TMI Blog2019 (9) TMI 1717X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... or proceeding and not by the law that prevails on the date of its decision or on the date of the filing of the appeal. In Anant Mills Company Limited vs. State of Gujarat, [ 1975 (1) TMI 62 - SUPREME COURT] (Anant Mills Company), it has been held that though the right of appeal is a creature of a statute, there is no reason why the legislature while granting the right cannot impose conditions for the exercise of such right so long as the conditions are not so onerous as to amount to unreasonable restrictions rendering the right almost illusory. There is a fundamental distinction between a right to file a suit and right to file an appeal which has been explained by Y.V. Chandrachud J. (as he then was) in the case of Ganga Bai vs. Vijay Kumar, [ 1974 (4) TMI 95 - SUPREME COURT] . Filing of a suit or an appeal within the prescribed period of limitation - HELD THAT:- In N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy, [ 1998 (9) TMI 602 - SUPREME COURT] (N. Balakrishnan), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of the parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but seek their remedy promptly. Th ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... #39;ble Supreme Court considered the scheme of Electricity Act and observed that it is a self-contained comprehensive legislation and a special adjudicatory forum i.e., Tribunal has been established to deal with a grievance of any person who may be aggrieved by an order of an adjudicating officer or of an appropriate Commission. Thus, whenever there is a special enactment prescribing a limitation period different from the Limitation Act, it is necessary to consider as to whether Section 5 of the Limitation Act is excluded. of course, in Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, the expression used is expressly excluded by special or local law . But, with the passage of time, the expression expressly excluded has also been interpreted to also mean exclusion by necessary implication having regard to the scope, object and scheme of the special law being a code by itself prescribing a limitation period different from the Limitation Act, which would exclude application of Section 5 of the Limitation Act - in computing the period of limitation for filing an appeal under Section 74(1) of the 2013 Act, the time spent in prosecuting bona fide with due diligence an appeal before an appellat ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... on prescribed under Section 74(1) of the 2013 Act so that the right to file an appeal is not lost either on account of ignorance of the provision or due to laxity in acting within time. Appeal dismissed. - B.V. Nagarathna and K. Natarajan, JJ. For the Appellant : Vasant Fernandes, HCGP. For the Respondents : Sajan Poovayya, Aditya Sondhi, Senior Advocates for Shirish Krishna and Monica Patil, Advocates. JUDGMENT B.V. NAGARATHNA, J. 1. The Deputy Commissioner, also the Special Land Acquisition Officer, Bengaluru ('SLAO' for short) has preferred this appeal assailing the judgment and award dated 29/10/2018 passed in Land Acquisition Case No. 33 of 2017 (LAC No. 33 of 2017) by the II Additional City Civil and Sessions Judge (C.C.H. No. 17) at Bengaluru (hereinafter referred to as 'reference court' for the sake of convenience). By the said judgment and award, the reference made by the SLAO under Section 64(1) of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 ('2013 Act' for the sake of convenience) is allowed and total compensation of Rs. 207,75,63,348/- (Rupees two ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from filing the appeal within the said period, allow it to be filed within a further period of not exceeding sixty days. That in the instant case, the award was passed on 29/10/2018 and sixty days from the date of the award is 28/12/2018. Further period of sixty days is provided for filing the appeal which is the extended period, provided the appellant is able to satisfy the High Court that he was prevented by sufficient cause from filing the appeal within sixty days. That, beyond the initial period of sixty days, a further period of only sixty days is provided to file an appeal which ended in the instant case on 26/02/2019. But, the instant appeal is filed beyond the said extended period of sixty days on 13/05/2019. That such an appeal is not maintainable and hence, the application seeking condonation of delay filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act ought to be dismissed and such an application under 2013 Act is not at all maintainable as the said Section does not apply to Section 74 of 2013 Act. In this regard, our attention was drawn to Section 29 of the Limitation Act to contend that the savings clause under Section 29(2) of the ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... d, appeal preferred, and application made after the prescribed period shall be dismissed, although limitation has not been set up as a defence. (2) For the purposes of this Act,--(a) a suit is instituted,-- (i) in an ordinary case, when the plaint is presented to the proper officer; (ii) in the case of a pauper, when his application for leave to sue as a pauper is made; and (iii) in the case of a claim against a company which is being wound up by the court, when the claimant first sends in his claim to the official liquidator; (b) any claim by way of a set off or a counter claim, shall be treated as a separate suit and shall be deemed to have been instituted-- (i) in the case of a set off, on the same date as the suit in which the set off is pleaded; (ii) in the case of a counter claim, on the date on which the counter claim is made in court; (c) an application by notice of motion in a High Court is made when the application is presented to the proper officer of that court. x x x 5. Extension of prescribed period in certain cases.