TMI Blog1985 (12) TMI 53X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ilash, New Delhi. These orders were served on the appellants on April 3, 1975. The above moities had been transferred by Shri Satya Pal Nayyar and Shri Yash Pal Nayyar in favour of Shri Deen Dayal Goel and Bhagwati Devi, respectively, under registered instruments dated July 27, 1974, for a stated consideration of Rs. 49,000. In the opinion of the Competent Authority, these transfers were vitiated by reason of the provisions contained in section 269C read with section 269F(6) of the Act and, hence, the acquisition orders. Each of the transferees preferred an appeal to the Appellate Tribunal under section 269G of the Act. The appeals were filed on July 9, 1975, and were beyond the time prescribed under section 269G(1) by fifty-seven days. Applications for condonation of delay were filed but these also were filed beyond the period mentioned in section 269G(1) and though the Tribunal found that there was sufficient cause for the delay in the filing of the appeals, it took the view that it had no power to condone the delay and dismissed the appeals accordingly. The appellants have preferred ITSA Nos. 4 and 5 to this court from the orders of the Tribunal. In respect of ITSA No. 6 of 1 ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... tion 249, which provides for an appeal to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner or the Commissioner (Appeals) from an order of the Income-tax Officer. Sub-section (2) provides for a period of 30 days within which the appeal is to be preferred and subsection (3) reads as under: "(3) The Appellate Assistant Commissioner [or, as the case may be, the Commissioner (Appeals)] may admit an appeal after the expiration of the said period if he is satisfied that the appellant had sufficient cause for not presenting it within that period. " The next stage is of appeal/cross-objections against the order of the Appellant Assistant Commissioner before the Appellate Tribunal. Section 253(3) and (4) provide for a period of 60 days within which an appeal/ cross-objection is to be preferred. Sub-section (5) says : " The Appellate Tribunal may admit an appeal or permit the filing of a memorandum of cross-objections after the expiry of the relevant period referred to in sub-section (3) or sub-section (4), if it is satisfied that there was sufficient cause for not presenting it within that period." We may now refer to section 264 which provides for an application to the Commissioner of Incom ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... nal, but here again there is no specific provision as to what is to happen if the application itself is preferred beyond the period of six months. It is in the context of these provisions that we have to construe section 269G. Section 269G occurs in Chapter XX-A relating to the acquisition of immovable properties.Under section 269 C read with section 269F, the Competent Authority can acquire certain properties in certain circumstances by passing an order under sub-section (6) of section 269F. Under sub-section (8) of section 269F, the Competent Authority is required to serve a copy of the order on the transferor, the transferee and on every person who has made objections against the acquisition. Where such an order is passed, the aggrieved party may appeal to the Appellate Tribunal. Where the aggrieved party is the transferor or transferee or any other person referred to in sub-section (8) of section 269F, the appeal has to be preferred within a period of 45 days from the date of the order, or a period of 30 days from the date of the service of a copy of the order on such person referred to in sub-section (8) whichever period expires later. If the appeal is preferred by any othe ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ture does not presumably intend any delay being condoned at all. In other situations, such as in sections 249, 253 and 264, a very wide discretion to condone the delay is given to the appropriate Tribunal. In yet other situations, such as in section 256(1), there is a provision for condonation of delay but only up to a specific extent. So far as sections 269G and 269H are concerned, the statute expressly provides that any application for condonation of delay must be preferred before the expiry of the period of 45 days, 30 days or 60 days, as the case may be. In the cases under appeal, it is common ground that the appeals as well as condonation applications were presented beyond the period mentioned in section 269G(1). That being so, the Tribunal held that, under the scheme of the Act, it was clear that it had no power to condone the delay and the appeals had to be dismissed, even though it also found as a fact, in ITSA Nos. 4 and 5, that there was sufficient cause for the delay in the making of the application by the assessee. The question is whether this view taken by the Tribunal is correct. To start with, there can be no quarrel with the settled proposition that a right of app ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... . B. Saharya, who addressed the principal arguments on behalf of the appellants, put forward his submissions in three parts: Firstly, he urged that the decisions relied upon for the Department were rendered in the light of the provisions of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, but section 29 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, has since been replaced by new section 29 in the Limitation Act, 1963. According to him, the two provisions are substantially different and the new provisions which are currently applicable warrant a totally different approach and call for different interpretation altogether. For the purpose of convenience, the two provisions may be set out side by side : INDIAN LIMITATION ACT, 1908 LIMITATION ACT, 1963 s. 29(1)... s. 29(1)... (2) Where any special or (2) Where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or application a period of appeal or application a period of limitation different from the period limitation different from the period prescribed therefor by the First prescribed by the Schedule, the Schedule, the provisions of section provisions of section 3 shall apply 3 shall apply, as if such period were a ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ation is to be computed under a special law, even where the appeal or application lay not to a court but to a tribunal. He drew our attention in this context to the preamble to the Limitation Act, 1963, the language of section 5 of the said Act as well as to the modifications effected by the said Act to the provisions contained in the earlier Act. Thirdly, turning to the provisions of section 269G(1), Mr. Saharya contended that the proviso to this sub-section cannot be said to expressly exclude the applicability of section 5 of the Limitation Act. He placed great emphasis on the language of this proviso which, he said, has been deliberately worded differently from the provisos in sections 246, 249 and 253 earlier referred to. He urged that this proviso did not at, all deal with the topic of condonation of any delay in the filing of an appeal beyond a prescribed period of limitation, as did the provisos to sections 249, 253 or 264 of the Act. This proviso is one which really extends the period of limitation in certain cases. According to Mr. Saharya, section 269G(1) read with the proviso leads to the result that the appeal has normally to be filed within the period of 45 days or 3 ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... 38 STC 543 (SC); Raj Chopra v. Shanno Devi, AIR 1981 Delhi 18; CIT v. Trilokinath [1984] 147 ITR 613 (MP) and Manoj Ahuja v. Inspecting Assistant Commissioner of Income-tax [1984] 150 ITR 696 (P H). Shri Dhir, who appeared on behalf of the appellant in ITSA No. 6 of 1976, adopted the arguments of Mr. Saharya. He referred to the decisions in Mahesh Harilal Khaman v. B. N. Narasimhan, AIR 1982 Guj 298, and Nirmal Khosla v. Union of India, AIR 1976 P H 22, in support of his contention that the delay in the filing of the appeal in his case should have been condoned by the Tribunal. In reply, Shri Wadhera, learned counsel for the Department, in addition to the line of cases indicated earlier, drew our attention to the following decisions Siha Singh v. Sundur Singh, AIR 1921 Lahore 280; Lata Mangeshkar v. Union of India [1959] 36 ITR 527 (Bom); Laxminarayan R. Rathi v. ITO [1963] 52 ITR 254 (Bom); New Savan Sugar and Gur Refining Co. Ltd. v. CIT [1969] 74 ITR 7 (SC); Commissioner of Sales Tax v. Parson Tools and Plants[1975] 35 STC 413 (SC); Cochin Co. v. CIT [1978] 114 ITR 822 (Ker); Inspecting Assistant Commissioner of Income-tax (Acquisition) v. Kedar Nath Jhunjhunwalla [1982] ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... her the proviso to section 269G(1) can be said to expressly exclude the application of section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act in regard to appeals before the Tribunal under that section. This question involves two aspects which we now proceed to discuss. The first aspect is whether the application of section 5 of the Limitation Act can be said to be excluded by section 269G unless the latter section refers specifically to the former section and expressly excludes its applicability. On this aspect, it is now well established that, in order to exclude the application of any of the provisions of the Limitation Act, that provision need not be expressly referred to and specifically excluded by the special or local law. What is necessary is to find out whether there is sufficiently clear indication in the language of the special or local law which would make the application of the provisions of sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act or any one of them inconsistent with, or redundant to, its scheme. Reference may be made in this context to the decision of the Supreme Court in Hukumdev v. Lalit Narain, AIR 1974 SC 480. Illustrations of provisions which have been considered as excluding ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... The