TMI Blog2015 (3) TMI 1400X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... nce to the facts on hand, statements of bank accounts have to be collected from the HDFC Bank. On the facts and circumstances of this case, instead of directing the petitioner/accused to seek for a direction against the employer to credit of subsistence allowance, which is now stated to be lying in the District Treasury, Thiruvannamalai, this Court, in exercise of powers under Section 482 of CrPC, deems it fit to suo motu implead the Director of the Agriculture Department, Ezhilagam, Chennai, as a party respondent to this revision case, only for the purpose of enabling him to credit the subsistence allowance to which the petitioner is entitled as a Government Servant. A direction is issued to the Manager, HDFC Bank, Thiruvannamalai Branch, to defreeze the salary account only to the limited extent of permitting the Director, Agriculture Department, Chennai, to deposit the subsistence allowances due and payable to the petitioner, within a period of two weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order - Criminal Revision Case is disposed of. - CRL. R.C. No. 265 of 2015 - - - Dated:- 30-3-2015 - Mr. Justice S. Manikumar, J. For the Petitioner : Mr. K. Kannan. ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... and the developer contending inter alia that they have colluded with each other and committed offences punishable under law. The petitioner has further contended that due to freezing of the abovesaid bank accounts, salary paid to the petitioner has not been credited into his salary account in A/c.No.50100008256170 maintained in HDFC Bank, Tiruvannamalai Branch and that salary is kept in the Treasury without any interest. The petitioner's son is studying in Engineering course. Inasmuch as the bank accounts have been frozen, the petitioner is not able to pay the college and incidental expenses. For the reasons stated supra, he has sought for a direction to defreeze the accounts. 7. On receipt of this notice, the police have objected for the prayer on the grounds inter alia that the petitioner has sold the property with an encumbrance to the defacto complainant and thus, cheated him. Police has further contended that the petitioner had deposited the money, received as sale consideration and hence, Bank accounts have to be frozen. According to police, investigation is still pending and statement of accounts have to be collected from the HDFC Bank and some other details have ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... urt below has held that there is no need to send any notice to the accused, before freezing the bank accounts. The Court below has also taken note of the averments made in the intervening petition that out of sale consideration of ₹ 2,80,00,000/-, the intervener has made two payments by way of Demand Drafts, in the name of the petitioner, for a sum of ₹ 80,00,000/- and ₹ 60,00,000/- respectively. The said amount has already been encashed. Thus, upon perusal of the averments, documents and submissions of the learned counsel for the petitioner/accused, police and the intervener and taking note of the contentions that if the bank accounts of the petitioner have to be defreezed, the petitioner would withdraw all the alleged cheated money said to be deposited, in the bank accounts and that it would be very difficult to recover the same, vide order dated 18.02.2015 in CrlMP.No.527 of 2015, the learned XI Metropolitan Magistrate, Saidapet, Chennai, has dismissed the petition filed under Section 451 CrPC, filed for defreezing the bank accounts. 11. Though Mr.K.Kannan, learned counsel for the petitioner assailed the correctness of the abovesaid order, on the grounds ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... lice in their objections have stated that the investigation is still pending and statement of accounts have to be collected from HDFC Bank, Thiruvannamalai Branch and some other documents have to be gathered. As rightly observed by the learned XI Metropolitan Magistrate, Saidapet, Chennai, that if the money is deposited in the petitioner's accounts, and if the petitioner's bank account, not defreezed, then there is a likelihood of the petitioner withdrawing the money. 14. On the aspect of the petitioner being served with a notice under Section 102 CrPC, the learned XI Metropolitan Magistrate, Saidapet, Chennai, has made a clear distinction. In the light of the above discussion, this Court is of the view that there is no manifest illegality in the impugned order dated 18.02.2015 in CrlMP.527 of 2015 in Central Crime Branch, Team-I, Vepery P.S. Crime No.131 of 2014, on the file of the learned XI Metropolitan Magistrate, Saidapet, Chennai. 15. In the memorandum of grounds of revision, the petitioner has contended that he being a government servant alleged to have involved in the commission of crime, has been placed under suspension. Subsistence allowance has not be ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... real intent by keeping the direction of the statute intact. 