TMI Blog2022 (9) TMI 1024X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ld. Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) National Faceless Appeal Centre (NFAC) in appeal No.NFAC/2012-13/10047066, NFAC/2012-13/10047067 NFAC/2012-13/10047068 NFAC/2012-13/10047069 dated 13/05/2022 (ld. CIT(A) in short) against the order of assessment passed u/s.154 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as Act) dated 23/04/2021 by the ld. Income Tax Officer, TDS, TDS Ward, Kalyan (hereinafter referred to as ld. AO). Identical issues are involved in all these appeals and hence they are taken up together and disposed of by this common order for the sake of convenience. 2. The only identical issue to be decided in this appeal is as to whether the ld. CIT(A), NFAC was justified in confirming the rectification order passed by the ld. AO u/s 154 of the Act by levying fees u/s 234E of the Act and consequentially interest u/s 220(2) of the Act in the facts and circumstances of the case. 3. We have heard the rival submissions and perused the materials available on record. We find that assessee was a practicing chartered accountant of a proprietory concern M/s Thar and Co. The assessee was required to file his quarterly TDS returns for quarters 2 and 3 in Form 24Q ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... aded that the interest u/s 220(2) of the Act was also liable to be cancelled. 6. The ld. CIT(A), NFAC observed that section 200A of the Act was inserted by the Finance Act 2009 with effect from 1.4.2010. This section provided for two kinds of adjustments in computation of TDS, namely, any arithmetic error, or any incorrect claim apparent from information in the TDS statements. Section 234E of the Act was inserted in the statute by the Finance Act 2012 and came into effect from 1.7.2012 which provided that in case of failure to deliver the TDS statement within the time prescribed u/s 200(3) of the Act , a person shall be liable to pay a fee amounting to Rs 200/- for every day during which the failure continues, subject to not exceeding the amount of tax deductible. The ld. CIT(A), NFAC observed that section 200A of the Act has been subsequently amended by Finance Act 2015 with effect from 1.6.2015 wherein 2 new clauses (c ) and (d) were inserted bringing clarification that during processing of a TDS statement, the fee, if any, shall be computed in accordance with the provisions of section 234E of the Act. There were contrary views on the disputed issue by the various High Courts. ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... urt was stated to be followed in by same court in its subsequent decision dated 12/12/2017 rendered in Writ Petition No. 618/2015 filed by Shree Ayappa Educational Charitable Trust. However, it was also pointed out that there was a conflicting decision by Hon ble Gujarat High Court in Rajesh Kourani V/s Union of India (297 CTR 502 20/06/2017) wherein it was held that Section 234E was a charging provision creating a charge for levy of fees for defaults in filing of TDS statements and the same could be levied even without a regulatory provision being found in Section 200A for computation of fees. In the above background, it was submitted that in case of conflicting judgement of two non-jurisdictional High Courts, the view favorable to the assessee should be taken in terms of the decision of Hon ble Supreme Court rendered in CIT V/s Vegetable products Ltd. (1972 88 ITR 192). 2.2.The learned CIT(A), going by the law of stare decisis as explained by Hon ble Bombay High Court in CIT V/s Thana Electric Supply Ltd. (206 ITR 727) concluded that in case of conflicting decisions of co-ordinate jurisdiction, the later decision is to be preferred if it was reached after full consideration ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... S and for the period in question, the relevant dates for filing of such statement is as follows: (i) 30th June - 15th July of the financial year; (ii) 30th September - 15th October of the financial year; (iii) 31st December - 15th January of the financial year; and (iv) 31st March - 15th May of the following financial year. 9. It may be recorded that Section 200(3) requiring to file formal TDS statement within the aforesaid each quarter was inserted on 1.4.2005 and at the relevant point of time, Section 272A(2)(k) provided for the penalty of Rs.100/- per day for each day of default in filing TDS statement and such provision also came to be inserted with effect from 1.4.2005. On 1.4.2010, Section 200A was inserted providing for the processing of the TDS statement and the consequent issuance of the intimation to the deductor, the same determined as payable by it or refundable by it. But, the relevant aspect is that, in initial provisions of Section 200A, there was no reference for fee payable under Section 234E. 10. On 1.7.2012, Section 234E providing for levying of fee of Rs.200/- per day for each day of default in filing TDS statement was inserted. Sec ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... hich shall not be less than ten thousand rupees but which may extend to one lakh rupees. (3) Notwithstanding anything contained in the foregoing provisions of this section, no penalty shall be levied for the failure referred to in clause (a) of sub-section (1), if the person proves that after paying tax deducted or collected along with the fee and interest, if any, to the credit of the Central Government, he had delivered or cause to be delivered the statement referred to in sub section (3) of section 200 or the proviso to sub-section (3) of section 206C before the expiry of a period of one year from the time prescribed for delivering or causing to be delivered such statement. (4) The provisions of this section shall apply to a statement referred to in sub-section (3) of section 200 or the proviso to sub section (3) of section 206C which is to be delivered or caused to be delivered for tax deducted at source or tax collected at source, as the case may be, on or after the 1st day of July, 2012. 