TMI Blog2019 (11) TMI 1678X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... at Sabrimala temple would open the floodgates of petitions to be filed questioning the validity of religious beliefs and practices followed by other religious sects - The position under our constitutional scheme is that the Supreme Court of India is the ultimate repository of interpretation of the Constitution. Once a Constitution Bench of five learned Judges interprets the Constitution and lays down the law, the said interpretation is binding not only as a precedent on all courts and tribunals, but also on the coordinate branches of Government, namely, the legislature and the executive. What follows from this is that once a judgment is pronounced by the Constitution Bench and a decree on facts follows, the said decree must be obeyed by all persons bound by it. The State of Kerala is directed to give wide publicity to this judgment through the medium of television, newspapers, etc. The government should take steps to secure the confidence of the community in order to ensure the fulfillment of constitutional values. The State government may have broad-based consultations with representatives of all affected interests so that the modalities devised for implementing the judgment o ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... Young Lawyers Association and Ors. v. State of Kerala W.P. (C) No.373 of 2006, which was delivered on 28 September, 2018, with regard to the Sabarimala temple dedicated to Lord Ayyappa. What a future constitution bench or larger bench, if constituted by the learned Chief Justice of India, may or may not do when considering the other issues pending before this Court is, strictly speaking, not before this Court at all. The only thing that is before this Court is the review petitions and the writ petitions that have now been filed in relation to the judgment in Indian Young Lawyers Association and Ors. v. State of Kerala, dated 28 September, 2018. As and when the other matters are heard, the bench hearing those matters may well refer to our judgment in Indian Young Lawyers Association and Ors. v. State of Kerala, dated 28 September, 2018, and may either apply such judgment, distinguish such judgment, or refer an issue/issues which arise from the said judgment for determination by a larger bench. All this is for future Constitution benches or larger benches to do. Consequently, if and when the issues that have been set out in the learned Chief Justice s judgment arise in future, they c ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... irgin ground but review of an earlier order which has the normal feature of finality. (at page 675) 4. In Kamlesh Verma v. Mayawati (2013) 8 SCC 320, this Court undertook an exhaustive review of the case law on review petitions and finally summarised the principles laid down by these judgments as follows: Summary of the principles 20. Thus, in view of the above, the following grounds of review are maintainable as stipulated by the statute: 20.1. When the review will be maintainable: (i) Discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence, was not within knowledge of the petitioner or could not be produced by him; (ii) Mistake or error apparent on the face of the record; (iii) Any other sufficient reason. The words any other sufficient reason have been interpreted in Chhajju Ram v. Neki [(1921-22) 49 IA 144 : (1922) 16 LW 37 : AIR 1922 PC 112] and approved by this Court in Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos v. Most Rev. Mar Poulose Athanasius [AIR 1954 SC 526 : (1955) 1 SCR 520] to mean a reason sufficient on grounds at least analogous to those specified in the rule . The same principles have be ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ) Article 25(1), by employing the expression all persons , demonstrates that the freedom of conscience and the right to freely profess, practise and propagate religion is available, though subject to the restrictions delineated in Article 25(1) itself, to every person including women. The right guaranteed under Article 25(1) has nothing to do with gender or, for that matter, certain physiological factors specifically attributable to women. (iii) The exclusionary practice being followed at the Sabrimala temple by virtue of Rule 3(b) of the 1965 Rules violates the right of Hindu women to freely practise their religion and exhibit their devotion towards Lord Ayyappa. This denial denudes them of their right to worship. The right to practise religion under Article 25(1) is equally available to both men and women of all age groups professing the same religion. (iv) The impugned Rule 3(b) of the 1965 Rules, framed under the 1965 Act, that stipulates exclusion of entry of women of the age group of 10 to 50 years, is a clear violation of the right of Hindu women to practise their religious beliefs which, in consequence, makes their fundamental right of religion under Article 25( ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... nder Section 4(1) shall not discriminate, in any manner whatsoever, against any Hindu on the ground that he/she belongs to a particular section or class. (xii) The language of both the provisions, that is, Section 3 and the proviso to Section 4(1) of the 1965 Act clearly indicate that custom and usage must make space to the rights of all sections and classes of Hindus to offer prayers at places of public worship. Any interpretation to the contrary would annihilate the purpose of the 1965 Act and incrementally impair the fundamental right to practise religion guaranteed under Article 