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TMI Blog2019 (12) TMI 1479X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... nder Section 397(1), Cr.P.C., and these Criminal Revision Cases are being disposed of by this common order. 3. The petitioners in all these Criminal Revision Cases are the accused in complaints filed against them for the offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act filed on the ground that the cheques issued by them towards discharge of legally enforceable debt or liability were dishonoured. During the pendency of the trial of the said cases, the revision petitioners have filed petitions in all the said cases respectively under Section 45 of the Evidence Act requesting the trial Courts to send the documents in question, whether the cheque or the promissory note, as the case may be, to the expert for examination either to compare the disputed signatures on the document in question with the admitted signatures or to determine the age of the ink to establish their defence taken in the respective cases. 4. All the said petitions filed under Section 45 of the Evidence Act were dismissed by the trial Courts on various grounds on factual aspects. 5. Aggrieved by the impugned orders in dismissing the said petitions filed under Section 45 of the Evidence Act, fi ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... inst the order passed deciding the rights and liabilities of the parties, which is an intermediate order, is maintainable. They have also relied on the judgments of the other High Courts like Madurai Bench of the Madras High Court, Karnataka High Court etc. to prop up their contention. The ratio laid down in all those decisions of other High Courts is based on the law laid down in Amar Nath AIR 1977 SC 2185 : (1977) 4 SCC 137 : 1977 SCC (Cri) 585 : 1978 SCR (1) 222 and Madhu Limaye AIR 1978 SC 47 : (1978) SCR (1) 749 : (1977) 4 SCC 551 (supra). They would finally contend that orders which are of matters of moment dealing with the rights and liabilities of the parties in relation to the trial of the case cannot be termed as interlocutory orders and they are to be construed as intermediate orders against which revision is maintainable. Therefore, they emphatically contend that these revision cases are maintainable under Section 397(1) Cr.P.C. 8. Per contra, learned Counsel for the respondents and the learned Additional Public Prosecutor would contend that revision under Section 397(1) Cr.P.C. is maintainable only against final orders which terminate the proceedings of the main case ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... such the said order cannot be construed as an order that is of matter of moment or touching the rights and liabilities of the party. So, it does not fall within the ambit of the intermediate order so as to maintain a revision against the said order. Therefore, they would contend that these revision cases are clearly barred under Section 397(2) Cr.P.C. and they are not maintainable under law. So, they prayed to dismiss the revisions as not maintainable. 9. The dispute is common place, facts are simple, law is well settled, yet a combat. This Court is once again called upon to answer the vexed question as to what is an interlocutory order as contemplated under Section 397(2) Cr.P.C. and whether an order passed under Section 45 of the Evidence Act is an interlocutory order attracting the bar under Section 397(2) Cr.P.C. and whether a revision against the said order under Section 397(1) Cr.P.C. is maintainable or not. 10. Despite the fact that there is considerable precedential guidance on the question whether a particular order passed during the pendency of trial of a criminal case is a final order or an interlocutory order or an intermediate order, the vexed question of law whethe ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ) Cr.P.C. to entertain revision against an interlocutory order. 13. This sub-section (2) of Section 397, Cr.P.C. is a new provision introduced in the year 1973. Earlier, prior to 1973, power of revision was conferred on the revisional Courts without any limitation or bar to maintain, the said revision against any order. Prior to 1973, there is no bar to maintain revision against an interlocutory order. So, many interlocutory orders passed by the trial Courts are being questioned by invoking this power of revision and trial of the cases are either being protracted or stalled in the trial Courts on account of questioning the said interlocutory orders in evision. So, considering the Law Commission Report issued in this regard, to curb this practice of stalling or protracting the proceedings of the case in the trial Court by way of preferring revisions against interlocutory orders, this new provision under Section 397(2) Cr.P.C. was introduced whereunder an express bar is imposed on the revisional Courts to entertain any revision under sub-section (1) of Section 397, Cr.P.C. against interlocutory orders. 