TMI Blog2023 (4) TMI 1241X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ement of fundamental rights arise, and where on undisputed facts the taxing authorities are shown to have assumed jurisdiction which they do not possess. In attempting to bypass the provisions of the statute by inviting the High Court to decide the questions which are primarily within the jurisdiction of the Revenue Authorities, the party approaching the Court has often to ask the Court to make assumptions of facts which remain to be investigated by the Revenue Authorities. In another decision of a three Judge Bench of the Supreme Court in Income-Tax Officer, Lucknow Vs. M/s. S.B. Singar Singh Sons Anr. [ 1976 (8) TMI 5 - SUPREME COURT] , it was held that the High Court was not justified in deciding the matter primarily within the jurisdiction of the revenue authorities by entertaining a writ petition. The relevant provisions of MMC Act read with the Rules, creates a robust statutory mechanism not only in respect of everything leading to the levy and collection of taxes but also providing for a specific statutory remedy of an appeal under Section 406 of the MMC Act of an appeal being provided, if a person is aggrieved by the fixation of a rateable value or capital value o ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... D Petitioners opposition to the preliminary objection. 25 26 E Analysis and Conclusion. 27 to 57 A) Preface 1. Petitioner No. 1 claims to be a federation of co-operative housing societies constituted for welfare of the residents of Kharghar Node which is an area in Navi Mumbai. It is averred that petitioner No. 1 is looking after the welfare of its Member Cooperative Housing Societies (for short the Societies ). Petitioner No. 2 is described to be a resident of Kharghar, and as an office bearer of a co-operative housing society, namely, one 'Stuti Residency Co-operative Housing Society Ltd.' The petition is affirmed by one Commander Siddheshwar Hira Kalawat who has described himself as General Secretary of petitioner No. 1. 2. Respondent No. 1 is the Commissioner of the Panvel Municipal Corporation (for short 'the PMC'). The PMC is constituted by the State Government by issuance of a notification under Section 3 of the Maharashtra Municipal Corporation Act, 1949 (for short, 'the MMC Act') with effect from 1 October 2016, so as to inc ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... sessment, culminated into PMC issuing bills to all the properties including to the properties situated in the Kharghar Node, with which members of petitioner no. 1 are concerned, namely, the co-operative societies in the Kharghar Node. It is not in dispute that Kharghar Node is a territorial area which forms small part of the municipal jurisdiction of the PMC. B) Challenge 8. The challenge as mounted in this petition is quite peculiar, namely to the property tax bills, issued by the PMC to the co-operative societies who are stated to be the members of petitioner No. 1. As noted above, the entire exercise relating to the assessment in question from the date the PMC was constituted, has culminated into the assessment and levy of the property taxes and the bills in question being issued. Illustratively, the petitioners have drawn Court's attention to a bill issued to one of its members namely Satyam Heights Cooperative Housing Society Ltd. which is for the period 1 October 2016 upto 2021-22 of an amount of Rs. 1,69,151/-. 9. Thus, only substantive prayer in the present petition is for issuance of a writ of mandamus to cancel the bills and demand notices issued for levying ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... he ground reality is clear, that the member societies have not authorized the petitioner to represent them, atleast in support of the alleged cause. It is thus contended that the present petition is wrongly portraying that the petitioner-federation is canvassing the interest of all its members. According to the PMC, this is clear from the averments as made in the Interim Application No. 2108 of 2023, preferred by the petitioner for deleting its members, as they were not even ready to pay nominal court fees of Rs. 125/- each. It is PMC's contention that refusal of said members to pay such meager amount of Rs. 125/- would demonstrate that petitioner No. 1 was claiming from them much higher amounts. It is contended that petitioner No. 1 has gone to the extent of publishing a notice in the newspaper inviting public at large to contact the office bearers of petitioner No. 1 to join in prosecuting the present petition, which according to the PMC, speaks volumes about the ill-intention of the petitioner-federation. It is contended that this is clearly an attempt to mislead, if not cheat, the gullible public. The contention is that when the court fees was Rs. 125/- per person/society, ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... half of the petitioners. Most of the contents of rejoinder affidavit are reiterations of what has been contended by the petitioners in the Writ Petition. The tenor of the rejoinder affidavit is also to the effect that as the petitioners have paid Court fees, this Court should hold the petition to be maintainable and entertain the same. The rejoinder affidavit also refers to previous orders passed on the petition and reiteration of the petitioner's contention that the demand for tax is illegal. The petitioners have referred to a totally unconnected case of Property Owners Association , being a case filed inter alia challenging the vires of the provisions of the Mumbai Municipal Corporation Act by which the capital method of levy of property taxes in Mumbai was assailed, which according to them, was entertained by this Court. It is on such ground that the petitioners contend that the reply affidavit ought not to be taken into consideration. 