TMI Blog2010 (2) TMI 1299X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... SLP(C) No.25790 of 2005]; C.A.No.1530 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.25792 of 2005]; C.A.No.1531 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.25794 of 2005]; C.A.No.1532 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.25795 of 2005]; C.A.No.1533 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.25895 of 2005]; C.A.No.1534 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.25168 of 2005]; C.A.No.1535 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.1621 of 2006]; C.A.Nos.1536-38 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) Nos.1608-1610 of 2006]; C.A.No.1539 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.25836 of 2005]; C.A.No.1540 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.1611 of 2006]; C.A.No.1541 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.1612 of 2006]; C.A.No.1542 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.1613 of 2006]; C.A.No.1543 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.1614 of 2006]; C.A.No.1544 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.1616 of 2006]; C.As @ SLP(C)No.9389/05, C.A.No.1545 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.1617 of 2006]; C.A.No.1546 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.26418 of 2005]; C.A.No.1547 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.26431 of 2005]; C.A.No.1548 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.26738 of 2005]; C.A.No.1549 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.1618 of 2006]; C.A.No.1550 of 2010 [arising ou ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.167 of 2007]; C.A.No.1589 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.11290 of 2007]; C.A.No.1590 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.18822 of 2007]; C.A.Nos.1591-92 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) Nos.4565-66 of 2010] (CC Nos.10441-10442); C.A.No.1593 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.6912 of 2006]; C.A.No.1594 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.6913 of 2006]; C.A.No.1595 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.7690 of 2007]; C.A.No.1596 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.9394 of 2007]; C.A.No.1597 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.25103 of 2005]; C.A.No.1598 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.25119 of 2005]; C.A.No.1599 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.25141 of 2005]; C.A.No.1600 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.25417 of 2005]; C.A.No.1601 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.25436 of 2005]; C.A.No.1602 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.25440 of 2005]; C.A.No.1603 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.21662 of 2005]; C.A.No.1604 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.22607 of 2005]; C.A.No.1605 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.22722 of 2005]; C.A.No.1606 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.4573 of 2010](CC No. 711); C.A.No.1607 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.4575 of 2010] (CC No ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... a Sandhu, Adv., Ms. Gunwant Dara, Adv., For Mrs. Anil Katiyar, Adv., Mr. Vishnu B. Saharya, Adv, For M/S Saharya Co., Advs., Mr. V.K. Verma, Adv, Ms. Rachana Srivastava ,Adv, Ms. Indira Jaisingh, ASG, Mr. H.P. Raval, ASG, Ms. Geeta Luthra, Sr.A dv., Mr. D.N. Goburdhan, Adv., Mr. Praveen Swarup, Adv. JUDGMENT Deepak Verma, J. 1. Permission to file Special Leave Petitions is granted. 2. Delay condoned. Substitution allowed. 3. Leave granted. 4. For planned development of Delhi, Lt. Governor issued notifications under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') on 05.11.1980 and 25.11.1980 to acquire more than 50,000 bighas of land situated in 13 different villages falling within Delhi. 5. The land owners, feeling aggrieved by the issuance of the said notifications under Section 4 of the Act, filed writ petitions in the High Court of Delhi challenging the same on variety of grounds. The said judgment rendered on 15.11.1983 in the case of Munni Lal and Ors. v. Lt. Governor of Delhi and Ors. is reported in ILR (1984) I Delhi 469. After considering the arguments advanced by learned Counsel for the ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... any order of stay passed by any court in their favour. In other words, there was no order of restraint from issuance of declaration under Section 6 of the Act. 16. According to the appellants, the Act provides that the said declaration should have been issued within a period of three years from the date of issuance of notifications under Section 4 of the Act, that is to say, positively on or before 24.11.1983. But no such declaration having been issued on or before 24.11.1983, i.e., within the statutory period of three years, it is contended that acquisition is illegal and void qua appellants' lands. In the aforesaid appeal, last declaration under Section 6 of the Act was finally issued on 07.06.1985, which according to the appellant, was clearly beyond statutory period of three years. Thus, whole proceedings of acquisition should be rendered illegal and void ab initio. However, the last declaration was still issued on 26.2.1986. 