TMI Blog2022 (4) TMI 333X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... t And Hon ble Shri Manoj Kumar Aggarwal, Am For the Appellant : Shri R. Venkata Raman (CA)-Ld. AR For the Respondent : Shri G. Johnson (Addl. CIT) Ld. DR ORDER MANOJ KUMAR AGGARWAL (ACCOUNTANT MEMBER) 1. The grievance of the assessee in aforesaid appeals for various Assessment Years (AY) is common i.e., levy of Fees u/s 234E for late filing of Quarterly TDS returns. 2. The Ld. AR, at the outset, submitted that ITA No.632/Chny/2021 is duplicate of ITA No.631/Chny/2021 and therefore, the same may be dismissed as infructuous. Concurring with the submissions, we dismiss ITA No.632/Chny/2021 as infructuous. 3. The Registry has noted a delay of one day in ITA Nos.622 to 631/Chny/2021, 633/Chny/2021 639/Chny/2021. Considering the period of delay, we condone the delay and admit the appeals for adjudication on merits. 4. The grounds raised by the assessee are identical in all the appeals. The grounds taken in ITA No.620/Chny/2021 read as under: - 1. For that the order of the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) -NFAC, is contrary to law, facts and circumstances of the case and is opposed to the principles of natural justice. 2. That the appellant ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... 1067 days 8. 627/Chny/2021 1067 days 9. 628/Chny/2021 1866 days 10. 629/Chny/2021 1332 days 11. 630/Chny/2021 1332 days 12. 631/Chny/2021 1246 days 13. 633/Chny/2021 1866 days 14. 634/Chny/2021 1583 days 15. 635/Chny/2021 1331 days 16. 636/Chny/2021 1584 days 17. 637/Chny/2021 1584 days 18. 638/Chny/2021 1584 days 19. 639/Chny/2021 1197 days The Ld. AR urged that the assessee had reasonable cause for late filing of appeals. The Ld. Sr. DR, on the other hand, submitted that such an inordinate delay could not be condoned and each ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... as been a considerable delay of 1065 days in presenting this appeal. The appellant has merely stated that this inordinate delay was attributable to lack of knowledge and communication gap, as the appellant did not receive the intimation through email communication. The appellant has neither elaborated upon these reasons, nor substantiated the same by way of any documentary evidence. In absence of any substantiation, the grounds for condonation of delay as mentioned by the appellant, is merely a bald assertion without any basis, which is not supported by cogent and proper evidence, and the same would not, as such, constitute sufficient cause within the meaning of section 249 (3) of the Act. In fact, the reasons put forward only show lack of due diligence on part of the appellant in making statutory compliances viz. furnishing of TDS statements within the prescribed period. 5.1 It is evident from the facts on record that the TDS statements for the relevant period were filed belatedly by the appellant; that these TDS statements have been filed electronically; and that the intimation order under section 200A has also been issued by the AO electronically. The said intimati ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ssessee in default has not presented any appeal within the time specified in that sub-section: he may present such appeal before the Ist day of July, 2000. (3) The Commissioner (Appeals) may admit an appeal after the expiration of the said period if he is satisfied that the appellant had sufficient cause for not presenting it within that period. 5.3 It is pertinent to note here that the delay may be condoned and the appeal may be admitted under section 249 (3) only if the appellant could successfully demonstrate that it had sufficient cause for not presenting the appeal within the stipulated period of thirty days. The exercise of discretion in matters of limitation, such as by way of condoning the delay under section 249 (3) of the Act, has to be carried out within the meaning of sufficient cause , as referred to in Section 5 of The Limitation Act, 1963. The general rule of law of limitation is that an extension of prescribed period shall not be granted, unless the appellant satisfies the court that he had sufficient cause for not presenting the appeal within the prescribed period. The onus of establishing sufficient cause lies on the appellant, as clearly ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... imitation Act should receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice, when the delay is not on account of any dilatory tactics, want of bona fides, deliberate inaction or negligence on the part of the appellant. 5.6 The aforesaid view was reiterated in the case of Balwant Singh (Dead) Vs. Jagdish Singh, (2010) (8 SCC 685), where in the Court has held as under:- 25. We may state that even if the term sufficient cause has to receive liberal construction, it must squarely fall within the concept of reasonable time and proper conduct of the party concerned. The purpose of introducing liberal construction normally is to introduce the concept of reasonableness as it is understood in its general connotation. 26. The law of limitation is a substantive law and has definite consequences on the right and obligation of a party to arise. These principles should be adhered to and applied appropriately depending on the facts and circumstances of a given case. Ortce a valuable right has accrued in favour of one party as a result of the failure of the other party to explain the delay by showing sufficient cause and its own conduct, it will be unreasona ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... India Ors., in its order dated 17.12.2019 arising out of Civil Appeal No. 9488 of 2019, has refused to condone delay by holding that:- 27.... the entire explanation as noted above, depict the casual approach, unmindful of the law of limitation despite being aware of the position of law. That apart when there is such a long delay and there is no proper explanation, lapses would also come into play while noticing as to the manner in which a party has proceeded before filing an appeal. 28. In the matter of condonation of delay and lapses, the well accepted position is also that the accrued right of the opposite party cannot be lightly dealt with. 5.11 In the case of Vedabai alias Vaijayanatabai Baburao Patil v. Shantaram Baburao Patil Smt. Vedabai (2002) (122 Taxman 114) (SC), the Hon'ble Apex Court, while disposing appeal, has concluded that a distinction has to be made between inordinate delay and a case where the delay is of few days and the court has to exercise discretion on the facts of each case. The relevant portion of the judgment is reproduced as under,- In exercising discretion u/s 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, to condone delay for sufficient caus ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ppellant from exercising its legal remedy of filing appeal within that prescribed period of thirty days, the delay thereafter cannot be condoned without there being compelling grounds, as laid down by the Hon'ble Courts. 5.16 On the given facts of the case, it is clear that the statutory right to appeal which was vested with the appellant has not been exercised within the stipulated time under section 249(2). Thus, this is clearly a case of lapses, which are directly the result of deliberate inaction on the part of the appellant. 5.17 This is not a case of change in law which is beneficial to the appellant and hence the delay in seeking such remedy may be condoned in the furtherance of substantial justice. Therefore, there is no denial or destruction of a statutory right in this case, by adhering to the prescribed period of limitation as otherwise it will only lead to protract the matter endlessly and will undoubtedly render the legislative scheme and intention behind the concerned provision otiose as held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Assistant Commissioner (CT) LTD, Kakinada Ors. Vs M/s Glaxo Smith Kline Consumer Health Care Limited (2020) (36 G.S.T. ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... een able to show any sufficient cause for not presenting the appeal within the said prescribed period, within the meaning of section 249(3) of the Act, read with section 5 of The Limitation Act. The application seeking condonation of delay in presenting the appeal is hereby rejected. Accordingly, the appeal is not admitted for adjudication on merits. Thus the appeal was dismissed on the ground of limitation against which the assessee is in further appeal before us. 7. Upon perusal of impugned order, it could be seen that Ld. CIT(A) has dealt with the issue of limitation in a very exhaustive manner. To seek condonation of inordinate delay of as many as 1065 days, it was incumbent on the assessee to show sufficient cause for late filing of the appeal. This is more important when the orders, notices etc. were readily available in the digital mode on TRACES as noted by Ld. CIT(A) in para- 5.1 of the order. The assessee could not demonstrate any sufficient cause for late filing of the appeal. Similar is the position before us wherein no new material could be adduced by the assessee in support of its submissions. Therefore, the appeal has rightly been dismissed by Ld. CIT(A) a ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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