difference in language has become necessary only because the statute contemplates the seeking of an extension of time before the prescribed time has expired and, hence, the usual statutory language used for condonation as in sections 246, 249 and 264 is inappropriate. We are unable, therefore, to agree with the learned counsel for the appellant that there is a qualitative difference in the nature of the two sets of provisions. Thirdly, there is a very important reason why a proviso of the nature in question has been introduced in sections 269G and 269H. These sections occur in Chapter XX-A of the Income-tax Act. This Chapter provides for the acquisition by the Government of immovable properties in certain cases of transfer with a view to counter the evasion of tax. It is unnecessary to set out in detail the provisions of this Chapter. It is sufficient to note that where parties purport to transfer property for a stated consideration and that consideration is found to be understated for the reasons contemplated by the statute, the Government has been given a power of acquiring the property and superseding the transfer effected by the parties. In other words, an order of acqu ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... he is expected to file an application within a period of 45 days or 30 days stating his inability to do so and requesting the Tribunal to specify a larger time within which he may be permitted to do so. The importance of this requirement will be easily recognised in the context of clauses (a) and (b) of the Explanation to section 269-I(1). It will be appreciated that if the provisions of section 5 of the Limitation Act were held to be applicable, as contended for by the assessee, making it possible for an assessee to go to the Tribunal at any time and plead that he had sufficient cause for not filing the appeal within the time specified and that the delay should be condoned, the result will be to render fluid the position regarding the vesting of the property. The same is the position where an appeal is preferred to the High Court. If the assessee's contentions were to be accepted, there would not be any certainty at all regarding the point of time when an order of acquisition becomes final because it will be liable to be set aside by any party either by an application for condonation of delay filed before the Tribunal or before the High Court or both. This will lead to great c ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... iry of the period may make it impossible to have a time frame within which the appeal should be disposed of and may frustrate, as pointed out earlier, the whole scheme of the acquisition chapter and in particular the purpose of section 269-I. In either view, there are bound to be a few hard cases. Both types of difficulties could perhaps have been solved if the section had been so worded as to permit the filing of an application after the expiry of the prescribed period but within a prescribed number of days (say, fifteen) thereafter. But we have to interpret the section as it stands and we think that we should give due effect to the difference in language of the proviso to section 269G as compared to the other provisions and its raison d'etre in the context of the paramount desirability of ensuring expeditious vesting of title to the property in dispute. For these reasons, we have come to the conclusion that the Tribunal's view that it was not in a position to condone the delay in the filing of the appeal is correct and should be upheld. These appeals are, therefore, dismissed but, in the circumstances, we make no order as to costs. D. K. KAPUR J.-I agree, but add a few w ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ed in section 269G. When that period is over and no appeal has been filed, the property will vest in the Central Government. The period under section 269G is 45 days from the date of the order, or 30 days from the date of service of the copy of the order, whichever is later. There is a power in the Appellate Tribunal to extend the period of limitation. Bat, that can be done only by moving an application before the expiry of the prescribed period of 45 days or 30 days, as the case may be. Thus, if no application is moved, the property will vest in the Central Government, but if an application is made, the Appellate Tribunal may extend the period and thus the vesting will be postponed. Similarly, if under section 269-I, an appeal is presented to the Appellate Tribunal, the vesting is postponed till the appeal is decided. If no further appeal is filed to the High Court under section 269H, then the vesting will take place. If an appeal is filed to the High Court, then the Explanation shows that the vesting is postponed till the order of acquisition is confirmed by the High Court. I completely agree with my learned brother's judgment that these special provisions regarding extension ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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