9911796707
TMI Blog2025 (5) TMI 37X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... . Initially, by order dated 29th January 2013, the learned Single Judge framed three preliminary issues [to be decided in the above suit] under the provisions of the Order XIV Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 [for short "CPC"]. For the sake of convenience, the issues framed by the learned Single Judge are reproduced hereunder:- 1. Whether the jurisdiction of the Hon'ble Court to try, entertain and dispose of the present suit is barred under section 269UN of the Income Tax Act, 1961 as pleaded in paragraph 1 of the Written Statement and/or section 293 of the Income Tax Act, 1961? 2. Whether the law of limitation bars the present suit? 3. Whether the plaintiff has the locus standi to maintain the present suit as pleaded in paragraph 11 of the written statement and/or is estopped from instituting the present suit? (emphasis supplied) 3. Issue No. 1 was answered in the affirmative, i.e. against the Appellant (original Plaintiff), and consequently the above suit was dismissed. Also, since the finding on Issue No. 1 was in the affirmative, namely, that the suit was barred by virtue of Section 269-UN and/or Section 293 of the IT Act, 1961, the other two issues were not ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... th September 1991, Defendant No. 1 passed an order of compulsory purchase of the suit property under Section 269-UD (1) of the IT Act, 1961 [for short the "1st Compulsory Purchase Order"] on the ground that the consideration mentioned in the said Agreement was understated. Being aggrieved by the 1st Compulsory Purchase Order [dated 27th September 1991], the Mulanis as well as Seawell preferred Writ Petition No. 3159 of 1991 and Writ Petition No. 3251 of 1991 respectively. What was sought in the aforesaid Writ Petitions was quashing of the 1st Compulsory Purchase Order. 8. By order dated 12th April 1993, this Court set aside the 1st Compulsory Purchase Order [dated 27th September 1991] and remanded the matter back to Defendant No. 1 to dispose of Mulanis' application for approval [in Form 37-I] in accordance with law and keeping in view the Judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of C.B. Gautam Vs. Union of India [(1993) 199 ITR page 530 : (1993) 1 SCC 78]. 9. After the remand, Defendant No. 1 once again passed an order for compulsory purchase dated 29th June 1993 [for short the "2nd Compulsory Purchase Order"] on the ground that the consideration mentioned in the Agreem ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... r the 3rd Compulsory Purchase Order, it was the statutory obligation of Defendant No. 1 and/or No. 2 to tender the apparent consideration to the vendors [the Mulanis and Defendant No. 19] by 31st October 2002 in accordance with Section 269-UG of the IT Act, 1961. They having failed to do so, the suit property statutorily re-vested with the Mulanis and Defendant No. 19 by virtue of Section 269-UH (1) of the IT Act, 1961. By this very letter dated 12th December 2002, Seawell [the Original Purchaser] also called upon the appropriate authority to issue a declaration under the IT Act, 1961 to the effect that the order dated 12th September 2002 [the 3rd Compulsory Purchase Order] stood abrogated [under Section 269-UH (2)]. However, no such declaration was issued by the appropriate authority. 13. It appears that thereafter between January 2003 to May 2005, the Mulanis made several visits and requested Defendant No. 1 to pass a formal order declaring that the 3rd Compulsory Purchase Order stood abrogated. However, no decision was taken or response given by the 1st Defendant either on the request of the Mulanis or to the letter dated 12th December 2002 addressed by Seawell. 14. It appears ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... suit property without any hindrance. The other consequential prayer sought is to restrain the Defendants and/or their servants and agents from in any manner interfering with the Plaintiff's possession and/or its right to develop, alienate, sell, transfer, or create any interest in the suit property. For the sake of convenience, the prayers in the above suit are reproduced hereunder:- "A. For a Declaration that: i. The said Order dated 12th September, 2002 of Compulsory Purchase of the said Property stands abrogated on and from 31st October, 2002; ii. on and from 31st October, 2002 all right, title and interest in the said Property, and all rights to the said FSI, stood re-vested in the Mulanis and Om Prakash Navani, respectively, and iii. On and from 16th May, 2006, the Plaintiff is the absolute owners of the said Property and have the absolute right, title and interest in the said Property including the right to develop, alienate, sell, transfer, create any interest in and in any manner to deal with and dispose of the said Property without any let or hindrance. B. For a Perpetual Injunction restraining the Defendants and their servants and agents from in any manner inte ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... Government under Section 269-UE (1) of the IT Act, 1961. He, thereafter, brought to our attention Section 269-UF (1) and submitted that where a compulsory order for the purchase of any immovable property is made by the appropriate authority [under Section 269-UD (1)], the Central Government shall pay, by way of consideration, an amount equal to the amount of the apparent consideration. He submitted that under Section 269-UG, this amount is to be paid within a period of one month from the end of the month in which the concerned immovable property becomes