TMI Blog2022 (10) TMI 464X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... are wide, the order impugned before it could not be brought within the scope of this Court s jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari under Article 32. A Nine Judge Constitution Bench of this Court in the case of K.S. Puttaswamy and another [ 2017 (8) TMI 938 - SUPREME COURT] has held that the right to privacy is a fundamental right. No doubt that the right to information is also a fundamental right. In case of such a conflict, the Court is required to achieve a sense of balance. A perusal of the judgments of this Court cited supra would reveal that it has been held that though the concept of finality of judgment has to be preserved, at the same time, the principle of ex debito justitiae cannot be given a go bye. If the Court finds that the earlier judgment does not lay down a correct position of law, it is always permissible for this Court to reconsider the same and if necessary, to refer it to a larger Bench. It has been held that this being the apex court, no litigant has any opportunity of approaching any higher forum to question its decisions. It has further been held that once a judicial satisfaction is reached that the direction was not open to be made and it is ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... he respondent Reserve Bank of India (hereinafter referred to as RBI ) in directing disclosure of confidential and sensitive information pertaining to their affairs, their employees and their customers under the Right to Information Act, 2005 (hereinafter referred to as the RTI Act ), which, in their submission, is otherwise exempt under Section 8 thereof. 3. We are treating Writ Petition (Civil) No. 1159 of 2019 as the lead matter. 4. Interlocutory Applications being I.A. No. 51632 of 2022 in Writ Petition (Civil) No.1159 of 2019 and I.A. No.54521 of 2022 in Writ Petition (Civil) No.683 of 2021 have been filed by the applicant Girish Mittal, thereby seeking dismissal of the present writ petitions. 5. It is the contention of the applicant that the present writ petitions, in effect, are challenging the final judgment and order dated 16th December 2015, passed by this Court in the case of Reserve Bank of India vs. Jayantilal N. Mistry (2016) 3 SCC 525 and hence the same is not maintainable and is liable to be dismissed. 6. We have heard Mr. Prashant Bhushan, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the applicant Girish Mittal and Mr. Rakesh Dwivedi, Mr. Mukul Rohatgi, ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... (supra), several Miscellaneous Applications were filed on behalf of the Banks for impleadment. As such, the judgment delivered in the case of Jayantilal N. Mistry (supra) is after consideration of rival submissions, which now cannot be reopened. He further submitted that this Court by order dated 28th April 2021, passed in M.A. No.2342 of 2019 in Transferred Case (Civil) No.91 of 2015 and other connected matters has specifically rejected the prayer filed by the Banks (writ petitioners herein) for recall of the judgment dated 16th December 2015 passed by this Court in the case of Jayantilal N. Mistry (supra), and as such, the present writ petitions are liable to be dismissed. 12. Per contra, the learned Senior Counsels appearing on behalf of the writ petitioners/Banks submit that though M.A. No.2342 of 2019 in Transferred Case (Civil) No.91 of 2015 and other connected matters were rejected by this Court by order dated 28th April 2021, this Court clarified that the dismissal of those applications shall not prevent the applicant Banks therein to pursue other remedies available to them in law. It is thus submitted that the said order would not come in the way of the present petitio ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... f the inspection carried out under Section 35 of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 are so confidential that they cannot even be provided to the Directors individually. He relies on the communication issued by the RBI to all the Banks dated 14th March 1998 in this regard. 17. Mr. Rohatgi further submitted that an earlier policy as notified by the RBI on 30th June 1992 was in tune with the provisions of Section 8 of the RTI Act, the provisions of the Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934 (hereinafter referred to as the RBI Act ) and the Banking Regulation Act, 1949. However, in view of the judgment of this Court in the case of Girish Mittal (supra), the RBI has modified the policy into a one line policy, providing therein that the disclosure of information was to be in accordance with the judgment and order of this Court in Girish Mittal (supra). Mr. Rohatgi, learned Senior Counsel relied on the judgment of this Court in the case of Bihar Public Service Commission vs. Saiyed Hussain Abbas Rizwi and another (2012) 13 SCC 61 in support of his submission that the Court will have to strike a balance between public interest and private interest. He