TMI Blog2003 (4) TMI 605X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... st part of this sub-Section says that a President or Vice-President of a municipality can be suspended if any criminal proceeding has been instituted against him/her in respect of any offence alleged to have been committed under the Prevention of Corruption Act or the Bombay Prohibition Act or while acting or purporting to act in discharge of his/her duties under the Act. Whereas, the second part deals with the suspension of a President or Vice-President who has been detained in a prison during trial under the provisions of any law. The present petition falls under the second part. Here the appellant was suspended from the President's office of Anand Municipality owing to his detention in judicial custody for alleged offences under Sections 307, 143, 147, 148 and 149 of the Indian Penal Code read with Section 25(c) of the Arms Act and under Section 135 of the Bombay Police Act. To the appellant, his suspension is bad in law since his detention was not 'during trial' as contemplated in Section 40(1) of the Act. It is also his case that the words 'during trial' should be given a strict meaning so as to cover detention only after commencement of trial of a case as ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ote the reason and spirit of Section 40 of the Act. 6. Now the entire issue boils down to the exercise of finding the true meaning of the word 'trial' as portrayed in the broad canvass of Section 40 of the Act. 7. In State of Bihar v. Ram Naresh Pandey 1957 SCR 279 at 289 this Court observed: The words 'tried' and 'trial' appear to have no fixed or universal meaning. No doubt, in quite a number of sections in the Code to which our attention has been drawn the words 'tried' and 'trial' have been used in the sense of reference to a stage after the inquiry. That meaning attaches to the words in those sections having regard to the context in which they are used. There is no reason why where these words are used in another context in the Code, they should necessarily be limited in their connotation and significance. They are words which must be considered with regard to the particular context in which they are used and with regard to the scheme and purpose of the provision under considerations. (Emphasis supplied) Following this view, this Court in Omprakash Shivaprakash v. K.I. Kuriakose, ruled that: The term 'trial' ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... nsure the smooth functioning of the office and to keep confidence of people in the institution. 10. In result, the word 'trial' should not be given a restricted meaning so as to include only proceedings after the accused is actually arraigned before the competent court for framing and facing of charges. Thus, detention in the present case took place during the process of trial. It served as a step in aid for trial. 11. The distinction between two parts of Section 40(1) of the Act regarding offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act, Bombay Prohibition Act, Gujarat Municipalities Act on the one hand and other enactments on the other is strongly relied upon on behalf of the appellant. Many offences arising under other laws adverted to in the latter part of Section 40(1) of the Act are no less serious than those adverted to in the former part of Section 40(1) of the Act. For that matter they may be far more serious. For example, drunkenness may be an offence under Bombay Prohibition Act, while murder and sedition are offences under the Indian Penal Code. Further, for practical reasons, if a person is kept in prison, whatever may be the nature of the offence whether ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... said High Court in Special Civil Application No. 4832 of 2001. 16. The basic fact of the matter is not in dispute. 17. The appellant herein was elected as a President of Anand Municipality. His term of office was to expire on 30.6.2002. The 6th respondent herein lodged two First Information Reports before the Anand Town Police Station which were marked as C.R. No. 257 of 2001 and C.R. No. 254 of 2001 for commission of alleged offences under Sections 307, 143, 147, 148 and 149 of the Indian Penal Code read with Section 25(c) of the Arms Act and under Section 135 of the Bombay Police Act. 18. In connection with investigation of said matters, the Appellant herein was arrested and detained in judicial custody from 13.6.2001 to 6.7.2001. The Director of Municipalities purported to act as an authorised officer in exercise of the power conferred upon him under Section 40 of the Act, directed that the petitioner be placed under suspension from his office in view of pendency of the said cases by an Order dated 21.6.2001 where against an appeal was preferred by him. Before the Appellate Authority a contention was raised by the appellant to the effect that as no charge sheet was sub ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... cause of their detention on accusation of an offence for which trial is under way. 19. Aggrieved, the appellant is before us. 20. Mr. Jaspal Singh, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant would inter alia submit that both the learned Single Judge as also the Division Bench of the High Court committed a manifest error in arriving at the aforementioned conclusion in so far as they failed to take into consideration the fact that as the offence alleged to have been committed by the appellant herein was triable by a Court of Session, the trial thereof in contradiction to the term 'investigation' or 'inquiry' would commence from the stage of Section 228 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. An investigation and/or an inquiry, the learned senior counsel would contend, cannot be said to be a 'trial' within the meaning of Section 40 of the Act. Strong reliance in support of the said contention has been placed on Raj Kishore Prasad v. State of Bihar and Anr. and State of Uttar Pradesh v. Lakshmi Brahman and Anr. 21. Mr. Singh would urge that having regard to the fact that the appellant was detained in judicial custody at the stage of i ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... nder: (1) Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947; or (ii) Bombay Prohibition Act, 1949; or (iii) while acting or purporting to act or discharge of his duties under the Gujarat Municipalities Act; and (b) when the holder of the office has been detained in prison during trial under the provisions of any law for the time being in force. 25. The legislature advisedly has used two different terms as regards different offences for achieving the same object. Whereas, the President or Vice-President of a Municipal Council may be placed under suspension upon institution of a case under Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, the Bombay Prohibition Act, 1949 and the said Act; but in relation to other cases order of suspension can be passed only when he has been detained in a prison during trial. 26. The expression 'trial' although has not been defined in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 must be construed in the light of the expression 'inquiry' or 'investigation' as contained in Sections 2(g) and 2(h) of the Code of Criminal Procedure which reads thus: 2(g) inquiry means every inquiry, other than a trial, conducted under this Code by a magistrate or Court; ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... eof. The Court, in the event of its coming to the conclusion that a literal meaning is possible to be rendered, would not embark upon the exercise of judicial interpretation thereof and nothing is to be added or taken from a statute unless it is held that the same would lead to a (SIC) or manifest injustice. 