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TMI Blog2020 (3) TMI 1245X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... er release from the Government After Care Home, Gaighat Patna. 4. The father of the petitioner Ashok Pandey had submitted a written report on 07.01.2019 at 7.45 p.m. to the officer-in-charge, Govindganj (Malahi) wherein he has alleged that his daughter aged 16 years had gone to Sirni Bazar on 10.12.2018 in the evening for purchasing some medicine and when she did not return for a quite long time, he started inquiring as to her whereabouts and came to know from his co- villagers that she was seen going together with one Dhanjeet Yadav of the same village. When he inquired from the parents and family members of Dhanjeet Yadav in this regard, they started abusing him and said that Dhanjeet Yadav would marry his daughter. He has further alleged that when he came to know that Dhanjeet Yadav and his family members had taken his daughter to Bettiah Court, he went together with his brother Santosh Pandey to Bettiah Civil Court, but by then they had already left the court premises. On further inquiry, he came to know that a fake mark sheet of matriculation and a fake adhar card recording the date of birth of his daughter as 01.01.1998 was submitted in the office of the Registrar of Marriag ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... r produced the victim after her medical examination with medial report. The doctor, who had examined the victim, had assessed her age between 16 and 17 years. 13. It is reiterated that the learned Magistrate, who had recorded the statement of the victim under Section 164 of the CrPC, had assessed her age to be 16 years. The documents filed by the informant recorded the date of birth of the victim as 02.01.2002. The medical report also suggested that the victim was a minor, but she expressed her desire to go to her sasural. 14. Under the circumstances mentioned above, vide order dated 19.01.2019, the learned ACJM, Motihari sent the victim to Short Stay Home at Motihari and directed her parents to produce the original documents regarding her date of birth and adjourned the matter to 25.01.2019 for passing further orders. 15. On 25.01.2019, when the victim was produced from the Short Stay Home, Motihari, the informant filed the original documents showing her date of birth to be 02.01.2002, but learned ACJM, Motihari adjourned the case to 29.01.2019 and, thereafter, to 04.02.2019, 12.02.2019, 15.02.2019, 25.02.2019 and 02.03.2019 for passing further orders and, in the meantime, the ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... circulated to all Judicial Magistrates that in such cases, women ought to be released to go with the people of their choice in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 483 of the CrPC. 22. In order to bring clarity to the matter, we deem it appropriate to extract the operative part of the order dated 23.09.2010 passed in Sahebi Khatoon (supra) hereinunder: 23.09.2010 "The facts of the case is that petitioner and respondent no.6 Md. Arif got married as per their own choice and since it was not a marriage of their parents consent, so they thought it proper to go away for some time from their place of residence, in order to get the matter settled. Petitioner and her husband went to Kolkata and for some time they resided there. The father of the petitioner Abdus Salam filed a written complaint before officer-in-charge of Azam Nagar police station alleging that her minor daughter Sahebi Khatoon has been kidnapped by respondent no.6 and other eight accused persons, Azam Nagar police station case no.76 of 2010 was registered for offence under Section 363, 366, 379, 120B and 34 of the IPC. On 6.7.2010.The respondent no.6 was arrested at Kokata. The petitioner was also brought and ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... error being committed by courts, due to which Criminal Writs, for issuance of Habeas Corpusare repeatedly being filed. In such case, confinement of writ petitioners (girls who are majors) at Remand Home is illegal confinement and fit for issuance of Writ of Habeaus Corpus. Section 483 of the Cr.P.C. imposes a duty on High Courts to exercise continuous superintendence over the courts; Judicial Magistrate, Subordinate to it, and to see that cases are expeditiously and properly disposed of by such Courts. In present nature of case, it seems to have been essential that a general direction be issued to all Magistrates of Subordinate Courts to exercise their jurisdiction, properly and judiciously. In exercise of jurisdiction u/S 483 Cr.P.C. all Judicial Magistrates/Chief Judicial Magistrates throughout the State of Bihar are directed to, decide such cases in the light of the decision of the Apex Court in Jaimala Vrs. Home Secretary, Govt. of Jammu and Kashmir reported in AIR 1982 SC 1297. The girl should be treated as major if she is assessed to be of an age in between 16 to 17 years as per the medical report and also as per own assessment. In such cases, instead of sending such girls t ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ition for issuance of writ of habeas corpus, an order passed by a Magistrate