also relies on the judgment of this Cou ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... writ petitions. It is submitted by learned Senior Counsels appearing on behalf of the writ petitioners/Banks that this Court in Jayantilal N. Mistry (supra) does not notice the judgment of this Court in the case of Supreme Court Advocates on Record Association and another (supra). The judgment of this Court in the case of Supreme Court Advocates on Record Association and another (supra) was rendered on 16th October 2015, whereas the judgment of this Court in the case of Jayantilal N. Mistry (supra) was rendered on 16th December 2015. It is further submitted that, in view of the judgment of the Constitution Bench consisting of Nine Hon ble Judges in the case of K.S. Puttaswamy and another (supra) clearly recognizing the right to privacy as a fundamental right, the law laid down by this Court in the case of Jayantilal N. Mistry (supra) to the contrary is no more a good law and, therefore, requires reconsideration by a larger Bench. 22. In the case of Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar and others (supra), a Nine Judge Constitution Bench of this Court was considering as to whether an order passed by the High Court on original side in the proceedings before it could be challenged under Article ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... further been held that since the order was passed in the proceedings pending before the High Court, the correctness of the impugned order could be challenged only by appeal and not by writ proceedings. It has been further held that, having regard to the fact that the order had been passed by a superior court of record in the exercise of its inherent powers, the question about the existence of the said jurisdiction as well as the validity or propriety of the order could not be raised in writ proceedings taken out by the petitioners for the issue of a writ of certiorari under Article 32. This Court further observed thus: We are, therefore, satisfied that so far as the jurisdiction of this Court to issue writs of certiorari is concerned, it is impossible to accept the argument of the petitioners that judicial orders passed by High Courts in or in relation to proceedings pending before them, are amenable to be corrected by exercise of the said jurisdiction. We have no doubt that it would be unreasonable to attempt to rationalise the assumption of jurisdiction by this Court under Article 32 to correct such judicial orders on the fanciful hypothesis that High Courts may pass extrav ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... . Sharma and others (supra) is concerned, in the said case, the first round of litigation arising out of termination of respondent employee had reached finality upto this Court. However, the same was sought to be reopened by filing another writ petition before the High Court. In this background, this Court observed thus: 90. Violation of fundamental rights guaranteed under the Constitution have to be protected, but at the same time, it is the duty of the court to ensure that the decisions rendered by the court are not overturned frequently, that too, when challenged collaterally as that was directly affecting the basic structure of the Constitution incorporating the power of judicial review of this Court. There is no doubt that this Court has an extensive power to correct an error or to review its decision but that cannot be done at the cost of doctrine of finality. An issue of law can be overruled later on, but a question of fact or, as in the present case, the dispute with regard to the termination of services cannot be reopened once it has been finally sealed in proceedings inter se between the parties up to this Court way back in 1980. 28. It could thus be seen that t ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... n Law, p. 5), and again when he declared in another study (Oliver Wendell Holmes : Common Carriers and the Common Law, (1943) 9 Curr LT 387, 388) that the law is forever adopting new principles from life at one end , and sloughing off old ones at the other. Explaining the conceptual import of what Holmes had said, Julius Stone elaborated that it is by the introduction of new extra legal propositions emerging from experience to serve as premises, or by experience guided choice between competing legal propositions, rather than by the operation of logic upon existing legal propositions, that the growth of law tends to be determined (Julius Stone : Legal Systems Lawyers Reasoning, pp. 58 59). 42. The concern of this Court for rendering justice in a cause is not less important than the principle of finality of its judgment. We are faced with competing principles - ensuring certainty and finality of a judgment of the Court of last resort and dispensing justice on reconsideration of a judgment on the ground that it is vitiated being in violation of the principles of natural justice or giving scope for apprehension of bias due to a Judge who participated in the decision-making p ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... judgments in exercise of its inherent power. 