TMI Blog2014 (10) TMI 1074X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e facts which noticed above are evaluated in the light of the law laid down in Nakul Deo Singh and the Apex Court judgments, the only conclusion that is possible is that no part of the cause of action, much less any integral part of the cause of action, has arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court justifying the entertainment of these writ petitions. The Division Bench judgment in Selvin Abraham v. Punjab Sind Bank is overruled - petition dismissed. - ANTONY DOMINIC, K. RAMAKRISHNAN AND ANIL K. NARENDRAN, JJ. For the Appellant : V.B. Hari Narayanan, SC For the Respondent : T.C. Govinda Swamy, Adv. and N. Nagaresh, Assistant Solicitor General JUDGMENT ANTONY DOMINIC, J. 1. W.P.(C). 22184/13 was filed by the first respondent herein, seeking to quash Ext. P1 order issued by the appellant, the first respondent in the writ petition, W.A. No. 743 of 2014 W.P.(C). Nos. 22184 of 2013 8678 of 2014 and to direct the appellant to allow him to join duty as Professor (Management). When the writ petition came up for orders, appellant raised an objection that since the entire cause of action had arisen at Chennai, the writ petition filed in t ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... for certain misconducts. Enquiry was conducted at Coimbatore and the charges were proved. The Disciplinary Authority dismissed him from service. This order was served on him at his native place in Kerala. His appeal and review were also dismissed. He filed a writ petition before the Kerala High Court challenging the order of suspension, dismissal and the orders passed by the appellate and review authorities. Objection was raised by the bank that this Court lacked territorial jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition as the entire cause of action arose outside the State. This contention was accepted by the learned single Judge, relying on the judgment of the Full Bench in Nakul Deo Singh (supra) and the writ petition was accordingly dismissed. 6. Before the Division Bench, the contention raised was that the order of dismissal became effective only when it was served on the appellant at his address at Kottayam in the State of Kerala and therefore, an integral part of the cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of this Court. The appellant also relied on the Apex Court judgments in State of Punjab v. Amarsingh Harika (AIR 1966 SC 1313), Union of India v. P. Kunhabdulla (198 ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... der on communication by registered post and since the order was communicated to the aggrieved while he was residing within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court, it must be held that part of the cause of action to challenge the order of removal from service arose within the State of Kerala where the order became effective by service on the employee. The Division Bench also held that where the impugned order is made by an authority in one State, which becomes effective on service in another State, the High Court in the latter State will also have jurisdiction as part of the cause of action arises therein. 11. In Thomaskutty (supra), another Division Bench of this Court held that mere service of notice cannot give rise to cause of action unless the service of notice is an integral part of the cause of action. It was held that since the appeal was rejected by the authority located beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the Kerala High Court, merely because intimation of the rejection of appeal was communicated to the petitioner who was then within the jurisdiction of this High Court, that would not confer on this Court jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of Indi ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... said decision for a Government servant to challenge an order against him, it was not sufficient to establish that an order of termination of his service has been made. That Government servant must further prove that the consequences of that order fell on him. The factum of the passing of the order by itself cannot afford him a ground to claim relief at the hands of the court. Therefore, for a claimant of that kind cause of action would arise at the place where the order of termination of service was made and also at the place where its consequence fell on the servant. This decision was followed by that court in Damamal v. Union of India (AIR 1967 Bom. 355). The Division Bench in that case said that even if the order were one made by the authority in New Delhi, there could hardly be any doubt that the effect of the order fell on the petitioner in that case at Ullas Nagar where he resided. It was also stated that it was not in dispute that the proceedings that would be taken against the petitioner in consequence of the impugned order would be by officers located within the territory in relation to which that court exercised jurisdiction. It may have to be noted here straightaway that ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ddhule Kalyanerama Rao v. Nabard, Bombay ((1994) 4 SLR 166). The learned Judge referred to the decision of the Kerala High Court in P.P. Gopalan's case and also the decision of the Calcutta High Court in S.K. Chatterji v. Coalfields Ltd. (1986 Lab IC 50). 