18. Mr. Kumbhakoni has contended that one would fail to appreciate as to how the present writ petition can be filed for reliefs which are to the effect that property taxes be not charged and collected, which is a major source of revenue fo ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... State of Maharashtra and Ors. [WP No. 12297 of 2021 decided on 16.2.2022] to contend that in dealing with the question in regard to an assessment order, passed by the Deputy Commissioner of Sales Tax, levying tax under Maharashtra Value Added Tax 2002, which was being assailed in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the Division Bench has held that the statutory requirements of an appeal being provided to assail the levy could not have been bypassed by the petitioner. In reaching to such conclusion, the Division Bench referred to the settled principles of law in regard to the scope of jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, observing that it was a discretionary remedy, inter alia observing as to in which circumstances could such a discretion to entertain a writ petition could be exercised by the High Court. The Division Bench in reaching to a conclusion that a writ petition in such circumstances would not be maintainable has referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in Thansingh Nathmal Ors. Vs. A. Mazid, Superintendent of Taxes AIR 1964 SC 1419; Mahyco Monsanto Biotech (India) Pvt. Ltd. Vs. The Union ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... he preliminary objection as urged on behalf of the PMC. Mr. Joshi would submit that the petition is not only maintainable but it also needs to be entertained. His first contention is that levy of tax itself is illegal for the reason that there is a breach of principles of natural justice in the PMC levying taxes, subject matter of demand under the impugned bills. It is next submitted that PMC has acted in breach of the taxation rules as contained in Chapter VIII under the Taxation Rules appended to the MMC Act and more particularly, Rule 30 which provides for property taxes to be payable half-yearly in advance. He submits that also there is breach of Section 99 of the MMC Act which provides for fixing of rates of taxes. He submits that on all counts the PMC has breached the provisions of law in making assessment. His next contention is levying of retrospective taxes demanded from 1 October 2016 till financial year 2021-2022, itself is illegal. It is his contention that there is no basis in law for such retrospective demand. It is his submission that the decisions as cited by Mr. Kumbhakoni are totally non-applicable in the facts of the present case. 26. Mr. Joshi has submitted ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... s hereinafter contained, appeals against any rateable value [or the capital value, as the case may be,] or tax fixed or charged under this Act shall be heard and determined by the Judge. (2) No such appeal [shall be entertained] unless- (a) it is brought within fifteen days after the accrual of the cause of complaint; (b) in the case of an appeal against a rateable value [or the capital value, as the case may be,] a complaint has previously been made to the Commissioner as provided under this Act and such complaint has been disposed of; (c) in the case of an appeal against any tax [including interest and penalty imposed] in respect of which provision exists under this Act for a complaint to be made to the Commissioner against the demand, such complaint has previously been made and disposed of; (d) in the case of an appeal against any amendment made in the assessment book for property taxes during the official year, a complaint has been made by the person aggrieved within [twenty-one days] after he first received notice of such amendment and his complaint has been disposed of; (e) in the case of an appeal against a tax, or in the case of an appeal made against ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... of default by the appellant at any time before the appeal is decided, on getting an intimation to that effect from the Commissioner, the Judge shall summarily dismiss the appeal.] (6) An appeal against the demand notice in respect of levy of cess under Chapter XIA or the Local Body Tax under Chapter XIB shall lie,- (i) to the Deputy Commissioner, when the demand notice is raised by the Cess Officer or any other officer, not being the Deputy Commissioner. (ii) to the Commissioner, when the demand notice is raised by the Deputy Commissioner. (7) The appeal under sub-section (6) shall be filed within fifteen days from the date of the demand notice. (8) No appeal under sub-section 96) shall be entertained by the Deputy Commissioner or, as the case may be, the Commissioner unless the amount of the disputed tax claimed from the appellant has been deposited by the appellant with the Commissioner. (emphasis supplied) 29. About 59 years back, a three Judge Bench of the Supreme Court in the case of Shivram Poddar Vs. Income Tax Officer, Central Circle II, Calcutta and Anr. AIR 1964 SC 1095 has held that resort to the High Court in exercise of its extraordinary jurisdic ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... rily within the jurisdiction of the revenue authorities, the party approaching the court has often to ask the court to make assumptions of facts which remain to be investigated by the revenue authorities. 