TMI Blog2024 (1) TMI 4X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... sed the Detention Order ostensibly to maintain public order without once more appreciating the difference between maintenance of law and order and maintenance of public order . The order of detention is, thus, indefensible. Whether there was proper application of mind to all relevant circumstances or whether consideration of extraneous factors has vitiated the Detention Order? - HELD THAT:- Whenever an accused is tried for an offence under a penal law which carries a maximum sentence, the Court is obliged while imposing sentence to apply its mind to the specific facts and circumstances of the case and to either impose maximum sentence or a lesser sentence. It has, therefore, a discretion regarding imposition of sentence - The very term maximum period in section 13 vests the Government with discretion, allowing it to be exercised while considering whether the detention is to be continued for the maximum period of 12 (twelve) months or any lesser period. In our opinion, the relevant provisions of the Act have to be so read as to inhere a safeguard against arbitrary exercise of discretionary power. The period of detention ought to necessarily vary depending upon the fac ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... enders and White Collar or Financial Offenders Act 1986 ( the Act , hereafter). Perusal of the Detention Order reveals that the Detenu earlier suffered an order of detention dated 4th March, 2021 under the category of White Collar Offender ; however, pursuant to an order of the High Court dated 16th August, 2021 in writ proceedings instituted by his father W.P. No.12321 of 2021 , the Detenu was released from detention on 17th August, 2021; that even after such release, the Detenu did not mend his habitual nature of committing crimes and in the recent past (during 2022 and 2023), in quick succession, had committed 9 (nine) more offences within the limits of Hyderabad Police Commissionerate, as listed therein; that out of such 9 (nine) offences, 5 (five) FIRs 3 (i) FIR No. 227/2022 dated 28.07.2022 for offences under Sections 186, 189, 353, 504, 506, IPC; (ii) FIR No. 262/2022 dated 10.10.2022 for offences under Sections 420, 384, 506 r/w 34, IPC; (iii) FIR No. 338/2022 dated 12.10.2022 for offences under Sections 354, 420, 323, 506 r/w 34, IPC; (iv) FIR No. 18/2023 dated 21.01.2023 for offences under Sections 506, 420, 406 r/w 34, IPC; and (v) FIR No. 35/2023 dated 08.02.2023 fo ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... a report dated 29th April, 2023 opined that there is sufficient cause for the detention of the detenu , whereupon the Government issued an order dated 20th May, 2023 under sub-section (1) of section 12 read with section 13 of the Act confirming the Detention Order and directing that the detention be continued for a period of 12 months from the date of detention, i.e., 27th January, 2023 (sic, 27th March, 2023). By a further order of even date, the appellant was informed by the Government of absence of any valid grounds/reasons to set aside/revoke the Detention Order leading to rejection of her representation. 5. The appellant then invoked the writ jurisdiction of the High Court whereupon the parties were heard and the impugned judgment delivered containing reasons for dismissing the writ petition. CONTENTIONS OF THE PARTIES 6. In course of hearing of the appeal, Mr. Luthra, learned senior counsel for the appellant invited our attention to several paragraphs of the impugned judgment to demonstrate the errors from which the same suffered, both factual as well as legal. He also placed on record written notes containing submissions on factual as well as legal aspects. ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... Ray, CJ. in Haradhan Saha vs. State of West Bengal AIR 1974 SC 2154 is to prevent the greater evil of elements imperiling the security and safety of a State, and the welfare of the Nation. Preventive detention, though a draconian and dreaded measure, is permitted by the Constitution itself but subject to the safeguards that are part of the relevant article and those carved out by the Constitutional Courts through judicial decisions of high authority which have stood the test of time. 10. It is common knowledge that recourse to preventive detention can be taken by the executive merely on suspicion and as a precaution to prevent activities by the person, sought to be detained, prejudicial to certain specified objects traceable in a validly enacted law. Since an order of preventive detention has the effect of invading one s personal liberty merely on suspicion and is not viewed as punitive, and the facts on which the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority is based for ordering preventive detention is not justiciable, meaning thereby that it is not open to the Constitutional Courts to enquire whether the detaining authority has erroneously or correctly reached a satis ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... we need not at all be guided by the view expressed in A.K. Gopalan (supra). Suffice it to observe that A.K. Gopalan (supra) was decided by this Court at the dawn of the Constitution, keeping in mind the then social realities, when the true and correct interpretation of the Constitution was yet to take shape and also without the benefit of any precedent on the point, which permits understanding of various points of view of Hon ble Judges and thereby makes it easy for successors to evolve the dynamic facets of the Fundamental Rights enshrined in the Constitution. 