16. In Union of India v. Oswal Woollen Mills Ltd. (1984 (2) SCC 646) the Supreme Court held that a Writ Petition under Art 226 of the Constitution should be filed either where the registered office of the company is situate or at the place where the particular respondents against whom primary relief was sought are located. Their Lordships pointed out that an inevitable result of filing of writ petitions elsewhere than at the place where the concerned office and the relevant records are located would be to delay prompt return and contest. This was followed by another decision of the Supreme Court in State of Rajasthan v. M/s. Swaika Properties (1985 SC 1289). In that decision their Lordships held that the very service of notice in the State of West Bengal under S. 55(2) of Rajasthan Urban Improvements Act on the owner of the land situate in the State of Rajasthan informing him of me State Government's proposal to acquire ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... r filed before the appellate authority in Delhi was dismissed by an order passed from Delhi, the mere fact that that order dismissing the appeal was conveyed to the petitioner at Calcutta could not enable the aggrieved person to invoke the jurisdiction of the High Court of Calcutta under Art 226 of the Constitution. The High Court held that it had no territorial jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition. After referring to the relevant decisions including the one in M/s. Swaika Properties and the one in Oil and Natural Gas Commission v. Utpal Kumar Basu (1994 (4) SCC 711) the Calcutta High Court again held in Kishori Prasad Sinha v. Union of India (1997 (5) SLR 353) that a writ petition could not be maintained in the Calcutta High Court on the allegation that the consequence of non-selection of the petitioner to a post outside the State by the authority that held the selection procedure outside the State fell on the petitioner at Calcutta and hence Writ Petition could be maintained in the Calcutta High Court. In Oil and Natural Gas Commission v. Utpal Kumar Basu (1994 (4) SCC 711) after referring to the Swaika Properties' case and the passage from Mulla on Code of Civil Proce ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... s communicated to the officer concerned or is otherwise published. 19. What really arise for decision is whether the fact that on communication of the order it becomes effective as far as a person is concerned and gives him the right to approach the court for relief is really a fact which is part of the bundle of facts that constitute a cause of action. It is well recognised that there is a distinction between cause of action and right of action. In American Jurisprudence 2nd Edn. Vol. I at page 541 it is stated as follows:- Although the courts sometimes confuse the term `cause of action' and `right of action' and state that right of action at law arises from the existence of a primary right in the plaintiff and the invasion of that right by some delict on the part of the defendant, in a legal sense, these terms are not synonymous or interchangeable. A right of action is the right to presently enforce a cause of action - a remedial right affording redress for the infringement of legal right belonging to some definite person, a cause of action is the operative facts which give rise to such right of action. Right of action does not arose until the performance of condit ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ld that illegality in the award of the contract at a station outside the jurisdiction of the High Court of Allahabad could not be entertained in the High Court of Allahabad merely on the ground that the station where the contract was to be performed fell within the jurisdiction of the High Court of Allahabad. In the recent decision of the Supreme Court in C.B.I. Mumbai v. Narayan Diwakar (JT 1999 (3) SC 635) the Supreme Court held that when a case was registered at Bombay a wireless message issued to the respondent at Ita Nagar Arunachal Pradesh to come and see the Inspector C.B.I., at Bombay on its receipt at Ita Nagar does not confer jurisdiction on the High Court at Gauhati under Art. 226 of the Constitution to quash the First Information Report. The Court took the view that the receipt of information by the aggrieved person that he should meet the concerned Inspector at Bombay does not enable that person to approach the High Court which has jurisdiction over the place from where he received the communication. 