--Any appeal or any application, other than an application under any of the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil P ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... or leave to appeal or for revision or for review of a judgment, the day on which the judgment complained of was pronounced and the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree, sentence or order appealed from or sought to be revised or reviewed shall be excluded. (3) Where a decree or order is appealed from or sought to be revised or reviewed, or where an application is made for leave to appeal from a decree or order, the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the judgment shall also be excluded. (4) In computing the period of limitation for an application to set aside an award, the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the award shall be excluded. Explanation.--In computing under this section the time requisite for obtaining a copy of a decree or an order, any time taken by the court to prepare the decree or order before an application for a copy thereof is made shall not be excluded. 13. Exclusion of time in cases where leave to sue or appeal as a pauper is applied for.--In computing the period of limitation prescribed for any suit or appeal in any case where an application for leave to sue or appeal as a pauper has been made and rejected, the time during which ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... nd/or if the appellant satisfies this Court that he was prevented by sufficient cause from filing the appeal within the said period, he could have preferred the appeal within a further period not exceeding sixty days, but not thereafter. Admittedly, in the instant case, the appeal is filed beyond one hundred and twenty (120) days from the date of the award (sixty days + sixty days) and hence, the appeal itself is not maintainable as Section 5 of the Limitation Act cannot be invoked under Section 74(1) of the 2013 Act, is the contention of the respondent. 11. This contention is, however, rebutted by learned HCGP by submitting that the provision of Section 5 of the Limitation Act is applicable and even if the appeal is filed beyond one hundred and twenty days (120 days), there is scope for condoning the same under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. That such an application has been filed and it may be allowed. That Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act does not expressly exclude Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act particularly Section 5 thereof, is the submission of learned HCGP. 12. At the outset, it must be noted that Section 74 of 2013 Act deals with filing an appeal to the H ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... dship Krishna Iyer J's observation in Sita Ram vs. State of U.P., [ (1979) 2 SCC 656] (Sita Ram), wherein he has observed that an appeal is the right of entering a superior court and invoking its aid and interposition to redress the error of the court below . In an appeal, strictly the question is whether the order of the court from which the appeal is brought was right on the materials which that court had before it ... A right of appeal, where it exists, is a matter of substance, and not of procedure. Thus, the right of appeal is paramount, the procedure for hearing canalises so that extravagant prolixity or abuse of process can be avoided and a fair workability provided. Amputation is not procedure while pruning may be. That an appeal is a remedial right and if the remedy is reduced to a husk by procedural excess, the right becomes a casualty. That cannot be. 17. With regard to filing of a suit or an appeal within the prescribed period of limitation, in N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy, [(1998) 7 SCC 123] (N. Balakrishnan), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under: 11. Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of parties. They are meant to ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... by an Authority under Section 69 may file an appeal to the High Court within sixty days from the date of the Award. The crucial words are within sixty days from the date of the award . Thus, the limitation period commences from the date of the award . The proviso however states that if the appellant has not preferred the appeal within sixty days from the date of the award and he could satisfy that he was prevented by sufficient cause from filing the appeal, then the High Court could, on being satisfied, allow the said appeal to be filed beyond the period of sixty days from the date of the award. Further, the appeal ought to have been filed within a further period not exceeding sixty days from the expiry of sixty days from the date of the award . In other words, on a simple reading of Section 74(1) of 2013 Act and the proviso thereto, it would imply that an appeal could be filed within sixty days from the date of the award; that 60 days is the prescribed period of limitation under the 2013 Act. But, a further period of sixty days is provided to file the appeal provided the appellant satisfies the High Court that he was prevented by sufficient cause from filing the appeal within t ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... Section 3 of the Limitation Act states that every suit instituted, appeal preferred, and application made after the prescribed period shall be dismissed, although limitation has not been set up as a defence. Clause (a) to sub-section (2) of Section 3 of the Limitation Act deals as to when a suit is instituted. Clause (b) to sub-section (2) of Section 3 states as to when a claim by way of set off or a counter claim is deemed to have been instituted and Clause (c) to sub-section (2) of Section 3 states that an application by notice of motion in a High Court is made when the application is presented to the proper officer of that Court. Section 3 of the Limitation Act has been adverted to in the case of State of Orissa vs. Mamata Mohanti, [(2011) 3 SCC 436] (Mamata Mohanti), wherein it has been observed that by virtue of Section 3 of the Limitation Act, it is obligatory on the part of the Court to dismiss a suit or appeal, if filed after the prescribed period even though the limitation is not set up as a defence or there is no defence raised on the issue of limitation, even at the appellate stage, because in some of the cases, it may go to the root of the matter. However, Section 3 is ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... his stage to deduce the development of law on the point for consideration. 