20. In Nathi Devi v. Radha Devi Gupta reported in AIR 2005 SC 648, the Apex Court held that, T he interpretation function of the Court is to discover the true legislative intent, it is trite that in interpreting a statute the Court must, if the words are clear, plain, unambiguous and reasonably susceptible to only one meaning, give to the words that meaning, irrespective of the consequences. Those words must be expounded in their natural and ordinary sense. When a language is plain and unambiguous and admits of only one meaning no question of construction of statute arises, for the Act speaks for itself. Courts are not concerned with the policy involved or that the results are injurious or otherwise, which may follow from giving effect to the language used. If the words used are capable of one construction only then it would not be open to the Courts to adopt any other hypothetical construction on the ground that such construction is more consistent with the alleged object and policy of the Act. In considering whether there is ambiguity, the Court must look at the statute as a whole and consider the appropriateness ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... inal rule of construction of statutes is to read the statutes literally, that is, by giving to the words their ordinary, natural and grammatical meaning. If, however, such a reading leads to absurdity and the words are susceptible of another meaning, the Court may adopt the same. But if no such alternative construction is possible, the Court must adopt the ordinary rule of literal interpretation. In the present case, the literal construction leads to no apparent absurdity and therefore, there can be no compelling reason for departing from that golden rule of construction. (v) In Poppatlal Shah v. State of Madras reported in AIR 1953 SC 274, the Supreme Court held that, It is settled rule of construction that to ascertain the legislative intent all the constituent parts of a statute are to be taken together and each word, phrase and sentence is to be considered in the light of the general purpose and object of the Act itself. (vi) In Rao Shive Bahadur Singh v. State, reported in AIR 1953 SC 394, the Supreme Court held that, While, no doubt, it is not permissible to supply a clear and obvious lacuna in a statute, and imply a right of appeal, it is incumbent on the Cou ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ney-General v. HRH Prince Ernest Augustus of Hanover reported in (1957) 1 All.ER 49, Lord Somervell of Harrow has explained the unambiguous, as unambiguous in context . (xi) In State of W.B., v. Union of India reported in AIR 1963 SC 1241, the Apex Court held that in considering the expression used by the Legislature, the Court should have regard to the aim, object and scope of the statute to be read in its entirety. (xii) In State of Uttar Pradesh v. Dr.Vijay Anand Maharaj reported in AIR 1963 SC 946, the Supreme Court held as follows: But it is said, relying upon certain passages in Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes, at p, 68, and in Crawford on Statutory Construction' at p. 492, that it is the duty of the Judge to make such construction of a statute as shall suppress the mischief and advance the remedy, and for that purpose the more extended meaning could be attributed to the words so as to bring all matters fairly within the scope of such a statute even though outside the letter, if within its spirit or reason. But both Maxwell and Crawford administered a caution in resorting to such a construction. Maxwell says at p.68 of his book: The ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... l sense must then be modified, extended, or abridged, so far as to avoid such an inconvenience, but no further. 11. Maxwell in his book on Interpretation of Statutes (11th Edition) at page 226 observes thus:-- The rule of strict construction, however, whenever invoked, comes attended with qualifications and other rules no less important, and it is by the light which each contributes that the meaning must be determined. Among them is the rule that that sense of the words is to be adopted which best harmonises with the context and promotes in the fullest manner the policy and object of the legislature. The paramount object, in construing penal as well us other statutes, is to ascertain the legislative intent and the rule of strict construction is not violated by permitting the words to have their full meaning, or the more extensive of two meanings, when best effectuating the intention. They are indeed frequently taken in the widest sense, sometimes even in a sense more wide than etymologically belongs or is popularly attached to them, in order to carry out effectually the legislative intent, or, to use Sir Edward Cole's words, to suppress the mischief and advance the reme ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ly established that it is variously styled as 'elementary rule' (See Attorney General v. Bastow [(1957) 1 All.ER 497]) and as a 'settled rule' (See Poppatlal Shall v. State of Madras [1953 SCR 667 : AIR 1953 SC 274]). The only recognised exception to this well-laid principle is that it cannot be called in aid to alter the meaning of what is of itself clear and explicit. Lord Coke laid down that: 'it is the most natural and genuine exposition of a statute, to construe one part of a statute by another part of the same statute, for that best expresseth meaning of the makers' (Quoted with approval in Punjab Breverages Pvt. Ltd. v. Suresh Chand [(1978) 3 SCR 370 : (1978) 2 SCC 144 : 1978 SCC (L S) 165]). (xix) In Nyadar Singh v. Union of India reported in AIR 1988 SC 1979, observed that ambiguity need not necessarily be a grammatical ambiguity, but one of the appropriateness of the meaning in a particular context. (xx) It is a well settled law of interpretation that when the words of the statute are clear, plain or unambiguous, ie., they are reasonably susceptible to only one meaning, the Courts are bound to give effect to that meaning irrespective ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... urt must give effect to it, whatever may be the consequences, for in that case the words of the statute speak the intention of the Legislature. Where the language is plain and admits of but one meaning, the task of interpretation can hardly be said to arise. The decision in a case calls for a full and fair application of particular statutory language to particular facts as found. It is a corollary to the general rule of literal construction that nothing is to be added to or taken from a statute unless there are adequate grounds to justify the inference that the Legislature intended something which it omitted to express. A construction which would leave without effect any part of the language of a statute will normally be rejected. (xxiv) In State of Jharkhand v. Govind Singh reported in (2005) 10 SCC 437, the Supreme Court held that, 12. It is said that a statute is an edict of the legislature. The elementary principle of interpreting or construing a statute is to gather the mens or sententia legis of the legislature. 