12. On 1.6.2015, clauses (c) to (f) came to be substituted under Section 200A providing that the fee under Section 234E can be computed at the time of processing of the return ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ucted at source to expeditiously determine the tax payable by, or the refund due to, the deductor as required under the said sub-section. 13.When the returns for TDS filed by the respective appellant-petitioners were processed in purported exercise of the power under Section 200A, the amount of fee under Section 234E is computed and determined. The demand is made and the intimation given under Section 200A includes the computation and the determination of the fee payable by the appellant-petitioners. 14.We may now deal with the contentions raised by the learned counsel for the appellants. The first contention for assailing the legality and validity of the intimation under Section 200A was that, the provision of Section 200A(1)(c), (d) and (f) have come into force only with effect from 1.6.2015 and hence, there was no authority or competence or jurisdiction on the part of the concerned Officer or the Department to compute and determine the fee under Section 234E in respect of the assessment year of the earlier period and the return filed for the said respective assessment years namely all assessment years and the returns prior to 1.6.2015. It was submitted that, when no e ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ter paying TDS with the fee and interest the amount is credited and he had delivered or caused to deliver the statement within one year from the time prescribed for submission of the said statement. To put it in other words, for failure to submit the statements, the penalty provided under Section 271(1)(a) cannot be imposed if the deductor complies with the requirement of sub-section (3) of Section 271H. Hence, it can be said that the fee provided under Section 234E would take out from the rigors of penalty under Section 271H but of course subject to the outer limit of one year as prescribed under sub-section (3) of Section 271H. It can also be said that when the Parliament intended to insert the provisions of Section 234E providing for fee simultaneously the utility of such fee was for conferring the privilege to the defaulter-deductor to come out from the rigors of penal provision of Section 271H. Be it recorded that, prior to Section 271H of the Act inserted in the statute book, the enforceability of requirement to file return under Section 200(3) and Section 206C(3) was by virtue of Section 272A(2)(k) of the Act which provided for the penalty of Rs.100/- per day for each day of ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ons 206 and 206C and 71 [statements under sub-section (2A) or sub section (3) of section 200 or the proviso to sub-section (3) or under sub-section (3A) of section 206C] shall not exceed the amount of tax deductible or collectible, as the case may be: Provided further that no penalty shall be levied under this section for the failure referred to in clause (k), if such failure relates to a statement referred to in sub-section (3) of section 200 or the proviso to sub-section (3) of section 206C which is to be delivered or caused to be delivered for tax deducted at source or tax collected at source, as the case may be, on or after the 1st day of July, 2012. ******* 18.The aforesaid shows that in the clause (k) if the said failure relates to a statement referred to in sub-section (3) of Section 200 or the sub-section (3) of Section 206C, no penalty shall be imposed for TDS after 01.07.2012. 19.Hence, it can be said that, the mechanism provided for enforceability of Section 200(3) or 206C (3) for filing of the statement by making it penal under Section 272A (2 (k) is done away in view of the insertion of Section 271H providing for penal provision for such failure to s ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... when the fee was provided under Section 234E, the Parliament also provided for its utility for giving privilege under Section 271H(3) that too by expressly put bar for penalty under Section 272A by insertion of proviso to Section 272A(2), it can be said that a particular set up for imposition and the payment of fee under Section 234E was provided but, it did not provide for making of demand of such fee under Section 200A payable under Section 234E. Hence, considering the aforesaid peculiar facts and circumstances, we are unable to accept the contention of the learned counsel for respondent-Revenue that insertion of clause (c) to (f) under Section 200A(1) should be treated as retroactive in character and not prospective. 