26. Hukumdev Narain Yadav vs. Lalit Narian Mishra, [(1974) 2 SCC 133], (Hukumdev Narain Yadav), is a matter which arose under the Representation of People Act, 1951. Under Section 81 of the said Act, a period of 45 days from the date of the election of a returned candidate is the limitation time prescribed within which an election petition calling in question any election on one or more grounds specified in sub-section (1) of Sections 100 and 101 has to be presented to the High Court. In the said case, the election petition had been presented beyond the period of 45 days and had been dismissed. One of the questions considered was, by virtue of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, whether the provisions of Sections 4 to 24 of the said Act were applicable to election petitions and if so, whether Section 5 of the Limitation Act was applicable. Also, whether the facts of the case therein warranted condonation of delay. Thus, unless Section 5 of the Limitation Act was made applicable, the discretion of the Court to extend the time would not be available. 27. In the said case, a comparison of Section 29(2) o ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... eme of the provisions concerning the filing of election petition under the Representation of the People Act, 1951, that Section 5 of the Limitation act did not govern the filing of the election petition or their trial and hence, the application filed for condonation of delay did not warrant any consideration. 28. In Union of India vs. Popular Construction Company, [2001 (8) SCC 470] (Popular Construction Company), the question that arose for determination was whether Section 5 of the Limitation Act was applicable to an application challenging an award under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as Arbitration Act ). Section 34 of the Arbitration Act states that an application seeking setting aside an arbitral award may not be made after three months have elapsed from the date on which the party making that application had received the arbitral award or, if a request had been made under Section 33, from the date on which that request had been disposed of by the arbitral tribunal. The proviso thereto further states that if the Court is satisfied that the applicant was prevented by sufficient cause from making the application within the ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... d securities for the specified period. From the date of such notification, properties (both movable and immovable) belonging to such person, stood attached under Sub Section (3) of Section 3. Section 4(2) of the Act permits any person aggrieved by a notification issued under Section 3(2) to file an objection within 30 days of its issuance. Question arose whether the said period of limitation of 30 days prescribed under Section 4(2) of the said Act was mandatory, or could be extended by resort to Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The Supreme Court held that the period of limitation prescribed in Section 4(2) of the said Act was mandatory and invoked Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act to exclude the application of Section 5 of the Limitation Act by observing that the Act in question was a special statute. The Supreme Court also observed that in view of express provision for condonation of delay, coupled with a non-obstante provision which states that the provisions of the said Act shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other law for the time being in force, or in any instrument having effect by virtue of any law or in any decree or order of ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... f the Arbitration Act. In the said case, after referring to section 34 of the Arbitration Act, and considering the same in light of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, it was observed that when any special statute prescribes certain period of limitation as well as provision for extension up to specified time limit on sufficient cause being shown, the period of limitation prescribed under the special law shall prevail and to that extent, the provisions of Limitation Act shall stand excluded. This is because of the intention of the Parliament in enacting sub-section (3) of Section 34 of the Act of 1996. That an application for setting aside the award must be made within three months and the period can be further extended on sufficient cause being shown by another period of thirty days, but not thereafter. Hence, Section 5 of the Limitation Act is inapplicable as it stands excluded under Section 29(2) of the Limitation. Further, it was also observed that even though Section 5 of the Limitation act is not applicable to an application filed under Section 34 of the Act for setting aside the award, one need not conclude that Section 14 of the Limitation Act would also be inapplicable to ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ssly provided. This is because, the Schedule to the Limitation Act prescribes the period of limitation only to proceedings in Courts and not to any proceedings before any Tribunal or quasi-judicial authority. Therefore, it was held that the provisions of the Limitation Act could apply to all proceedings under the Arbitration Act both in Court and in arbitration except to the extent expressly excluded by the provisions of the Arbitration Act. This was because of the express reference to applicability of the Limitation Act to the proceedings in Court and arbitral Tribunal under Section 43 of the Arbitration Act. (c) The next question considered by his Lordship was whether under the proviso to Section 34(3) of the Arbitration Act, Section 14 of Limitation Act was excluded. Section 14 of Limitation Act relates to exclusion of time when proceeding bona fide in a court without jurisdiction. While considering Section 14 in light of Section 34(3) of the Arbitration Act and the proviso thereto, it was observed that the use of the words but not thereafter in the proviso makes it clear that even if a sufficient cause is made out for a longer extension, the extension cannot be beyond thir ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... here is no prohibition provided under Section 34, there is no reason why Section 14 of the Limitation Act should not be read into the Arbitration Act, which would advance the cause of justice. Thus, if a statute is silent and if there is no specific provision, then the statute should be interpreted which advances the cause of justice. The same view was reiterated in Coal India Limited vs. Ujjal Transport Agency, [(2011) 1 SCC 117] (Ujjal Transport Agency). 