13. Interpretation postulates the search for the true meaning of the words used in the statute as a medium of expression to communicate a particul ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... chalam v. Dy. Transport Commr. [1977 (2) SCC 273] it was observed that courts must avoid the danger of a priori determination of the meaning of a provision based on their own preconceived notions of ideological structure or scheme into which the provision to be interpreted is somewhat fitted. They are not entitled to usurp legislative function under the disguise of interpretation. (xxv) In Vemareddy Kumaraswamy Reddy v. State of A.P., reported in (2006) 2 SCC 670, the Supreme Court held that, 12. It is said that a statute is an edict of the legislature. The elementary principle of interpreting or construing a statute is to gather the mens or sententia legis of the legislature. It is well-settled principle in law that the court cannot read anything into a statutory provision which is plain and unambiguous. (xxvi) In A.N. Roy Commissioner of Police v. Suresh Sham Singh reported in AIR 2006 SC 2677, the Apex Court held that, It is now well settled principle of law that, the Court cannot change the scope of legislation or intention, when the language of the statute is plain and unambiguous. Narrow and pedantic construction may not always be given effect to. ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ll not be accepted except for compelling reasons. It is not a sound principle of construction to brush aside words in a statute as being in apposite surplusage, if they can have appropriate application in circumstances conceivably within the contemplation of the statute. (xxx) In Gujarat Urja Vikas Nigam Ltd. v. Essar Power Ltd., reported in (2008) 4 SCC 755, the Supreme Court, at Paragraphs 52, 54, 55 and 56, held as follows: 52. No doubt ordinarily the literal rule of interpretation should be followed, and hence the court should neither add nor delete words in a statute. However, in exceptional cases this can be done where not doing so would deprive certain existing words in a statute of all meaning, or some part of the statute may become absurd. (xxxi) In Phool Patti v. Ram Singh reported in (2009) 13 SCC 22, the Supreme Court held that, 9. It is a well-settled principle of interpretation that the court cannot add words to the statute or change its language, particularly when on a plain reading the meaning seems to be clear. (xxxii) In Mohd. Shahabuddin v. State of Bihar, reported in (2010) 4 SCC 653, the Supreme Court held that, 179. Even oth ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... do so. The court cannot add words to a statute or read words which are not there in it. Even if there is a defect or an omission in the statute, the court cannot correct the defect or supply the omission - Union of India v. Deoki Nandan Aggarwal [1992 Supp (1) SCC 323] and Shyam Kishori Devi v. Patna Municipal Corpn. [AIR 1966 SC 1678] (xxxiv) In Sri Jeyaram Educational Trust Ors., v. A.G.Syed Mohideen Ors. reported in 2010 CIJ 273 SC (1), it is held that, 6. It is now well settled that a provision of a statute should have to be read as it is, in a natural manner, plain and straight, without adding, substituting or omitting any words. While doing so, the words used in the provision should be assigned and ascribed their natural, ordinary or popular meaning. Only when such plain and straight reading, or ascribing the natural and normal meaning to the words on such reading, leads to ambiguity, vagueness, uncertainty, or absurdity which were not obviously intended by the Legislature or the Lawmaker, a court should open its interpretation tool kit containing the settled rules of construction and interpretation, to arrive at the true meaning of the provision. While usi ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... omaly or absurdity which must be avoided. So as to enable a superior court to interpret a statute in a reasonable manner, the court must place itself in the chair of a reasonable legislator/ author. So done, the rules of purposive construction have to be resorted to which would require the construction of the Act in such a manner so as to see that the object of the Act fulfilled; which in turn would lead the beneficiary under the statutory scheme to fulfill its constitutional obligations. 24. In Shri Ram Saha v. State reported in AIR 2004 SC 5080, it is held that in applying a purposive construction a word of caution is necessary that the text of the statute is not to be sacrificed and the Court cannot rewrite the statute on the assumption that whatever furthers the purpose of the Act must have been sanctioned. 25. Crawford on 'Statutory Construction' (Ed. 1940, Art. 261, p. 516) sets out the following passage from an American case approvingly as follows: The question as to whether a statute is mandatory or directory depends upon the intent of the legislature and not upon the language in which the intent is clothed. The meaning and intention of the legisl ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... estion as to whether a statute is mandatory or directory would depend upon the statutory scheme. It is now well known that use of the expression shall or may by itself is not decisive. The court while construing a statute must consider all relevant factors including the purpose and object the statute seeks to achieve. (see P.T.Rajan v. T.P.M.Sahir and U.P.SEB v. Shiv Mohan Singh). 