TMI Blog2015 (12) TMI 1848X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... sustain. Clearly, the intention of the legislature could not have been to render virtually the entire Temple Act, enacted on the specific subject, meaningless, by way of enacting a proviso to Section 2(oo) of the OEA Act, 1951 as an amendment in 1974, which is the general legislation in the instant case. Section 2(oo) of the OEA Act, 1951, thus, to that extent requires to be struck down so that both the OEA Act, 1951 as well as the Temple Act, 1955 can be given due effect in their respective field of operation. In exercise of the powers conferred Under Article 142 of the Constitution, this Court can pass any order as may be necessary for doing complete justice in a case before it. In the instant case, great injustice will be caused to the Appellant Temple if the rights conferred upon it by the Temple Act are allowed to be taken away by operation of the proviso to Section 2(oo) of the OEA Act. Therefore, we have to strike down the proviso to Section 2(oo) of the OEA Act and also quash the notification dated 18.03.1974 in so far as it relates to the property of Lord Jagannath Temple at Puri - Further, it is a settled principle of law that once a property is vested by an Act of leg ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... s it is bad in law. Since we have categorically recorded the finding both on facts and in law while answering Point No. 1 in favour of the Appellant Temple Committee holding that the provisions of the OEA Act, 1951 have no application to the lands of the Lord Jagannath Temple at Puri, there is no need for us to pass an order in favour of the Temple under the OEA Act, 1951 as the suit lands were already vested in favour of the Lord Jagannath Temple at Puri by virtue of the provisions of the Temple Act, 1955. Application allowed. - Civil Appeal Nos. 7729 and 7730 of 2009, 142, 221, 2981, 3414, 3415, 3446 of 2010, Civil Appeal Nos. 14631-14632 of 2015 (Arising out of SLP (C) Nos. 9167-9168 of 2010) and Civil Appeal No. 9627 of 2010 - - - Dated:- 16-12-2015 - V. Gopala Gowda and C. Nagappan, JJ. JUDGMENT V. Gopala Gowda, J. 1. Leave granted in the Special Leave Petitions. 2. The present appeals arise out of the impugned judgment and order dated 07.07.2009 passed in Original Jurisdiction Case No. 2421 of 2000 and other Writ Petitions which were disposed of in terms of the judgment dated 07.07.2009 by the High Court of Orissa at Cuttack, whereby the High Court ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... 1951 and that lands had wrongly been settled in favour of the Temple. The High Court by the impugned judgment dated 07.07.2009 set aside the order of the Tahsildar dated 30.11.1992 and held as under: ...it is seen in the instant case, the property has been dedicated as Amrutmonahi to Lord Sri Jagannath of Puri and the marfatdar of the property is Mahanta Siddha Brundaban Ramanuj Das. Thus, the property is attached with a charge of rendering service to Lord Jagannath by using the usufructs thereof as food offering to Lord Jagannath by using the usufructs thereof as food offering to Lord Jagannath. It is further found that on the above analysis, the property cannot be held to be under the control of the administrator of Shri Jagannath Temple but is a trust property attached with a charge and the trustee has to fulfil the wish of the dedicator of the said property by offering the usufructs to Lord Jagannath as food offering. However, since the trustee/marfatdar is the Mahanta of Siddha Math, it cannot be said that the math has absolutely no interest over the said property just because it is recorded as Amrutmonohi. Applying the ratio of the decision in the case of Mahanta Shri Sri ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ounsel appearing on behalf of both the parties, it is important for us to examine the provisions of the relevant Acts, as well as the previous judgments of this Court on the issue. There are two important acts which operate in the instant case. The first is the Shri Jagannath Temple Act, 1955 (hereinafter referred to as the Temple Act, 1955 ). The long title of the Act reads as follows: An Act to provide for better administration and governance of Shri Jagannath Temple at Puri and its endowments. The Preamble of the Temple Act, 1955 states as under: Whereas the ancient Temple of Lord Jagannath of Puri has ever since its inception been an institution of unique national importance in which millions of Hindu devotees from regions far and wide have reposed their faith and belief and have regarded it as the epitome of their tradition and culture. And whereas by Regulation IV of 1809 passed by the Governor-General in Council on 28th April, 1809 and thereafter by other laws and Regulations and in pursuance of arrangement entered into with the Raja of Khurda, later designated the Raja of Puri, the said Raja came to be entrusted hereditary with the management of the affairs of ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... of the Temple and its endowments to the State Government which may pass orders for the maintenance and administration of the temple, which reads as under: 30. (1) Subject to the provisions of this Act the general superintendence of the Temple and its endowments shall vest in the State Government which may pass any orders that may be deemed necessary for the proper maintenance or administration of the Temple or its endowments or in the interest of the general public worshipping in the Temple. Section 33 of the Temple Act, 1955 empowers the Committee to be in possession of all the moveable and immoveable properties belonging to the Temple. It reads as under: 33. (1) The Committee shall be entitled to take and be in possession of all movable and immovable properties including the Ratna Bhandar and funds and jewelries, records, documents and other assets belonging to Temple. 6. A Constitution Bench of this Court had the occasion to examine the provisions of the Temple Act, 1955 in detail, while adjudicating upon its constitutional validity in the case of Raja Bira Kishore Deb v. State of Orissa AIR 1964 SC 1501. Wanchoo, J., speaking for the bench observed as under: This ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... tate as under: 'trust estate' means an estate the whole of the net income whereof under any trust or other legal obligation has been dedicated exclusively to charitable or religious purposes of a public nature without any reservation of pecuniary benefit to any individual: Provided that all estates belonging to the Temple of Lord Jagannath at Puri within the meaning of the Shri Jagannath Temple Act, 1955 and all estates declared to be trust estates by a competent authority under this Act prior to the date of coming into force of the Orissa Estates Abolition (Amendment) Act, 1970 shall be deemed to be trust estates. (Emphasis laid by this Court) Section 3 of the OEA Act, 1951 provides for vesting of an estate in the State by way of a notification as under: 3. Notification vesting an estate in the State-(1) The State Government, may from time to time by notification, declare that the estate specified in the notification has passed to and become vested in the State free from all encumbrances. (3) Such publication shall be conclusive evidence of the notice of the declaration to everybody whose interest is affected by it. 8. Section 2(oo) was inserted by way ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... he Petitioner's estate could not be vested in the State by a notification issued subsequently. It is important to note at this stage that while upholding the validity of the notification, this Court did not advert to the provisions of the Temple Act, 1955 at all. 9. Another judgment of this Court which is important to be examined is the Constitution Bench decision in the case of Mahant Shri Srinivas Ramanuj Das v. Surjanarayan Das AIR 1967 SC 256, which examined the nature of 'amrutamanohi' properties. 10. Mr. M.L. Varma, the learned senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the Respondent Math contends that the controversy in the instant case is squarely covered by two judgments of this Court, the Division Bench judgment in the case of Lord Jagannath and the Constitution Bench judgment in the case of Surjanarayan Das referred to supra. The learned senior Counsel places strong reliance on the following paragraphs of the decision in the case of Surjanarayan Das (supra): 40. We may now consider the properties in schedule Kha said to be the Amruta Monohi properties of Lord Jagannath and held by the Plaintiff as marfatdar. The Plaintiff alleges that these properties ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... anarayan Das and Lord Jagannath have held field since 1967 and 1989, respectively. The learned senior Counsel places reliance on a seven judges Bench decision of this Court in State of Gujarat v. Mirzapur Moti Kureshi Kassab Jamat (2005) 8 SCC 534 wherein, while examining the scope of the doctrine of stare decisis, it was held as under: 111. Stare decisis is a Latin phrase which means to stand by decided cases; to uphold precedents; to maintain former adjudication. This principle is expressed in the maxim stare decisis et non quieta movere which means to stand by decisions and not to disturb what is settled. This was aptly put by Lord Coke in his classic English version as Those things which have been so often adjudged ought to rest in peace . However, according to Justice Frankfurter, the doctrine of stare decisis is not an imprisonment of reason (Advanced Law Lexicon, P. Ramanatha Aiyer, 3rd Edition 2005, Volume 4, p. 4456). The underlying logic of the doctrine is to maintain consistency and avoid uncertainty. The guiding philosophy is that a view which has held the field for a long time should not be disturbed only because another view is possible. xxx xxx xxx ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... led by a long line of decisions rendered by this Court. In Mohanlal Goenka v. Benoy Kishna Mukherjee this Court observed: There is ample authority for the proposition that even an erroneous decision on a question of law operates as 'res judicata' between the parties to it. The correctness or otherwise of a judicial decision has no bearing upon the question whether or not it operates as 'res judicata.' 