36. In Commissioner of Central Excise Customs vs. Hongo India (P) Ltd., [(2009) 5 SCC 791] (Hongo India), the question for consideration was whether the High Court had the power to condone the delay in presentation of the reference application under the unamended Section 35-H(1) of the Central Excise Act, 1944 beyond the prescribed period by applying Section 5 of the Limitation Act. Section 35-H(1) states that the Commissioner of Central Excise or other party, within a period of 180 days of the date upon which he is served with notice of an order under Section 35C, direct the Tribunal to refer to the High Court any question of law arising from such order of the Tribunal. In the said matter, the Commissioner of Customs and Ce ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... tion of the decision or order by the Company Law Board to him on any question of law arising out of such order. The proviso states that if the High Court is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from filing the appeal within the said period (of sixty days), it could allow the appeal to be filed within a further period not exceeding sixty days . It was observed that the Companies Act, 1956 being a special enactment and the Company Law Board being a special Tribunal, there was curtailment of the Court's power by the exclusion of operation of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, if the appeal was filed beyond 120 days. 38. In Chhattisgarh State Electricity Board vs. Central Electricity Regulatory Commission and others, [(2010) 5 SCC 23] (Chhattisgarh State Electricity Board), the question was whether Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 could be invoked by the Hon'ble Supreme Court for allowing the aggrieved persons to file an appeal under Section 125 of the Electricity Act, 2003 after more than 120 days from the date of communication of the decision or order of the Appellate Tribunal for Electricity. Section 125 of the Electricity Act, 2003 sta ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... 125 of the Electricity Act and its proviso. That any other interpretation would defeat the object of the legislation, namely to provide special limitation for filing an appeal against the decision or order of the Tribunal or otherwise proviso to Section 125 would then become nugatory. The Hon'ble Supreme Court then went on to consider the question as to what was the date of the communication of the decision or order for the purpose of Section 125 of the Electricity Act in the said case. In that context, Harish Chandra Raj Singh vs. Land Acquisition Officer, [AIR 1961 SC 1500], (Harish Chandra Raj Singh) was referred to in the context of the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and as to whether an award made under the aforesaid Act can be treated to have been communicated on the date of its making. It was held that the period of limitation for seeking a reference would commence from the date the award was made known to the party under Section 12(2) of the said Act. It would be useful to extract paragraph 6 of Harish Chandra Raj Singh: 6. There is yet another point which leads to the same conclusion. If the award is treated as an administrative decision taken by t ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ransport Commissioner vs. Nand Singh, [(1979) 4 SCC 19], wherein a similar question in the context of filing of an appeal under Section 15 of the U.P. Motor Vehicles Taxation Act, 1935 was construed and the Allahabad High Court held that the date of the communication of the order will be the starting point for limitation of filing an appeal. While approving the view taken by the High Court, Hon'ble Supreme Court observed in paragraph 2 as under: 2. In our opinion, the judgment of the High Court is right and cannot be interfered with by this Court. Apart from the reasons given by this Court in the earlier judgment to the effect that the order must be made known either directly or constructively to the party affected by the order in order to enable him to prefer an appeal if he so likes, we may give one more reason in our judgment and that is this: It is plain that mere writing an order in the file kept in the office of the Taxation Officer is no order in the eye of law in the sense of affecting the rights of the parties for whom the order is meant. The order must be communicated either directly or constructively in the sense of making it known, which may make it possible for ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... limitation period commenced from 07.06.2007, the date on which the impugned order that was passed was conveyed to the parties by letter signed by the Deputy Registrar of the appellate tribunal. It was further held that the appellant despite receipt of letter dated 07.06.2007, or the communication sent by respondent therein on 17.07.2007, filed the appeal almost six months therefrom. It was held that the appeal had been filed after more than 120 days from the date of communication of the Tribunal's order, as such the same could not be entertained. 45. Ketan vs. Special Director, Directorate of Enforcement and another, [(2011) 15 SCC 30] (Ketan) raised the question, as to, whether, the High Court could entertain an appeal under Section 35 of the Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999, from an order of the Appellate Tribunal beyond 120 days. Section 35 of the said Act states that any person aggrieved by any decision or order of the appellate Tribunal may file an appeal to the High Court within sixty days from the date of communication of the decision or order of the Appellate Tribunal to him on any question of law arising out of the said order. The proviso states that the High C ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... 