22. It is hardly required to be stated that, as per the well established principles of interpretation of statute, unless it is expressly provided or impliedly demonstrated, any provision of statute is to be read as having prospective effect and not retrospective effect. Under the circumstances, we find that substitution made by clause (c) to (f) of sub-section (1) of Section 200A can be read as having prospective effect and not having retroactive character or e ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... hat the question of further scrutiny for testing the constitutional validity of Section 234E would be rendered as an academic exercise because there would not be any cause on the part of the petitioners to continue to maintain the challenge to constitutional validity under Section 234E of the Act. At this stage, we may also record that the learned counsels appearing for the appellant had also declared that if the impugned notices under Section 200A are set aside, so far as it relates to computation and intimation for payment of fee under Section 234E, the appellant- petitioners would not press the challenge to the constitutional validity of Section 234E of the Act. But, they submitted that the question of constitutional validity of Section 234E may be kept open to be considered by the Division Bench and the Judgment of the learned Single Judge may not conclude the constitutional validity of Section 234E of the Act. 26.Under these circumstances, we find that no further discussion would be required for examining the constitutional validity of Section 234E of the Act. Save and except to observe that the question of constitutional validity of Section 234E of the Act before the Div ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... atement filed by person deducting the tax. Prior to 01.06.2015, this provision did not contain any reference to the adjustment of fee to be computed in accordance with the provisions of section 234E of the Act. This provision was made only with effect from 01.06.2015. 5. In the petition, the petitioner has raised following threefold grievances: I. That section 234E of the Act is ultra-vires and unconstitutional. II. Rule 31A of the Rules insofar as it prescribes longer period for the Government to file the statements as compared to the other assessees is discriminatory and arbitrary and therefore unconstitutional. III. Prior to 01.06.2015, section 200A did not authorize the Assessing Officer to make adjustment of the fee to be levied under section 234E of the Act. This provision introduced with effect from 01.03.2016 is not retrospective and therefore, for the period between 01.07.2002 i.e. when section 234E was introduced in the Act and 01.06.2015 when proper mechanism was provided under section 200A of the Act for collection of fee, the department could not have charged such fee. 6. Appearing for the petitioner, learned advocate Shri Parth Contractor at t ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... asonable classification. 9. With respect to the amendment in section 200A, counsel submitted that the charging provision is section 200E of the Act. Section 200A merely provides a mechanism. Such a provision cannot govern the charging provision. Even in absence of amendment in section 200A, the Assessing Officer was always authorized to levy fee in terms of section 200E of the Act. At best, the amendment in the said provision should be seen as clarificatory or providing a mechanism which till then was missing. Counsel referred to the decision of Rajasthan High Court in case of Dundlod Shikshan Sansthan v. Union of India [2015] 63 taxmann.com 243/235 Taxman 446 (Raj.), where, in the context of challenge to the vires to the section 234E of the Act, incidentally this issue also came up for consideration. 10. In order to appreciate the rival contentions, we may take a closer look at the statutory provisions applicable. Section 200 of the Act pertains to duty of the person deducting tax and imposes a duty on a person deducting tax in accordance with the foregoing provisions of chapter-XVII to pay such sum to the credit of the Central Government within the time prescribed. Sub- ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... quired to be filed under sub-section (3) of section 200 or under proviso to sub-section (3) of section 206C of the Act. As per sub-section (2) of section 271H in case of default to file the statements, the assessee may be liable to penalty of not less than rupees ten thousand but not more than rupees one lakh. Under sub-section (3) of section 271H however, such penalty would be avoided if the assessee proves that he had paid the tax deducted or collected alongwith interest and he had filed the necessary statement within one year from the time prescribed for filing such statements. We may also record that clause (k) of sub-section (2) of section 272A provides for penalty for failure to deliver the statement within the time specified in sub-section (3) of section 200 or the proviso to sub-section (3) of section 206C at a rate of rupees one hundred for every date during which the failure continues. However, with effect from 01.07.2012, a proviso was added limiting the effect of this provision upto 01.07.2012. In other words, after 01.07.2012, the penalty provision of section 271H would apply in such cases of defaults. 