14. Therefore, considering this, historical background in introducing sub-sectio ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... l orders by the statute. Therefore, the party aggrieved by the final orders passed in any such cases can invoke Section 397(1) Cr.P.C. to question the legality, correctness or propriety of the said finding, sentence or orders before the revisional Courts. Now on account of the ratio laid down in Amar Nath and Madhu Limaye (supra) by the Apex Court, an order called as intermediate order has been carved out which can also be termed as a quasi final order. If right of appeal is not provided against the said intermediate or quasi final order then also the parties can invoke the revisional jurisdiction under Section 397(1) Cr.P.C. However, an order which is pure and simple interlocutory order which do not decide anything finally is to be considered as interlocutory order and no revision against that interlocutory order is maintainable under Section 397(1) Cr.P.C. in view of the express bar imposed under Section 397(2) Cr.P.C. 16. Now, the seminal question that arises for determination in this batch of criminal revision cases is what are the orders that can be construed as intermediate or quasi final orders and whether the order passed under Section 45 of the Evidence Act is an interloc ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... tion 397(2) Cr.P.C. was introduced and incorporated in Cr.P.C. in the year 1973, the question as to what are interlocutory orders came up for consideration before the Apex Court in the year 1977 in Amar Nath. Since the expression "interlocutory order" is not defined in the Code, the said expression has fallen for interpretation before the Apex Court in Amar Nath. That was a case where the learned Magistrate has taken cognizance of the case on a complaint filed by the complainant therein against the accused and issued summons to the accused. The said order of taking cognizance of the case and issuing summons to the accused was challenged by the accused by way of filing revision under Section 397(1) Cr.P.C. Therefore, while considering the maintainability of revision against the said order, the Apex Court held that an order which relates to taking cognizance of the case and thereby issuing summons to the accused for his appearance cannot be construed as a pure interlocutory order as ultimately if the challenge to the said order is accepted and if the Court finds that taking cognizance of the case against the accused itself is bad under law and if the said order is set aside, it would ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... tainable. 21. Therefore, a careful consideration of the law laid down in Amar Nath and Madhu Limaye (supra), which has introduced the concept of intermediate order or the quasi final order, shows that if an order though passed during the pendency of the trial of the case, either at the initial stage or at any stage of the trial of the case, if ultimately the said order has the effect of terminating the main proceedings of the case once for all and decides the case finally once for all and puts an end to the case, then those orders though passed during the pendency of the trial of the case, are to be construed as quasi final orders or intermediate orders against which revision is maintainable. 22. In the context while understanding the purport of the said two judgments, it is to be noticed that as the right of the accused to question the order taking cognizance of the case against him without any valid legal basis, is a substantial right conferred on him, as it touches the liability of the accused to face the trial, and if the challenge to the order is ultimately accepted and the order is set aside, as it would have the effect of terminating the main proceedings of the case itself ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... lly severely curtailed by sub-section (2) thereof. There is a complete prohibition in a court exercising its revision jurisdiction in respect of interlocutory orders. Therefore, what is the nature of orders in respect of which a court can exercise its revision jurisdiction? 16. There are three categories of orders that a court can pass - final, intermediate and interlocutory. There is no doubt that in respect of a final order, a court can exercise its revision jurisdiction - that is in respect of a final order of acquittal or conviction. There is equally no doubt that in respect of an interlocutory order, the court cannot exercise its revision jurisdiction. As far as an intermediate order is concerned, the court can exercise its revision jurisdiction since it is not an interlocutory order. 17. The concept of an intermediate order first found mention in Amar Nath v. State of Haryana (supra) 7 in which case the interpretation and impact of Section 397(2) of the Cr.P.C. came up for consideration. This decision is important for two reasons. Firstly it gives the historical reason for the enactment of Section 397(2) of the Cr.P.C. and secondly considering that historical background, ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... edings would continue. 