20. In the instant case, the High Court had assumed jurisdiction on the assumption that a certain ground had been urged before the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal which had arbitrarily refused to consider the same and record a finding thereon. This assumption, in our opinion, stood thoroughly discounted by the concomitant circumstances of the case, including the dilatory and questionable conduct of the assessee. This was therefore not a fit case for the exercise of its special jurisdiction under Article 226 by the High Court. 31. In Assistant Collector of Central Excise, Chandan Nagar, West Bengal Vs. Dunlop India Ltd. Ors. (1985)1 SCC 260 referring to the decision in Titaghur Paper Mills Co. Ltd. Vs. State of Orissa (1983)2 SCC 433, the Supreme Court observed that Article 226 is not meant to short circuit or circumvent statutory procedures. It is only where statutory remedies are entirely ill-suited to meet the demands of extraordinary situations, as for instance where the ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... nce in this regard may be made to Article 329 and ordainments of other similarly worded articles in the Constitution. Article 226 does not, in terms, impose any limitation or restraint on the exercise of power to issue writs. While it is true that exercise of writ powers despite availability of a remedy under the very statute which has been invoked and has given rise to the action impugned in the writ petition ought not to be made in a routine manner, yet, the mere fact that the petitioner before the high court, in a given case, has not pursued the alternative remedy available to him/it cannot mechanically be construed as a ground for its dismissal. It is axiomatic that the high courts (bearing in mind the facts of each particular case) have a discretion whether to entertain a writ petition or not. One of the self-imposed restrictions on the exercise of power under Article 226 that has evolved through judicial precedents is that the high courts should normally not entertain a writ petition, where an effective and efficacious alternative remedy is available. At the same time, it must be remembered that mere availability of an alternative remedy of appeal or revision, which the party ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... should, in exercise of its discretion, issue a writ of certiorari to quash the proceedings and decisions of inferior courts subordinate to it and ordinarily the superior court will decline to interfere until the aggrieved party has exhausted his other statutory remedies, if any. But this rule requiring the exhaustion of statutory remedies before the writ will be granted is a rule of policy, convenience and discretion rather than a rule of law and instances are numerous where a writ of certiorari has been issued in spite of the fact that the aggrieved party had other adequate legal remedies. *** 6. At the end of the last century, this Court in paragraph 15 of the its decision reported in (1998) 8 SCC 1 (Whirlpool Corporation vs. Registrar of Trade Marks, Mumbai and Others) carved out the exceptions on the existence whereof a Writ Court would be justified in entertaining a writ petition despite the party approaching it not having availed the alternative remedy provided by the statute. The same read as under: (i) where the writ petition seeks enforcement of any of the fundamental rights; (ii) where there is violation of principles of natural justice; (iii) where the orde ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... by the PMC. Thus, applying the very principles laid down by the Supreme Court in M/s. Godrej Sara Lee Ltd. (supra) which considers the principles of law as laid down by the Supreme Court in Whirlpool Corporation vs. Registrar of Trade Marks, Mumbai and Others (1998) 8 SCC 1, it is quite intriguing as to how the petitioners can contend that this petition needs to be entertained, so as to permit the petitioners to challenge the bills levying property taxes and issues of such levy to be adjudicated in the present proceedings. We are thus afraid as to how in the present facts, the decision of the Supreme Court in M/s. Godrej Sara Lee Ltd. (supra) would assist the petitioners. 