13. This Court in Shibban Lal Saksena vs. State of Uttar Pradesh AIR 1954 SC 179 speaking through Hon ble B.K. Mukherjea, J. (as the Chief Justice then was) quashed an order of preventive detention under the Detention Act reasoning that if one of the two grounds for ordering detention was illegal, the order of detention could not survive on the other ground. Law was laid down in the following words: 8. The first contention raised by the learned counsel raises, however, a somewhat important point which requires careful consideration. It has been repeatedly held by this Court that the power to issue a detention order ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... of Section 3(1)(a) and in that sense are foreign to the Act, the satisfaction of the detaining authority on which the order of detention is based is open to challenge and the detention order liable to be quashed. Similarly, if some of the grounds supplied to the detenu are so vague that they would virtually deprive the detenu of his statutory right of making a representation that again may introduce a serious infirmity in the order of his detention. If, however, the grounds on which the order of detention proceeds are relevant and germane to the matters which fall to be considered under Section 3(1)(a), it would not be open to the detenu to challenge the order of detention by arguing that the satisfaction of the detaining authority is not reasonably based on any of the said grounds. 8. It is, however, necessary to emphasise in this connection that though the satisfaction of the detaining authority contemplated by Section 3(1)(a) is the subjective satisfaction of the said authority, cases may arise where the detenu may challenge the validity of his detention on the ground of mala fides and in support of the said plea urge that along with other facts which show mala fides the ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... inted out in State of Madras v. V.G. Row [(1952) 1 SCC 410 : AIR 1952 SC 196 : 1952 SCR 597] that preventive detention is largely precautionary and based on suspicion and to these observations may be added the following words uttered by the learned Chief Justice in that case with reference to the observations of Lord Finlay in Rex v. Halliday [1917 AC 260] namely, that the court was the least appropriate tribunal to investigate into circumstances of suspicion on which such anticipatory action must be largely based . This being the nature of the proceeding, it is impossible to conceive how it can possibly be regarded as capable of objective assessment. The matters which have to be considered by the detaining authority are whether the person concerned, having regard to his past conduct judged in the light of the surrounding circumstances and other relevant material, would be likely to act in a prejudicial manner as contemplated in any of sub-clauses (i), (ii) and (iii) of clause (1) of sub-section (1) of Section 3, and if so, whether it is necessary to detain him with a view to preventing him from so acting. These are not matters susceptible of objective determination and they cou ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... as regards the fact in respect of which it is required to be satisfied. Emperor v. Shibnath Bannerji [AIR 1943 FC 75 : 1944 FCR 1 : 45 Cri LJ 341] is a case in point. Then there may be a case where the power is exercised dishonestly or for an improper purpose : such a case would also negative the existence of satisfaction on the part of the authority. The existence of improper purpose , that is, a purpose not contemplated by the statute, has been recognised as an independent ground of control in several decided cases. The satisfaction, moreover, must be a satisfaction of the authority itself, and therefore, if, in exercising the power, the authority has acted under the dictation of another body as the Commissioner of Police did in Commissioner of Police v. Gordhandas Bhanji [1951 SCC 1088 : AIR 1952 SC 16 : 1952 SCR 135] and the officer of the Ministry of Labour and National Service did in Simms Motor Units Ltd. v. Minister of Labour and National Service [(1946) 2 All ER 201] the exercise of the power would be bad and so also would the exercise of the power be vitiated where the authority has disabled itself from applying its mind to the facts of each individual case by self-creat ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... in accordance with the procedure established by law has always been placed by this Court on the detaining authority because Article 21 of the Constitution provides in clear and explicit terms that no one shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except in accordance with procedure established by law. This constitutional right of life and personal liberty is placed on such a high pedestal by this Court that it has always insisted that whenever there is any deprivation of life or personal liberty, the authority responsible for such deprivation must satisfy the court that it has acted in accordance with the law. This is an area where the court has been most strict and scrupulous in ensuring observance with the requirements of the law, and even