TMI Blog1978 (2) TMI 62X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... rvice line and not the petitioner. In accordance with the terms of that agreement of 1959 the petitioner contributed a sum of Rs.3,00,600 during accounting year ending on June 30, 1964, and this payment was made so that the electric power line could be laid to the factory of the petitioner-company. The year of account of the petitioner is from 1st July of each year to 30th June of the following year. Hence, for the accounting year 1963-64, the assessment year would be 1965-66. The petitioner capitalised the sum of Rs. 3,00,600 and claimed depreciation at the rate of 10 per cent. on this amount for the assessment year 1965-66. The Income-tax Officer concerned allowed depreciation at the rate of 10 per cent. on the said capitalised sum of Rs. 3,00,600. The order was passed on July 21, 1969. For assessment year 1966-67, the petitioner again claimed depreciation at the rate of 10 per cent. on the written down value of the capitalised sum of Rs. 3,00,600, that is, 10 per cent. of Rs. 2,70,540. However, the Income-tax Officer assessing the petitioner for the year 1966-67 disallowed the claim for depreciation on the ground that the petitioner was not the owner of the power line under t ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... pending with the respective authorities. The petitioner, therefore, contended that the time for pursuing the appeal should be excluded. In any event, the petitioner contended that there was sufficient cause for the delay in filing the revision application to the respondent. By his order dated March 29, 1975, the respondent rejected the application for condonation of delay holding that there was no sufficient cause for the delay in preferring the revision application. Exhibit E to the petition herein is a copy of the order passed by the respondent herein holding that there was no sufficient cause for delay in filing the revision application and rejecting the revision petition as time barred. After setting out the facts which we have narrated above and after referring to the provisions of section 264(3), the respondent proceeds in exhibit E : " The assessee's contention that the date of communication of the Tribunal's order for the subsequent year should be considered for the purpose of filing the revision petition is, therefore, not tenable. It is true that the Income-tax Officer has taken a different view in the subsequent assessment year. The assessee, however, could have file ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e Court observed as follows (in para. 3) : ' This discretion like other judicial discretion must be exercised with vigilance and circumspection according to justice, common-sense, and sound judgment. The discretion is to know through law what is just : See Keighley's case [1609] 10 Co. Rep. 139a ; 77 ER 1136.' It was further observed that the words ' sufficient cause ' which occurred in section 5 of the Limitation Act had received liberal construction and that similar interpretation should be placed upon those words in cognate statutory provisions like the one under consideration in that case. In this connection the following passage from the decision of the Madras High Court in Krishna v. Chathappan [1889] ILR 13 Mad 269 (which had earlier received approval in Dinabandhu Sahu v. Jadumoni Mangaraj, AIR 1954 SC 411 and Ramlal v. Rewa Coalfields Ltd., AIR 1962 SC 361) was cited with affirmance : ' We think that section 5 gives the courts a discretion which in respect of jurisdiction is to be exercised in the way in which judicial power and discretion ought to be exercised upon principles which are well understood ; the words " sufficient cause " receiving a liberal construct ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... be advanced by condoning the delay and again in exercising the judicial discretion in condoning the delay, this discretion like the other judicial discretions must be exercised with vigilance and circumspection according to justice, common-sense and sound judgment. It may be pointed out that the principles which have been culled out with reference to exercise of discretion by regular courts have been applied to quasi-judicial Tribunals as well. In Lonand Gram Panchayat's case, AIR 1968 SC 222, the Supreme Court was dealing with the provisions of the Minimum Wages Act and the Tribunal functioning under the provisions of that Act. The case of Hiraben v. Ishwarbharti [1977] 18 GLR 467 (Guj), was a case of a Tribunal functioning under the Motor Vehicles Act. The Supreme Court has observed in paragraphs 5 and 6 of its judgment that the power of superintendence over Tribunals vested in the High Court under article 227 of the Constitution is not greater than the power under article 226 and is limited to seeing that the Tribunal functions within the, limits of its authority. The High Court will not review the discretion of the authority judicially exercised, but it may interfere if the ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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