35. As noted above, the relevant provisions of MMC Act read with the Rules, creates a robust statutory mechanism not only in respect of everything leading to the levy and collection of taxes but also providing for a specific statutory remedy of an appeal under Section 406 of the MMC Act of an appeal being provided, if a person is aggrieved by the fixation of a rateable value or capital value or 'tax fixed' or 'charged' under MMC Act, to be assailed in such appeal, which is to be filed before th ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... dy of an appeal, as each of the assessees would be required to prove on evidence, that the PMC in issuing individual bills in respect to each of these assesses, has not acted in accordance with the provisions of law and/or that in respect of such assesses there was a breach of principles of natural justice. We may also observe that all these are issues which are purely subjective and which are required to be individually adjudicated before the appellate authority. On a deeper scrutiny, it would certainly not be possible for this Court, in exercise of its writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and in such blanket manner, examine these issues, albeit camouflaged by the petitioners to be common issues. 38. If we accept the contentions as made on behalf of the petitioners, we fear that we are creating a new pattern and jurisprudence in relation to such matters being entertained in exercise of writ jurisdiction, thereby rendering the provision for a statutory appeal wholly otiose. This would lead to severe and drastic consequences, in as much as assessments as may be levied by the several Municipal Corporations, governed by the provisions of the MMC Act, wou ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e legal rights have been infringed or for that matter there is a cause of action for petitioner No. 1 to maintain this petition. As observed above, insofar as petitioner No. 2 is concerned, certainly by having a combination of petitioner No. 1 which by itself has no cause of action or who cannot be itself aggrieved, petitioner No. 2 cannot contend that the petition be held maintainable or be entertained qua petitioner No. 2. We have observed that petitioner No. 2 if aggrieved, he would have a statutory remedy of filing an appeal as provided for under Section 406 of the MMC Act. 40. In the context of locus of the petitioners to maintain the present petition, reliance is placed by Mr. Joshi on a decision of a learned Single Judge of the Karnataka High Court in the case of Vishwabharathi House Building Co-operative Society Ltd. Vs. Bangalore Development Authority (1991)0 AIR (Kar) 133. In our opinion, Mr. Joshi's reliance on this decision is not well founded for the reason that it is not petitioner no. 1 who is aggrieved by issuance of any bills. No civil wrong is caused to petitioner no. 1 but is alleged to be caused to its members. Also this is not a petition which is filed i ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e tax committee special notice in respect of property tax was issued to all property owners (under provisions of section 150A of the Act). As provided by the statute, objections were invited from property owners under the provisions of rule 15 of Taxation rules (Chapter VIII) (Taxation rules, for short) and on receipt of objections in respect of levied property tax personal hearing was given to each property owner who had raised objection in respect of his property tax bill (as is statutorily provided under provisions of rule 18 of taxation rules). 32. The administrative tax committee, on receipt of objections and after hearing the property owners, reviewed its decision in respect of each property tax bill and made necessary changes, if any, to the final bill in accordance with the provisions of Rule 19 of the Taxation Rules. I crave leave to refer to and rely upon the documents in respect of the hearing given to the Petitioner. 33. I say and submit that after considering objections from the residents of the Corporation area, NGOs, leaders of various social and political parties etc, it was felt necessary to review the percentage of tax to be levied. Hence on 06-042021 the Ge ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... w.e.f. 01-04-2021 instead of from 01-10-2016 cannot be accepted; representation be forwarded to CIDCO to stop charging service charges w.e.f. 01-04-2021 etc. I say that the Commissioner of Panvel Municipal Corporation accepted the recommendation of the Administrative Committee as aforesaid vide his order dated 30-03-2021, a copy of the said order is annexed to the compilation of documents. 42. Insofar as the petitioner's contention that the PMC ought not to have imposed property taxes with effect from its constitution, as CIDCO was collecting service charges has also been stated to be totally untenable by PMC. It is PMC's contention that the statutory levy of property taxes cannot be compared to what was being charged by CIDCO, as it was not permissible for CIDCO to accept any taxes under the provisions of the constitution as CIDCO was not a municipal corporation. The relevant averments in that regard are required to be noted, which read thus: 37. I say that the contention of the Petitioner that as they are already paying Charges to CIDCO it is not legal on part of the Corporation to collect property tax from the residents of Panvel is unfounded and not tenable in e ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... es development fees/charges. 39. I say that it is well settled in law that there is difference in service charges and property tax and hence both can be simultaneously levied on the citizens and does not amount to double taxation as is wrongly portrayed. Formation of Respondent Corporation is under provisions of the Act while the appointment of CIDCO as Planning Authority is under the provisions of the MRTP Act. The service charges and property tax applicable work in different spheres and hence does not amount to double taxation. 