25(1). Therefore, we hold that Rule 3(b) of the 1965 Rules is ultra vires the 1965 Act. 6. Nariman, J. concurred with these views, and concluded, in paragraph 172, that the Ayyappa temple at Sabarimala cannot claim to be a religious denomination which can then claim the protection of Article 26 of the Constitution of India as follows: 172. In these circumstances, we are clearly of the view that there is no distinctive name given to the worshippers of this particular temple; there is no common faith in the sense of a belief common to a particular religion or section thereof; or common org ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... l) Thereafter, the learned Judge stated his conclusions as follows: 296. I hold and declare that: 1) The devotees of Lord Ayyappa do not satisfy the judicially enunciated requirements to constitute a religious denomination under Article 26 of the Constitution; 2) A claim for the exclusion of women from religious worship, even if it be founded in religious text, is subordinate to the constitutional values of liberty, dignity and equality. Exclusionary practices are contrary to constitutional morality; 3) In any event, the practice of excluding women from the temple at Sabarimala is not an essential religious practice. The Court must decline to grant constitutional legitimacy to practices which derogate from the dignity of women and to their entitlement to an equal citizenship; 4) The social exclusion of women, based on menstrual status, is a form of untouchability which is an anathema to constitutional values. Notions of purity and pollution , which stigmatize individuals, have no place in a constitutional order; 5) The notifications dated 21 October 1955 and 27 November 1956 issued by the Devaswom Board, prohibiting the entry of women between th ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... llowing issues: 9.1. The devotees of Lord Ayyappa do not constitute a separate religious denomination and cannot, therefore, claim the benefit of Article 26 or the proviso to Section 3 of the Kerala Hindu Places of Public Worship (Authorisation of Entry) Act, 1965 [ 1965 Act ]. This is outlined in paragraph 144(i) of the judgment of the learned C.J.; paragraph 172 of the judgment of Nariman, J.; and paragraph 296(1) of the judgment of Chandrachud, J. The judgment of Malhotra, J. records an opposite tentative conclusion in paragraph 312(iv). 9.2. The four majority judgments specifically grounded the right of women between the ages of 10 to 50, who are excluded from practicing their religion, under Article 25(1) of the Constitution, emphasizing the expression all persons and the expression equally occurring in that Article, so that this right is equally available to both men and women of all ages professing the same religion. This proposition becomes clear from paragraph 144(ii) and (iii) of the judgment of the learned C.J.; from paragraph 174 read with paragraph 177 of the judgment of Nariman, J.; and paragraph 291 of the judgment of Chandrachud, J. As against this, the ju ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... a very restricted meaning on the words restriction and modification and, as they swung the balance, their opinions must be accepted as the decision of the Court because their opinions embody the greatest common measure of agreement among the seven Judges. (at pp. 302-303) 11. The greatest common measure of agreement among the majority judgments, being the test enunciated by this decision, is the three propositions outlined above, to which all the four majority Judges agree. On whether the exclusion of women from Hindu temples is an essential part of the Hindu religion, three Judges clearly held that it is not, with Nariman, J. assuming that such exclusionary practice is an essential part of the Hindu religion. It is with these prefatory remarks that we now begin to examine the arguments of counsel for the review petitioners. 12. Shri K. Parasaran, who led the attack on behalf of the review petitioners, placed at the forefront of his arguments the judgment of this Court in Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos v. Most Rev. Mar Poulose Athanasius, (1955) 1 SCR 520, and relied strongly on the following passage: It does not appear that either of the two majority Judges ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... s. The observations of Chandrachud, J. on Article 17 of the Constitution cannot be said to be a material error manifest on the face of the record which undermines the soundness of the three conclusions reached by all the majority judgments supra. Further, since the view of Chandrachud, J. on Article 17 of the Constitution is a possible view, it cannot be a subject matter of review. As stated hereinabove, the interpretation of Article 15 and Article 17 of the Constitution were not treated as central issues in the present case by at least three learned Judges, namely, Dipak Misra, C.J., Khanwilkar, J., and Nariman, J. In this view of the matter, these arguments have necessarily to be rejected. 15. Other learned counsel have essentially reargued the case on all other points. They argued that the Ayyappa temple at Sabarimala constituted a religious denomination and could, therefore, claim the protection of Article 26 of the Constitution of India as well as the proviso to Section 3 of the 1965 Act. This argument is a re-argument of what was argued before us before the judgment of 28.09.2018 was delivered. 