20. It appears to us that the decisions in M/s. Swaika Properties case and the decision of the Supreme Court and that of the High Court subsequent thereto clearly estab ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... become effective only on such communication to the aggrieved person only furnishes the aggrieved person with a right of action. Receipt of the communication is not a fact in the bundle of facts constituting the cause of action. Even though only on receipt of the order the aggrieved person may be able to challenge that order, receipt of the order cannot be said to be a fact forming the cause of action. For, the cause of action arises on the appeal being dismissed by the authority outside the jurisdiction of the court. The fact that until an order is published or made known, the order does not became effective since it will be open to the authority to change his mind before releasing the order, is not a ground to hold that the communication of the order also forms part of the cause of action to the aggrieved person. The fact that a person who was dismissed from service while he was in service outside the State would have to suffer the consequence of that dismissal when he is in his native place by being rendered jobless, is not a fact which constitutes the bundle of facts giving rise to a cause of action in his favour to challenge his dismissal. That right accrued to him earlier whe ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... sed in that behalf by the respondents is well founded. 13. The aforesaid paragraphs of the judgment shows that the Full Bench has laid down the principle that receipt of communication by itself does not constitute a fact in the bundle of facts constituting cause of action and that at best, receipt of the order or communication only gives the party right of action based on the cause of action, which already arose out of the action complained of. On that basis, the Full Bench took the view that when the action complained of takes place outside the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court and an appeal therefrom is also dismissed by an authority located outside the jurisdiction of the High Court, cause of action wholly arises outside jurisdiction of the High Court and Article 226(2) of the Constitution of India cannot be invoked to sustain a writ petition on the basis that an integral part of the cause of action has arisen within the jurisdiction of this Court. 14. The Full Bench has also held that the fact that until it is published or made known, an order does not become effective is not a ground to hold that the communication of the order to the aggrieved person forms part ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... l jurisdiction. According to NICCO, it became aware of the contract proposed to be given by ONGC on reading the advertisement which appeared in the Times of India at Calcutta. In response thereto, it submitted its bid or tender from its Calcutta office and revised the rates subsequently. When it learnt that it was considered ineligible it sent representations, including fax messages, to EIL, ONGC, etc., at New Delhi, demanding justice. As stated earlier, the Steering Committee finally rejected the offer of NICCO and awarded the contract to CIMMCO at New Delhi on 27-1-1993. Therefore, broadly speaking, NICCO claims that a part of the cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of the Calcutta High Court because it became aware of the advertisement in Calcutta, it submitted its bid or tender from Calcutta and made representations demanding justice from Calcutta on learning about the rejection of its offer. The advertisement itself mentioned that the tenders should be submitted to EIL at New Delhi; that those would be scrutinised at New Delhi and that a final decision whether or not to award the contract to the tenderer would be taken at New Delhi. Of course, the execution of the co ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... which have no bearing with the lis or the dispute involved in the case, do not give rise to a cause of action so as to confer territorial jurisdiction on the court concerned. If we apply this principle then we see that none of the facts pleaded in para 16 of the petition, in our opinion, falls into the category of bundle of facts which would constitute a cause of action giving rise to a dispute which could confer territorial jurisdiction on the courts at Ahmedabad. 18. The issue of territorial jurisdiction again came up for consideration before the Apex Court in National Textiles Corp. Ltd. v. Haribox Swalram ((2004) 9 SCC 786). In that case, upholding the objection that the Calcutta High Court did not territorial jurisdiction in the matter and allowing the appeal, the Apex Court held thus in paragraphs 12 and 12.1. 12. In the present case, the textile mills are situate in Bombay and the supply of cloth was to be made by them ex-factory at Bombay. According to the writ petitioners, the money was paid to the mills at Bombay. The learned Single Judge after a detailed discussion of the matter held that the Calcutta High Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... petition. For the purpose of this judgment, we feel paragraph 27 of the judgment is relevant and therefore, is extracted for reference: 27. When an order, however, is passed by a court or tribunal or an executive authority whether under provisions of a statute or otherwise, a part of cause of action arises at that place. Even in a given case, when the original authority is constituted at one place and the appellate authority is constituted at another, a writ petition would be maintainable at both the places. In other words, as order of the appellate authority constitutes a part of cause of action, a writ petition would be maintainable in the High Court within whose jurisdiction it is situate having regard to the fact that the order of the appellate authority is also required to be set aside and as the order of the original authority merges with that of the appellate authority. 