TMI Blog2020 (9) TMI 713X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... he copy of the order, the appellants had a period of 45 days to file an appeal. This period expired on 02.02.2020 - By virtue of the proviso to Section 421(3), the Appellate Tribunal was empowered to condone the delay upto a period of period of 45 days. This period of 45 days started running from 02.02.2020 and it expired even according to the appellants on 18.03.2020. The appellants did not file the appeal on or before 18.03.2020, but filed it on 20.07.2020. It is relevant to note that the lock down was imposed only on 24.03.2020 and there was no impediment for the appellants to file the appeal on or before 18.03.2020. To overcome this difficulty, the appellants rely upon the order of this Court dated 23.03.2020. Failure to take note of the lockdown as well as the order passed by this Court on 23.03.2020, extending the period of limitation for filing any proceeding with effect from 15.03.2020 until further orders - HELD THAT:- What was extended by the order of this Court was only the period of limitation and not the period upto which delay can be condoned in exercise of discretion conferred by the statute. The above order passed by this Court was intended to benefit vigilan ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... rding to the appellants, the certified copy of the order dated 25.10.2019 passed by the NCLT was received by their counsel on 19.12.2019, pursuant to the copy application made on 21.11.2019. 6. Though the appellants admittedly received the certified copy of the order on 19.12.2019, they chose to file the statutory appeal before NCLAT on 20.07.2020. The appeal was filed along with an application for condonation of delay. 7. By an order dated 04.08.2020, the Appellate Tribunal dismissed the application for condonation of delay on the ground that the Tribunal has no power to condone the delay beyond a period of 45 days. Consequently the appeal was also dismissed. It is against the dismissal of both the application for condonation of delay as well as the appeal, that the appellants have come up with the present appeals. 8. The contentions raised by the learned counsel for the appellants are twofold namely (i) that the Appellate Tribunal erred in computing the period of limitation from the date of the order of the NCLT, contrary to Section 421(3) of the Companies Act, 2013, and (ii) that the Appellate Tribunal failed to take note of the lockdown as well as the order passed by t ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ded by the appellants, that the period of limitation of 45 days prescribed in Section 421(3) would start running only from the date on which a copy of the order of the Tribunal is made available to the person aggrieved. It is also true that under Section 420(3) of the Act read with Rule 50, the appellants were entitled to be furnished with a certified copy of the order free of cost. 14. Therefore if the appellants had chosen not to file a copy application, but to await the receipt of a free copy of the order in terms of Section 420(3) read with Rule 50, they would be perfectly justified in falling back on Section 421(3), for fixing the date from which limitation would start running. But the appellants in this case, chose to apply for a certified copy after 27 days of the pronouncement of the order in their presence and they now fall back upon Section 421(3). 15. Despite the above factual position, we do not want to hold against the appellants, the fact that they waited from 25.10.2019 (the date of the order of NCLT) upto 21.11.2019, to make a copy application. But atleast from 19.12.2019, the date on which a certified copy was admittedly received by the counsel for the appell ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... all subordinate Courts/Tribunals within their respective jurisdiction. Issue notice to all the Registrars General of the High Courts, returnable in four weeks. 19. But we do not think that the appellants can take refuge under the above order. What was extended by the above order of this Court was only the period of limitation and not the period upto which delay can be condoned in exercise of discretion conferred by the statute. The above order passed by this Court was intended to benefit vigilant litigants who were prevented due to the pandemic and the lockdown, from initiating proceedings within the period of limitation prescribed by general or special law. It is needless to point out that the law of limitation finds its root in two latin maxims, one of which is Vigilantibus Non Dormientibus Jura Subveniunt which means that the law will assist only those who are vigilant about their rights and not those who sleep over them. 20. It may be useful in this regard to make a reference to Section 10 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 which reads as follows: 10. Computation of time (1) Where, by any 19 [Central Act] or Regulation made after the commencement of this Ac ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... Limited (2012) 2 SCC 624, this Court dealt with the meaning of the words prescribed period in paragraphs 13 and 14 as follows: 13. The crucial words in Section 4 of the 1963 Act are prescribed period . What is the meaning of these words? 14. Section 2(j) of the 1963 Act defines 2(j) 'period of limitation' which means the period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by the Schedule, and 'prescribed period' means the period of limitation computed in accordance with the provisions of this Act. Section 2(j) of the 1963 Act when read in the context of Section 34(3) of the 1996 Act, it becomes amply clear that the prescribed period for making an application for setting aside arbitral award is three months. The period of 30 days mentioned in proviso that follows Sub-Section (3) of Section 34 of the 1996 Act is not the 'period of limitation' and, therefore, not 'prescribed period' for the purposes of making the application for setting aside the arbitral award. The period of 30 days beyond three months which the court may extend on sufficient cause being shown under the proviso appended to Sub-Section (3) of Secti ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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