1) of the SICA, 1985, the question was whether it was permissible for AAIFR (appellate authority) under the said Act, to condone the delay beyond the period of 45 days plus 60 days and whether the High Court in exercise of power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India would condone the delay and remit the matter for decision on merits by the AAIFR. In that context, the question as to whether Section 5 of the Limitation Act was applicable was also considered. After elucidating on the scheme of law, under SICA, 1985 and by observing that it is a complete code by itself and the nature of the remedy provided therein is covered by the said Act, it was observed that the intention of the Legislature in enacting sub-section (1) of Section 25 of the SICA, 1985 and proviso thereunder is that the appeal should be preferred within 45 days from the date of issue of the order to a person and the said period can be further extended on sufficient cause being shown, by another 15 days, but not thereafter. That the said period is absolute and cannot be extended under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. Hence, it was held that Section 5 of the Limitation Act was excluded because of the provisions ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... and the dealer or other person so appealing shall serve a copy of the notice of revision on the respondents to the proceedings. Section 84 of the Assam VAT Act states that in computing the period of limitation under that Chapter, the provisions of Sections 4 and 12 of the Limitation Act, 1963 shall, so far as may be, apply. The Hon'ble Supreme Court held, on a scrutiny of the scheme of the VAT Act, it showed that it is a complete Code by not only laying down the forum but also prescribing the time-limit within which each forum is competent to entertain the appeal or revision. The underlying object of the Act appears to be not only to shorten the length of the proceedings initiated under the different provisions contained therein, but also to ensure finality of the decision made thereunder. The fact that the period of limitation described therein has been equally made applicable to the assessee as well as the Revenue lent ample credence to such a conclusion. Therefore, it was held that the application of Section 5 of the Limitation Act to a proceeding under Section 81(1) of the VAT Act was excluded by necessary implication, by virtue of the language employed in Section 84 of the ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... iple of unbreakability of time once the award has been passed by the reference Court has to be considered and answered. 53. Bengal Chemists and Druggists Association vs. Kalyan Chowdhury, [(2018) 3 SCC 41] (Bengal Chemists) is a case which arose under Sections 421(3) and 433 of the Companies Act, 2013 in the context of limitation period of forty-five (45) days prescribed in Section 421(3) plus additional forty-five (45) days in its proviso, to file an appeal from the orders of the Tribunal. Section 421(3) speaks that every appeal under Section 421(1) shall be filed within a period of forty-five days from the date on which a copy of the order of the Tribunal is made available to the person aggrieved and shall be in such form and accompanied by such fees as may be prescribed. The proviso states that the Appellate Tribunal may entertain an appeal after the expiry of the said period of forty-five days from the date aforesaid, but within a further period not exceeding forty-five days, if it is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from filing the appeal within that period. Section 433 states that the provisions of the Limitation Act shall, as far as may be, a ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... riod of thirty days, if it is satisfied that the appellant had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal within the period of thirty days. The Section further provides that no appeal shall be entertained after the expiry of the period of ninety days. The Division Bench of the Kerala High Court, on a reading of the scheme of the NIA Act and in particular, Section 21 of the said Act, held that the High Court had no jurisdiction to condone the delay in filing the appeal beyond the period of ninety days. It was observed that the power of the High Court under the first proviso to sub-section (5) of Section 21 of the said Act was curtailed and a further restriction in the second proviso thereto was a clear indication that the High Court cannot exercise the power under Section 5 of the Limitation Act to condone the delay. Hence, there was an express exclusion of Section 5 of the Limitation Act as contemplated under Section 29(2) thereof. In the said case, there was delay of 164 days in filing the appeal and the appeal was dismissed as not maintainable. 55. Farhan Shaikh vs. State (National Investigation Agency), (Farhan Shaikh) is also a matter which arose under Section 21 of the ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... hich would exclude the application of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. Hence, the aforesaid order of the Coordinate Bench of this Court is of no assistance to the appellant. Scheme of 2013 Act and Article 300A of the constitution: 59. The right to file an appeal under Section 74(1) of the Act and the restriction vis- -vis limitation period in filing the same must be viewed in light of the scheme of 2013 Act. But before doing so, it would be useful to refer to Article 300A of the Constitution which states that no person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law, although this appeal is filed by the State but Article 300A would assume importance while applying Section 74(1) of the 2013 Act when a land loser seeks to file an appeal. The said Article was inserted by the Constitution (44th Amendment) Act, 1978 with effect from 20th June 1979. Prior to the amendment, deprivation of property save by authority of law was guaranteed by Article 31 as a fundamental right. But on repeal of Article 31, the said right is no longer a fundamental right but a Constitutional right. Article 300A ensures that the right to property cannot be abridged or curtailed by the State except ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e 300A of the