16. Ms. Indira Jaising, learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of the i ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ss, practise and propagate religion. Therefore, there is no question of the enactment being hit by Article 25. This point also has to be rejected as there is no error, let alone material error, manifest on the face of the record of the majority view. 18. A great deal of argument was devoted to whether the practice of excluding women between the ages of 10 to 50 from the shrine at Sabarimala would constitute an essential religious practice. Three of the majority Judges held that such a religious practice, having no basis in the Hindu religion, could not be held to be an essential religious practice see paragraphs 122 and 123 of the judgment of the learned C.J., and paragraph 227 read with paragraph 296(3) of the judgment of Chandrachud, J. Here again, it cannot be said that there is any error apparent. What has to be seen in the judgments of this Court is whether such practice is an essential practice relatable to the Hindu religion, and not the practice of one particular temple. Nothing has been shown to us, as was correctly pointed out by the learned Chief Justice, from any textual or other authorities, to show that exclusion of women from ages 10 to 50 from Hindu temple ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ratio of the majority judgments in this case is only that the exclusionary practice of keeping women from the ages of 10 to 50 from exercising their right of worship in a particular Hindu temple falls foul of Article 25 of the Constitution of India inasmuch as (i) all persons are equally entitled, when they belong to the same religious group, to exercise their fundamental right of practicing religion; and (ii) that this is a case covered by Article 25(2)(b), which deals with throwing open all Hindu religious institutions of a public character to all classes and sections of Hindus. The majority judgments have held that Section 3 of the 1965 Act is a legislation in pursuance of this part of Article 25(2)(b), which expressly comes in the way of any custom which interferes with the rights of women from the ages of 10 to 50 from worshipping in a Hindu religious institution of a public character. Article 25(1) also contains two other exceptions, namely, that this right is (a) subject to public order, morality, and health; and (b) is also subject to the other provisions of Part III, as has been explained in the majority judgments. This argument must also, therefore, be rejected. 21. R ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ublic Interest Litigation in which all necessary parties were joined and heard, and the same issues that were raised before this Court were decided by the Division Bench. 26. It is true that the Division Bench judgment in Mahendran (supra), was a complaint which was converted into an original petition under Article 226 of the Constitution as a PIL. The Secretary, Travancore Devaswom Board, and the Chief Secretary to the Government of Kerala were made respondents to the petition. Further, the Indian Federation of Women Lawyers, Kerala Branch and the President of the Kerala Kshetra Samrakshana Samithi were impleaded and permitted to participate in the proceedings. As a matter of law, there is no doubt whatsoever that res judicata as a principle does apply to public interest litigation. However, this Court in V. Purushotham Rao v. Union of India Ors., (2001) 10 SCC 305, set out the law as stated in Rural Litigation and Entitlement Kendra v. State of U.P., 1989 Supp. (1) SCC 504, which it followed, and stated: We may not be taken to have said that for public interest litigations, procedural laws do not apply. At the same time it has to be remembered that every technicality in ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... y contained in the statutory prohibition cannot be set at naught. This is for the same reason as that contained in matters which pertain to issues of law that raise jurisdictional questions. We have seen how, in Natraj Studios (AIR 1981 SC 537), it is the public policy of the statutory prohibition contained in Section 28 of the Bombay Rent Act that has to be given effect to. Likewise, the public policy contained in other statutory prohibitions, which need not necessarily go to jurisdiction of a Court, must equally be given effect to, as otherwise special principles of law are fastened upon parties when special considerations relating to public policy mandate that this cannot be done. (at page 3414) 27. When it comes to important issues as to the interpretation of the Constitution, which is entrusted by the Constitution under Article 145(3) to a Bench consisting of a minimum of five Supreme Court Judges, it is obvious that an erroneous interpretation of the Constitution by a High Court (which affects the general public much more than an erroneous interpretation of a statutory prohibition enacted in public interest) cannot possibly be res judicata as against a judgment of a ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... rity judgments has been made out. The review petitions are hence dismissed. Equally, all writ petitions filed under Article 32 of the Constitution, that have been filed directly attacking the majority judgments dated 28.09.2018, are dismissed as not being maintainable in view of Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar v. State of Maharashtra, (1966) 3 SCR 744, as followed in Rupa Ashok Hurra v. Ashok Hurra, (2002) 4 SCC 388 [see paragraphs 7 to 14]. 