could be assailed and set-aside; (2) Whether an order of remand passed by a Judicial Magistrate could be reviewed in a petition seeking the writ of habeas corpus, holding such order of remand to be an illegal detention; (3) Whether an improper order could be termed/viewed as an illegal detention; (4) Whether under Section 483 Cr.P.C., a Division Bench of this Court, exercising constitutional powers of issuing prerogative writs, especially writ of habeas corpus, could issue general directions to all the Magistrates/Chief Judicial Magistrates of the State of Bihar for releasing such women and permitting them to go along with the people of their choice, who are minors and are brought before them (Magistrates) with the charge of their having married somebody of their own volition." 26. Since the reference was desired to be resolved by a larger Bench, the same has come up for consideration before us under the orders of Hon'ble the Chief Justice. 27. Mr. Bashishtha Narayan Mishra, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submitted that the petitioner was having affair with Dhanjeet Yadav since la ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... irections to all the Magistrates including the Chief Judicial Magistrates of the State of Bihar for releasing similarly circumstanced detenues. According to him, even if a minor aged about 16 years and above is brought before the Magistrate with the charge of her having married somebody on her own volition, the Magistrate would not be justified in sending her to an After Care Home or Protection Home. In support of his submissions, he has placed reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in Jaya Mala vs. Home Secretary, Government of J. & K. & Ors. [AIR 1982 SC 1297]. 29. Per contra, Mr. Pushkar Narain Shahi, learned Additional Advocate General appearing for the State submitted that in a writ seeking a writ of habeas corpus, the provision of Section 483 of the CrPC can not be invoked for passing a general direction and setting aside the order passed by the Chief Judicial Magistrate. He contended that in case of any illegality in the judicial order of remand, the High Court by issuing a writ of certiorari may quash the same. However, while exercising the constitutional power of prerogative writ especially writ of habeas corpus, this Court cannot issue general direction in exercis ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ciendum" which is commonly known as the writ of habeas corpus, is a prerogative process for securing the liberty of the subject by affording an effective means of immediate release from the unlawful or unjustifiable detention whether in prison or in private custody. It is a prerogative writ by which the queen has a right to inquire into the causes for which any of her subjects are deprived of their liberty. By it the High Court and the judges of that Court, at the instance of a subject aggrieved, command the production of that subject, and inquiry into the cause of his imprisonment. If there is no legal justification for the detention, the party is ordered to be released. Release on habeas corpus is not, however, an acquittal, nor may the writ be used as a means of appeal." 33. Habeas corpus ad subjiciendum means "that you have the body to submit or answer." 34. May in his Constitutional History of England (1912), Vol.II, p.130, described writ of habeas corpus as "the first security of civil liberty". Blackstone called the writ of habeas corpus as "the great and efficacious writ in all manner of illegal confinement." 35. Julius Stone in Social Dimensions of Law and Justice, (196 ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... air and reasonable and any unjust, unfair and unreasonable procedure by which liberty of a person is taken away shall destroy such freedom. 42. Article 22 empowers enactment of legislation providing for preventive detention. But no one can be detained for a period longer than two months unless an Advisory Board has opined that there is, in its opinion, sufficient cause for its detention. There are safeguards of furnishing of grounds of detention and rights of representation. 43. A writ of habeas corpus under Article 32 of the Constitution of India in the Supreme Court is available in case of violation of fundamental rights guaranteed under Article 21 but it does not relate to interference with the personal liberty by a private citizen. However, the High Court has jurisdiction to issue writ of habeas corpus under Article 226 of the Constitution of India not only for violation of fundamental rights of freedom but also for other purposes. The High Court can issue such writ against a private person also. 44. Habeas corpus writ is most commonly used in India as a remedy in case of preventive detention because in such cases, the validity of the order detaining the detenue is not subje ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... on is found to be unlawful, having himself discharged and freed from such restraint. The most characteristic element of the writ is its peremptoriness and, as pointed out by Lord Halsbury, L.C., in Cox v. Hakes (supra), "the essential and leading theory of the whole procedure is the immediate determination of the right to the applicant's freedom" and his release, if the detention is found to be unlawful. That is the primary purpose of the writ; that is its substance and end. ..." 