TMI Blog1947 (12) TMI 11X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... pril 1936 and 14th October 1936, the appellant, along with two others, conspired to commit criminal breach of trust and cheat and defraud the Provincial Government of the revenues due to it by way of motor tax on certain vehicles belonging to the Jai Vilas Motor Service, and in pursuance of that conspiracy committed criminal breach of trust by dishonestly issuing motor licences without collecting in full the amount of tax due on them and cheated and defrauded the Provincial Government of its revenues to the extent of Rs. 3,942-4-0 by causing delivery of the licences on the false representation contained in the certificate of endorsement of payment of tax in the registration certificates of the vehicles concerned that full tax had been paid. The appellant was also charged with signing false certificates of payment of tax in the registration certificates and falsifying accounts by omitting to enter the particulars relating to such licences in the treasury accounts. On those allegations an information was filed charging the accused under Sections 120B, 420, 468,197, 409 and 477A, Penal Code. Thereafter 37 witnesses were examined before the Magistrate. After the proceedings thus went ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... sent of the Governor, such consent was equally necessary for the charge under Section 120B, Penal Code. The further objection was under Section 197, Criminal P.C. Rajamannar J. overruled both the objections of the appellant and dismissed the petition. The result of that order is that the proceedings have to go on before the Magistrate. The learned Judge, however, granted a certificate under Section 205(1) of the Government of India Act, 1935. The appellant has thereupon filed this appeal. 5. On behalf of the respondent, a preliminary objection was taken to the maintainability of the appeal. It is recognised that having regard to the certificate this Court will not question that a dispute on the interpretation of the Government of India Act had arisen in the matter. But in order to determine that this Court has jurisdiction under the provisions of Section 205(1), Government of India Act, 1935, it is necessary for us to ascertain whether the appeal is really from a judgment, decree or final order of the High Court. The certificate granted by the High Court does not preclude us from considering that point. Section 205(1), Government of India Act, 1935, runs as follows: An ap ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... n 109, Civil P.C. on the footing that the order passed by him was a final order. On appeal the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council pointed out that the order in question was not a final order and the preliminary objection against the sustenance of the appeal was upheld. Viscount Cave, in delivering the judgment of the Board, observed as follows: The question as to what is a final order was considered by the Court of Appeal in the case of Salaman v. Warner (1891) 1 QB. 734, Bozson v. The Altrincham Urban District Council No. (J) (1903) 1 K.B. 547 and Issacs v. Salbestien (1916) 2 K.B. 139. The effect of these and other judgments is that an order is final if it finally disposes of the rights of the parties. The orders now under appeal do not finally dispose of those rights, but leave them to be determined by the Courts in the ordinary way. These observations show that the Judicial Committee considered that the words used in the abovementioned three English decisions gave the same meaning to the expression final order , and adopted the definition as given by Lord Esher M.R. in Salaman's case (1891) 1 Q.B. 734. The Judicial Committee further held that when the effe ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... sed on appeal by a High Court. It was noticed that the words final order were used in contrast with interlocutory order. The learned Judge took the view that in cases in which the decision of the point in dispute either way did not result in finally disposing of the matter before the Court, the decision did not amount to a final order. In that case, as noted in the judgment of Varada-chariar J. no objection was taken on behalf of the Crown to the maintainability of the appeal and the majority of the Judges therefore dealt with the case on the assumption that an appeal was competent. 10. In Venugopala Reddiar and Anr. v. Krishnaswami Reddiar and Anr. A.I.R. (30) 1943 F.C. 24 a suit was filed in Trichinopoly (South India) for recovery of properties some of which were situate in Burma and some in South India. On 1st April 1937, Burma ceased to be a part of British India. The suit, when instituted, was permissible under Section 17, Civil P.C. After the separation of Burma, it wa3 contended by the defendant that the Court ceased to have jurisdiction in respect of lands which were situate in Burma. The contention was negatived. On appeal to the Federal Court, the decision of the l ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... rought before the Court. In criminal proceedings, an examination of the discussion in paras 260-64 of vol. IX of Halsbury's Laws of England (Hailsham Edition) shows that the word judgment is intended to indicate the final order in a trial terminating in the conviction or acquittal of the accused. The word decree is of course out of place in a criminal proceeding. 13. In India, for civil suits, the words judgment and decree are defined in Section 2, Civil P.C, 1908. A judgment means the statement given by the Judge of the grounds of a decree or order passed by the Court. A decree is defined as the formal expression of an adjudication which, so far as regards the Court expressing it, conclusively determines the rights of the parties with regard to all or any of the matters in controversy in the suit and may be either preliminary or final. As a judgment is only the grounds for an order, it is not the order, and this distinction is maintained by omitting the word judgment from. Section 109, Civil P.C., which deals with the right of appeal to the Judicial Committee from the High Court. In that section a right of appeal is given against the decree or final order only. The ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... tice was not considering whether the order in question before the Bench was a final order or not and whether on that ground the appeal was competent or not. This point is made clear in the judgment of Varadachariar J., which Sir Maurice Gwyer C.J. had adopted in his judgment. The observations in King-Emperor v. Shibnath Banerji A.I.R. (32) 1945 P.C. 156 were also intended to uphold the position that Section 205(1), Constitution Act, gave the Federal Court appellate jurisdiction both in civil and criminal matters and that the jurisdiction was not limited to civil matters only. It was also in that connection that their Lordships emphasized the width of the language used in the section. We are unable to read those observations as disapproving in any manner the view of Sulaiman J. in Hori Ram Singh's case A.I.R. (26) 1939 P.C. 43 about the true meaning of the words judgment or final order in Section 205(1), Constitution Act. 17. It was argued on behalf of the appellant that the words judgment or final order should be given a wider interpretation so as to enable the Court to entertain appeals like the present in criminal matters in any event. We are unable to accept this conten ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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