30. An argument was made by some of the review petitioners that, given the fact that there have been mass protests against implementation of this judgment, we ought to have a re-look at the entire problem. On the other hand, Ms. Indira Jaising, learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of certain ladies, including Scheduled Caste ladies who have been obstructed from entering the Sabarimala temple, or having entered the temple, have been subjected to physical and other abuses, has made a fervent plea before us to ensure that our judgment is implemented in both letter and in spirit. 31. The arguments and counter-arguments so made, need us to restate a few constitutional fundamentals. Under our constitutional scheme, the Supreme Court is given a ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... The expression authority is not defined by the Constitution of India. However, it is used in several Articles of the Constitution of India. Depending upon the context in which it is used, the expression is used either in a wide or narrow sense. Examples of the expression being used in a narrow sense are as follows: Article 73(2) of the Constitution states: 73. Extent of executive power of the Union.- xxx xxx xxx (2) Until otherwise provided by Parliament, a State and any officer or authority of a State may, notwithstanding anything in this article, continue to exercise in matters with respect to which Parliament has power to make laws for that State such executive power or functions as the State or officer or authority thereof could exercise immediately before the commencement of this Constitution. As can be seen from this Article, here, an authority is only of a State, when contrasted with authorities of the Union Government. Similarly, the converse case is referred to in the proviso to Article 162 as follows: 162. Extent of executive power of State.-Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, the executive power of a State shall extend to the matters wit ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... 44 is to be given the widest possible meaning. 37. In Supreme Court Bar Assn. v. Union of India, 1998 (4) SCC 409, this Court held that the Bar Council of India or the Bar Council of a State would be covered, being an authority for the purposes of Article 144, as it is a body created by statute, which performs a public duty [see paragraph 79]. 38. Likewise, any authority that exhibits a defiant attitude to any order of the Supreme Court has been castigated as being wholly objectionable and not acceptable. In M.C. Mehta v. Union of India, (2001) 3 SCC 763, this Court stated as follows: 11. We are distressed at certain reports which have appeared in the print and electronic media, exhibiting defiant attitude on the part of Delhi Administration to comply with our orders. The attitude, as reflected in the newspapers/electronic media, if correct, is wholly objectionable and not acceptable. We have no doubt that all those concerned with Delhi Administration are aware of the provisions of Article 144 of the Constitution which reads, 144. Civil and judicial authorities to act in aid of the Supreme Court.-All authorities, civil and judicial, in the territory of India sha ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e executive. What follows from this is that once a judgment is pronounced by the Constitution Bench and a decree on facts follows, the said decree must be obeyed by all persons bound by it. In addition, Article 144 of the Constitution mandates that all persons who exercise powers over the citizenry of India are obliged to aid in enforcing orders and decrees of the Supreme Court. This then is the constitutional scheme by which we are governed the rule of law, as laid down by the Indian Constitution. 41. Looked at from another angle, every member of the executive Government i.e. every Central Minister, including the Prime Minister, as well as every State Minister, including the Chief Ministers in the various States are bound vide Article 75(4) and Article 164(3), read with the Third Schedule, to uphold and defend the Constitution. Thus, insofar as Ministers belonging to the Centre are concerned, Article 75(4) states: 75. Other provisions as to Ministers.- xxx xxx xxx (4) Before a Minister enters upon his office, the President shall administer to him the oaths of office and of secrecy according to the forms set out for the purpose in the Third Schedule. xxx x ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e purpose in the Third Schedule. THIRD SCHEDULE xxx xxx xxx III B Form of oath or affirmation to be made by a member of Parliament:- I, A.B., having been elected (or nominated) a member of the Council of States (or the House of the People) swear in the name of God do --------------------------------------------- that I will bear true solemnly affirm faith and allegiance to the Constitution of India as by law established, that I will uphold the sovereignty and integrity of India and that I will faithfully discharge the duty upon which I am about to enter. 44. Insofar as the Members of State Legislative Assemblies and Councils are concerned, Article 188, read with the Third Schedule, is as follows: 188. Oath or affirmation by members.