17. It has also been appellants' case that the stay order granted in favour of the other land-owners, who had challenged either the notification issued under Section 4 of the Act or the declaration under Section 6 of the Act, would not b ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... n that declaration issued under Section 6 was not beyond time. 21. Impugned order further shows that it placed reliance on another judgment of this Court reported in (1990) 7 SCC 44, Delhi Administration v. Gurdip Singh Uban and Ors. wherein it has been held that all those land-owners who had not preferred objections under Section 5A of the Act, could not be allowed to contend that either enquiry under Section 5A of the Act was bad or the declaration issued under Section 6 must be struck down on the ground of limitation or consequently, notification issued under Section 4 of the Act would stand lapsed. Thus, the appellant's petition was not entertained and ultimately came to be dismissed. 22. It has neither been disputed here nor before the High Court that some of the appellants herein and many similarly situated land-owners had not preferred objections under Section 5A of the Act. There are other appeals, in which objections were preferred but have been decided against them or even though objections were preferred but were not pressed, on account of subsequent developments that have taken place. We would deal with those type of matters little later. 23. Mr. P.P. ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... Land Acquisition (Amendment and Validation) Ordinance, 1967 but before the commencement of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 shall be made after the expiry of three years from the date of the publication of the notification; or (ii) published after the commencement of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984, shall be made after the expiry of one year from the date of the publication of the notification: Provided further that no such declaration shall be made unless the compensation to be awarded for such property is to be paid by a company, or wholly or partly out of public revenues or some fund controlled or managed by a local authority. [Explanation 1. - In computing any of the periods referred to in the first proviso, the period during which any action or proceeding to be taken in pursuance of the notification issued under Section 4, Sub-section (1), is stayed by an order of a Court shall be excluded. [Explanation 2. - Where the compensation to be awarded for such property is to be paid out of the funds of a corporation owned or controlled by the State, such compensation shall be deemed to be compensation paid out of public revenues.] (2) Eve ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... is not likely to suffer any loss, much less an irreparable loss, even if the land owned, possessed and occupied by the appellant is exempted from acquisition whereas the appellant would suffer a greater loss and injury as with long passage of time he has constructed his house, is residing therein for long number of years and acquisition thereof would lead to serious consequences and would be disastrous to him and other similarly situated land owners. In other words, it has been contended that equitable justice is required to be meted out to the appellant and this Court shall ensure that no injustice is rendered to this appellant and other such hundreds of appellants. 30. In the light of the aforesaid contentions, learned senior counsel for the appellant submitted that following questions of law would arise in this and the connected appeals: (i) Whether proposition of law propounded in Delhi Administration v. Gurdip Singh Uban and Ors. (Supra), (referred to as No. 1) has correctly been understood by the Division Bench in the impugned order? (ii) Whether the judgment in the case of Abhey Ram and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors. (Supra) which approved the Full Bench opi ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... publication of notification under Section 4 of the Act and further declaration under Section 6 of the Act for determining as to whether the same had been issued within the aforesaid period or not. In other words, he has contended that irrespective of the fact that there was any stay or there was no stay, in either case, the period of three years should be calculated from the actual date of publication of notification issued under Section 4 of the Act till the date of publication of notification under Section 6 of the Act. 34. Dr. Rajeev Dhawan, learned senior counsel appearing in some appeals contended that primarily petitions of these appellants have been dismissed on the ground of laches. He has contended that in Balak Ram Gupta v. Union of India