14. Section 200A(1) of the Act prior to 01.06.2015 provided as ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... amended. In the amended form, the same provision reads as under: Section 200A(1) Processing of statements of tax deducted at source. 200A. (1) Where a statement of tax deduction at source [or a correction statement] has been made by a person deducting any sum (hereafter referred to in this section as deductor) under section 200, such statement shall be processed in the following manner, namely:- (a) the sums deductible under this Chapter shall be computed after making the following adjustments, namely:- (i) any arithmetical error in the statement; or (ii) an incorrect claim, apparent from any information in the statement; (b) the interest, if any, shall be computed on the basis of the sums deductible as computed in the statement; (c) the fee, if any, shall be computed in accordance with the provisions of section 234E; (d) the sum payable by, or the amount of refund due to, the deductor shall be determined after adjustment of the amount computed under clause (b) and clause (c) against any amount paid under section 200 or section 201 or section 234E and any amount paid otherwise by way of tax or interest or fee; (e) an intimation shall be ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... 30th June 31st July of the financial year 15th July of the financial year 2 30th September 31st October of the financial year 15th October of the financial year 3 31st December 31st January of the financial year 15th January of the financial year 4 31st March 15th May of the financial year immediately following the financial year in which the deduction is made 15th May of the financial year immediately following the financial year in which the deduction is made This rule thus, while laying down the last date by which such statements should be filed, draws two categories; in case of deductor is an office of government and in case of a deductor is a person other than the office of the government. Consistently, the office of the government is granted 15 days extra time as compared to the other deductors. For example, the statement for the date of the quarter ending on 30th June, an o ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... furnish the statements. Such penalty would be in the range of Rs.10,000/- and Rs.1 lakh. No penalty would be imposed if the tax is deposited with fee and interest and the statement is filed within one year of the due date. With addition to these two provisions prescribing fee and penalty respectively, clause (k) of sub-section (2) of section 272A became redundant and by adding a proviso to the said section, this effect was therefore limited upto 01.07.2012. 17. In essence, section 234E thus prescribed for the first time charging of a fee for every day of default in filing of statement under sub-section (3) of section 200 or any proviso to sub-section (3) of section 206C. This provision was apparently added for making the compliance of deduction and collection of tax at source, depositing it with Government revenue and filing of the statements more stringent. 18. In this context, we may notice that section 200A which pertains to processing of statements of tax deducted at source provides for the procedure once a statement of deduction of tax at source is filed by the person responsible to do so and authorizes the Assessing Officer to make certain adjustments which are prim ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ion 200A would be in nature of clarificatory amendment. Even in absence of such provision, as noted, it was always open for the Revenue to charge the fee in terms of section 234E of the Act. By amendment, this adjustment was brought within the fold of section 200A of the Act. This would have one direct effect. An order passed under section 200A of the Act is rectifiable under section 154 of the Act and is also appealable under section 246A. In absence of the power of authority to make such adjustment under section 200A of the Act, any calculation of the fee would not partake the character of the intimation under said provision and it could be argued that such an order would not be open to any rectification or appeal. Upon introduction of the recasted clause (c), this situation also would be obviated. Even prior to 01.06.2015, it was always open for the Revenue to calculate fee in terms of section 234E of the Act. The Karnataka High Court in case of Fatheraj Singhvi (supra) held that section 200A was not merely a regulatory provision, but was conferring substantive power on the authority. The Court was also of the opinion that section 234E of the Act was in the nature of privilege t ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the assessee, we find that before taking up the issue involved in the question of law referred to us in this case for consideration, it is necessary to first decide the last submission of learned counsel that this court, while interpreting an all-India statute like the Income-tax Act, is bound to follow the decision of any other High Court and to decide accordingly even if its own view is contrary thereto, in view of the practice followed by this court in such matters. Because, if we are to accept this