where a requirement of the law is breached in the slightest measure, the court has not hesitated to strike down the order of detention or to direct the release of the detenu even though the detention may have been valid till the breach occurred. The court has always regarded personal liberty as the most precious possession of mankind and refused to tolerate illegal detention, regardless of the social cost involved in the release of a pos ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ce in the order of detention. The purpose of the Telangana Offenders Act 1986 is to prevent any person from acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. For this purpose, Section 3 prescribes that the detaining authority must be satisfied that the person to be detained is likely to indulge in illegal activities in the future and act in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. The satisfaction to be arrived at by the detaining authority must not be based on irrelevant or invalid grounds. It must be arrived at on the basis of relevant material; material which is not stale and has a live link with the satisfaction of the detaining authority. The order of detention may refer to the previous criminal antecedents only if they have a direct nexus or link with the immediate need to detain an individual. If the previous criminal activities of the Appellant could indicate his tendency or inclination to act in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order, then it may have a bearing on the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority. However, in the absence of a clear indication of a causal connection, a mere reference to the pending crim ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... tiny cannot penetrate. 21. Apart from the aforesaid decisions, multiple decisions have been rendered by this Court over the years which provide suitable guidance to us to complete the present exercise; however, we wish to conclude this discussion by referring to one decision of this Court delivered little in excess of a decade back by a Bench of 3-Judges. 22. In Rekha vs. State of Tamil Nadu ( 2011 ) 5 SCC 244 , this Court observed that: 21. It is all very well to say that preventive detention is preventive not punitive. The truth of the matter, though, is that in substance a detention order of one year (or any other period) is a punishment of one year s imprisonment. What difference is it to the detenu whether his imprisonment is called preventive or punitive? ( italics in original ) *** 29. Preventive detention is, by nature, repugnant to democratic ideas and an anathema to the Rule of law. No such law exists in the USA and in England (except during war time). Since, however, Article 22(3)(b) of the Constitution of India permits preventive detention, we cannot hold it illegal but we must confine the power of preventive detention within very narrow li ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... retion of the detaining authority. 24. We, however, hasten to observe here that though the decision in Rekha (supra) reflects on an important aspect of loss of liberty without trial by taking recourse to preventive detention laws, the decision of the Constitution Bench in Haradhan Saha (supra) still holds the field and to the extent the learned Judges in Rekha (supra) sound a note discordant with the law laid down in Haradhan Saha (supra) ought not to be construed as acceptance by us as the correct exposition of law. 25. Be that as it may, culling out the principles of law flowing from all the relevant decisions in the field, our understanding of the law for deciding the legality of an order of preventive detention is that even without appropriate pleadings to assail such an order, if circumstances appear therefrom raising a doubt of the detaining authority misconceiving his own powers, the Court ought not to shut its eyes; even not venturing to make any attempt to investigate the sufficiency of the materials, an enquiry can be made by the Court into the authority s notions of his power. Without being remotely concerned about the sufficiency or otherwise of the materials on w ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... of a live and proximate link between the past conduct of a person and the imperative need to detain him or is based on material which is stale; (viii) the ground(s) for reaching the requisite satisfaction is/are such which an individual, with some degree of rationality and prudence, would consider as connected with the fact and relevant to the subject-matter of the inquiry in respect whereof the satisfaction is to be reached; (ix) the grounds on which the order of preventive detention rests are not vague but are precise, pertinent and relevant which, with sufficient clarity, inform the detenu the satisfaction for the detention, giving him the opportunity to make a suitable representation; and (x) the timelines, as provided under the law, have been strictly adhered to. Should the Court find the exercise of power to be bad and/or to be vitiated applying any of the tests noted above, rendering the detention order vulnerable, detention which undoubtedly visits the person detained with drastic consequences would call for being interdicted for righting the wrong. ANALYSIS AND DECISION 26. Since in the present case power under section 3 of the Act was exercised, it ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ds scrutiny on application of the requisite tests. 