and Ors. reported in 37 (1989) DLT 150 [hereinafter referred to as 'B.R. Gupta-II'], notification with regard to acquisition of lands situated in 11 villages was quashed and in subsequent judgment, notification with regard to two more villages was quashed. Therefore, there was no occasion on the part of these appellants to have continued to prosecute their objections preferred under Section 5A of the Act. 35. According ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... he right envisaged under Section 5A is a collective right and cannot be equated with Section 6. It has also been argued on the Doctrine of Public Law to contend that there was no case for dismissal of the petitions of these appellants on the ground of laches. According to him, it would amount to discrimination to these appellants vis-a-vis the other land-owners who have been extended the benefit of quashment of notifications, thereby exempting their lands from being acquired, therefore, the same cannot be allowed to stand. 40. Mr. Mukul Rohtagi, learned Senior Counsel appearing for some other appellants contended that he is appearing for those land-owners, who had actually filed their objections under Section 5A of the Act and belong to village Shayoorpur. The said petitions were filed in the year 1985. 41. However, unfortunately, when the said petitions were heard on 3.3.2005, learned Counsel for the appellants was absent as a result whereof, the petitions came to be dismissed. Thus, they were constrained to file review petitions but same also came to be dismissed on 27.4.2006. 42. It has further been contended that on account of difference of opinion between Hon& ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ame to be dismissed. He further informed that appellants still continue to be in possession of the lands, and have already constructed houses over the same, without any permission or sanction, since at that time no permission/sanction was required to be obtained either from Panchayat or Municipal Corporation. 47. As regards laches, it has been tried to be explained by contending that First Master Plan was published on 1.9.1962 but it lapsed in 1981. The second Master Plan was in force upto 2001. On account of serious confusion due to variety of reasons, the land-owners were in a lurch as to what legal steps are required to be taken due to the fact that Delhi Administration itself had dropped further acquisition proceedings. He, therefore, contended that when there was such a massive confusion, not only amongst the litigating public but also amongst the advocates representing them, thus, they were fully justified in not taking up the issue earlier and their petitions could not have been dismissed solely on the ground of delay or laches when the same were sufficiently explained to the Bench. 48. Mr. T.R. Andhyarujina, learned senior counsel appeared for Springdales Educatio ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... this regard would have been granted to them. 52. Learned Counsel appearing for respondents Shri Hiren Rawal, ASG, Ms. Indira Jaising, ASG, Mr. D.N. Goburdhan and Ms. Gita Luthra opposed the prayer of the appellants and contended that matters have now been settled by long catena of cases either by High Court or by this Court, ever since the notifications were issued in the year 1980. Thus, it is too late in the day for the appellants to challenge the same on any other grounds. 53. Learned ASG for respondent No. 1, Union of India, Mr. H.S. Rawal has taken us through the aims and objects of Amending Act No. 13 of 1967 and Amending Act No. 68 of 1984, primarily to bring to our notice the purpose and reasons for bringing various amendments in the original Land Acquisition Act 1894. He submitted that vide Amending Act No. 13 of 1967, amending provisions thereof came into operation with effect from 12.4.1967. 54. It has been submitted that the challenge by land owners to the issuance of notifications under Section 4 of the Act stood concluded in favour of the respondents by a Division Bench Judgment in the matter of Munni Lal (supra). Argument was, therefore, advanced that ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... d. In other words, it has been contended that the provisions of the Act have fully been complied with and there has not been any violation thereof. 59. He has further brought to our notice that W.P.(C) No. 2850 of 1985 was filed in the High Court of Delhi challenging the same issue with regard to period of limitation prescribed between issuance of notification under Section 4 and further declaration under Section 6 of the Act, which came to be dismissed by Division Bench on 25.11.1985. Pursuant to the said order, respondents had taken possession of part of the land sought to be acquired vide order dated 14.7.1987. 