35. It is also a well settled principle of law that when two different expressions are used by the legislature, the same must be held to have intended to convey two different meanings. Section 40, as noticed hereinbefore, uses the term 'instituted' in relation to offences under the statutes specified therein; whereas in relation to the others, the term 'during the trial' has been used. 36. In this case the Court has to proceed on the presumption that according to the Legislature, institution of a criminal case against the holder of office under one category of offences must have been thought of to be so derogatory that he may not continue to hold the same; whereas in the cases of offences under other category which although may be more heinous and serious, some sort of investigation or inquiry leading to issuance of charge-sheet acceptance thereof by the C ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e an inquiry, Section 319 Cr.PC would be obviously attracted, subject of course to deciding whether the material put forth by the investigation could be termed as 'evidence', as otherwise no evidence is recordable by a Magistrate in such proceedings. While enacting the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, the prefatory note before Parliament containing Objects and Reasons gave out the changes proposed to be made with a view to speed up the disposal of criminal cases. Item (a) specifically provided the preliminary inquiry which precedes the trial by a Court of Session, otherwise known as committal proceeding, is being abolished as it does not serve any useful purpose and has been the cause of considerable delay in the trial of offences . 41. We are not oblivious of the fact that the word trial, may in different situations be interpreted differently, having regard to the text and context thereof, as was the case in The State of Bihar v. Ram Naresh Pandey [1957 SCR 279]: wherein having regard to omission of the definition of the word 'trial' in Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 it was held that the power of the public prosecutor to withdraw a case in terms of ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... d so in clear terms. The legislature, in fact, has stated so in such terms in respect of an offence specified therein in the first part of Section 40. A strict construction of the second part of Section 40 in the aforementioned situation is, therefore, called for, having regard to the fact that the act of suspension from holding an office would be quasi-criminal in nature. 43. It is trite that a law leading to disqualification to hold an office should be clear and unambiguous like a penal law. In the event a statute is not clear, recourse to strict interpretation must be made for construction thereof. In his classic work 'The Interpretation and Application of Statutes' Read Dickerson states: (1) The Court will not extend the law beyond its meaning to take care of a broader legislative purpose. Here strict means merely that the Court will refrain from exercising its creative function to apply the rule announced in the statute to situations not covered by it, even though such an extension would help to advance the manifest ulterior purpose of the statute. Here, strictness relates not to the meaning of the statute but to using the statute as a basic for judicial law m ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... particular interpretation if it shall appear that the result would be unreasonable or oppressive. (Emphasis supplied) 47. Blackburn, J. in Wills v. Thorp said (1875) LR 10 QB 383: When the Legislature imposes a penalty, the words imposing it must be clear and distinct. 48. In Craies on Statute Law (7th Edn. At p. 530) referring to U.S. v. Wiltberger, (1820) 2 Wheat (US) 76, it is observed thus: The distinction between a strict construction and a more free one has, no doubt, in modern times almost disappeared, and the question now is, what is the true construction of the statute? I should say that in a criminal statute you must be quite sure that the offence charged is within the letter of the law. This rule is said to be founded on the tenderness of the law for the rights of individuals, and on the plain principle that the power of punishment is vested in the Legislature, and not in the judicial department, for it is the Legislature, not the Court, which is to define a crime and ordain its punishment. 49. It is also well-known that there exists a principle against doubtful penalisation. In Shri Mohd. Ali Khan and Ors. v. The C.W., Tax, New Delhi, it is held ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... nt standards in the matter of issuance of order of suspension, the legislature must have in mind the impact of institution of case which, in its opinion, would amount to moral turpitude and other offences. So far as offences under the statutes other than specified in the first part of the statute are concerned, the legislature did not evidently intend that an order of suspension be issued automatically without making an investigation in relation thereto. 54. For the foregoing reasons, I am of the opinion that the judgment of the High Court cannot be sustained. It is set aside accordingly. The civil appeal is allowed. However, having regard to the fact that the term of the petitioner came to an end on 30.6.2002 and the election have been held on 11.7.2002, we do not intend to proceed with the contempt petition. The contempt proceeding is, therefore, dropped. 55. In the circumstances of this case, parties shall pay and bear their own costs. A.R. Lakshmanan, J. 56. I have had the privilege of perusing the judgments proposed by my learned Brothers Justice S. Rajendra Babu and Justice S.B. Sinha. I respectfully concur with the opinion expressed by Brother Justice S. Rajend ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... are to be kept away from the elected office until they are cleared of the charge. The last paragraph of Section 40 of the Act uses the expression under the provisions of any law for the time being in force makes the legislative intent manifest that the provision is intended to cover detention in prison during trial under provisions of any law including the criminal procedure code. As rightly pointed out by the Division Bench of the High Court, the word trial cannot be given a fixed meaning as is to be understood from the Criminal Procedure Code and the word trial has to be given the meaning as is to be understood from the law applicable to the trial in question during which the holder of the elected office has been detained. 58. This apart, the word trial has not been expressly defined in Criminal Procedure Code. The word, in my view, should not be given a restrictive meaning to include only proceedings after the accused is actually arraigned before the competent Court for framing and facing the charge. In arriving at the said conclusion, the High Court has placed reliance on many judgments cited before it. 59. The High Court has rightly held that the detention in ja ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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