22. The view expressed in Amar Nath ( (1977) 4 SCC 137) : (AIR 1977 SC 2185) and Madhu Limaye ( (1977) 4 SCC 551) : (AIR 1978 SC 47) was followed in K.K. Patel v. State of Gujarat ( (2000) 6 SCC 195 : 2001 SCC (Cri) 200) : (AIR 2000 SC 3346) wherein a revision petition was filed challenging the taking of cognizance and issuance of a process it was said : (K.K. Patel case (((2000.) 6 SCC 195 : 2001 SCC (Cri) 200), SCC p. 201, para 11) : AIR 2000 SC 3346, at p. 3348, para 12) "11......It is now well-nigh settled that in deciding whether an order challenged is interlocutory or not as for Section 397(2) of the Code, the sole test is not whether such, order was passed during the interim stage (vide Amar Nath v. State of Haryana (((1977) 4 SCC. 137) : AIR 1977 SC 2185), Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra (1977) 4 SCC 551) : (AIR 1978 SC 47), V.C. Shukla v. State (1980 Supp SCC 92 : 1980 SCC (Cri) 695) : (AIR 1280 SC 962) and Rajendra Kumar Sitaram Pande v. Uttam ( (1999) 3 SCC 134 : 1999 SCG (Cri) 393) : (AIR 1999 SC 1028). The feasible test is whether by upholding the objections raised by a party, it would result in culminating the proceedings, if so a ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... it is an order which is of matter of moment or that it touches the substantial rights and liabilities of the parties in relation to the trial, the legal position is now clear from the precedential guidance given in the three-Judge Bench judgment of the Apex Court in Girish Kumar Suneja that those orders which have the effect of terminating the proceedings of the main case once for all though passed at interlocutory stage are alone to be construed as an intermediate or quasi final order. That is the only feasible test to decide whether a particular order is an interlocutory order or an intermediate or quasi final order for the purpose of maintaining revision under Section 397(1) Cr.P.C. Therefore, in the considered opinion of this Court, the said concept of intermediate order cannot be stretched to that extent so as to take within its fold all other interlocutory orders which are passed during the trial of the case relating to summoning of witnesses and sending the document to experts for examination etc. on the ground that it touches the rights and liabilities of the party in relation to trial of the case. They are only the orders passed as step in aid of the trial of the pending c ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... o the trial of the case, as they do not decide anything finally and result into culmination of the proceedings of the main case once for all. The Apex Court did not consider the said orders as intermediate or quasi final orders. The same analogy applies to an order passed under Section 45 of the Evidence Act also. Therefore, the said contention of the learned counsel for the revision petitioners holds no water and it cannot be countenanced. 28. For the aforesaid reasons, particularly in view of the interpretation given by the three-Judge Bench judgment of the Apex Court in Girish Kumar Suneja, the judgment of the Madurai Bench of the Madras High Court in the case of Kalyanaraman v. K.S. Janakiranian order dated 24.08.2009 passed in Cri.O.R(MD) No. 4270 of 2009, that an order passed under Section 45 of the Evidence Act is the order which is of matter of moment which affects the rights of the accused on a particular aspect of the trial cannot be said to be an interlocutory order and it is to be construed as an intermediate order, with due respect, cannot be held to be laying down a correct law on the point. Similarly, for the aforementioned reasons, the judgment of the common High C ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... is no dispute relating to the legal position that an order issuing process after taking cognizance of the case is an intermediate order against which revision is maintainable. So, this judgment is also of no avail to the case of the revision petitioners. 32. To sum up, after considering the law enunciated by the Apex Court in Amar Nath (AIR 1977 SC 2185) (supra), Madhu Limaye (AIR 1978 SC 47) (supra) and Girish Kumar Suneja (AIR 2017 SC 3620) (supra), as discussed (supra), it is held that since the order passed under Section 45 of the Evidence Act do not decide anything finally and results into culminating the main proceeding of the case, in any way, it cannot be construed as an order which is of matter of moment or as an intermediate or quasi final order so as to maintain revision against the said order. It is held that on par with the law laid down in Sethuraman (2009 Cri LJ 2247 (SC)) that an order summoning a witness or calling for a document is an interlocutory order against which revision is barred, the order passed under Section 45 of the Evidence Act is also a pure and simple interlocutory order against which revision is barred under Section 397(2) Cr.P.C. 33. Therefore, ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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