TMI Blog2020 (1) TMI 1595X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the Act. Accordingly, without going into the merits of the case, the application deserves to be rejected as not admissible in terms of first proviso to section 98(2) of the Act. Appeal dismissed. - MP/AAAR/04/2020 - - - Dated:- 14-1-2020 - SHRI V.K. SAXENA, AND SHRI RAGHWENDRA KUMAR SINGH, MEMBER PROCEEDINGS (Under section 101 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 and the Madhya Pradesh Goods and Services Tax Act,2017) 1. At the outset, we would like to make it clear that the provisions of both the CGST Act and the MPGST Act are similar except for certain specific provisions. Therefore, unless a specific mention is made to such dissimilar provisions, a reference to the CGST Act would mean a reference to the si ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... s proceedings in the matter of classification of flavored milk. It has been mentioned that the summons were issued to the appellant on 15.07.2019 for appearance on 18.07.2019. And during currency of inquiry the appellant have preferred this application for advance ruling. It has accordingly been pointed out that the application is hit by provisions of section 98(2) of the CGST Act 2017 as the matter is already pending before DGGI. 5. The application filed by the applicant was rejected by the Authority of Advance Ruling. QUESTIONS RAISED BEFORE THE APPELLATE AUTHOURITY- Whether flavored milk is taxable at the rate of 5 %under schedule IV of the CGST Act ? GROUNDS OF APPEAL- The appellant being aggrieved with such an or ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... initiated an investigation on the impugned subject. There was nothing in record to suggest that the appellant was explicitly informed on the matter as has reportedly been communicate by the DGGI to the Ld. AAR. (b) That, rather, from the summon, and the appearance before DGGI it appeared to the appellant that the DOG! themselves were unsure of the classification of 'flavored milk'. (c) That, therefore, the appellant company decided to go for a ruling from the appropriate authority, as provided under the Act. (d) That, hence, the DGGI alleging having started an enquiry is far fetched and smacks revenue bias. This is evident from the fact that in the summon itself the DGGI has asked for the manufacturing process of flav ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... h unsubstantiated unilateral averment is redundant in the impugned proceeding. 2. That, the appellant submits, at no point in the purported enquiry the DGGI has explicitly informed the appellant about the purpose an intent of the enquiry. It was the appellant who only presumed of such an intent of the DGGI. Therefore, it was not prudent and possible on the part of the appellant to furnish such information, merely on a presumptive basis. Hence, the motive of the appellant as subscribed vide para - 6.3 of the order is incorrect and misplaced. On the contrary, the appellant themselves had decided to move the impugned application to the proper authority under the Act to have authoritative and binding pronouncement. As such, it was the appell ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... covered under section 97(2)(a). However, we also take a note of the letter of the Joint Director DGGI, where in it has been informed that the enquiry on this issue had been initiated by DGGI prior to filing of instant application. 3. At the time of personal hearing, the authorized representative of the appellant also confirmed that they were in receipt of summons issued by DGGI in this matter and the application before AAR had been preferred subsequent to initiation of proceedings at DGGI Bhopal. Although it was incumbent upon the appellant to disclose this fact in the application. In fact, the appellant have intentionally avoided disclosing this fact in the application just to avoid the provisions of section 98(2). 4. First proviso ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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