47. In Basant Chandra Ghose vs. King Emperor [1945 (7) F.C.R. 81], the Federal Court concluded : "... If at any time before the Court directs the release of the detenue, a valid order directing his detention is produced, the Court cannot direct his release merely on the ground that at some prior stage there was no valid cause for detention. ..." 48. In A.K. Gopalan vs. Government of India, [AIR 1966 SC 816], the Supreme Court speaking through Wanchoo, J., held: "It is well-settled that in dealing with a petition for habeas corpus the Court has to see whether the detention on the date on which the application is made to the Court is legal, if nothing more has intervened between the date of the app ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... has to be passed by a court of competent jurisdiction". 54. A major question that comes before the Court is whether a writ of habeas corpus lies against the order of any remand by any court. 55. A plethora of judgments speak about it and it is a settled proposition that no writ of habeas corpus lies against an order of remand made by a competent court of jurisdiction. However, we proceed to examine the relevant judgments and the circumstances under which it could be applied. 56. Additionally, we need to see the difference between illegal and irregular orders. These variations need to be examined one by one. 57. Thereafter, the issue of the consequences on an order of remand without jurisdiction and whether it is mere irregularity or it turns into illegality shall be discussed. 58. In Manubhai Ratilal Patel vs. State of Gujrat & Ors. [(2013) 1 SCC 314], the accused was arrested on 16.07.2012 and was produced before the learned Magistrate 1st Class on 17.07.2012 at 4:00 p.m. On the prayer of police for remand, the police custody was granted by the learned Magistrate upto 2:00 p.m. on 19.07.2012. However, on 18.07.2012 only, it was brought to the notice to concerned investigatin ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... hether there exists reasonable grounds to commit the accused to custody and extend his remand. The purpose of remand as postulated under Section 167 is that investigation cannot be completed within 24 hours. It enables the Magistrate to see that the remand is really necessary. This requires the investigating agency to send the case diary along with the remand report so that the Magistrate can appreciate the factual scenario and apply his mind whether there is a warrant for police remand or justification for judicial remand or there is no need for any remand at all. It is obligatory on the part of the Magistrate to apply his mind and not to pass an order of remand automatically or in a mechanical manner. 25. It is apt to note that in Madhu Limaye, In re [(1969) 1 SCC 292] it has been stated that: (SCC p. 299, para 12) " 12. Once it is shown that the arrests made by the police officers were illegal, it was necessary for the State to establish that at the stage of remand the Magistrate directed detention in jail custody after applying his mind to all relevant matters." 62. While dealing with the issue of entertaining a habeas corpus writ, when a person is remanded to judicial cus ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... agistrate. The sphere of activity is clear cut and well demarcated. Thus viewed, we do not perceive any error in the order passed by the High Court refusing to grant a writ of habeas corpus as the detention by virtue of the judicial order passed by the Magistrate remanding the accused to custody is valid in law." (emphasis supplied) 63. In Saurabh Kumar vs. Jailor, Koneila Jail & Anr., [(2014) 13 SCC 436], the petitioner, who was in judicial custody by virtue of order passed by Judicial Magistrate had filed a writ of habeas corpus under Article 32 read with Articles 14, 21, 22 of the Constitution of India for a direction to the respondents to produce him before the Supreme Court and also to direct respondent State to devise a way to prevent malicious arrest and detention by the police that too without maintaining necessary record and further to direct the State to pay the petitioner compensation considering that the detention is a black mark on his future career prospects. While dismissing the writ petition, the Supreme Court observed : "The only question with which we are concerned within the above backdrop is whether the petitioner can be said to be in the unlawful custody. O ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... nd was to enure till 23-3-2018. Further, without challenging the stated order of the Magistrate, a writ petition was filed limited to the relief of habeas corpus. In that view of the matter, it was not a case of continued illegal detention but the incumbent was in judicial custody by virtue of an order passed by the jurisdictional Magistrate, which was in force, granting police remand during investigation of a criminal case. Resultantly, no writ of habeas corpus could be issued." (emphasis supplied) 