20. Yet another principle that is laid down in paragraph 30 of the judgment is one of forum conveniens. According to the Apex Court, even if a small part of the cause of action arises within the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court, the same by itself may not be considered to be a determinative ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ugh in view of Section 141 of the Code of Civil Procedure the provisions thereof would not apply to writ proceedings, the phraseology used in Section 20(c) of the Code of Civil Procedure and Clause (2) of Article 226, being in pari materia, the decisions of this Court rendered on interpretation of Section 20(c) CPC shall apply to the writ proceedings also. Before proceeding to discuss the matter further it may be pointed out that the entire bundle of facts pleaded need not constitute a cause of action, as what is necessary to be proved, before the petitioner can obtain a decree, is material facts. The expression material facts is also known as integral facts. 41. Keeping in view the expression cause of action used in Clause (2) of Article 226 of the Constitution of India, indisputably even if a small fraction thereof accrues within the jurisdiction of the Court, the Court will have jurisdiction in the matter though the doctrine of forum conveniens may also have to be considered. 22. The factual dispute that led to the judgment in Alchemist Ltd. v. State bank of Sikkim ((2007) 11 SCC 335) was that the appellant having its registered and corporate office at Chandigarh, respo ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ds Ltd. v. Kalyan Banerjee ((2008) 3 SCC 456). In that case, the company was having its head office in West Bengal and the employee therein was terminated by his appointing authority who had his office in Jharkhand. The writ petition was filed before the Calcutta High Court which held that it had jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition. In the appeal filed, the Apex Court held that only that court within which the entire cause of action had arisen will have jurisdiction and that no part of the cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of the Calcutta High Court. On that basis, the appeal was allowed. 25. We should also make reference to some of the judgments of this Court where Nakul Deo Singh (supra) was followed. Prakash v. Food Corporation of India (2007 (4) KLT 895) was a case where disciplinary action was initiated while the employee was working in the Food Corporation's establishment in Bihar. Later, he was transferred to Kerala. While working in Kerala, he was served with a memo of charges pursuant to which, inquiry was conducted. The order of punishment was communicated to the employee, who, by that time, was transferred and was posted at Pune. An appeal was ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... w. It is also the settled principle of law that in a service dispute, issue of an order of termination gives rise to cause of action and service of that communication, though is necessary to give effect to the order, does not amount to a part of the cause of action much less an integral part of the cause of action. In other words, the issue of the order gives rise to the cause of action and the service of the order gives rise to a right of action. 29. Having understood the principles laid down in Nakul Deo Singh as above, the further question is whether there is any distinction between the service of the order of dismissal passed by the disciplinary authority and the order of the appellate authority rejecting an appeal filed against the order of dismissal. We have already seen from the Full Bench judgment that when an appeal is filed against an order of dismissal and the appellate authority passed an order thereon, the order of the disciplinary authority would merge into the appellate authority's order. If the principles governing cause of action with respect to the order issued by the disciplinary authority are applied in the context of an order issued by the appellate auth ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... order of dismissal is not a mere service of a notice, it definitely gives rise to a cause of action and such service of notice forms an integral part of the cause of action. If it is to be held that it does not form an integral part of cause of action, the factum of service of such order of dismissal does not require to be proved for giving effect to the order of dismissal . 32. Reading of this judgment would show that after noticing the respective contentions and precedents, including the judgment in Nakul Deo Singh, the Division Bench found that the question to be considered was whether; while serving the order of dismissal on the appellant at Kottayam in the State of Kerala, whether it forms part of a cause of action enabling the appellant to file a Writ Petition before this Court. 