30. In Delhi Airtech Services (P) Ltd., v. State of U.P., reported in 2011 (9) SCC 354, one of the substantial questions of law framed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India, was whether Section 17(3-A) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, is mandatory or directory and whether noncompliance of the same, would vitiate the entire land acquisition proceedings, even when the land had already vested in the State, in terms of Section 17(1) of the Act. Due to the divergent views expressed by the Hon'ble Judges, the matter has been referred to a larger Bench. However, the decisions considered by Hon'ble Mr. Justice Swatanter Kumar, are worth consideration, in this case, 117. In 'Principles of Statutory Interpretation', 12th Edition, 2010, Justice G.P. Singh, at page 389 states ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... interpretation of the language of statutes, it remains to consider what intentions are to be attributed to the legislature on questions necessarily arising out of its enactments and on which it has remained silent. The first such question is: when a statute requires that something shall be done, or done in a particular manner or form, without expressly declaring what shall be the consequence of non-compliance, is the requirement to be regarded as imperative (or mandatory) or forms prescribed by the statute have been regarded as essential to the act or thing regulated by it, and their omission has been held fatal to its validity. In others, such prescriptions have been considered as merely directory, the neglect of them involving nothing more than liability to a penalty, if any were imposed, for breach of the enactment. An absolute enactment must be obeyed or fulfilled exactly, but it is sufficient if a directory enactment be obeyed or fulfilled substantially . It is impossible to lay down any general rule for determining whether a provision is imperative or directory. No universal rule, said Lord Campbell L.C., can be laid down for the construction of statutes, as to whe ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... his purpose could be defeated by terming it mandatory or otherwise. 120. Reference can be made to the following paragraphs of May George (supra) : 16. In Dattatraya Moreshwar v. The State of Bombay and Ors. [AIR 1952 SC 181], this Court observed that law which creates public duties is directory but if it confers private rights it is mandatory. Relevant passage from this judgment is quoted below: '7........It is well settled that generally speaking the provisions of the statute creating public duties are directory and those conferring private rights are imperative. When the provisions of a statute relate to the performance of a public duty and the case is such that to hold null and void acts done in neglect of this duty would work serious general inconvenience or injustice to persons who have no control over those entrusted with the duty and at the same time would not promote the main object of legislature, it has been the practice of the Courts to hold such provisions to be directory only, the neglect of them not affecting the validity of the acts done.' 17. A Constitution Bench of this Court in State of U.P. v. Babu Ram Upadhya [AIR 1961 SC 751] de ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... directory accordingly. Equally, it is settled law that when a statute is passed for the purpose of enabling the doing of something and prescribes the formalities which are to be attended for the purpose, those prescribed formalities which are essential to the validity of such thing, would be mandatory. However, if by holding them to be mandatory, serious general inconvenience is caused to innocent persons or general public, without very much furthering the object of the Act, the same would be construed as directory.' 121. The Legislature in Sections 11A and 17(3A) of the Act has used the word 'shall' in contradistinction to the word 'may' used in some other provisions of the Act. This also is a relevant consideration to bear in mind while interpreting a provision. 122. The distinction between mandatory and directory provisions is a well accepted norm of interpretation. The general rule of interpretation would require the word to be given its own meaning and the word 'shall' would be read as 'must' unless it was essential to read it as 'may' to achieve the ends of legislative intent and understand the language of the provisi ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... true one. The intention to produce an unreasonable result is not to be imputed to a statute. On the other hand, it is not impermissible, but rather is acceptable, to adopt a more reasonable construction and avoid anomalous or unreasonable construction. A sense of the possible injustice of an interpretation ought not to induce Judges to do violence to the well settled rules of construction, but it may properly lead to the selection of one, rather than the other, of the two reasonable interpretations. In earlier times, statutes imposing criminal or other penalties were required to be construed narrowly in favour of the person proceeded against and were more rigorously applied. The Courts were to see whether there appeared any reasonable doubt or ambiguity in construing the relevant provisions. Right from the case of R. v. Jones, ex p. Daunton [1963(1) WLR 270], the basic principles state that even statutes dealing with jurisdiction and procedural law are, if they relate to infliction of penalties, to be strictly construed; compliance with the procedures will be stringently exacted from those proceedings against the person liable to be penalized and if there is any ambiguity or doubt, ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... Act is an expropriatory legislation and followed the case of Hindustan Petroleum Corporation v. Darius Shapur Chennai and Ors. [(2005) 7 SCC 627]. Therefore, it should be construed strictly. The Court has also taken the view that even in cases of directory requirements, substantial compliance with such provision would be necessary. 