21. Similarly, in State of West Bengal v. Hemant Kumar Bhattacharjee this Court reiterated the above principles in the following words: A wrong decision by a court having jurisdiction is as much binding between the parties as a right one and may be superseded only by appeals to higher tribunals or other procedure like review which the law provides. 22. The recent decision of this Court in Kalinga Mining Corporation v. Union of India is a timely reminder of the very same principle. The following passage in this regard is apposite: In our opinion, if the parties are allowed to reagitate issues which have been decided by a court of competent jurisdiction on a subsequent change in the law then all earlier litigation relevant thereto would always remain in a ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ase of Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Gurnam Kaur (1989) 1 SCC 101. The learned senior Counsel further places reliance on another decision of this Court in the case of State of U.P. v. Synthetics and Chemicals Ltd. (1991) 4 SCC 139 wherein the principle of per incuriam was discussed as under: 'Incuria literally means 'carelessness'. In practice per in curium appears to mean per ignoratium.' English Courts have developed this principle in relaxation of the rule of stare decisis. The 'quotable in law' is avoided and ignored if it is rendered, in ignoratium of a statute or other binding authority' (Young v. Bristol Aeroplane Ltd.). Same has been accepted, approved and adopted by this Court while interpreting Article 141 of the Constitution which embodies the doctrine of precedents as a matter of law. In Jaisri Sahu v. Rajdewan Dubey, this Court while pointing out the procedure to be followed when conflicting decisions are placed before a Bench extracted a passage from Halsbury Laws of England incorporating one of the exceptions when the decision of an Appellate Court is not binding. The learned senior Counsel further places reliance on the decision ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... former suit; (iv) The court which decided the former suit must be a court competent to try the subsequent suit or the suit in which such issue is subsequently raised; and (v) The matter directly and substantially in issue in the subsequent suit must have been heard and finally decided by the Court in the first suit. The above legal principles laid down by this Court have been reiterated in the case of Syed Mohd. Salie Labbai and Ors. v. Mohd. Hanifa and Ors. AIR 1976 SC 1569, as under: ...it may be necessary to mention that before a plea of res judicata can be given effect, the following conditions must be proved-(1) that the litigating parties must be the same; (2) that the subject-matter of the suit also must be identical; (3) that the matter must be finally decided between the parties; and (4) that the suit must be decided by a court of competent jurisdiction. In the Lord Jagannath case referred to supra, this Court was concerned only with the validity of the vesting notification dated 18.03.1974, whereas in the instant case, it is the validity of the order dated 30.11.1992 that is being examined, along with the question whether land once vested for a particular purpose ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the State Government in view of the amended provision of the proviso to Section 2(oo) of the OEA Act, 1951 inserted by way of an Amendment in the year 1974. The judgment in the case of Lord Jagannath was passed only on consideration of the OEA Act, 1951. The provisions of the Temple Act, 1955, which is the principal Act that applies to the Lord Jagannath Temple, Puri were not adverted to at all. 17. We now turn our attention to the validity of the vesting order dated 30.11.1992 passed by the Tahsildar of Puri in O.E.A. Claim Case No. 68 of 1990, by which the suit lands were settled in favour of the Temple. 