65. In Serious Fraud Investigation Office vs. Rahul Modi & Anr., [(2019) 5 SCC 266], the Supreme Court cancelled bail granted by the Delhi High Court to Rahul Modi and Mukesh Modi accused of duping investors of several hundred crores through a ponzi scheme run by their Gujarat based other co-operative societies. Both the accused were released by the Delhi High Court in a habeas corpus writ petition even though they were remanded to judicial custody under the orders of a competent court. After elaborately dealing with the ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in earlier cases, the Supreme Court held as follows :- "The act of directing remand of an accused is thus held to be a judicial ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... that while dealing with writ of habeas corpus, the Supreme Court has held that it is essentially a procedural writ. It deals with the machinery of justice and not the substantive law. The object of the writ is to secure release of a person who is illegally restrained of his liberty. In Manubhai Ratilal Patel vs. State of Gujrat & Ors. (supra), the Supreme Court has held that a writ of habeas corpus is not to be entertained when a person is committed to judicial custody or police custody by the competent court by an order which prima facie does not appear to be without jurisdiction or passed in an absolutely mechanical or wholly illegal manner. In Saurabh Kumar vs. Jailor, Koneila Jail & Anr. (supra), the Supreme Court has held that since the petitioner was in judicial custody by virtue of an order passed by a Judicial Magistrate and, hence, it could not be held to be an illegal detention. The Supreme Court has further held that even if the Magistrate has acted mechanically in remanding the accused to judicial custody and has dealt with the process in a cavalier fashion which shows inconsistencies towards the denial of personal liberty of citizen, a writ of habeas corpus would not b ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... of remand passed by a Judicial Magistrate of competent jurisdiction cannot be reviewed in a petition seeking the writ of habeas corpus. Question No.3 : "Whether an improper order could be termed/viewed as an illegal detention ?" Answer: In view of the clear, unambiguous and consistent view of the Supreme Court in the aforediscussed cases, we unhesitatingly conclude and hold that an illegal order of judicial remand cannot be termed/viewed as an illegal detention. 69. Thus, the first three issues referred for determination are answered, accordingly. 70. The last issue referred for determination by this Bench is :- "(4) Whether under Section 483 Cr.P.C., a Division Bench of this Court, exercising constitutional powers of issuing prerogative writs, especially writ of habeas corpus, could issue general directions to all the Magistrates/Chief Judicial Magistrates of the State of Bihar for releasing such women and permitting them to go along with the people of their choice, who are minors and are brought before them (Magistrates) with the charge of their having married somebody of their own volition." 71. Section 482 of the CrPC empowers the High Court to make such orders as may b ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... rected accordingly." 76. A three-judge Bench of the Supreme Court in TGN Kumar vs. State of Kerala & Ors. (supra) while answering the question posed by the two-judge Bench, in paras 13, 21 and 22 held as follows : "13. Similarly, while it is true that the power of superintendence conferred on the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is both administrative and judicial, but such power is to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases in order to keep the subordinate courts within the bounds of their authority. In any event, the power of superintendence cannot be exercised to influence the subordinate judiciary to pass any order or judgment in a particular manner. 21. Thus, in the instant case, we have no hesitation in holding that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code and/or Article 227 of the Constitution by laying down the a fore extracted general directions, which are inconsistent with the clear language of Sections 205 and 313 of the Code, as noted above. We feel that in the light of the aforenoted guidelines laid down by this Court, further directions on the same issue by the High Court were wholly uncalled for ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... Supreme Court has held that the High Court, apart from exercising its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, has a duty to exercise continuous superintendence over the Judicial Magistrates in terms of Section 483 of the C r.P.C. 79. In Popular Muthiah vs. State Represented By Inspector Of Police, [2006 (3) SCC (Cri) 245], the Supreme Court has held that it is also significant to note that whereas inherent power of a court or a tribunal is generally recognized, such power has been recognized under the CrPC only in the High Court and not in any other court. The High Court, apart from exercising its revisional or inherent powers, indisputably may also exercise its supervisory jurisdiction in terms of Article 227 of the Constitution of India and in some matters in terms of Section 483 thereof. 