vested in the Central Government under sub-section (1), or, as the case may be, sub-section (6) of Section 269UE. 18. Mr. Salve thereafter turned our attention to Section 269-UH which stipulates that if the Central Government fails to tender [under sub-section (1) of Section 269-UG] or deposit [under sub-section (2) or sub-section (3) of Section 269-UG], the whole or any part of the amount of consideration required to be tendered or deposited within the period specified, the order to purchase the immovable property by the Central Government made under sub-section (1) of Section 269-UD shall stand abrogated and the immovable proper ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... by no stretch of the imagination, can be construed to mean that the Plaintiff is calling into question the order passed by the appropriate authority under Section 269-UD (1) of the IT Act, 1961. He, therefore, submitted that the reliance placed on Section 269-UN to oust the jurisdiction of this court, is wholly misconceived and misplaced. 20. Similarly, Mr. Salve submitted that even Section 293 of the IT Act, 1961 does not oust the jurisdiction of this Court. He submitted that Section 293 bars a suit to set aside or modify any proceedings taken, or order made, under the IT Act, 1961, and no prosecution, suit or other proceedings shall lie against the Government or any officer of the Government for anything done in good faith or intended to be done in good faith under the IT Act, 1961. The present suit does not in any way seek to modify or set aside any proceedings taken, or order made, under the IT Act, 1961. What the present suit seeks is only a declaration that by virtue of Section 269-UH, the 3rd Compulsory Purchase Order [dated 12th September 2002] stands abrogated and the suit property re-vests in the transferors. This relief is sought solely on the basis that the apparent co ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ry Purchase Order [dated 12th September 2002] is not maintainable and is liable to be dismissed. He submitted that this court lacks jurisdiction to entertain the present suit seeking a declaration that the 3rd Compulsory Purchase Order [dated 12th September 2002] passed under Section 269-UD of the IT Act, 1961 stands abrogated, as this would amount to an inquiry into all matters and issues allegedly leading to the alleged abrogation. This would be wholly impermissible in view of Section 293 of the IT Act, 1961. The learned Attorney General submitted that Section 293 unequivocally bars any civil suit or legal proceeding in respect of any action taken under the IT Act, 1961, including orders passed under Section 269-UD. The bar under Section 293 applies to the entire IT Act, 1961 enacting a bar against any adjudication of proceedings under the Act by any court. This would necessarily include all matters in relation to 3rd Compulsory Purchase Order [dated 12th September 2002] passed under Section 269-UD. 23. The learned Attorney General then submitted that the relief sought by the Plaintiff, namely, that there is an abrogation under Section 269-UH (1), is an indirect way of questioni ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... clause [Section 293] is misconceived, as there is no conflict between these two provisions. The special versus the general principle will apply only when there is an express intent to substitute a field already occupied. In fact, Section 293 existed even before the amendment introducing Chapter XX-C, and continues to apply broadly to all actions under the IT Act, 1961 including the compulsory purchase orders passed under Section 269-UD. According to the learned Attorney General, the harmonious construction of Section 269-UN and Section 293 reinforces the legislative intent to completely oust the jurisdiction of civil courts in matters related to compulsory purchase orders passed under Section 269-UD. Therefore, any challenge to such an order by way of a civil suit must fail. The legislative history of Section 293 and the scheme of Chapter XX-C clearly indicate that once an order is passed under Section 269-UD, it is meant to attain finality, thereby preventing interdiction of purchase orders through civil litigation. 26. The learned Attorney General thereafter submitted that it is the plaintiff's case that they have a right to demand a declaration that the 3rd Compulsory Purchase ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... wrong by purchasing litigation, was the submission. 28. Without prejudice to the aforesaid arguments, the learned Attorney General submitted that under Section 269-UH (2), when an order under Section 269-UD (1) is abrogated and the immovable property is re-vested in the transferor, the appropriate authority [Defendant No. 1] is required to make a declaration in writing to that effect and follow the further process stipulated under Section 269-UH (2). It was submitted that none of the legal requirements as stipulated in Section 269-UH (2) had occurred, namely, that the appropriate authority did not issue any declaration in writing, or deliver a copy of such declaration to the transferors or any person interested therein, or deliver or caused to be delivered possession of the suit property back to the transferors. In the absence of the mandatory legal compliance of Section 269-UH (2), i.e. passing of a declaration by the appropriate authority, the transferor or any other person cannot take upon themselves and declare that the compulsory purchase order passed under Section 269-UD (1) stood abrogated, and thereafter proceed to deal with the immovable property. 