60. It has not been disputed before us that Mrs. Gita Sagar had written a letter on 31.3.1989 mentioning therein that on account of several developments and judgment of the High Court of Delhi in B.R. Gupta-II the acquisition proceedings are being dropped. It was followed by another circular issued by respondent on 07.12.1999 but it has been contended before us that they were not addressed to any of the appellants or land owners whose lands were sought to be acquired and by no stretch of imagination it could be said that all further proceedings of acquisition of ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e ground of limitation or on any other ground. To buttress this ground, learned Counsel for respondents have placed reliance on the following judgments: 1) Vishwas Nagar Evacuees Plot Purchasers Association v. Under Secretary, Delhi Administration reported in (1990) 2 SCC 268; 2) Star Wire (India) Ltd. v. State of Haryana (1996) 11 SCC 698; and 3) Swaika Properties (P) Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan (2008) 4 SCC 695. 65. It was then submitted that as regards grant of permission was concerned, the same has not been issued by the competent authority as prescribed under the Delhi Land (Restrictions on Transfer) Act, 1972. Therefore, advantage thereof cannot be taken by the appellants. To put forth further arguments in this regard, reliance has been placed on a recent judgment of this Court reported in (2008) 9 SCC 177 Meera Sahni v. Lt. Governor of Delhi. It has been brought to our notice that NOCs produced before this Court for perusal, would show that the same have been issued under the seal and signature of Tehsildar and not by the competent authority as defined under Delhi Land (Restrictions on Transfer) Act, 1972. Therefore, no advantage thereof could be claimed b ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... F. Hoffmann-LA Roche and Co. A.G. and Ors. v. Secretary of State for Trade and Industry reported in 1975 AC 295, in this regard. 70. She has further submitted that in view of three earlier judgments of this Court, it has been held that Explanation 1 appended to first proviso to Section 6 would apply squarely to the facts of the case therefore, it is neither legally permissible nor warranted to take a different view. 71. Coming to the question of legitimate expectation, it was contended that no advantage of noting on the files or inter se circulars issued by Departments can be taken by the parties. It was also submitted that the letter of Mrs. Gita Sagar as also the Circular issued thereafter would show that none was addressed to any of the appellants and the same had died their own natural death, on which appellants cannot build up their cases invoking the doctrine of 'Legitimate Expectation'. She has also submitted that as the cause of action had actually accrued to the appellants in the year 1985 unless they are able to successfully show to this Court and reasonably explain the delay caused in filing the writ petitions in the High Court, the High Court was fully ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... assed in favour of the land owners, the period of limitation would be three years from the date of issuance of notification under Section 4 of the Act or it would be more on account of stay order granted in other matter in which such appellants were not parties. 77. On account of difference of opinion between two Benches of High Court of Delhi, matter was referred to a Full Bench, referred to as B.R. Gupta-I, the only question posed before it for opinion was with regard to effect of grant of stay, where challenge is to the issuance of notification under Section 4 of the Act vis-a-vis other land owners who had not challenged it. After considering the ambit, scope and nature of stay granted especially in land acquisition matters, Full Bench has expressed its opinion in paragraphs 26 to 31, reproduced hereinbelow: 26. Learned Counsel for the petitioners is to some extent right in his contention that broad as the above observations are, these cases are slightly different in that they all dealt with the effect of the operation of stay order only vis-a-vis one of the parties to the litigation in which the stay order is passed. But we are of opinion that these decisions are of g ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... o consolation to say that there was no stay regarding other lands covered by the scheme. To compel the Government to proceed against the other lands (by refusing the benefit of the explanation in such a case on the ground that there is no stay order in respect thereof) would only result in waste of public expenditure and energy. If, ultimately, the single owner succeeds in establishing a vitiating element in the S.4 notification and in getting it quashed by the Supreme Court, the whole proceeding of acquisition will fail and the government will have to retrace the steps they may have taken in respect of other lands. (See: Shenoy v. Commercial Tax Officer AIR 1985 SC 621 and Gauraya v. Thakur AIR 1986 SC 1440). Assuming that where such final order is by a High Court the position is not free from difficulty, the debate as to whether, in law, the quashing of the order enures only to the benefit of the party who filed the writ petition and obtained the order is futile, for the moment the Government seeks to enforce