28. In the present case, the Detention Order was based on 5 (five) distinct offences, of which there is a crime allegedly committed by the Detenu in relation to a minor girl. Crimes have also been registered on allegations of cheating, and obstructing a public official from discharging his duty, as well as a crime has been registered involving dacoity. In Crime Nos. 262/2022, 18/2023 and 35/2023, charge-sheets are yet to be filed and the Detenu has been released on bail whereas in regard to Crime Nos. 338/2022 and 227/2022, charge-sheets have been filed without even arresting him. 29. The issues with the Detention Order which we need to address are these: first, whether the alleged acts of commission for which the Detenu has been kept under detention are prejudicial to public order and secondly, whether all relevant circumstances were considered or whether extraneous factors weighed in the mind of the detaining authority leading to the conclusion that the Detenu is a habitual offender and for prevention of further crimes by him, he ought to be detained. Incidentally, the issue of whether application of mind is manifest in f ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... circle representing public order and the smallest circle represents security of State. It is then easy to see that an act may affect law and order but not public order just as an act may affect public order but not security of the State. (underlining ours, for emphasis) 33. For an act to qualify as a disturbance to public order, the specific activity must have an impact on the broader community or the general public, evoking feelings of fear, panic, or insecurity. Not every case of a general disturbance to public tranquillity affects the public order and the question to be asked, as articulated by Hon ble M. Hidayatullah, CJ. in Arun Ghosh vs. State of West Bengal (1970) 1 SCC 98 , is this: Does it [read: the offending act] lead to disturbance of the current of life of the community so as to amount a disturbance of the public order or does it affect merely an individual leaving the tranquillity of the society undisturbed? In that case, the petitioning detenu was detained by an order of a district magistrate since he had been indulging in teasing, harassing and molesting young girls and assaults on individuals of a locality. While holding that the conduct of the petit ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... es to the examination of what constitutes public order . Even within the provisions of the Act, the term public order has, stricto sensu, been defined in narrow and restricted terms. An order of detention under section 3(1) of the Act can only be issued against a detenu to prevent him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order . Public order is defined in the Explanation to section 2(a) of the Act as encompassing situations that cause harm, danger or alarm or a feeling of insecurity among the general public or any section thereof or a grave wide-spread danger to life or public health . 36. Ram Manohar Lohia (supra) is an authority to rely upon for the proposition that if liberty of an individual can be invaded under statutory rules by the simple process of making of a certain order, he can be so deprived only if the order is in consonance with the said rule. Strict compliance with the letter of the rule, in such a case, has to be the essence of the matter since the statute has the potentiality to interfere with the personal liberty of an individual and a Court is precluded from going behind its face. Though circumstances may make it necessary ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e order of detention impugned in that writ petition failed to differentiate between offences which create a law and order situation and which prejudicially affect or tend to prejudicially affect public order . The present Detention Order fares no better. Even if the offences referred to in the Detention Order, alleged to have been committed by the Detenu have led to the satisfaction being formed, still the same are separate and stray acts affecting private individuals and the repetition of similar such acts would not tend to affect the even flow of public life. The offence in respect of the minor girl did exercise our consideration for some time but we have noted that the Detenu was not arrested because of an order passed by the High Court on an application under section 438 of the Criminal Procedure Code ( Cr. PC , hereafter). The investigating agency not having elected to have such order quashed by a higher forum, the facts have their own tale to tell. Even otherwise, the gravity of the offences alleged in Arun Ghosh (supra) was higher in degree, yet, the same were not considered as affecting public order . The only other offence that could attract the enumerated category of ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... tion is based only on 5 (five) out of these 9 (nine) crimes, which are alleged to show that the Detenu s activities are prejudicial to the maintenance of public order, apart from disturbing peace and tranquillity in the area. 44. Interestingly, even in paragraph 9 E of his Counter Affidavit, the Commissioner has extracted a portion of the Detention Order which we have set out in paragraph 3 (supra). The reiteration of considering past criminal history of the Detenu is not without its effect, as we shall presently discuss. 