131. If I analyze the above principles and the various judgments of this Court, it is clear that it may not be possible to lay down any straitjacket formula, which could unanimously be applied to all cases, irrespective of considering the facts, legislation in question, object of such legislation, intendment of the legislature and substance of the enactment. In my view, it will always depend upon all these factors as stated by me above. Still, these precepts are not exhaustive and are merely negative. There could be cases where the word 'shall' has been used to indicate the legislative intent that the provisions should be mandatory, but when examined in light of the scheme of the Act, language of the provisions, legislative intendment and the objects sought to be achieved, such an interpretation may defeat the very purpose of the Act and, ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... spector of Police, DCB, Tirunelveli and others reported in 2008 (3) CTC 657, Vinoshkumar Ramachandran Valluvar v. The State of Maharashtra, reported in 2011 (1) MWN (Cr.) 497 (FB) (Bom), and the order of this Court made in CrlOP No.13103, etc of 2013 dated 30.08.2013, in T.Subbulakshmi v. The Commissioner of Police, Chennai and others. 33. In R.Sivaraj's case, the learned Public Prosecutor had not disputed the fact that the Investigating Officer has not reported freezing of the Bank accounts to the Magistrate. He had contended that it was only an irregularity and the same would not vitiate the freezing of bank accounts. 34. Reading of the order made in R.Sivaraj's case, shows that the learned Sessions Judge, has considered the process of investigation, collection of evidence, seizure of case properties, properties used in the commission of offence, with a reference to the commision of offence. Mandatory requirements of the investigating Officer under Section 102(3) CrPC had been taken note of. 15. In STATE OF MAHARASHTRA VS. TAPAS D.NEOGY [1999 (3) CTC 350 (SC)], it was held that the bank account is the property capable of seizure thus, for the purpose of ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... in not reporting of a freezing of bank accounts and that it would not vitiate the same, the learned Judge of this Court, has directed defreezing of the accounts of the accused therein. 36. A cursory look at sub Section (3) of Section 102 CrPC, no doubt, makes it clear that it is the duty of the police officer acting under subsection (1) shall forthwith the report the seizure to the magistrate having jurisdiction. 37. Section 157 of the Code of Criminal Procedure deals with the procedure for investigation, and it states that (1)If, from information received or otherwise, an officer in charge of a police station has reason to suspect the commission of an offence which he is empowered under section 156 to investigate, he shall forthwith send a report of the same to a Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of such offence upon a police report and shall proceed in person, or shall depute one of his subordinate officers not being below such rank as the State Government may by general order, prescribe in this behalf, to proceed, to the spot, to investigate circumstances of the case, and, if necessary to take measures for the discovery of the offender: Provided that- (a) When ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... onfession shall be recorded by a police officer on whom any power of a Magistrate has been conferred under any law for the time being in force. (2) The Magistrate shall, before recording any such confession, explain to the person making it that he is not bound to make a confession and that, if he does so, it may be used as evidence against him; and the Magistrate shall not record any such confession unless, upon questioning the person making it, he has reason to believe that it is bear, made voluntarily. (3) If at any time before the confession is recorded, the person appearing before the Magistrate states that he is not willing to make the confession, the Magistrate shall not authorize the detention of such person in police custody. (4) Any such confession shall be recorded in the manner provided in section 281 for recording the examination of an accused person and shall be signed by the person making the confession; and the Magistrate shall make a memorandum at the foot of such record to the following effect. I have explained to (name) that he is not bound to make a confession and that, if he does so, any confession he may make may be used as evidence against him and I bel ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ding- (i) Ninety days, where the investigation relates to an offence punishable with death, imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a term of not less than ten years; (ii) Sixty days, where the investigation relates to any other offence, And, on the expiry of the said period of ninety days, or sixty days, as the case may be, the accused person shall be released on bail if he is prepared to