Constitution provided the provision is given a meaningful interpretation so as to advance the cause of justice both from the point of view of a land loser as well as a requiring authority or the State. The reasons for the same are not far to see. The Land Acquisition Act, 1894 has been repealed by 2013 Act. The latter law has been enacted by the Parliament to ensure, in consultation with institutions of local self-government and Gram Sabhas established under the Constitution, a humane, participative, informed and transparent process for land acquisition for industrialisation, development of essential infrastructural facilities and urbanisation with the least disturbance to the owners of the land and other affected families. The 2013 Act also provides for just and fair compensation to the affected families whose land has been acquired or proposed to be acquired or are affected by such acquisition and make adequate provisions for such affected persons for their rehabilitation and resettlement. The 2013 Act also ensures that the cumulative outcome of compulsory acquisition should be that affected persons become partners in development leading to an improvement in their p ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ovisions under section 40 of the 2013 Act, the appropriate Government may exempt undertaking of the Social Impact Assessment study by the Expert Group. 64. Section 10A which is in Chapter IIIA empowers the appropriate Government in public interest by notification to exempt any of the projects stated therein from the application of the provisions of Chapters II and III of the 2013 Act. 65. Chapter IV deals with the notification of acquisition. Section 11 of the Act deals with notification and acquisition. Once a notification is issued under Section 11 of the Act, stating that any land in any area is required or likely to be required for any public purpose, a preliminary survey of the land has to be carried out by giving at least sixty days prior notice. Further, where a preliminary notification under Section 11 is not issued within twelve months from the date of appraisal of the Social Impact Assessment Report submitted by the Expert Group under Section 7, then, such report shall be deemed to have lapsed and a fresh Social Impact Assessment shall be required to be undertaken prior to acquisition proceedings under section 11. Further, the appropriate Government has the power to ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e an award within a period of twelve months from the date of publication of the declaration under section 19 and if no award is made within that period, the entire proceedings for the acquisition of the land shall lapse. However, the appropriate Government has the power to extend the period of twelve months, if in its opinion, circumstances exist justifying the same. 69. The Collector may at any time, but not later than six months from the date of award or where he has been required under the provisions of the Act to make a reference to the Authority under section 64, before the making of such reference, by order, correct any clerical or arithmetical mistakes in either of the awards or errors arising therein either on his own motion or on the application of any person interested or local authority, after giving reasonable opportunity of making representation in the matter to any person to be prejudicially affected. Under Section 37(2) of the Act, on the making of the award, the Collector has to give immediate notice of his award to such of the persons interested who are not present personally or through their representatives when the awards are made. 70. Under Section 38, the ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... om the date of the award of the Authority, in respect of other persons seeking re-determination of compensation on the basis of the amount of compensation awarded by the authority in respect of other lands. The said application may be in writing and to be made within three months from the date of the award of the Authority. When such an application is received, the Collector shall, hold an inquiry and re-determine the amount. 73. Section 74 is the Section under consideration. It pertains to filing of an appeal to High Court by any person aggrieved by the Award passed by an Authority whereunder the period of limitation is sixty days from the date of Award with an extended period of another sixty days. On a consideration of the scheme of the Act, it is evident that the acquisition and requisition of the land and payment of fair compensation to the land-loser is based on specific time lines at various stages. Thus, the object of 2013 Act is to ensure that the land which is sought to be acquired is not subject to uncertainty and endless passage of time and the said land-owner is not in any way prejudiced on account of the acquisition sought to be made by the authority. It is in ligh ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... red in equity and justice by long enjoyment or what may have been lost by a party's own inaction, negligence or laches. (See: Popat and Kotecha Property v. State Bank of India Staff Assn. (2005) 7 SCC 510; Rajendar Singh Ors. v. Santa Singh Ors., AIR 1973 SC 2537; and Pundlik Jalam Patil v. Executive Engineer, Jalgaon Medium Project, (2008) 17 SCC 448). 