45. In Khudiram Das (supra), while examining the history sheet of the detenu, this Court had, in express terms, clarified that a generalisation could not be made that the detenu was in the habit of committing those offences. Merely because the detenu was charged for multiple offences, it could not be said that he was in the habit of committing such offences. Further, habituality of committing offences cannot, in isolation, be taken as a basis of any detention order; rather it has to be tested on the metrics of public order , as discussed above. Therefore, cases where such habituality has created any public disorder could qualify as a ground to order d ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... fences punishable under the Indian Penal Code, the said crimes can be effectively dealt with under the provisions of the Indian Penal Code. The detaining authority cannot be permitted to subvert, supplant or substitute the punitive law of land, by ready resort to preventive detention. 48. Since the aforesaid order of the High Court went unchallenged and is, thus, binding upon the parties, it was not open to the Commissioner to refer to the very same antecedent offences again in the Detention Order under challenge. There was no direct nexus or link with the immediate need to order detention and we hold extraneous considerations having found their way into the Detention Order. 49. The other aspect requiring some guidance for detaining authorities and on which we wish to comment is that there is no requirement in law of orders of detention being expressed in language that would normally be considered elegant or artistic. An order of detention, which is capable of comprehension, has to precisely set forth the grounds of detention without any vagueness. The substance of the order and how it is understood by the detenu determines its nature. An order in plain and simple language ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... be detrimental to public order, unless he is preventively detained from doing so by an appropriate order of detention. With respect to the stage of proceedings in the offences which form its basis, the Detention Order states that despite being contested by the State, bail has been granted to the Detenu in Crimes No. 4 and 5. Insofar as grant of bail to the Detenu is concerned, the Commissioner states that: I strongly believe that if such a habitual criminal is set free his activities would not be safe to the society and there is an imminent possibility of his committing similar offences by violating the bail conditions in one of the cases, which would be detrimental to public order, unless he is preventively detained from doing so by an appropriate order of detention. 51. We are of the opinion that the aforesaid excerpts from the Detention Order lay bare the Commissioner s attempt to transgress his jurisdiction and to pass an order of detention, which cannot be construed as an order validly made under the Act. The quoted observations are reflective of the intention to detain the Detenu at any cost without resorting to due procedure. It is neither the case of the r ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... er would make it clear that the reason for the said Order is not any apprehension of widespread public harm, danger or alarm but is only because the Detenu was successful in obtaining anticipatory bail/bail from the Courts in each of the five FIRs. If a person is granted anticipatory bail/bail wrongly, there are well-known remedies in the ordinary law to take care of the situation. The State can always appeal against the bail order granted and/or apply for cancellation of bail. The mere successful obtaining of anticipatory bail/bail orders being the real ground for detaining the Detenu, there can be no doubt that the harm, danger or alarm or feeling of security among the general public spoken of in Section 2(a) of the Telangana Prevention of Dangerous Activities Act is make believe and totally absent in the facts of the present case. ( underlining ours, for emphasis ) 54. On the ground of consideration of extraneous materials too, the Detention Order is unsustainable. 55. A pernicious trend prevalent in the state of Telangana has not escaped our attention. While the Nation celebrates Azadi Ka Amrit Mahotsav to commemorate 75 years of independence from foreign rule, s ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... sed before us. Seldom have we found orders of detention continued, after the advice of the Advisory Board, for less than the maximum period permissible under the relevant law. Consideration of the matter by the Advisory Board, which consists of respectable members including retired High Court judges and those qualified to become High Court judges, was conceived to act as a safety valve against abuse of power by the detaining authority and/or to check the possibility of grave injustice being caused to a detenu. It is one thing to say that the Advisory Board has expressed an opinion that there is sufficient cause for the detention and, therefore, the detention has been continued; yet, it is quite another thing to say that the detention should continue for the maximum permissible period. In the light of sub-section (2) of section 11 read with sub-section (1) of section 12 of the Act, the period for which the detention should continue is left to be specified by the Government with the stipulation in section 13 thereof that the maximum period shall be 12 (twelve) months from the date of detention. This appears on a plain reading of the relevant statutory provisions. That apart, Mr. Luth ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... cle 14 of the Constitution for the reason that it has conferred unlimited discretion on the detaining authority to fix the period of detention. Repelling the challenge, this Court held: 28. *** The maximum period of detention has been fixed by Section 13 and the discretion to fix the duration within the maximum has been given to the Government after considering all the relevant circumstances. Seeing that the maximum period of detention has been fixed by Section 13 and that the discretion to fix the period of detention in a particular case has to be exercised after taking into account a number of imponderable circumstances, we do not think that there is any substance in the argument that the power of Government to determine the period of detention is discriminatory or arbitrary. 62. In A.K. Roy (supra), the Court echoed the above view by holding that: 77. Dr Ghatate's objection against Section 13 is that it provides for a uniform period of detention of 12 months in all cases, regardless of the nature and seriousness of the grounds on the basis of which the order of detention is passed. There is no substance in this grievance because, any law of preventive detenti ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... or arbitrarily; it should be guided by reasonableness and fairness. A legislature does not intend abuse of the law or its unfair use. 65. While considering the validity of an externment order under the Maharashtra Police Act, 1951, this Court in Deepak vs. State of Maharashtra 2022 SCC OnLine SC 99 held : When the competent authority passes an order for the maximum permissible period of two years, the order of externment must disclose an application of mind by the competent authority and the order must record its subjective satisfaction about the necessity of passing an order of externment for the maximum period of two years which is based on material on record. 66. True it is, Deepak (supra) was not a case arising out of preventive detention laws. However, in situations where discretion is available with authorities to decide the period of detention, as articulated by Lord Halsbury in Susannah Sharp vs. Wakefield Ors. [ 1891 ] A.C. 173, 179 , this discretion should be exercised in accordance with the rules of reason and justice, not according to private opinion; according to law, and not humour; it is to be, not arbitrary, vague, and fanciful, but legal and re ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... n validly performed cannot be pressed into service for upholding the period for which the detention would continue if the order of detention itself suffers from an illegality rendering it unsustainable. That apart, the reasoning of no prejudice being suffered by the detenu because a power of revocation/modification is available to the Government would not be of any consolation if such power were not exercised at all. In such a case, the prejudice would be writ large. The decision in Vijay Kumar (supra) is, therefore, distinguishable. 70. Viewed reasonably, the period of detention ought to necessarily vary depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case and cannot be uniform in all cases. The objective sought to be fulfilled in each case, whether is sub-served by continuing detention for the maximum period, ought to bear some reflection in the order of detention; or else, the Government could be accused of unreasonableness and unfairness. Detention being a restriction on the invaluable right to personal liberty of an individual and if the same were to be continued for the maximum period, it would be eminently just and desirable that such restriction on personal liberty, i ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... f detention. *** 75. Mr. Luthra rightly pointed out that the excerpted sentence is part of the discussion made by this Court while dealing with the first contention of the appellant that the detention order was contrary to the proviso to section 3(2) of the 1986 Act. 76. Mr. Dave next relied on the reasons assigned in Pesala Nookaraju (supra) to contend that the impugned Detention Order should be held legal and unexceptionable. 77. On the merits of the matter, we find the Court in Pesala Nookaraju (supra) to have found the impugned order of detention to be perfectly valid. This is borne out by paragraphs 65 and 71, which we quote hereunder: 65. *** if the detention is on the ground that the detenu is indulging in manufacture or transport or sale of liquor then that by itself would not become an activity prejudicial to the maintenance of public order because the same can be effectively dealt with under the provisions of the Prohibition Act but if the liquor sold by the detenu is dangerous to public health then under the Act of 1986, it becomes an activity prejudicial to the maintenance of public order, therefore, it becomes necessary for the detaining authority to b ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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