29. For all the afores ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ation",- (1) in relation to any immovable property in respect of which an agreement for transfer is made, being immovable property of the nature referred to in sub-clause (i) of clause (d), means,- (i) if the immovable property is to be transferred by way of sale, the consideration for such transfer as specified in the agreement for transfer; (ii) if the immovable property is to be transferred by way of exchange,- (A) in a case where the consideration for the transfer consists of a thing or things only, the price that such thing or things would ordinarily fetch on sale in the open market on the date on which the agreement for transfer is made; (B) in a case where the consideration for the transfer consists of a thing or things and a sum of money, the aggregate of the price that such thing or things would ordinarily fetch on sale in the open market on the date on which the agreement for transfer is made, and such sum; (iii) if the immovable property is to be transferred by way of lease,- (A) in a case where the consideration for the transfer consists of premium only, the amount of premium as specified in the agreement for transfer; (B) in a case where the considerati ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... , furniture, fittings or other things, such machinery, plant, furniture, fittings or other things also. Explanation.-For the purposes of this sub-clause, "land, building, part of a building, machinery, plant, furniture, fittings and other things" include any rights therein; (ii) any rights in or with respect to any land or any building or a part of a building (whether or not including any machinery, plant, furniture, fittings or other things therein) which has been constructed or which is to be constructed, accruing or arising from any transaction (whether by way of becoming a member of, or acquiring shares in, a cooperative society, company or other association of persons or by way of any agreement or any arrangement of whatever nature), not being a transaction by way of a sale, exchange or lease of such land, building or part of a building;" (emphasis supplied) 33. In the present case, it is not in dispute that the transfer [by way of sale] of the "immovable property" in question is one as defined in Section 269-UA (d) (i), and therefore, the "apparent consideration" would be as defined in Section 269-UA (b) (1) (i). Section 269-UB gives power to the Central Government to ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... 35. To put it in a nutshell, what Section 269-UC stipulates is that no transfer of any immovable property [in such area and of such value exceeding five lakh rupees as may be prescribed], can be effected except after an agreement for transfer is entered into between the person who intends transferring the immovable property [the transferor] and the person to whom it is proposed to be transferred [the transferee], in accordance with the provisions of Section 269-UC (2), at least four months before the intended date of transfer. Further, the agreement must be reduced to writing in the form of a statement by each of the parties to such transfer or by any of the parties to such transfer acting on behalf of himself and on behalf of the other parties. 36. Section 269-UD inter alia provides that once the agreement of transfer [in the form of a statement as required under Section 269-UC (2)] is furnished, and the appropriate authority is of the opinion that the consideration mentioned therein is understated, it can purchase the said property by making an order to that effect as stipulated in Section 269-UD (1). Section 269-UD reads as under:- "269-UD. Order by appropriate authority fo ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... give a reasonable opportunity of being heard to the transferor, the person in occupation of the immovable property if the transferor is not in occupation of the property, the transferee and to every other person whom the appropriate authority knows to be interested in the property. (1-B) Every order made by the appropriate authority under sub-section (1) shall specify the grounds on which it is made. (2) The appropriate authority shall cause a copy of its order under sub-section (1) in respect of any immovable property to be served on the transferor, the person in occupation of the immovable property if the transferor is not in occupation thereof, the transferee, and on every other person whom the appropriate authority knows to be interested in the property." (emphasis supplied) 37. Once an order of compulsory purchase is passed under Section 269-UD (1), the immoveable property, which forms the subject matter of the said order, vests in the Central Government as stipulated in Section 269-UE (1) or 269-UE (6), as the case may be. For the sake of convenience Section 269-UE reads as under: "269-UE. Vesting of property in Central Government.-(1) Where an order under sub-secti ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... fficer to assist him and it shall be the duty of such officer to comply with such requisition. (5) For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that nothing in this section shall operate to discharge the transferor or any other person (not being the Central Government) from liability in respect of any encumbrances on the property and, notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, such liability may be enforced against the transferor or such other person. (6) Where an order under sub-section (1) of Section 269-UD is made in respect of an immovable property, being rights of the nature referred to in sub-clause (ii) of clause (d) of Section 269-UA, such order shall have the effect of- (a) vesting such right in the Central Government; and (b) placing the Central Government in the same position in relation to such rights as the person in whom such a right would have continued to vest if such order had not been made. (7) Where any rights in respect of any immovable property, being rights in, or with respect to, any land or any building or part of a building which has been constructed or which is to be constructed, have been vested in the C ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... 