33. Thereafter, the Division Bench considered whether, Kunhabdulla's case was overruled by the Full Bench in Nakul Deo Singh's case. In this context, after referring to the facts in Kunhabulla's case and Thomaskutty's case and also the Full Bench judgment, the Division Bench concluded thus; 15. The Full Bench proceeds further and draws a distinction between cause of act ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... was employed at the relevant time and not in his native place to which he might have retired on his dismissal. This expression of view by the Full Bench without overruling the judgment in Kunhabdulla's case (supra) gives an indication that the Full Bench was considering the impact of service of notice in the appeal and not the factual circumstances relating to service of the original order of dismissal. In fact the observation That right accrued to him earlier when he was dismissed from service outside the State and he lost his employment indicates approval of Kunhabdulla's case (supra) whereas the observation When a person is dismissed or reduced in rank, he suffers the consequences where he was employed at the relevant time and not in his native place to which he might have retired on his dismissal gives an indication of implied overruling of Kunhabdulla's case (supra). 34. Reading of paragraph 15 of Selvin Abraham shows that the Division Bench has proceeded on the footing that in the cases before the Full Bench, orders rejecting the appeals were communicated in the state of Kerala and that the question considered by the Full Bench was whether such communica ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... s Ltd. and finally held that an order of dismissal when it becomes effective definitely forms an integral part of the cause of action. It is on that basis, the writ petition was held to be maintainable. 37. First of all, the Division Bench has distinguished Nakul Deo Singh primarily on the basis that the said case dealt with the question whether service of an order in an appeal would be an integral part of the cause of action. In so far as this reasoning adopted by the Division Bench in Selvin Abraham is concerned, according to us, in determining the question of cause of action, whether the order served is that of the original authority or that of the appellate authority is immaterial. 38. The Full Bench judgment shows that in service disputes where the appellate authority has passed an order in the appeal filed against the disciplinary authority's order, the order would merge in the appellate order. Therefore, the order of the disciplinary authority loses its separate existence and what survives for challenge is the appellate order and it is the service of the appellate order that gives effect to the proceedings initiated and concluded by the disciplinary authority. We h ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... d with cases arising out of service of orders of the disciplinary authority but that of the appellate authority is factually erroneous. Therefore, the distinction drawn by the Division Bench does not have any sound basis. 41. Paragraph 16 of the judgment shows that in Selvin Abraham, the Division Bench was uncertain as to whether the Full Bench had approved or disapproved the judgment in Kunhabdulla. It is true that in Nakul Deo Singh, the Full Bench has not, in specific terms, stated that Kunhabdulla is overruled. But a reading of the judgment shows that the Full Bench did not approve the principles laid down therein and on the other hand, approved the principles laid down in Thomaskutty. This, therefore, leaves no room for doubt that the judgment in Kunhabdulla is at least impliedly overruled by the Full Bench in Nakul Deo Singh. 42. The Division Bench further relies on the judgment of the Apex Court in Amarsingh Harika to hold that only on service of the order, it becomes effective and therefore, an integral part of the cause of action arose at the place where the order is served, to entertain a challenge against the order. In this context, it is relevant to state that rat ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ctive unless it is published and communicated to the officer concerned. If the appointing authority passed an order of dismissal, but does not communicate it to the officer concerned, theoretically it is possible that unlike in the case of a judicial order pronounced in Court, the authority may change its mind and decide to modify its order. It may be that in some cases, the authority may fell that the ends of justice would be met by demoting the officer concerned rather than dismissing him. An order of dismissal passed by the appropriate authority and kept with itself, cannot be said to take effect unless the officer concerned knows about the said order and it is otherwise communicated to all the parties concerned. If it is held that the mere passing of the order of dismissal has the effect of terminating the services of the officer concerned, various complications may arise. If before receiving the order of dismissal, the officer has exercised his power and jurisdiction to take decisions or do acts within his authority and power, would those acts and decisions be rendered invalid after it is known that an order of dismissal had already been passed against him? Would the officer c ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... torial jurisdiction. Therefore, in our view, Amarsingh Harika is not a precedent on the issue of territorial jurisdiction and could not have been of any relevance on that issue. 