TMI Blog2017 (1) TMI 1810X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... aspects of enforceability of an award entail an accrued right both in the person in whose favour the award is made and against whom the award is pronounced. It will also be noticed that the Supreme Court made it clear that for the right to accrue, there is no necessity that legal proceedings must be pending when the new Act comes into force. The Supreme Court in Thyssen observed that the right to have the award enforced (which also comprises of the negative right of the award debtor to not have it enforced till his objections under Section 34 of the said Act are heard and decided) is certainly an accrued right. Given the fact that the amended Section 36 takes away the right of an automatic stay of enforcement of an award, it is clear that the amendment introduced in Section 36 by virtue of the Amending Act would definitely impinge upon the accrued right of the party against whom the award is given after the arbitral proceedings have been held under the unamended provisions. Since an accrued right is affected, unless a contrary intention appears in the amending statute, the amendments would have to be treated as prospective in operation. Prospective from the standpoint of c ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... FAO (OS) No. 222/2016 - - - Dated:- 6-1-2017 - Hon ble Mr Justice Badar Durrez Ahmed And Hon ble Mr Justice Ashutosh Kumar For the Appellants : Mr. Rajiv Nayar, Senior Advocate with Mr. Saurabh Seth, Mr. Ashok Chhabra and Mohd. Umar Iqbal Khan For the Respondents : Mr. Kirti Uppal, Senior Advocate with Ms. Aastha Dhawan. JUDGMENT BADAR DURREZ AHMED, J 1. These appeals are taken up together as they arise out of the common order dated 31.05.2016 passed in, inter alia , OMP Nos. 7 8 of 2016 which were petitions under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as the said Act ). Those petitions had been filed against an award dated 13.10.2015. The petitions were filed on 04.01.2016. 2. The appellants are aggrieved by the impugned order because the learned single Judge has directed the appellants to deposit a sum of Rs 2.70 crores without prejudice to the rights and contentions of the parties and subject to the deposit being made, it was directed that notice may be treated as issued to the respondents on the objections filed by the petitioners under Section 34 of the said Act. It was also directed that in case the ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... forcement. Where the time for making an application to set aside the arbitral award under section 34 has expired, or such application having been made, it has been refused, the award shall be enforced under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908) in the same manner as if it were a decree of the Court. 36. (1) Where the time for making an application to set aside the arbitral award under section 34 has expired, then, subject to the provisions of sub-section (2), such award shall be enforced in accordance with the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, in the same manner as if it were a decree of the court. (2) Where an application to set aside the arbitral award has been filed in the Court under section 34, the filing of such an application shall not by itself render that award unenforceable, unless the Court grants an order of stay of the operation of the said arbitral award in accordance with the provisions of subsection (3), on a separate application made for that purpose. (3) Upon filing of an application under sub-section (2) for stay of the operation of the arbitral award, the Court may, subject to such conditions as it may deem fit ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e at which the repeal takes effect; or (b) affect the previous operation of any enactment so repealed or anything duly done or suffered thereunder; or (c) affect any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued or incurred under any enactment so repealed; or (d) affect any penalty, forfeiture or punishment incurred in respect of any offence committed against any enactment so repealed; or (e) affect any investigation, legal proceeding or remedy in respect of any such right, privilege, obligation, liability, penalty, forfeiture or punishment as aforesaid, and any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced, and any such penalty, forfeiture or punishment may be imposed as if the repealing Act or Regulation had not been passed. 8. It was submitted in the context of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act that a repeal of an enactment would not affect any right acquired or accrued under the repealed enactment, unless a different intention appears in the repealing Act. It was contended that Section 26 of the Amending Act does not express any intention of retrospective application prior to 23.10.2015. It was furthe ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... existed under the old Section 36. This is so as now a party has to seek a stay by way of an application under Section 36(2) of the new provisions and conditions could be imposed on the parties even where the court grants a stay of the enforcement of the award. 13. It was next contended by the learned counsel for the petitioners that Section 26 of the Amending Act does not indicate any intention of retrospective application of the amended provisions. 14. On behalf of the respondents, it was contended that Section 26 of the Amending Act needs to be compared with Section 85(2)(a) of the said Act. The following table sets out the two provisions:- Comparison of Section 26 of the Amendment Act, 2015 and Section 85(2)(a)of the 1996 Act Section 26 under the 2015 Act Section 85(2)(a) under the 1996 Act Nothing contained in this Act shall apply to the arbitral proceedings commenced, in accordance with the provisions of section 21 of the principal Act, before the commencement of this Act unless the parties otherwise agree but this Act shall apply in relation to arbitral proceedings commenced on or after th ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ment according to the award, and upon the judgment so pronounced a decree shall follow, and no appeal shall lie from such decree except on the ground that it is in excess of, or not otherwise in accordance with the award. ] thereof and also appeal arising thereunder. 3. In cases where arbitral proceedings have commenced before the coming into force of the new Act and are pending before the arbitrator, it is open to the parties to agree that the new Act be applicable to such arbitral proceedings and they can so agree even before the coming into force of the new Act. 4. The new Act would be applicable in relation to arbitral proceedings which commenced on or after the new Act comes into force. 5. Once the arbitral proceedings have commenced, it cannot be stated that the right to be governed by the old Act for enforcement of the award was an inchoate right. It was certainly a right accrued. It is not imperative that for right to accrue to have the award enforced under the old Act some legal proceedings for its enforcement must be pending under that Act at the time the new Act came into force. 