TMI Blog2022 (7) TMI 2X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... her an order is interlocutory order or not. In Hasmukh A. Jahveri Vs. Shella Dadlani [ 1980 (9) TMI 293 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT ], the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India held that the meaning of the term interlocutory order is not always converse of the term final order and held that an order determining important rights and liabilities cannot be termed as interlocutory. Applying the tests to the power exercisable under Section 148 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, as rightly pointed out by the learned Counsel for the respondent, it is not a pre-condition in the appeal to be taken on file and therefore will not result in a final order of deciding the appeal. Applying the test of deciding the rights of the parties, it has been held that it is only a direction to deposit, subject to the final outcome in the appeal and therefore is only a matter of procedure without finally determining the rights of parties. Applying the test as to whether non-passing of such order or accepting of any plea by the accused or the complainant, whether it would result in culmination of proceedings, the answer is again in the negative - Therefore, applying any of the tests advocated by the Ho ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... mount has to be deposited and in the instant case, while double the cheque amount has been ordered as compensation, the learned Principal Sessions Judge, Chennai ordered 15% of the cheque amount alone to be deposited in terms of Section 148 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. And hence the revision. 4. Heard Mr.Bijesh Thomas, learned Counsel for the petitioner and Mr.G.R.Hari, learned Counsel for the respondent. 5. Mr.Bijesh Thomas, learned Counsel for the petitioner, relying upon the judgment in Surinder Singh Deswal @ Col. S.S.Deswal and Ors. Vs. Virender Gandhi and Anr. (2019) 11 SCC 341 , would submit that the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India has held that an order for deposit under Section 148 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 is mandatory and a plain reading of the Section 148 of the Act, it is clear that it is only 20% of the compensation/fine amount and not the cheque amount and therefore, the Trial Court ought to have ordered deposit of a total sum of Rs.8,64,000/-, being 20% of the compensation amount and therefore, he would pray that to that extent, this Court should interfere in the order of the learned Principal Sessions Judge, Chennai. 6. Per ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ained in Halsbury's Laws of England, in paragraph No.12, which is extracted hereunder:- 12. Ordinarily and generally the expression interlocutory order has been understood and taken to mean as a converse of the term final order . In volume 22 of the third edition of Halsbury's Laws of England at p. 742, however, it has been stated in para 1606: ... a judgment or order may be final for one purpose and interlocutory for another, or final as to part and interlocutory as to part. The meaning of the two words must therefore be considered separately in relation to the particular purpose for which it is required. In para 1607 it is said: In general a judgment or order which determines the principal matter in question is termed final . In para 1608 at pp. 744 and 745 we find the words: An order which does not deal with the final rights of the parties, but either (1) is made before judgment, and gives no final decision on the matters in dispute, but is merely on a matter of procedure, or (2) is made after judgment, and merely directs how the declaration of right already given in the final judgment, are to be worked out, is termed interlocutory ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... rpretation, only those orders would be revisable which are orders passed on the final determination of the action but are not appealable under Chapter XXIX of the Code. This does not seem to be the intention of the Legislature when it retained the revisional power of the High Court in terms identical to the one in the 1898 Code. In what cases then the High Court will examine the legality or the propriety of an order or the legality of any proceeding of an inferior criminal court? Is it circumscribed to examine only such proceeding which is brought for its examination after the final determination and wherein no appeal lies? Such cases will be very few and far between. It has been pointed out repeatedly, vide for example, River Wear Commissioners v. William Adamson [(1876-77) 2 AC 743] and R.M.D. Chamarbaugwalla v. Union of India [AIR 1957 SC 628 : (1957) SCR 930] that although the words occurring in a particular statute are plain and unambiguous, they have to be interpreted in a manner which would fit in the context of the other provisions of the statute and bring about the real intention of the Legislature. On the one hand, the Legislature kept intact the revisional power of the H ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... we are concerned in this case, even though it may not be final in one sense, is surely not interlocutory so as to attract the bar of sub-section (2) of Section 397. In our opinion it must be taken to be an order of the type falling in the middle course. 10. The Hon'ble Supreme Court of India, thereafter, considered the decisions in Amar Nath and Ors. Vs. State of Haryana and Another (1977) 4 SCC 137 case, then, Mohan Lal Magan Lal thacker Vs. State of Gujarat AIR 1968 SC 733 and Parmeshwari Devi (SMT) Vs. State and Another (1977) 1 SCC 169 and held in paragraph No.17 that applying literally the test would amount to insurmountable difficulty. Therefore, held that a purposeful interpretation of Section 397(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, whereby, it is concluded that it cannot be termed as if the Revision is maintainable under Section 397 of the Code of Criminal Procedure only against such of those final orders, against which, no appeal would lie, but, the Revision, would be maintainable as against such intermediate orders, which cannot be termed as pure and simple interlocutory order, but, at the same time, would not be final orders. 11. Time and again, the ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... wer to direct the convicted accused - appellant to deposit such sum which shall be a minimum of 20% of the fine or compensation awarded by the trial Court. By the amendment in Section 148 of the N.I. Act, it cannot be said that any vested right of appeal of the accused - appellant has been taken away and / or affected. 14. In Surinder Singh Deswal @ Col. S.S.Deswal and Ors. Vs. Virender Gandhi and Anr. (cited supra), the nature of power exercisable under Section 148 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 is discussed and laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India. It is useful to extract the paragraph No.9 of the said judgment as hereunder:- 9. Now so far as the submission on behalf of the appellants, relying upon Section 357(2) CrPC that once the appeal against the order of conviction is preferred, fine is not recoverable pending appeal and therefore such an order of deposit of 25% of the fine ought not to have been passed and in support of the above reliance placed upon the decision of this Court in Dilip S. Dahanukar [Dilip S. Dahanukar v. Kotak Mahindra Co. Ltd., (2007) 6 SCC 528 : (2007) 3 SCC (Cri) 209] is concerned, the aforesaid has no substance. T ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
|