46. In paragraph 9 of Selvin Abraham, it is seen that the Division Bench rejected the contention that Nakul Deo Singh was approved by the Apex Court in Mosaraf Hossain Khan (supra) This is on the reasoning that the Supreme Court in this case was considering the question regarding what constitutes cause of action in the light of section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 and was not concerned with a similar factual situation. The judgment in Mosaraf Hossain Khan (supra) shows that complaints were filed against it under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act in the court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Birbhum at Suri. On receipt of summons in the case, a writ petition was filed before this Court which was registered as W.P.(C). 2666/05. The writ petition was admitted and an interim stay of further proceedings pursuant to the complaints, including the arrest of the petitioners was passed. 47. Paragraph 14 of the judgment shows that according to the Apex Court, the preliminary question that ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ch was addressed to him on his home address in Gaya, Bihar rejecting his claim for disability compensation. It is further evident that when the appellant was signed off and declared medically unfit, he returned back to his home in the District of Gaya, Bihar and, thereafter, he made all claims and filed representation from his home address at Gaya and those letters and representations were entertained by the respondents and replied and a decision on those representations were communicated to him on his home address in Bihar, Admittedly, appellant was suffering from serious heard muscles disease (Dilated Cardiomyopathy) and breathing problem which forced him to stay in native place, wherefrom he had been making all correspondence with regard to his disability compensation. Prima facie, therefore, considering all the facts together, a part or fraction of cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of the Patna High Court where he received a letter of refusal disentitling him from disability compensation. 21. Apart from that, from the counter-affidavit of the respondents and the documents annexed therewith, it reveals that after the writ petition was filed in the Patna High Court ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... Uniyal v. State of Uttarakhand ((2012) 8 SCC 417). In Shyam Babu Verma's case (supra), relief was granted observing that it shall only be just and proper not to recover any excess amount which has already been paid to them . In Sahib Ram's case (supra), it was observed that Under the circumstances the amount paid till date may not be recovered from the appellant . 51. In its judgment, the Apex court held that these observations were made in exercise of the extraordinary powers under Article 142 of the Constitution of India which vests the power in the Apex Court to pass equitable orders in the ends of justice. Proceeding further, explaining the nature of the powers exercised by it under Article 142 of the Constitution of India and Article 136 thereof, the Apex Court held thus; The directions of the Court under Article 142 of the Constitution, while moulding the relief, that relax the application of law or exempt the case in hand from the rigour of the law in view of the peculiar facts and circumstances do not comprise the ratio decidendi and therefore lose its basic premise of making it a precedent . On the aforesaid reasoning, concluding that Rafiq Masih was ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... fits emanating therefrom; 55. In so far as W.P.(C). 8678/14 is concerned, since 30.3.2009, the petitioner herein was working as Branch Manager of Indian Bank at Microsate at Puducherry. He continued there till 29.4.2010 when he was transferred and posted to Perinthalmanna, where, he joined on 1.5.2010. He was later transferred to Kunnamkulam on 11.7.2011 and while working at Kunnamkulam, by Ext. P2 order, he was placed under suspension pending disciplinary action. He was thereafter issued with Ext. P3 memo of charges containing various misconducts, all relating to his tenure at Puducherry and the disciplinary authority was the Assistant General Manager, Zonal office, Puducherry, the 4th respondent. Preliminary enquiry was conducted at the Zonal office, Puducherry on 30.12.2011 and the petitioner participated in the enquiry. 56. Thereafter, enquiry was also conducted at the Zonal office, Puducherry in which also, the petitioner participated. Ext. P4 is the report of the enquiry that was submitted to the disciplinary authority. The disciplinary authority, thereafter, forwarded the enquiry report along with his letter dated 20.7.2012, which was served on the petitioner while he ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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