6. If a narrow meaning of the phrase in relation to arbitral proceedings ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ime of commencement of the new Act but also the provisions of the old Act for enforcement of the award under that Act. 24 . The contention that if it is accepted that the expression in relation to arbitral proceedings would include proceedings for the enforcement of the award as well, the second limb of Section 85(2)(a) would become superfluous. We do not think that would be so. The second limb also takes into account the arbitration agreement entered into under the old Act when the arbitral proceedings commenced after the coming into force of the new Act. . xxxxx xxxxx xxxxx xxxxx xxxxx 28. Section 85(2)(a) is the saving clause. It exempts the old Act from complete obliteration so far as pending arbitration proceedings are concerned. That would include saving of whole of the old Act up till the time of the enforcement of the award. This (sic Thus) Section 85(2)(a) prevents the accrued right under the old Act from being affected. Saving provision preserves the existing right accrued under the old Act. There is a presumption that the legislature does not intend to limit or take away vested rights unless the language clearly points to the contrary. It is correct t ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... stances is sought to be enforced or set aside under the provisions of the old Act. We, therefore, cannot adopt a construction which would lead to such anomalous situations where the party seeking to have the award set aside finds himself without any remedy. We are, therefore, of the opinion that it would be the provisions of the old Act that would apply to the enforcement of the award in the case of Civil Appeal No. 6036 of 1998. Any other construction on Section 85(2)(a) would only lead to confusion and hardship. This construction put by us is consistent with the wording of Section 85(2)(a) using the terms provision and in relation to arbitral proceedings which would mean that once the arbitral proceedings commenced under the old Act it would be the old Act which would apply for enforcing the award as well. (underlining added) 17. It was contended on behalf of the respondents that a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court in Tufan Chatterjee v. Rangan Dhar : AIR 2016 Cal 213 and the Madras High Court in New Tirupur Area Development Corporation Limited v. Hindustan Construction Company Limited : [ Application No.7674/2015 in O.P. 931/2015 ] have held that since S ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... an automatic stay. 19. For all these reasons, it was contended by the learned counsel for the respondents that no interference with the impugned order was called for and the appeals ought to be dismissed. 20. In rejoinder, it was submitted by the learned counsel for the appellants that the decision of the Calcutta High Court in Tufan Chatterjee (supra) sought to bifurcate the words contained in Section 26 of the Amending Act inasmuch as it distinguished the terms to arbitration proceedings and in relation to arbitration proceedings to contend that the former means only proceedings before the arbitral tribunal, whereas the latter refers to all proceedings including court proceedings post the award. It was contended that if this interpretation was to be accepted, it would lead to serious contradictions, especially in the interplay between Sections 9 and 17, where the court proceedings (in relation to arbitral proceedings which commenced before the amendment) would be under Section 9 of the new regime, and the arbitral proceedings (which commenced before the amendment) would have to be under the old regime (including Section 17). It was, therefore, contended that it wo ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... emanating therefrom before the court. This was contended on the basis of the Supreme Court decision in Thyssen Stahlunion (supra) . It was also contended on the strength of an observation in the said decision that if it was not so, only the word to could have sufficed. It may be recalled that in that decision, Section 85(2)(a) of the said Act had come up for interpretation. That provision also comprised of two parts. But, in both parts, the expression used was in relation to arbitral proceedings . In that context, the Supreme Court had observed that the expression in relation to did not admit of a restrictive meaning and that the first limb of Section 85(2)(a) was not a limited saving clause as it saved not only the proceedings pending at the time of commencement of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, but also the provisions of the Arbitration Act, 1940 for enforcement of the award under that Act (i.e., the 1940 Act). It was contended on behalf of the respondents that in Section 26 of the Amending Act, while the expression in relation to arbitral proceedings is used in the second part, in the first part the expression employed is to the arbitral proceedings . ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... prior to 23.10.2015, but the petition under Section 34 seeking the setting aside of the award was made after 23.10.2015; the third category would be comprised of those cases where the arbitral proceedings commenced prior to 23.10.2015 and not only the award was made prior to 23.10.2015, but the petition under Section 34 had also been instituted before court prior to 23.10.2015. The three categories can be graphically represented as follows:- t0 = date on which arbitral proceedings commence t1 = date of award t2 = date of filing of petition under Section 34 of the said Act 23.10.2015 = date on which amending act commenced. 28. Given the three categories of cases, if the interpretation of the respondents is accepted, then the first part of Section 26 would only deal with the first category. In other words, there would be nothing in Section 26 of the Amending Act which pertained to the second and third categories of cases. 29. In such a situation, it would have to be considered, independent of Section 26 of the Amending Act, as to whether the amended provisions applied to the said second and third category of cases. In this regard, we may note th ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ement of the arbitral proceedings. 30. Now, if the argument of the respondents is to be accepted that the first limb of Section 26 applies only to arbitral proceedings in the sense of proceedings before arbitral tribunals and not to court proceedings, then, it is obvious that Section 26 is silent with regard to the second and third categories of cases to which we have already referred above. In other words, in respect of these categories, no contrary intention of retrospectivity is evinced upon a reading of Section 26 of the Amending Act. Therefore, even if we take the argument of the respondents to be correct, the result would still be the same and, that is, that in respect of all the arbitral proceedings commenced prior to 23.10.2015, the unamended provisions of the said Act would continue to operate till the enforcement of the award. 31. We may also notice that in case the argument of the respondents is to be accepted that where arbitral proceedings commenced prior to 23.10.2015, the unamended provisions would be saved only in respect of the proceedings before the arbitral tribunal and would not extend to court proceedings, the same would result in serious anomalies. This ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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