18. Mr. Harin P. Raval, the learned senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the Appellant Temple Committee contends that in view of Section 5 of the Temple Act, 1955 read with Sections 16 and 33 of the said Act, all endowments of the temple, including the properties belonging to or given or endowed for the support of the Temple or given or endowed for the performance of any service including the service of offerings to the deity or charity connected therewith vest in Temple Committee. The learned senior Counsel contends that the Temple Act, 1955 is a special legislation enact ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... consideration to a particular subject. When a General Act is subsequently passed, it is logical to presume that Parliament has not repealed or modified the former Special Act unless it appears that the Special Act again received consideration from Parliament... The learned senior Counsel further places reliance on a more recent judgment of this Court, in the case of Commercial Tax Officer, Rajasthan v. Binani Cements Ltd. and Anr. (2014) 8 SCC 319, wherein after adverting to a number of previous decisions on the aspect, it was held as under: 46. In Gobind Sugar Mills Ltd. v. State of Bihar this Court has observed that while determining the question whether a statute is a general or a special one, focus must be on the principal subject-matter coupled with a particular perspective with reference to the intendment of the Act. With this basic principle in mind, the provisions must be examined to find out whether it is possible to construe harmoniously the two provisions. If it is not possible then an effort will have to be made to ascertain whether the legislature had intended to accord a special treatment vis-a-vis the general entries and a further endeavour will have to be mad ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ities-the Temple and the Math. Thus, it cannot be contended that the properties of the Math belong to the Temple. 20. The learned senior Counsel further contends that Section 2(oo) of the OEA Act, 1951 which defines Trust Estate, was inserted in the year 1974. Under the proviso, all estates belonging to the temple of Lord Jagannath were deemed to be trust estates. Thus, the estate of Lord Jagannath came to be vested in the State Government vide notification dated 18.03.1974. The amendments to the OEA Act, 1951 were effected when the Temple Act, 1955 was in force. The learned senior Counsel contends that it is a well settled principle of law that a subsequent legislation prevails over a prior legislation. 21. We accept the contentions advanced by the learned senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the Appellant Temple Committee and are unable to agree with the contentions advanced by the learned senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the Respondent Math. The Temple and the Math are two distinct legal entities. The OEA Act, 1951 was enacted to provide for the abolition of all rights, title and interest in the land of intermediaries and vesting the same in the State. The Act was th ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... her with the land on which they stand shall, subject to the other provisions of the Act, vest absolutely in the State Government free from all encumbrances and the intermediary shall cease to have any interest in them. (Emphasis laid by this Court) On the other hand, keeping in view the growing irregularities in the management of the affairs of the temple, the Temple Act, 1955 was enacted by the state, which received the assent of the President on 15.10.1955. We agree with the contention advanced by Mr. Harin P. Raval, the learned senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the Appellant Temple Committee that as far as the Jagannath Temple of Puri and its endowments are concerned, the provisions of the Temple Act, 1955, being the special law, take priority over the provisions of any other legislation. Section 5 of the Temple Act, 1955 makes it clear that the properties and endowments of the Temple stand statutorily vested in the Temple Committee. The Constitution Bench judgment in the case of Surjanarayan Das referred to supra draws a distinction between the 'amrutamanohi' properties of the Math and the Temple in the following terms: 40. The Gazetteer makes a reference t ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... (Emphasis laid by this Court) The OEA Act, 1951 was thus enacted with a view to protecting the interest of the cultivators of the soil and to do away with the evils of the zamindari system. In the light of the same, it cannot be said that the provisions of the OEA Act, 1951 will apply to the land of the Appellant Temple Committee over the provisions of the Temple Act, 1955, which is clearly the special legislation in the instant case. At this stage, it is also crucial to examine the statement of objects and reasons of the Amendment Act of 1974 by virtue of which Section 2(oo) was inserted in the OEA Act, 1951. It states as under: The Orissa Estates Abolition Act, 1951 provides for the abolition of temporarily and permanently settled zamindaris and other intermediary interests and tenures in the State of Orissa. All estates except trust estates have vested in the Government by virtue of notifications issued in that behalf by the Government under the Act. For carrying out the purposes of trusts efficiently and to ensure proper performance of traditional rites and rituals in the religious institutions when trust estates are vested in the Government...... and that any land or b ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... at