31. This Court in the case of A.R. Antulay (supra), speaking through Sabyasachi Mukharji, J. observed thus: 82. Lord Cairns in Rodger v. Comptoir D'escompte De Paris [(1869 71) LR 3 PC 465, 475 : 17 ER 120] observed thus: Now, Their Lordships are of opinion, that one of the first and highest duties of all courts is to take care that the act of the court does no injury to any of the suitors, and when the expression the act of the court is used, it does not mean merely the act of the primary court, or of any intermediate court of appeal, but the act of the court as a whole, from the lowest court which entertains jurisdiction over the matter up to the highest court which finally disposes of the case. It is the duty of the aggregate of those Tribunals, if I may use the expression, to take care that no act of the court in the course of the whole of the proceedings does an injury to the suitors in the court. 83. This passage was quoted in the Gujarat High Court by D.A. Desai, J., speaking for the Gujarat High Court in Soni Vrajlal v. Soni Jadavji [AIR 1972 Guj 148 : (1972) 13 Guj LR 555] as mentioned before. It ap ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e direction was not open to be made and it is accepted as a mistake of the court, it is not only appropriate but also the duty of the court to rectify the mistake by exercising inherent powers. Judicial opinion heavily leans in favour of this view that a mistake of the court can be corrected by the court itself without any fetters. This is on the principle as indicated in ( Alexander) Rodger case [(1969 71) LR 3 PC 465 : 17 ER 120]. I am of the view that in the present situation, the court's inherent powers can be exercised to remedy the mistake. Mahajan., J. speaking for a Four Judge Bench in Keshardeo Chamria v. Radha Kissen Chamria [1953 SCR 136 : AIR 1953 SC 23] at Page 153 stated: The judge had jurisdiction to correct his own error without entering into a discussion of the grounds taken by the decree holder or the objections raised by the judgment debtors. 103. The Privy Council in Debi Bakhsh Singh v. Habib Shah [ILR (1913) 35 All 331] pointed out that an abuse of the process of the court may be committed by the court or by a party. Where a court employed a procedure in doing something which it never intended to do and there is an abuse of the process of the ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... to mould the relief to do complete justice in the matter. It is the ratio decidendi of a judgment and not the final order in the judgment, which forms a precedent. The term judgment and decision are used, rather loosely, to refer to the entire judgment or the final order or the ratio decidendi of a judgment. Rupa Ashok Hurra [(2002) 4 SCC 388] is of course, an authority for the proposition that a petition under Article 32 would not be maintainable to challenge or set aside or quash the final order contained in a judgment of this Court. It does not lay down a proposition that the ratio decidendi of any earlier decision cannot be examined or differed in another case. Where violation of a fundamental right of a citizen is alleged in a petition under Article 32, it cannot be dismissed, as not maintainable, merely because it seeks to distinguish or challenge the ratio decidendi of an earlier judgment, except where it is between the same parties and in respect of the same cause of action. Where a legal issue raised in a petition under Article 32 is covered by a decision of this Court, the Court may dismiss the petition following the ratio decidendi of the earlier decision. Such dis ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the petitioners/Banks to pursue other remedies available to them in law. 39. In view of the judgment of this Court in the case of Jayantilal N. Mistry (supra), the RBI is entitled to issue directions to the petitioners/Banks to disclose information even with regard to the individual customers of the Bank. In effect, it may adversely affect the individuals fundamental right to privacy. 40. A Nine Judge Constitution Bench of this Court in the case of K.S. Puttaswamy and another (supra) has held that the right to privacy is a fundamental right. No doubt that the right to information is also a fundamental right. In case of such a conflict, the Court is required to achieve a sense of balance. 41. A perusal of the judgments of this Court cited supra would reveal that it has been held that though the concept of finality of judgment has to be preserved, at the same time, the principle of ex debito justitiae cannot be given a go bye. If the Court finds that the earlier judgment does not lay down a correct position of law, it is always permissible for this Court to reconsider the same and if necessary, to refer it to a larger Bench. 42. Without expressing any final opinion, pri ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
|