submission, it will be an exercise in futility to examine the real controversy before us with a view to decide the issue, as in that case in view of the Calcutta decision whatever may be our decision on the question of law referred to us, we would be bound to follow the decision of the Calcutta High Court and answer the question accordingly. This submission, in our opinion, is not tenable as it goes counter not only to the powers of this court to hear the reference and decide the questions of law raised therein and to deliver its judgment thereon but also to the doctrine of binding precedent known as stare decisis. We shall deal with the reasons for the same at some length a little l ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the decision of one High Court is not a binding precedent on another High Court. The Supreme Court in Vattiama Champaka Pillai v. Sivathanu Pillai, AIR 1979 SC 1937, dealing with the controversy whether a decision of the erstwhile Travancore High Court can be made a binding precedent on the Madras High Court on the basis of the principle of stare decisis, clearly held that such a decision can at best have persuasive effect and not the force of binding precedent on the Madras High Court. Referring to the States Reorganisation Act, it was observed that there was nothing in the said Act or any other law which exalts the ratio of those decisions to the status of a binding law nor could the ratio decidendi of those decisions be perpetuated by invoking the doctrine of stare decisis. The doctrine of stare decisis cannot be stretched that far as to make the decision of one High Court a binding precedent for the other. This doctrine is applicable only to different Benches of the same High Court. It is also well-settled that though there is no specific provision making the law declared by the High Court binding on subordinate courts, it is implicit in the power of supervision conferred ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ving decided whose decision binds whom, we may next examine what is binding. It is well-settled that it is only the ratio decidendi that has a precedent value. As observed by the Supreme Court in S.P. Gupta v. President of India, AIR 1982 SC 149 (at page 231) : It is elementary that what is binding on the court in a subsequent case is not the conclusion arrived at in a previous decision, but the ratio of that decision, for it is the ratio which binds as a precedent and not the conclusion. A case is only an authority for what it actually decides and not what may come to follow logically from it. Judgments of courts are not to be construed as statutes (see Amar Nath Om Parkash v. State of Punjab, AIR 1985 SC 218; [1985] 1 SCC 345). While following precedents, the court should keep in mind the following observations in Mumbai Kamgar Sabha v. Abdulbhai Faizullabhai [1976] 49 FJR 15, 32 ; AIR 1976 SC 1455 (at pages 1467-68) : It is trite, going by Anglophonic principles, that a ruling of a superior court is binding law. It is not of scriptural sanctity but is of ratiowise luminosity within the edifice of facts where the judicial lamp plays the legal flame. Beyond those wall ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ment, divorced from the context of the questions under consideration by this court, to support their reasoning. In the above decision, the Supreme Court, also quoted with approval, the following note of caution given by it earlier in Madhav Rao Jivaji Rao Scindia Bahadur v. Union of India, AIR 1971 SC 530, at page 578 (at page 320 of 198 ITR) : It is not proper to regard a word, a clause or a sentence occurring in a judgment of the Supreme Court, divorced from its context, as containing a full exposition of the law on a question when the question did not even fall to be answered in that judgment. It is thus clear that it is only the ratio decidendi of a case which can be binding-not obiter dictum. Obiter, at best, may have some persuasive efficacy. From the foregoing discussion, the following propositions emerge : (a) The law declared by the Supreme Court being binding on all courts in India, the decisions of the Supreme Court are binding on all courts, except, however, the Supreme Court itself which is free to review the same and depart from its earlier opinion if the situation so warrants. What is binding is, of course, the ratio of the decision and no ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... scope and ambit thereof. The fact that there is only one decision of any one High Court on a particular point or that a number of different High Courts have taken identical views in that regard is not at all relevant for that purpose. Whatever may be the conclusion, the decisions cannot have the force of binding precedent on other High Courts or on any subordinate courts or Tribunals within their jurisdiction. That status is reserved only for the decisions of the Supreme Court which are binding on all courts in the country by virtue of article 141 of the Constitution. However, upon perusal, we note that the observation that decision in later point of time has to be followed has been made in the context of decisions rendered by different benches of same High Court and the said observation do not apply in case of conflicting decisions of two non-jurisdictional High Court. 