75. Similarly, in Rohitash Kumar and others vs. Om Prakash and others, [(2013) 11 SCC 451] (Rohitash Kumar) at paragraphs 23 to 30, it has been observed as under: Hardship of an individual: 23. There may be a statutory provision, which causes great hardship or inconvenience to either the party concerned, or to an individual, but the Court has no choice but to enforce it in full rigour. It is a well settled principle of interpretation that hardship or inconvenience caused cannot be used as a basis to alter the meaning of the language employed by the legislature, if such meaning is clear upon a bare perusal of the Statute. If the language is plain and hence allows only one meaning, the same has to be given effect to, even if it causes hardship or possible injustice. (Vide: CIT (Ag.), West Bengal v. Keshab Chan ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... omit any part thereof. The Court cannot proceed with the assumption that the legislature, while enacting the Statute has committed a mistake; it must proceed on the footing that the legislature intended what it has said; even if there is some defect in the phraseology used by it in framing the statute, and it is not open to the court to add and amend, or by construction, make up for the deficiencies, which have been left in the Act. The Court can only iron out the creases but while doing so, it must not alter the fabric, of which an Act is woven. The Court, while interpreting statutory provisions, cannot add words to a Statute, or read words into it which are not part of it, especially when a literal reading of the same, produces an intelligible result. (Vide: Nalinakhya Bysack v. Shyam Sunder Haldar Ors., AIR 1953 SC 148; Sri Ram Ram Narain Medhi v. State of Bombay, AIR 1959 SC 459; M. Pentiah Ors. v. Muddala Veeramallappa Ors., AIR 1961 SC 1107; The Balasinor Nagrik Co-operative Bank Ltd. v. Babubhai Shankerlal Pandya Ors., AIR 1987 SC 849; and Dadi Jagannadham v. Jammulu Ramulu Ors., (2001) 7 SCC 71). 28. The Statute is not to be construed in light of certain notion ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... t, Section 3 of the Limitation Act shall apply and the provisions contained in Sections 4 to 24 inclusive shall apply only insofar as, and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law. Before ascertaining as to whether there is an exclusion of Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act and particularly Section 5 thereof under the provisions of the 2013 Act, it is necessary to have a bird's view of relevant Sections from 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act applicable to appeals only. 78. Section 4 deals with expiry of prescribed period when the Court is closed. It states that where the prescribed period for any suit, appeal or application expires on a day when the Court is closed, the suit, appeal or application may be instituted, preferred or made on the day when the Court re-opens. The explanation states that the Court shall be deemed to be closed on any day within the meaning of the Section, if during any part of its normal working hours it remains closed on that day. 79. In computing the period of limitation in filing an appeal, a litigant is not entitled to take into account the time taken in obtaining the judgment and decree appealed fro ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... tial period of sixty days. Thus, the extended period of limitation is fixed under Section 74(1) of the 2013 Act. The controversy in the instant case is whether Section 5 of the Limitation Act would apply or whether it is excluded in view of the specific provision provided under Section 74(1) of the 2013 Act. Having regard to the dictum of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Popular Construction Company and other judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, it is held that Section 74(1) of the 2013 Act excludes Section 5 of the Limitation Act as the extended period of limitation is fixed as 60 days under the proviso to Section 74(1) of the 2013 Act. 82. But the question that still remains is as to whether Section 4 and any of Sections 6 to 24 of the Limitation Act are excluded. The expression used in Section 74(1) of the Act is sixty days from the date of the award. The said expression has to be construed in light of the contingencies which arise subsequent to passing of the award which will have to be discerned in light of Section 4 to Section 24 of the Limitation Act when they are applicable to appeals. We have already dealt with Section 4 of the Act. Sections 6 to 11 b ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ure with defect of jurisdiction. Under Section 14, insofar as an appeal is concerned, the time spent in prosecution before a wrong forum would have to be excluded, the principles stated therein would be applied insofar as the appeals under the 2013 Act are concerned, by filing an application under the proviso to Section 74(1) of the 2013 Act and seeking condonation of delay in filing an appeal before the competent Court having jurisdiction by seeking exclusion of time spent in bona fide prosecuting the appeal before the wrong appellate forum. In such an event, if the appellate court is satisfied having regard to the requirement of Section 14 thereof, it could constitute sufficient cause for filing the appeal within the period of sixty days under sub-section (1) of Section 74 as well as the extended period of sixty days under the proviso thereto, as the case may be. Thus, the expression not exceeding sixty days cannot be applied in a literal sense as application of Section 14 of the Limitation Act is not excluded under Section 74(1) of the 2013 Act. In such circumstances, the expression not exceeding sixty days cannot be given a verbatim meaning or a plain meaning but a contextu ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ressly excluded by special or local law . But, with the passage of time, the expression expressly excluded has also been interpreted to also mean exclusion by necessary implication having regard to the scope, object and scheme of the special law being a code by itself prescribing a limitation period different from the Limitation Act, which would exclude application of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. 