the acquisition against the others, they would come up with similar petitions which cannot but be allowed. In other words, in many of the present day notifications, the acqu ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ceeding, the principle of locus standi stands considerably diluted. Any public spirited person can challenge the validity of proceedings of acquisition on general grounds and when he does this the litigation is not inter parties simpliciter: it is a public interest litigation which affects wider interests. The grounds of challenge to the notification may be nothing personal to the particular landholder but are, more often than not, grounds common to all or substantial blocks of the land owners. In fact, this group of petitions now listed before us raise practically the same contentions just as the previous batch of writ petitions challenging the notifications under S. 4 raised certain common contentions. To accept the contention that the challenges and interim orders in such petitions should be confined to the particular petitioners and their lands would virtually provide persons with common interests with a second innings. If the initial challenge succeeds, all of them benefit; and if for some reason that fails and the second challenge succeeds on a ground like the one presently raised, the first batch of petitioners also get indirectly benefited because of the impossibility of pa ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... f the other matters would enure the benefit to the appellants also. Though, prima facie, the argument of the learned Counsel is attractive, on deeper consideration, it is difficult to give acceptance, to the contention of Mr. Sachar. When the Division Bench expressly limited the controversy to the quashing of the declaration qua the writ petitioners before the Bench, necessary consequences would be that the declaration published under Section 6 should stand upheld. 11. It is seen that before the Division Bench judgment was rendered, the petition of the appellants stood dismissed and the appellants had filed the special leave petition in this Court. If it were a case entirely relating to Section 6 declaration as has been quashed by the High court, necessarily that would enure the benefit to others also, though they did not file any petition, except to those whose lands were taken possession of and were vested in the State under Sections 16 and 17(2) of the Act free from all encumbrances. But it is seen that the Division Bench confined the controversy to the quashing of the declaration under Section 6 in respect of the persons qua the writ petitioners before the Division Bench. ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... defaults. The appellants should have been more careful, cautious and vigilant to get the matters listed along with those 73 petitions, which were ultimately allowed by the High Court. Not having done so, the appellants have obviously to suffer the consequence of issuance of notifications under Section 4 and further declaration under Section 6 of the Act. 87. Perusal of the opinion of Full Bench in B.R. Gupta-I would clearly indicate with regard to interpretation of the word 'any' in Explanation 1 to the first proviso to Section 6 of the Act which expands the scope of stay order granted in one case of land owners to be automatically extended to all those land owners, whose lands are covered under the notifications issued under Section 4 of the Act, irrespective of the fact whether there was any separate order of stay or not as regards their lands. The logic assigned by Full Bench, the relevant portions whereof have been reproduced hereinabove, appear to be reasonable, apt, legal and proper. 88. It is also worth mentioning that each of the notifications issued under Section 4 of the Act was composite in nature. The interim order of stay granted in one of the matters ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... would show that in the case in hand as many as four declarations under Section 6 of the Act were issued from time to time. Finally when declaration is quashed by any Court, it would only enure to the benefit of those who had approached the Court. It would certainly not extend the benefit to those who had not approached the Court or who might have gone into slumber. 92. To us, this appears to be the scheme of the Act and that was the intention of the Parliament. That being so, scheme of the Act as has been legislated, has to be given full effect to. 93. We find no ground to grant the same reliefs to those appellants to whom on earlier occasions, same relief was granted. At this long distance of time, it would neither be proper nor legally justified to grant that benefit to the appellants. If it is granted to even those who had not approached the court, then it would frustrate the very purpose and scope of the Act. In the light of the aforesaid, we are of the considered opinion that final quashment of the declaration under Section 6 of the Act by any Court, in some other matter, cannot be extended to the benefit of the