the Standing orders Act should stand protanto re pealed by Section 79(c) of the Electricity Supply Act. We are clearly of the view that the provisions of the Standing orders Act must prevail over Section 79(c) of the Electricity Supply Act, in regard to matters to which the Standing orders Act applies. Further, Justice Krishna Iyer in the case of LIC v. D.J. Bahadur AIR 1980 SC 2181, while examining the difference between general and special statutes held as under: In determining whether a statute is a special or a general one, the focus must be on the principal subject matter plus the particular perspective. For certain purposes, an Act may be general and for certain other purposes it may be special and we cannot blur distinctions when dealing with finer points of law. In law, we have a cosmos of relativity not absolutes-so too in life. The ID Act is a special statute devoted wholly to investigation and settlement of industrial disputes which provides definitionally for the nature of industrial disputes coming within its ambit. It creates an infrastructure for investigation into, solution of and adjudication upon industrial disputes. It also provides the necessary machine ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... terfere with the special provision unless it manifests that intention very clearly. Each enactment must be construed in that respect according to its own subject-matter and its own terms. (Emphasis laid by this Court) 23. In the instant case, there is a clear conflict between the proviso of Section 2(oo) of the OEA Act, 1951 and Sections 5 and 33 of the Temple Act, 1955. It is also clear that both the above statutory provisions of the Acts cannot survive together. While the rule of harmonious construction must be given effect to as far as possible, when the provisions of two statutes are irreconcilable, it needs to be decided as to which provision must be given effect to. In the instant case, Section 2(oo) proviso in its entirety is not violative of the provisions of the Temple Act. At the cost of repetition, we reproduce the relevant part of Section 2(oo) of the OEA Act, 1951 as under: Provided that all estates belonging to the Temple of Lord Jagannath at Puri within the meaning of the Shri Jagannath Temple Act, 1955 and all estates declared to be trust estates by a competent authority under this Act prior to the date of coming into force of the Orissa Estate Abolition (A ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... is a particular enactment and a general enactment in the same statute and the latter, taken in its most comprehensive sense, would overrule the former, the particular enactment must be operative, and the general enactment must be taken to affect only the other parts of the statute to which it may properly apply. The rule has been applied as between different provisions of the same statute in numerous cases some of which only need be mentioned: De Winton v. Brecon, Churchill v. Crease, United States v. Chase and Carroll v. Greenwich Ins. Co. 10. Applying this rule of construction that in cases of conflict between a specific provision and a general provision the specific provision prevails over the general provision and the general provision applies only to such cases which are not covered by the special provision, we must hold that Clause 5(a) has no application in a case where the special provisions of Clause 23 are applicable. (Emphasis laid by this Court) It becomes clear from a perusal of the above mentioned two judgments of this Court that while provisions of different statutes must be harmoniously constructed as far as possible, in cases where it is not possible, t ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... he land in favour of the Mahantas of various Maths as Marfatdars of the Shri Jagannath Mohaprabhu Bije, Puri is in violation of the provisions of the Temple Act, 1955 and is thus, liable to be set aside. Answer to Point No. 2 26. We will now examine whether even according to the provisions of the OEA Act, 1951, the Respondent Math had the right to file an application for settlement of the suit lands in terms of Sections 6 and 7 of the OEA Act, 1951. There are certain provisions of the OEA Act, 1951 which need to be appreciated at this stage. Section 2(hh) of the OEA Act, 1951 defines an intermediary interest as follows: 'Intermediary interest' means an estate or any rights or interest therein held or owned by or vested in an Intermediary and any reference to 'estate' in this Act shall be construed as including a reference to 'Intermediary Interest' also Section 8A provides for filing of claims Under Section 6, 7 and 8 of the OEA Act, 1951 which reads as under: 8-A. Filing of claims Under Section 6, 7 and 8 and dispute relating thereto-(1) The Intermediary shall file his claim in the prescribed manners for settlement of fair and equitable re ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ions advanced by the learned senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the