88. Applying the aforesaid judicial dicta, it is held that the phrase 'within sixty days from the date of the Award' in Section 74(1) of the 2013 Act and the expression within a further period not exceeding sixty days in the proviso thereto must be interpreted to mean that there is a specific limitation prescribed in the 2013 Act, which is a code by itself in the matter of grant of fair compensation in respect of acquisition of land and other matters incidental thereto. Therefore, the special statute having a specific provision regarding limitation period would prevail over the Limitation Act, which is a general law and hence, Section 5 of the Limitation Act is not applicable to Section 74(1) of the 2013 Act as it prescribes a specific period of limitation different from ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... he Award' and 'further period not exceeding sixty days', in our view, the day on which the Award was signed which is the date of the Award would have to be excluded. Further, the period taken for preparation of the certified copy of the judgment and Award would also have to be excluded. If after such exclusion of the aforesaid period, if the appeal is filed within a period of sixty days, then the there would be no delay in filing of the appeal to the High Court. If it is beyond that period, then the proviso would apply, provided the appeal is filed within sixty days as mentioned in the proviso to Section 74(1) of 2013 Act. 90. Similarly, under Section 13 of the Limitation Act, while computing the period of limitation prescribed for filing of an appeal under Section 74(1) of the 2013 Act in cases where leave to sue or appeal as a pauper is applied for, the time during which the appellant has been prosecuting in good faith his application for such leave regarding payment of the Court fees prescribed for filing of an appeal to the High Court, shall have to be excluded by treating the appeal as having the same force and effect as if the court fees had been paid in the fi ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... . The application of Sections 12 to 14 of Limitation Act is in order to advance justice as the reasons for exclusion of the periods mentioned in those Sections while computing the limitation period are those which are beyond the control of the party seeking to file an appeal to the High Court. In the same vein Section 4 of the Limitation Act is applicable. Thus, a pedantic interpretation of the 2013 Act must be avoided. It must be interpreted in such a manner that the judicial dicta with regard to the applicability of a distinct limitation period under the Special Act in light of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act on the one hand, is balanced with the Constitutional right of a land-loser on the other hand. This would also advance the cause of justice of the stake holders involved in the acquisition of land under the 2013 Act as in the instant case. 93. The application of the aforesaid principles to the instant case must be now made having regard to the facts herein. On a perusal of the certified copy of the impugned judgment of the reference court, it is noted that the impugned judgment was rendered by the reference court on 29/10/2018 and the impugned Award was signed and made ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... page No. 94 of the Memorandum of appeal, it is noted as under: The date on which the certified copy was applied for was: 09/11/2018; The applicant was required to appear on: 10/12/2018; The copy was ready on: 01/12/2018. Thereafterwards, there is no noting as to when the applicant i.e., appellant herein appeared nor when the certified copy was delivered to the appellant herein. Although the copy was to be ready on 01/12/2018 and the appellant herein was required to appear on 10/12/2018, in the absence of knowing as to when the appellant appeared and as to when the certified copy was actually delivered to the appellant in the instant case, in other words, received by the appellant, the calculation of the limitation period of sixty days is incomplete, the reason being, the appellant could not have preferred the appeal without receiving the certified copy of the Award. But it is not known as to on what date appellant actually appeared before the concerned officer of the reference court for receiving the copy. No doubt, having regard to the specific period of limitation prescribed under Section 74(1) of the 2013 Act and there being exclusion of Section 5 of the Limitation ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... led, if not within 60 days, at least within 120 days from 27/11/2018 as, from the certified copy of the impugned award it is noted that the certified copy of the award was ready on 01/12/2018. 96. We have already interpreted Section 74(1) of 2013 Act in light of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act by holding that Section 5 thereof is not applicable whereas Section 4 and Sections 12, 13 and 14 are applicable while computing the period of limitation of 60 days + 60 days. As already noted, there is no indication as to when the certified copy was delivered to the appellant even though it was prepared on 01/12/2018 and the appellant was required to appear on 10/12/2018. In the instant case, while we accept the contentions of learned counsel for the respondent that Section 5 of the Limitation Act is not applicable to Section 74(1) of the 2013 Act and there cannot be any condonation of delay as contemplated under the said Section in the instant case, nevertheless, Sections 4, 12 to 14 of the Limitation Act are applicable to Section 74(1) of the 2013 Act while computing the period of sixty days + sixty days under Section 74(1) of the 2013 Act. Further, we do not venture to condone any d ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... s filed belatedly even after giving the benefit of the proviso to Section 74(1) of the Act. Hence, the application (I.A. No. 1 of 2019) is liable to be dismissed. 99. Before parting with this case, we would like to observe on two aspects. Firstly, having regard to specific period of limitation within which an appeal could be filed before the High Court under Section 74 of the 2013 Act, it is just and necessary for the Chief Ministerial Officer or the Officer concerned in the reference court to clearly indicate the date on which the certified copy of the award is prepared; when the applicant has to appear and the date on which it is delivered to the applicant. In the instant case, the aforesaid aspects are conspicuous by their absence in the certified copy of the impugned award. 100. Secondly, there has been laxity on the part of the appellant/State in appearing before the concerned Officer in the reference court so as to receive the certified copy of the award for the purpose of filing this appeal. The real reasons for the same are not known. However, this would only indicate that the authorities concerned are unaware of the provision of Section 74(1) of the 2013 Act prescrib ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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