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TMI Blog1964 (10) TMI 113X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... based upon certain criteria. Some of the lands of the appellant fell in group Nos. 4 and 5, and his khajan lands fell in ground No. 6. He valued the khajan lands at ₹ 500 per acre, i.e., at anna 1 pies 7 1/2 per sq. yard, and the lands in group No. 4 at ₹ 1-6-0 per sq. yard, and those in group No. 5 at ₹ 1-4-0 per sq. yard. Though the appellant claimed before the Land Acquisition Officer ₹ 44,02,858-8-0 as compensation for the land and ₹ 10,696-14-0 as loss of assessment, the said Officer awarded a total amount of ₹ 1,31,096-4-0 as compensation. The appellant filed an application under s. 18 of the Land Acquisition Act for a reference to the District Court questioning the correctness of the compensation awarded to him by the Land Acquisition Officer. His reference was numbered as Reference No. 55 of 1953. The learned Civil Judge, Senior Division, Thana, heard that reference along with others made at the instance of different claimants and gave his award on November 30, 1953. The learned Civil judge increased the compensation in respect of the khajan lands from l anna and 7 1/2 pies per sq. yard to as. 8 per sq. yard, and in respect of lands in gr ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... s void. (2) The Act infringed Art. 14 of the Constitution. And (3) it was not save under Art. 31-A of the Constitution, as, though the land acquired was an "estate" within the meaning of the said provision, the acquisition had no concern with agrarian reforms or even with the regulation of village economy as laid down by the decisions of this Court. 5 . Learned Attorney-General appearing for the respondent contended that the said Act was covered by Art. 31-A of the Constitution and, therefore, its validity could not be questioned on the ground that it contravened either Art. 14 or Art. 31 of the Constitution. Assuming that his contention was wrong, he proceeded to argue that the Amending Act was saved by Art. 31(5)(a) of the Constitution and, therefore, the question of the adequacy of the compensation could not be questioned in court. He further sought to ward off the attack based on Art. 14 of the Constitution on the foot of the doctrine of classification. 6. The first question is whether the Amending Act was void on the ground that it did not comply with the provisions of s. 299 of the Government of India Act, 1935. To appreciate the contentions of the parties it woul ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... of any land, or, any commercial or industrial undertaking, or any interest in, or in any company owning, any commercial or industrial undertaking, unless the law provides for the payment of compensation for the property acquired and either fixed the amount of the compensation, or specifies the principles on which, and the manner in which, it is to be determined." 8 . Under this sub-section the power to make any law by an appropriate legislature was subject to the conditions laid down therein. 9. The power thereunder could not be exercised unless the conditions were complied with. They were fetters on the legislative power. Section 299 of the Government of India Act in express terms said that the appropriate legislature had no power to make any law authorising the compulsory acquisition for public purposes of any land etc. unless the law provided for the payment of compensation for the property acquired. If "compensation" was not so provided, it affected the competency of the appropriate Legislature to make the said law. If it did not have power, the law so made was a nullity. It is as if it did not exist on the statute book. 10. The question is whether the Act pro ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... he legislative judgment as to what principles should guide the determination of the amount payable. Whether such principles take into account all the elements which make up the true value of the property appropriated and exclude matters which are to be neglected, is a justiciable issue to be adjudicated by the court. 11. Applying the said principles to the facts of the case before it, this Court held thus : "Considering that the impugned Act is a permanent enactment and lands may be acquired under it many years after it came force, the fixing of the market value on December 31, 1946, as the ceiling on compensation, without reference to the value of the land at the time of the acquisition is arbitrary and cannot be regarded as due compliance in letter and spirit with the requirement of article 31(2). The fixing of an anterior date for the ascertainment of value may not, in certain circumstances, be a violation of the constitutional requirement as, for instance, when the proposed scheme of acquisition becomes known before it is launched and prices rise sharply in anticipation of the benefits to be derived under it, but the fixing of an anterior date which might have no relati ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... matter of construing the meaning of similar words and expressions used in both the provisions. It must also be remembered that the wording in the last part of s. 299 of the Government of India Act, 1935, was bodily lifted and introduced in Art. 31(2) of the Constitution and, therefore, it is reasonable to assume that at any rate when the Constitution was originally framed the intention was not no give a different meaning to the said wording. If the intention of the Constitution-makers to give a different meaning, they would have used appropriate words like "price", "consideration" etc. to indicate that they were departing from the framework of s. 299 of the Government of India Act, 1935. We cannot therefore, share the opinion of the High Court that the expression "compensation" in s. 299 of the Government of India Act, 1935, should be given a meaning more restricted than that given by this Court to the said expression in Art. 31(2) of the Constitution. Both must bear the same meaning. If so, the expression "compensation" in s. 299 of the Government of India Act, 1935, means a "just equivalent" of what the owner has been deprived of. ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ng Act under Art. 31(5)(a) of the Constitution, in our view, cannot also succeed. The material part of Art. 31(5)(a) reads : "Nothing in clause (2) shall affect the provisions of any existing law other than a law to which the provisions of clause (6) apply." 16. Clause (6) of Art. 31 reads : "Any law of the State enacted not more than eighteen months before the commencement of this Constitution may within three months from such commencement be submitted to the President for his certification; and thereupon, if the President by public notification so certifies, it shall not be called in question in any court on the ground that it contravenes the provisions of clause (2) of this article or has contravened the provisions of sub-section (2) of section 299 of the Government of India Act, 1935." 17. A combined reading of these two provisions discloses that clause (2) of Art. 31 of the Constitution shall not affect any existing law except a law of a State enacted not more than 18 months before the commencement of the Constitution unless such law was submitted within three months from such commencement to the President for his certification and the President certi ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ) thereof, it would equally save the attack based on the infringement of s. 299(2) of the Government of India Act, 1935. The argument is far-fetched. Article 31-A says that no law providing for the acquisition by the State of any estate or of any rights therein or the extinguishment or modification of any such right shall be deemed to be void on the ground that it is inconsistent, or takes away or abridges any of the rights conferred by Art. 14, Art. 19 or Art. 31. If a particular statute attracts Art. 31-A, it cannot be invalidated on the ground that it does not comply with the provisions of Art. 31(2) of the Constitution, namely, that the Act has not fixed the amount of compensation. But Art. 31-A cannot have any bearing in the context of an Act which had no legal existence at the time the Constitution came into force. It does not purport to revive laws which were void at the time they were made. The analogy drawn between a fundamental right under Art. 31(2) and the conditions laid down in s. 299 of the Government of India Act, 1935, if it has any justification, is irrelevant in the context of a pre-Constitution void law. In this view, Art. 31-A does not come into the picture at ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... every one of the Acts specified in the Ninth Schedule from any challenge on the ground of violation of any of the fundamental rights secured under Part III of the Constitution, irrespective of whether they are pre-existing or new rights, is placed beyond any doubt or question by the very emphatic language of Article 31-B which declares that none of the provisions of the specified Acts shall be deemed to be void or ever to have become void on the ground of the alleged violation of the rights indicated and "notwithstanding any judgment, decree or order of any court or tribunal." 20. This judgment was followed by this Court in the second decision cited above. The said decisions turned upon the express provisions of Art. 31-B of the Constitution. Though the Observations therein appear to be wide, they have no bearing on the question whether the Act was void before the Constitution came into force. The question whether a particular Act was void before the constitution came into force would not arise if the Constitution itself included the said act in the Ninth Schedule and declared that the said Act should not be deemed to be void or even to have become void. It was possible ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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