Respondent Math. The Form 'H' submitted in terms of the OEA Act, 1951 in Claim Case No. 58 of 1975 reveals that while Column 9 [Whether with respect to the lands in possession of the applicant or his temporary lessee or mortgagee on the date of vesting] is marked as 'Self Possession', and Column 11 [If in the possession of a temporary lessee or mortgagee give full details of the lessee or mortgagee......] has been left blank. Therefore, the claim of the Respondent Math and the basis of its claim is not stated in the claim petition. In the absence of the same, its claim as intermediary to prefer claim Under Sections 5, 6, 7, 8 of the OEA Act, 1951 before the Tahsildar is wholly untenable in law. Further, the order dated 12.01.1982, passed in OEA Claim Case No. 58 of 1975 filed by the Respondent Math to settle the lands in their favour has been passed by the Tahsildar, Puri. Section 8A of the Act clearly provides that the claims have to be filed before the Collector. Mr. L. Nageshwar Rao, the learned senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the Tahsildar contends that the definition of Collector i ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... , as we have already held supra that once the land already vested in the Temple Committee Under Sections 5 and 33 of the Temple Act, 1955 which is a special enactment to deal with the properties endowed to the Appellant Temple Committee, the same could not have been divested by applying the provisions of the OEA Act, 1951 by way of an amendment to the Act by insertion of Sections 2(oo) and 3A in the OEA Act, 1951, as the operation of the said Act and the Temple Act, 1955 are in different fields and the objects and intendment of the abovementioned two Acts are entirely different. A constitution bench of this Court in the case of Calcutta Gas Co. Ltd. v. State of West Bengal AIR 1962 SC 1044 held that in case of a conflict or overlap between different entries, the rule of harmonious construction must be applied to give effect to all the entries. This Court held as under: 8.....Before construing the said entries is would be useful to notice some of the well settled rules of interpretation laid down by the Federal Court and this Court in the matter of constructing the entries. The power to legislate is given to the appropriate Legislatures by Article 246 of the Constitution. The ent ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... general power ought not to be so construed as to make a nullity of a particular power conferred by the same Act and operating in the same field, when by reading the former in a more restricted sense effect can be given to the latter in its ordinary and natural meaning. The rule of construction adopted by that decision for the purpose of harmonizing the two apparently conflicting entries in the two Lists would equally apply to an apparent conflict between two entries in the same List. Patanjali Sastri, J., as he then was, held in State of Bombay v. Narothamdas Jethabai, that the words administration of justice and constitution and organization of all courts in item one of List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Government of India Act, 1935, must be understood in a restricted sense excluding from their scope jurisdiction and powers of courts specifically dealt with in item 2 of List II. In the words of the learned Judge, if such a construction was not given the wider construction of entry 1 would deprive entry 2 of all its content and reduce it to useless lumber. This rule of construction has not been dissented from in any of the subsequent decisions of this Court. It may ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... is also quashed by this Court, to the extent, it applies to the lands and estate of Lord Jagannath Temple at Puri. iv) We make it very clear that the striking down of the first part of the proviso to Section 2(oo) of the OEA Act, 1951 as mentioned above and quashing of the notification referred to supra will be prospective and this judgment shall not be applicable to the settled claim of the claimants hitherto under the provisions of the OEA Act of 1951 in so far as the lands of the Lord Jagannath Temple at Puri are concerned. v) In view of the disposal of appeals above-mentioned in favour of the Temple Managing Committee, C.A. Nos. @ SLP (C) Nos. 9167-9168 of 2010 (filed by Sri Raghab Das Math) and C.A. No. 9627 of 2010 (filed by Bauli Matha) are hereby dismissed. vi) No costs are awarded in these proceedings. 35. Hon'ble Mr. Justice V. Gopala Gowda pronounced the judgment of the Bench comprising His Lordship and Hon'ble Mr. Justice C. Nagappan. 36. Leave granted in SLP (C) Nos. 9167-9168 of 2010. 37. C.A. Nos. 7729 of 2009, 7730 of 2009, 142 of 2010, 221 of 2010, 2981 of 2010, 3414 of 2010, 3415 of 2010 and 3446 of 2010 are allowed and C.A. Nos. 14631-1 ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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