80. In view of the above discussions, our answer to the fourth issue referred for our determination is that in the exercise of constitutional powers granted to the Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court would not be justified in issuing a general direction under Section 483 of the CrPC to all Magistrates/Chief Judicial Ma ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... al sanction by itself is a ground for detention danger looms large that the normal criminal trials, and Criminal Courts set up for administering justice will be substituted by detention laws often described as lawless law. There is not the slightest suggestion that witnesses are not forthcoming in respect of the alleged infraction of law. Why the normal investigation was not pursued is a question difficult to answer. If in respect of the incident of Jan. 10, 1981, a charge could have been laid under Section 307 I.P.C., on the face of it, a serious charge, the detenu as accused could have been arrested and if he moved for bail the same could have been legally resisted. ..." 85. The Supreme Court further observed : "... It is not made clear in the return why normal procedure of investigation, arrest and trial has not been found adequate to thwart the criminal activities of the detenu. ..." 86. The consideration of the Supreme Court in the subsequent paragraphs being of pivotal importance is extracted hereinunder : "But there is a greater infirmity which strikes at the root of the order. It is alleged in the petition that detenu was a minor aged about 17 years at the time of arr ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ircumstances of this case the detention order was wholly unwarranted and deserved to be quashed." (emphasis supplied) 87. After discussing the facts and dictum of the Supreme Court in Jaya Mala (supra), let us analyze the applicability of the same in the age assessment of a girl in cases of elopement. 88. There is a sharp difference between the two cases as in Jaya Mala (supra) the principle of margin of error in age determination was discussed in reference to the age of the accused. It would not be out of context to assert at this stage that in criminal jurisprudence, the benefit of doubt always goes to the accused. 89. To the contrary, with certain allied issues, a pertinent question arises as to what should be the criteria while deciding the age of the minor girl in cases of elopement. Whether Section 94 of the Juvenile Justice (care & Protection of Children) Act, 2015 would be an apt parameter for determination of age of the minor girl. Further, whether the principle of margin of error as applied in Jaya Mala (supra) and the rule of 'benefit of doubt' is equally applicable in cases of age determination of a victim or what other relevant factors can be considered whi ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... Supreme Court, we are of the opinion that till the judgment in Jarnail Singh (supra) holds good, the age of the victim has to be determined on the same line as of the person accused of an offence. 96. Section 94 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 provides for presumption and determination of age of a juvenile in conflict with law. 97. Sub-section (2) of Section 94 provides the manner in which the Child Welfare Committee or the Juvenile Justice Board should undertake the process of age determination. It reads as under:- "Section 94(2).- In case, the Committee or the Board has reasonable grounds for doubt regarding whether the person brought before it is a child or not, the Committee or the Board, as the case may be, shall undertake the process of age determination, by seeking evidence by obtaining- (i) the date of birth certificate from the school, or the matriculation or equivalent certificate from the concerned examination Board, if available; and in the absence thereof; (ii) the birth certificate given by a corporation or a municipal authority or a panchayat; (iii) and only in the absence of (i) and (ii) above, age shall be determined by ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... cused and the victim. It is well settled principle of criminal law that benefit of doubt should always go to the accused. Accordingly, it may be said that in case of an accused the lower side of the margin (reduced age) would be beneficial to him as he would be treated as a juvenile if assessed below 18, but while applying the principle of 'margin of error' in reference to the victim in cases of elopement, which principle is to be followed, is still undecided. 105. To settle the guiding principle in such cases is of prime importance, as the outcome of application of principle of 'margin of error' would severely affect the mental, physical, emotional and psychological well being of a girl. 106. Let us see what may be the possible outcome if one applies the principle of 'margin of error' to a victim girl in cases of elopement : (i) If the girl's age is assessed to be between 17 and 19 in her medical examination, then by application of Jaya Mala (supra) if her age is being assessed 17, then : (a) If she wishes to go to her husband and not to her family due to her security issues; In such cases, since there is threat to her life in her family, the Co ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... interest under its parens patriae powers in providing care to its citizens who are unable to care for themselves." 