3.6. Proceeding further, we find that Pune bench of Tribunal in its recent decision tiled as Medical Superintendent Rural Hospital, DOBI, BK V/s DCIT (100 Taxmnan.com 78 25/10/2018), faced with similar factual matrix, chose to follow the favorable decision rendered by Hon ble Karnataka High Court by drawing ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... une - Trib.) and also in Swami Vivekanand Vidyalaya (supra) and Medical Superintendant Rural Hospital v. ACIT [IT Appeal Nos.2072 2073 (PUN) of 2017, order dated 21-12-2017], which has been relied upon by the learned Authorized Representative for the assessee. 13. The Hon'ble High Court of Karnataka in the case of Fatheraj Singhvi (supra) had also laid down similar proposition that the amendment to section 200A of the Act w.e.f. 01.06.2015 has prospective effect and is not applicable for the period of respective assessment years prior to 01.06.2015. The relevant findings of the Hon'ble High Court are in paras 21 and 22, which read as under:- 21. However, if Section 234E providing for fee was brought on the state book, keeping in view the aforesaid purpose and the intention then, the other mechanism provided for computation of fee and failure for payment of fee under Section 200A which has been brought about with effect from 1.6.2015 cannot be said as only by way of a regulatory mode or a regulatory mechanism but it can rather be termed as conferring substantive power upon the authority. It is true that, a regulatory mechanism by insertion of any provision made ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the fee after intimation received under Section 200A, the aforesaid view will not permit the deductor to reopen the said question unless he has made payment under protest. 14. The Hon'ble High Court thus held that where the impugned notices given by Revenue Department under section 200A of the Act were for the period prior to 01.06.2015, then same were illegal and invalid. Vide para 27, it was further held that the impugned notices under section 200A of the Act were for computation and intimation for payment of fees under section 234E of the Act as they relate for the period of tax deducted at source prior to 01.06.2015 were being set aside. 15. In other words, the Hon'ble High Court of Karnataka explained the position of charging of late filing fees under section 234E of the Act and the mechanism provided for computation of fees and failure for payment of fees under section 200A of the Act which was brought on Statute w.e.f. 01.06.2015. The said amendment was held to be prospective in nature and hence, notices issued under section 200A of the Act for computation and intimation for payment of late filing fees under section 234E of the Act relating to the period o ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... has failed to take into consideration the settled law that where there is difference of opinion between different High Courts on an issue, then the one in favour of assessee needs to be followed as held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Vegetable Products Ltd. (supra), in the absence of any decision rendered by the jurisdictional High Court. The Hon'ble Bombay High Court in Rashmikant Kundalia v. Union of India [2015] 54 taxmann.com 200 had decided the constitutional validity of provisions of section 234E of the Act and had held them to be ultra vires but had not decided the second issue of amendment brought to section 200A of the Act w.e.f. 01.06.2015. In view thereof, respectfully following the ratio laid down by the Hon'ble High Court of Karnataka and Pune Bench of Tribunal in series of cases, we delete the late filing fees charged under section 234E of the Act for the TDS returns for the period prior to 01.06.2015. 18. Further before parting, we may also refer to the order of CIT(A) in the case of Junagade Healthcare Pvt. Ltd., where the CIT(A) had dismissed appeals of assessee being delayed for period of December, 2013 and July, 2014. The CIT(A) while computing ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ee are allowed. As rightly observed by co-ordinate bench in para-17, the decision of Hon ble Bombay High Court in Rashmikant Kundalia v. Union of India [2015] 54 taxmann.com 200 deal only with examining the constitutional validity of provisions of section 234E of the Act and do not deal with effect of amendment in Section 200A w.e.f. 01.06.2015. Therefore, respectfully following the aforesaid view of co-ordinate bench of Pune Tribunal, we hold that view favorable to the assessee was to be adopted and therefore, the levy of fees u/s 234E for any period prior to 01/06/2015 would not be sustainable in the eyes of law. We order so. 4. In the result, the appeal stands allowed to the extent indicated in the order. 7.We find that factual matrix to be identical in the present appeals. Undisputedly, the TDS returns have been processed before 01/06/2015 which is evident from the fact that impugned order is dated 14/05/2015. Therefore, drawing analogy from the decision of Hon ble Supreme Court rendered in CIT V/s Vegetable products Ltd. (1972 88 ITR 192), we prefer to follow the decision of Hon ble Karnataka High Court rendered in Fatehraj Singhvi V/s Union of India (73 Taxmann ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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