We, therefore, taking into consideration the entire aspect of the matter in order to prevent the miscarriage of justice set-aside the issue to the file of the Learned CIT(A) to finalize it afresh upon giving a reasonable opportunity of being heard to the assessee and upon taking into consideration the relevant evidence already placed on record and also the evidence which the assessee may choose to file at the time of hearing of the appeal. However, we make it clear that the assessee will also co-operate with the Ld. CIT(A) and will not take unnecessary adjournment, whatsoever. 3. In the result the appeal filed by the assessee is allowed for statistical purposes. ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... days from the date on which the hearing of the case was concluded but, where it is not practicable so to do on the ground of exceptional and extraordinary circumstances of the case, the Bench shall fix a future day for pronouncement of the order, and such date shall not ordinarily (emphasis supplied by us now) be a day beyond a further period of 30 days and due notice of the day so fixed shall be given on the notice board. 8. Quite clearly, ordinarily the order on an appeal should be pronounced by the bench within no more than 90 days from the date of concluding the hearing. It is, however, important to note that the expression ordinarily has been used in the said rule itself. This rule was inserted as a result of directions of H ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... time. As a matter of fact, even before this formal nationwide lockdown, the functioning of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal at Mumbai was severely restricted on account of lockdown by the Maharashtra Government, and on account of strict enforcement of health advisories with a view of checking spread of Covid 19. The epidemic situation in Mumbai being grave, there was not much of a relaxation in subsequent lockdowns also. In any case, there was unprecedented disruption of judicial wok all over the country. As a matter of fact, it has been such an unprecedented situation, causing disruption in the functioning of judicial machinery, that Hon ble Supreme Court of India, in an unprecedented order in the history of India and vide order dated 6. ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... en such is the position, and it is officially so notified by the Government of India and the Covid-19 epidemic has been notified as a disaster under the National Disaster Management Act, 2005, and also in the light of the discussions above, the period during which lockdown was in force can be anything but an ordinary period. 10. In the light of the above discussions, we are of the considered view that rather than taking a pedantic view of the rule requiring pronouncement of orders within 90 days, disregarding the important fact that the entire country was in lockdown, we should compute the period of 90 days by excluding at least the period during which the lockdown was in force. We must factor ground realities in mind while interpretin ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... excluded for the purpose of time limits set out in rule 34(5) of the Appellate Tribunal Rules, 1963. Viewed thus, the exception, to 90-day time-limit for pronouncement of orders, inherent in rule 34(5)(c), with respect to the pronouncement of orders within ninety days, clearly comes into play in the present case. Of course, there is no, and there cannot be any, bar on the discretion of the benches to refix the matters for clarifications because of considerable time lag between the point of time when the hearing is concluded and the point of time when the order thereon is being finalized, but then, in our considered view, no such exercise was required to be carried out on the facts of this case. 5. On the basis of the observation made i ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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