present appellants. In any case, there is no ground fo ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the benefit of the explanation only to situations (iii) and (iv), it could have enacted the proviso as indicated earlier and added an explanation that, in computing the period of limitation, periods covered by stay orders would be excluded. The legislature need not have at all referred to situation (ii) above. But the Legislature also wanted to make it clear that the explanation would apply in respect of notifications under S.4 issued prior to 25-9-1981 as well. In doing so, the provision could well have taken into account even S.4 notifications issued prior to 29-1- 1967 for it was quite conceivable that, though the two year period for following these up with declaration under S.6 had elapsed by 28-1-1969, the failure to make a S.6 declaration may have been the consequence of a stay order from a court. But the Legislature decided to exclude this category from the provision for extension in the explanation, and decided to confine itself to all notifications under S.4 made after 29-1-1967. This is very important and the manner in which Clause (a) of the proviso is worded so as to cover all notifications after 29-1-1967 and before 24-9-1984 precludes the contention urged on behalf of ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... amount to sufficient compliance of Section 5A of the Act but Hon'ble Mr. Justice Madan B. Lokur was of the view that if a matter is heard by 'A' obviously it has to be decided by him only and if it has been decided by 'B' then the same would amount to miscarriage of justice and obviously would lead to violation of principles of natural justice. 101. Only to this limited extent, with regard to interpretation of Section 5A of the Act, matter was referred to third learned Judge Hon'ble Mr. Justice T.S. Thakur, (as he then was). In his separate judgment, Hon'ble Mr. Justice Thakur concurred with the view expressed by Hon'ble Mr. Justice Madan B. Lokur titled Chatro Devi v. Union of India and Ors. reported in 137 (2007) DLT 14 known as Chatro Devi-II. 102. We have been given to understand that, feeling aggrieved by the majority opinion as expressed by two learned Judges in the matter of Chatro Devi II, the Union of India had filed 39 Special Leave Petitions in this Court wherein leave has been granted and appeals are now pending disposal in accordance with law. 103. At the first instance, we thought of getting those matters also listed befo ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... notification under Section 4(1) is a composite one and equally the declaration under Section 6 is also a composite one, unless the declaration under Section 6 is quashed in toto, it does not operate as if the entire declaration requires to be quashed. It is seen that the appellants had not filed any objections to the notice issued under Section 5A. 106. To satisfy ourselves with regard to the aforesaid arguments advanced by learned Counsel for the appellants, we have gone through the record and find that Land Acquisition Collector had heard the objections and thereafter had forwarded the same to Lt. Governor for his opinion. The dates from which the objections were heard have already been given hereinabove. Similarly, the manner in which the same were dealt with by Lt. Governor has also been scrutinized. We do not find any infirmity or illegality in the procedure adopted in the same. We are of the considered opinion that there has been full, complete and strict compliance of the provisions contained in the Act by the respondents. 107. In the light of the aforesaid discussion, it is not necessary for us to consider the judgment of this Court in the case of Oxford English S ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... urdip Singh Uban, admittedly, no objections were preferred under Section 5A of the Act, therefore, the appellants' cases stood on a higher pedestal than those which were considered in the aforesaid two cases also has no merits. It was also submitted that the so called satisfaction of Lt. Governor was not legally tenable as admittedly no records were sent to him by the Land Acquisition Collector after deciding the objections filed by the appellants along with his report. We have already mentioned above that there has been application of mind by the Lt. Governor to the facts of the case. 112. As has been mentioned above and held by this Court in Abhey Ram (supra) that notification under Section 4(1) of the Act being composite one it would not be proper and legally justifiable to quash the same more so when most of the appellants had not filed any objections under Section 5A of the Act. Thus, the declarations issued under Section 6 of the Act cannot be quashed. 113. The clear ratio of the aforesaid passage of this Court is that unless the declarations issued by respondents on as many as four dates, as mentioned hereinabove, in the year 1985, are quashed in toto, it canno ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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