and does furnish bail, and every person released on bail under this sub-section shall be deemed to be to released under the provisions of Chapter XXXIII for the purposes of that Chapter;] (b) No Magistrate shall authorize detention in any custody under this section unless the accused is produced before him; (c) No Magistrate of the second class, not specially empowered in this behalf by the high Court, shall authorize detention in the custody of the police. [Explanation I. For the avoidance of doubts, it is hereby declared that, notwithstanding the expiry of the period specified in paragraph (a), the accused shall be detained in Custody so long as he does not furnish bail.] [Explanation II].If any question arises whether an accused person was produced before ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ng further investigation into the offence unless the officer making the investigation satisfies the Magistrate that for special reasons and in the interests of justice the continuation of the investigation beyond the period of six months is necessary. (6) Where any order stopping further investigation into an offence has been made under sub-section (5), the Sessions Judge may, if he is satisfied, on an application made to him or otherwise, that further investigation into the offence ought to be made, vacate the order made under sub-section (5) and direct further investigation to be made into the offence subject to such directions with regard to bail and other matters as he may specify. 42. Section 169 of the Code of Criminal Procedure which deals with the Release of accused when evidence deficient states that If, upon an investigation under this Chapter, it appears to the officer in charge of the police station that there is not sufficient, evidence or reasonable round of suspicion to justify the forwarding of the accused to a Magistrate, such officer shall, of such person is in custody, release him on his executing a bond, with or without sureties, as such officer may ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... police report, a report in the form prescribed by the State Government, stating- (a) The names of the parties; (b) The nature of the information; (c) The names of the persons who appear to be acquainted with the circumstances of the case; (d) Whether any offence appears to have been committed and, if so, by whom; (e) Whether the accused has been arrested; (f) Whether he has been released on his bond and, if so, whether with or without sureties; (g) Whether he has been forwarded in custody under section 170. (ii) The officer shall also communicate, in such manner as may be prescribed by the State Government, the action taken by him, to the person, if any whom the information relating to the commission of the offence was first given. (3) Where a superior officer of police has been appointed under section 158, the report shall, in any case in which the State Government by general or special order so directs, be submitted through that officer, and he may, pending the orders of the Magistrate, direct the officer in charge of the police station to make further investigation. (4) Whenever it appears from a report forwarded under ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ot be, conveniently transported to the court, he may give custody thereof to any person on his executing a bond undertaking to produce the property before the court as and when required and to give effect to the further orders of the court as to the disposal of the same. 47. Reading of sub-section (3) of Section 102 CrPC, makes it clear that every police officer acting under sub-section (1) shall forthwith report the seizure to the Magistrate having jurisdiction. As stated supra, no sooner a crime is registered, the same has to be reported to the Magistrate having jurisdiction. The Magistrate monitors the progress of the crime registered and he is empowered to pass suitable orders during investigation, recording and collection of an evidence, in relation to the crime reported. 48. The word 'shall' used in Sub Section (3) of Section (2) of the Act, cast a duty on the police officer towards seizure of the properties and to report forthwith to the Magistrate who had jurisdiction. 49. The word shall used under Sub Section (3) of the Section 102 CrPC can be meant and interpreted to cast a mandatory duty on the police officer, to seize the property and to repo ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... c.No.00000010860298490 maintained in State Bank of India, Tiruvannamalai Branch, have been frozen by the respondent Police on 08.05.2014. Taking note of the submissions of the learned counsel for the petitioner, it could be deduced that from May 2014 to till date, the petitioner has not been paid the subsistence allowance. 55. In the light of the above, a direction is issued to the Manager, HDFC Bank, Thiruvannamalai Branch, to defreeze the salary account only to the limited extent of permitting the Director, Agriculture Department, Chennai, to deposit the subsistence allowances due and payable to the petitioner, within a period of two weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. On such deposit, the petitioner is also permitted to move appropriate application before the learned XI Metropolitan Magistrate, Saidapet, Chennai, to permit him to get his salary/subsistence allowance from the Salary account in A/c.No.50100008256170 maintained in HDFC Bank, Tiruvannamalai Branch. Directions issued to defreeze the salary account is only to a limited extent and shall not be extended to other transactions made by the petitioner, prior to 08.05.2014. With the above directions ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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