-Every member of the Legislative Assembly or the Legislative Council of a State shall, before taking his seat, make and subscribe before the Governor, or some person appointed in that behalf by him, an oath or affirmation according to the form set out for the purpose in the Third Schedule. THIRD SCHEDULE xxx xxx xxx VII B Form of oath or affirmation to be made by a member of the Legislature of a St ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... France and Russia against absolute monarchs are a sober reminder to the people of the world that social transformation, which took place cataclysmically in rivers of human blood, is to be eschewed. An absolute monarch like Peter the Great of Russia, could order, by decree, that no adult male shall, in the future, have a beard. This was done as part of a move to bring Russia out of the middle ages and in line with other advanced European nations. For most Orthodox Russians, the beard was a fundamental symbol of religious belief and self-respect. It was an ornament given by God, worn by the prophets, the apostles and by Jesus himself. Ivan the Terrible expressed the traditional Muscovite feeling when he declared, to shave the beard is a sin that the blood of all the martyrs cannot cleanse. It is to deface the image of man created by God. This decree was carried out overnight, with Russian officialdom being armed with razors with which they were to shave, on the spot, those unfortunate wretches who had not obeyed the decree. Eventually those who insisted on keeping their beards were permitted to do so on paying an annual tax. Payment entitled the owner to a small bronze medallion wi ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... f his equals or by the law of the land. 40. To no one will we sell, to no one deny or delay right or justice. 52. Despite the fact that Pope Innocent III, by a papal bull, in August of that year, annulled the Magna Carta, the Magna Carta was repeatedly affirmed by English monarchs. Copies of it were printed and distributed both in the time of Henry III, i.e., the son of King John, and Edward I, King John s grandson. 53. The next important landmark in English Law, so far as the rule of law is concerned, is the famous Petition of Right3 of 1628, in clause VIII of which, it was stated: They do therefore humbly pray your most excellent majesty that no man hereafter be compelled to make or yield any gift, loan, benevolence, tax or such like charge without common consent by act of parliament, and that none be called to make answer or take such oath or to give attendance or be confined or otherwise molested or disquieted concerning the same or for refusal thereof. And that no freeman in any such manner as is before mentioned be imprisoned or detained. And that your Majesty would be pleased to remove the said soldiers and mariners, and that your people may not be so bur ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... mately depend upon the aid of the executive arm even for the efficacy of its judgments. (emphasis supplied) 57. Given the fact that the U.S. Constitution did not contain any Article resembling Article 144 of our Constitution, the case of the Cherokee Indians vis- -vis the State of Georgia is instructive. In the first judgment dealing with the Cherokee Indians, Chief Justice Marshall stated that the Supreme Court had no original jurisdiction to try the case as the Cherokee nation was not a foreign nation [see Cherokee Nations v. State of Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 43 (1831)]. However, after this first case was decided, the Georgia legislature passed a law requiring all white persons living within the Cherokee territory of the State of Georgia to obtain a license, and to take an oath of allegiance to the State of Georgia. Two white missionaries refused to do so, and were arrested and convicted by a Georgian Court to four years imprisonment. This time, Chief Justice Marshall, in 1832, held the Georgia statute unconstitutional on the ground that the jurisdiction of the Federal Courts over Cherokee Indians was exclusive, and consequently, the State of Georgia had no power to pass law ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... of the laws. A State acts by its legislative, its executive, or its judicial authorities. It can act in no other way. The constitutional provision, therefore, must mean that no agency of the State, or of the officers or agents by whom its powers are exerted, shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. Whoever, by virtue of public position under a State government . . . denies or takes away the equal protection of the laws violates the constitutional inhibition; and, as he acts in the name and for the State, and is clothed with the State s power, his act is that of the State. This must be so, or the constitutional prohibition has no meaning. Ex parte Virginia, 100 U. S. 339, 347; 25 L ed 676, 679. Thus, the prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment extend to all action of the State denying equal protection of the laws; whatever the agency of the State taking the action, see Virginia v. Rives, 100 U. S. 313; Pennsylvania v. Board of Directors of City Trusts of Philadelphia, 353 U. S. 230; Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U. S. 1; or whatever the guise in which it is taken, see Derrington v. Plummer, 240 F.2d 922; Department of Conservation and Developme ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... they set apart a body of men who were to be the depositories of law, who, by their disciplined training and character and by withdrawal from the usual temptations of private interest, may reasonably be expected to be as free, impartial, and independent as the lot of humanity will admit. So strongly were the framers of the Constitution bent on securing a reign of law that they endowed the judicial office with extraordinary safeguards and prestige. No one, no matter how exalted his public office or how righteous his private motive, can be judge in his own case. That is what courts are