6), of Section 269-UE: Provided that if any liability for any tax or any other sum remaining payable under this Act, the Wealth Tax Act, 1957 (27 of 1957), the Gift Tax Act, 1958 (18 of 1958), the Estate Duty Act, 1953 (34 of 1953), or the Companies (Profits) Surtax Act, 1964 (7 of 1964), by any person entitled to the consideration payable under Section 269-UF, the appropriate authority may, in lieu of the payment of the amount of consideration, set off the amount of consideration or any part thereof against such liability or sum, after giving an intimation in this behalf to the person entitled to the consideration. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), if any dispute arises as to the apportionment of the amount of consideration amongst persons claiming to be entitled thereto, the Central Government shall deposit with the appropriate authority the amount of consideration required to be tendered under sub-section (1) within the period specified therein. (3) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), if the person entitled to the amount of consideration does not consent to receive it, or if there is any dispute as to the title to receive the amo ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... to be tendered or deposited thereunder within the period specified therein in respect of any immovable property which has vested in the Central Government under sub-section (1) or, as the case may be, sub-section (6) of Section 269-UE, the order to purchase the immovable property by the Central Government made under sub-section (1) of Section 269-UD shall stand abrogated and the immovable property shall stand revested in the transferor after the expiry of the aforesaid period: Provided that where any dispute referred to in sub-section (2) or sub-section (3) of Section 269-UG is pending in any court for decision, the time taken by the court to pass a final order under the said sub-sections shall be excluded in computing the said period. (2) Where an order made under sub-section (1) of Section 269-UD is abrogated and the immovable property revested in the transferor under sub-section (1), the appropriate authority shall make, as soon as may be, a declaration in writing to this effect and shall- (a) deliver a copy of the declaration to the persons mentioned in sub-section (2) of Section 269-UD; and (b) deliver or cause to be delivered possession of the immovable property back ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... 2) Any transfer of any immovable property made in contravention of the provisions of sub-section (1) shall be void." (emphasis supplied) 43. Section 269-UL puts restrictions on registration etc of documents in respect of transfer of immovable property and stipulates that no registering officer appointed under the Registration Act, 1908 shall register any document which purports to transfer the immovable property exceeding the value prescribed under Section 269-UC unless a certificate from the appropriate authority is obtained stating that it has no objection to such transfer. 44. Thereafter, and what is important for our purposes, is Section 269-UN. This Section provides that save as otherwise provided in Chapter XX-C, any order made under Section 269-UD (1) or under Section 269-UF (2) shall be final and conclusive and shall not be called in question in any proceeding, either under the IT Act, 1961, or under any other law for the time being in force. For the sake of convenience, Section 269-UN is reproduced hereunder:- "269-UN. Order of appropriate authority to be final and conclusive.-Save as otherwise provided in this Chapter, any order made under sub-section (1) of Section ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... le property becomes vested in the Central Government under Section 269-UE (1) or Section 269-UE (6), as the case may be. If this consideration is not paid within the stipulated period [i.e. the period mentioned in Section 269-UG], then Section 269-UH stipulates that the compulsory order of purchase passed under Section 269-UD (1) shall stand abrogated and the immovable property shall stand re-vested in the transferor after the expiry of the aforesaid period. Section 269-UH further stipulates that once an order is abrogated and the immovable property is re-vested in the transferor [as stipulated in Section 269-UH (1)], the appropriate authority shall make a declaration to that effect. As mentioned earlier, Section 269-UN stipulates that any order made under Section 269-UD (1) or Section 269-UF (2) shall be final and conclusive and shall not be called in question in any proceeding under the IT Act, 1961 or any other law for the time being in force. 