40. I say and submit that there is no discrimination or inequality in imposition of property tax in respect of property holders from CIDCO Administrative Region (CAR, for short) and property holders in rural areas and property owners from Panvel municipal council area. 43. In regard to the petitioner's contention that it was illegal for the PMC to levy tax with retrospective effect, the PMC has stated that there is no levy of tax with retrospective effect as contended by the petitioner. In this regard, the PMC has contended that the PMC has determined the Annual Letting Rate, Rateable Value and Tax for the period commencing from the formation ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the regime of municipal taxation being introduced to make retrospective levy. Such powers have been expressly conferred under Section 150A of the Act. Section 150A begins with a non-obstante clause to provide, that if for any reason, any person liable to pay any of the taxes or fees leviable under this Act has escaped assessment in any year, the Commissioner may, at any time within six years from the date on which such person should have been assessed, serve on such person a notice assessing him to the tax or fee due and demanding payment thereon within 15 days from the date of such service, and the provisions of the MMC Act and the rules made thereunder shall apply as if the assessment was made in the year to which the tax or fee relates. Section 150A reads thus: 150A. Power to assess in case of escape from assessment Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in this Act or the rules made thereunder, if for any reason any person liable to pay any of the taxes or fees leviable under this Act has escaped assessment in any year, the Commissioner may, at any time within six years from the date on which such person should have been assessed, serve on such person a notic ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ependent consideration depending upon the nature of property each of such cooperative societies, and depending upon various factors of different amounts. Thus, assessment of property taxes in respect of each individual society would be on different considerations by applying the taxation rules. Thus, each of such assessments are subjective, and on specific considerations as applicable to the property of individual assesses. Illustratively, a cooperative society in a given case may have 70% commercial tenements and 30% residential tenements whereas in case of another cooperative society it may be vice versa or more differently. It may also happen that a particular cooperative society has a very limited tenements and may have a large open space. Thus the basis of assessment for levy of tax in respect of each of the properties of the members of petitioner no. 1 would be independent and distinct. The Municipal Corporation makes assessment on varied factors which are infact requirements of the taxation rules. It cannot be a blanket common consideration in issuance of bills for different properties nor it is so pleaded in the writ petition. 48. From what has been contended by Mr. Josh ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... rrect approach. 50. We find that Mr. Kumbhakoni's reliance on the decision in M/s. Mestra A.G. Switzerland (supra), certainly would assist the case of the PMC. In this case, the Division Bench taking review of the decisions on alternate remedy being available to the petitioner therein, has held that in any matter relating to tax, where the party has an option of approaching the appellate forum, it would not be prudent in the judicious exercise of discretion to derail from the procedure as ignoring the law as contained in the statute in question. The observations of the Court in paragraph nos. 17 to 19 reads thus: 17. Mr. Sridharan is again right, but only partially. Notwithstanding that questions of fact emerged for decision in Thansingh Nathmal (supra), the Supreme Court had the occasion to lay down therein a principle of law which is salutary and not to be found in any other previous decision rendered by it. The principle, plainly is that, if a remedy is available to a party before the high court in another jurisdiction, the writ jurisdiction should not normally be exercised on a petition under Article 226, for, that would and allow the machinery set up by the concerne ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... etitions on the short ground that the petitioners have an equally efficacious alternative remedy by way of an appeal to the Prescribed Authority under sub-section (1) of Section 23 of the Act, then a second appeal to the Tribunal under sub-section (3)(a) thereof, and thereafter in the event the petitioners get no relief, to have the case stated to the High Court under Section 24 of the Act.. *** 11. Under the scheme of the Act, there is a hierarchy of authorities before which the petitioners can get adequate redress against the wrongful acts complained of. The petitioners have the right to prefer an appeal before the Prescribed Authority under subsection (1) of Section 23 of the Act. If the petitioners are dissatisfied with the decision in the appeal, they can prefer a further appeal to the Tribunal under subsection (3) of Section 23 of the Act, and then ask for a case to be stated upon a question of law