114. In State of Kerala & Anr. vs. N.M. Thomas & Ors., [1976(1) SCR 906], it has been categorically held that the Court is also 'State' within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India. Thus, Court can also act as Parens Patriae so as to meet the ends of justice. 115. Relying on the above-mentioned reasoning, the Supreme Court in Aruna Ramchandra Shanbaug vs. Union of India & Ors., [2011 (3) SCALE 298] has observed : "In our opinion, in the case of an incompetent person who is unable to take a decision whether to withdraw life support or not, it is the Court alone, as parens patriae, which ultimately must take this decision, though, no doubt, the views of the near relatives, next friend and doctors must be given due weight". 116. In Suchita Srivastava & Anr. vs. Chandigarh Administration, [(2009) 9 SCC 1], the Supreme Court observed : "The doctrine of "parens patriae" has been evolved in common law and is applied in situations where the State must make decisions in order to protect the interests of those persons who are unable to take care o ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... onstitution are a testimony of the standard of governance and welfare that the people expect from their representatives to maintain and carry out respectively. Doctrine of Parens Patriae is simply one of the links in this long chain. This doctrine makes sure that the voiceless, abandoned and disabled people are ultimately the responsibility of the State and the State must take all the steps to ensure their well-being as they are not in a position to do so. 121. Thus, keeping in view the role of the Court as parens patriae, it is expected from the court that whatever decision it might take as to the assessment of the age of the victim, it needs to serve the best interests of the girl. Before reaching any conclusion, the court must consider the detrimental effects on a girl child, not only in terms of her physical or mental health but also in terms of her nutrition, education and her general well being. 122. The direction of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Sahebi Khatoon (Supra) i.e. the girl should be treated as major, if she is assessed to be of an age in between 16-17 as per the medical report and also as per own assessment, also needs to be reconsidered in the l ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... l child and impact of an early marriage in her mental, physical and psychological health in Independent Thought (supra), observed as follows :- ". ... an early marriage and sexual intercourse at an early age could have detrimental effects on the girl child not only in terms of her physical and mental health but also in terms of her nutrition, her education, her employability and her general well-being. To make matters worse, the detrimental impact could pass on to the children of the girl child who may be malnourished and may be required to live in an impoverished state due to a variety of factors. An early marriage therefore could have an inter-generational adverse impact." 126. After extensively discussing the Law Commission Reports (84th and 172nd), National Charter for Children, 2003, National Policy of Children and other various national and international reports concerning ill effects on the girl after marriage in early age held that it can adversely affect their educational prospects and restrict economic autonomy. It read down Exception 2 to Section 375 of the IPC, holding that the same will not apply in the case of minors. Accordingly, Exception 2 to Section 375 of the ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... s necessary to refer to what Supreme Court has held in the said case. It states that "however, it is notorious and one can take judicial notice that the margin of error in age ascertained by radiological examination is two years on either side". 134. Thus, it can be seen that the Supreme Court has used the phrase "one can take judicial notice" 135. Another important aspect which has arisen in the instant case is the issue of maintainability of a writ of habeas corpus in cases of sending girls to Protection Home/Nari-Niketan. Undisputedly, the sole object of writ of habeas corpus is to secure the liberty and the freedom of any person and to afford security against the illegal detention. Sending a girl to a Protection Home/Nari Niketan cannot be treated as detention or anything akin to remand as applicable in criminal laws. 136. In criminal law, the concept of detention is attached with a sort of punishment or it can be seen to protect the society at large from any person. But sending a girl to a Protection Home/Nari Niketan can never be equated with any punishment or to protect the society at large from such girl. If it were not so, then every child in the custody of his/her pare ..... 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