for. United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U. S. 258, 307-309 (concurring opinion). The duty to abstain from resistance to the supreme Law of the Land, U.S. Const., Art. VI, 2, as declared by the organ of our Government for ascertaining it, does not require immediate approval of it, nor does it deny the right of dissent. Criticism need not be stilled. Active obstruction or defiance is barred. Our kind of society cannot endure if the controlling authority of the Law as derived from the Constitution is not to be the tribunal specially charged with the duty of ascertaining and declaring what ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ers. He regarded the occasion as a most favourable opportunity for striking a blow at the Supreme Court. The opportunity of striking a blow at these courts, he wrote, was given me, and to the utmost of my strength, I will inflict it. He issued orders instructing the Poona court to ignore the writ, with the result that the writ remained unserved. This was a direct and calculated challenge to the authority of the Supreme Court. The Governor added insult to injury by addressing a letter to the judges, informing them that he had given orders to the Company s servants to take no notice of any writs issued by the Supreme Court to the mofussil courts, or to native subjects resident outside the limits of the town and island of Bombay. When the Clerk of the Court read out this communication in open court at its next sitting, the judges strongly and rightly resented the discourteous and dictatorial tone of the communication; and they nobly and valiantly declared that the court would not allow any individual, be his rank ever so distinguished, or his powers ever so predominant, to address it in any other way respecting its judicial and public functions, than as the humblest suitor, who a ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... rther contained orders appointing Dewar, who was then AdvocateGeneral, as Chief Justice, and William Seymour, a barrister, as puisne judge, Chambers being dead. Lord Ellenborough, President of the Board of Control, expressed the hope that these appointments will prevent all mischief in future; as Grant will now be like a wild elephant between two tame elephants. But Grant was wild elephant with a very tough hide, and made of sterner stuff for twenty years and closed his stormy and valiant judicial career in 1848, as judge of the Supreme Court of Calcutta. Grant forfeited the favour of the authorities, but gained immensely in popularity with the Bombay public. It is said that on his departure from Bombay, the natives drew his carriage . Grant died at sea on his voyage home, after his retirement from the Calcutta High Court. (emphasis supplied) (at pp. 196-198) 63. Given the chequered history of the open flouting of judgments of superior courts in the 19th century, the 20th century has witnessed a complete about-turn, as can be seen by the U.S. Supreme Court judgment in Cooper v. Aaron (supra). Today, it is no longer open to any person or authority to openly flout a ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e scrutiny and respectful, even though outspoken, comments of ordinary men. (at page 335) 64. Bona fide criticism of a judgment, albeit of the highest court of the land, is certainly permissible, but thwarting, or encouraging persons to thwart, the directions or orders of the highest court cannot be countenanced in our Constitutional scheme of things. After all, in India s tryst with destiny, we have chosen to be wedded to the rule of law as laid down by the Constitution of India. Let every person remember that the holy book is the Constitution of India, and it is with this book in hand that the citizens of India march together as a nation, so that they may move forward in all spheres of human endeavour to achieve the great goals set out by this Magna Carta or Great Charter of India. 65. The Constitution places a non-negotiable obligation on all authorities to enforce the judgments of this Court. The duty to do so arises because it is necessary to preserve the rule of law. If those whose duty it is to comply were to have a discretion on whether or not to abide by a decision of the court, the rule of law would be set at naught. Judicial remedies are provided to stakeho ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... s that Section 3 of the 1965 Act will apply by reason of the non-obstante clause contained therein, as a result of which every place of public worship which is open to Hindus or any section or class thereof is open to all Hindus to worship therein in the like manner and to the like extent as any other Hindu; and no Hindu of whatsoever section or class shall in any manner be prevented, obstructed or discouraged from entering any such place of public worship or from worshipping or offering prayers thereat or performing religious service therein. 2 ROBERT K. MASSIE, PETER THE GREAT: HIS LIFE AND WORLD, 234-235 (Ballantine Books 1980) 3 This Petition of Right was signed by King Charles I, who was one of the Stuart Kings of England, who believed that he governed the realm by divine right. His father, King James I s Chief Justice, Lord Edward Coke, stated a fundamental of the British Constitution when he said to his King that, Bracton saith, quod Rex non debet esse sub-homine set sub Deo et lege , i.e., the King ought not to be under any man, but under God and the law. 4 The Travancore Devaswom Board, in the initial round of hearing, opposed the public interest writ petit ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
|