for the opinion of the High Court under Section 24 of the Act. The Act provides for a complete machinery to challenge an order of assessment, and the impugned orders of assessment can only be challenged by the mode prescribed by the Act and not by a petition under Article 2 ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... Article 20(1) or Article 31(2) of the Constitution. He has addressed us at length in support of his case that neither of the two articles is violated by the impugned proviso. On the other hand, the learned Solicitor-General has sought to support the findings of the High Court on the said two constitutional points; and he has pressed before us as a preliminary point his argument that on a fair and reasonable construction, the proviso cannot be applied to the case of the first respondent. We would, therefore, first deal with this preliminary point. In cases where the vires of statutory provisions are challenged on constitutional grounds, it is essential that the material facts should first be clarified and ascertained with a view to determine whether the impugned statutory provisions are attracted; if they are, the constitutional challenge to their validity must be examined and decided. If, however, the facts admitted or proved do not attract the impugned provisions there is no occasion to decide the issue about the vires of the said provisions. Any decision on the said question would in such a case be purely academic. Courts are and should be reluctant to decide constitutional po ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... stands merely because in its view the standards are too high and for this reason the rule is unreasonable. In the case before us there was neither pleading nor proof of any facts directed to that end. The only basis on which the contention regarding unreasonableness or discrimination was raised was an apriori argument addressed to the Court, that the division into the zones was not rational, in that hilly and plain areas of the country were not differentiated for the prescription of the minimum Reichert values. That a distinction should exist between hilly regions and plains, was again based on apriori reasoning resting on the different minimum Reichert values prescribed for Himachal Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh and on no other. It was, however, not as if the entire State of Himachal Pradesh is of uniform elevation or even as if no part of that State is plain country but yet if the same minimum was prescribed for the entire area of Himachal Pradesh, that would clearly show that the elevation of a place is not the only factor to be taken into account. In Kusum Ingots (supra) the Hon'ble Apex Court held as under:- 19. Passing of a legislation by itself in our opinion do no ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... on of the courts. It is implicit in the exercise of such extraordinary jurisdiction that the relief prayed for must be one to enforce a legal right. In fact, the existence of such right, is the foundation of the exercise of the said jurisdiction by the Court. The legal right that can be enforced must ordinarily be the right of the appellant himself, who complains of infraction of such right and approaches the Court for relief as regards the same. 10. A legal right , means an entitlement arising out of legal rules. Thus, it may be defined as an advantage, or a benefit conferred upon a person by the rule of law. The expression, person aggrieved does not include a person who suffers from a psychological or an imaginary injury; a person aggrieved must, therefore, necessarily be one whose right or interest has been adversely affected or jeopardised. (emphasis supplied) 52. On maintainability of the writ petition, Mr. Joshi has placed reliance on an interim order passed by a coordinate Bench of this Court in Mahadev Waghmare Anr. Vs. The State of Maharashtra, Urban Development Department Ors. (supra). We may, at the very outset, observe that the said interim orders would ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... in the present petition is entertained, it would bring about drastic and adverse consequences on the levy of property taxes/issuance of bills, to other assesses who have not filed any proceedings and are due to pay the bills or have taken a position not to litigate. A public body like the respondent-PMC cannot be placed in a cloud of such uncertainty when it comes to levy and recovery of municipal taxes. Thus, entertaining this petition would open flood gates of litigation before this Court. This more particularly, as none of the grounds as raised in the petition impresses us, so as to exercise our extra-ordinary writ jurisdiction by permitting these assessees to bypass the remedy of a statutory appeal. This apart, entertaining such petitions would also send a wrong signal to the other municipal corporations/municipalities in the State of Maharashtra, that in matters of challenge to property taxes, an en masse plea of the nature as in the present case can be entertained. We do not intend to subscribe to any such impression or set up an example as being canvassed by the petitioner that on every possible aspect in regard to the municipal taxation, the matter should come to the High C ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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