47. What we have to consider in this appeal, firstly, is whether the reliefs sought in the present suit are barred by virtue of the provisions of Section 269-UN of the IT Act, 1961. As mentioned earlier, in the present suit, the Plaintiff ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... n 269-UN refers to a situation where the validity or the legality of the order passed under Section 269-UD (1) or under Section 269-UF (2) is being challenged or disputed. On the other hand, seeking a declaration that the order under Section 269-UD (1) stands "abrogated" means that the said order is officially brought to an end, either by law or by agreement. As per our knowledge, the word "abrogate" means to officially end a law, an agreement, etc. or to end a law, agreement, or custom formally. Seeking a declaration that the order passed under Section 269-UD (1) stands abrogated can never mean that the said order is being challenged or being "called in question" as referred to in Section 269-UN. In fact, seeking a declaration that an order stands abrogated, proceeds on the basis that the said order, which now stands abrogated, was valid. Once this is the case, we are clearly of the view that the suit filed by the Plaintiff is not barred by virtue of the provisions of Section 269-UN of the IT Act, 1961. 50. However, the matter does not stop here. We also have to examine whether the suit would be barred by virtue of the provisions of Section 293 of the IT Act, 1961. As mentioned e ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... . v. Government General in Council, 74 Ind App 50 = (AIR 1947 PC 78). In the first case it was laid down by the Judicial Committee that the ouster of the jurisdiction of a civil court is not to be lightly inferred and can only be established if there is an express provision of law or is clearly implied. In the second case it was held that where a liability to tax is created by statute which gives special and particular remedies against illegal exactions the remedy contemplated by the statute must be followed and it is not open to the assessee to pursue the ordinary civil process of courts. To the latter case we shall refer in some detail presently. Opinion in this Court has, however, wavered as to how far to go with the dicta of the Privy Council in the two cases. ********** 32. Neither of the two cases of Firm of Illuri Subayya, 1964-1 SCR 752 = (AIR 1964 SC 322) or Kamla Mills, 1966 1 SCR 64 = (AIR 1965 SC 1942) can be said to run counter to the series of cases earlier noticed. The result of this inquiry into the diverse views expressed in this Court may be stated as follows: (7) Where the statute gives a finality to the orders of the special tribunals the civil court's jur ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... s the conditions above set down apply. (emphasis supplied) 51. In the present case, we do not find that the declaration sought by the Plaintiff in the above suit is expressly barred under Section 269-UN or under Section 293. We also do not find any clear intendment in these provisions which would bar the Civil Court from granting the relief sought. We agree with the learned Attorney General of India that Section 293 and Section 269-UN of the IT Act, 1961 have to be read harmoniously. However, even reading them harmoniously, in the facts of the present case, we fail to see how these two provisions would oust the jurisdiction of the Civil Court. As mentioned earlier, all that the Plaintiff seeks in the present suit is a declaration that on and from 31st October 2002, the 3rd Compulsory Purchase Order stands abrogated and the suit property re-vests in the Mulanis and Defendant No. 19 (Omprakash Navani). This declaration, in no way, calls into question the said order as referred to in Section 269-UN and neither does it seek to modify or set aside the said order as contemplated under Section 293. In these circumstances, even when Section 269-UN and Section 293 are read harmoniously, ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... als so constituted, and whether remedies normally associated with actions in Civil Courts are prescribed by the said statute or not. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has clearly opined that the exclusion of the Civil Court's jurisdiction is not readily to be inferred unless it is barred, either expressly or by necessary implication. We therefore find that the argument canvassed by the learned Attorney General of India that the present suit is barred because any inquiry to be done with reference to whether an abrogation has taken place or otherwise would be a proceeding under the IT Act, 1961, does not commend to us. Consequently, we are unable to agree with the submissions of the learned Attorney General of India that the present suit is barred either under the provisions of Section 269-UN or under Section 293 of the IT Act, 1961. 54. As correctly submitted by Mr. Salve, the learned Single Judge has erred when he came to the conclusion that as the Plaintiff is seeking a declaration that the 3rd Compulsory Purchase Order stands abrogated, this Court will have to further declare that the said order stood annulled, cancelled or set aside. The abrogation of the order takes place by operation ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... The Plaintiff stated that she was the daughter of one Shri. Bansidhar Agarwal from his first wife, while Defendant Nos. 1 to 5 were the children of Bansidhar Agarwal from his second wife. Defendant No. 1 was Babulal whose residential and business premises were subjected to a search and seizure operation under Section 132 of the IT Act, 1961 and various assets including certain gold ornaments [being the subject matter of the suit filed by the Plaintiff], were seized. In the suit, the Plaintiff (Parmeshwari Devi) prayed for partition of those very gold ornaments seized under the IT Act, 1961. The Plaintiff stated that her mother died in 1938 and at that time she was possessed of 200 tolas of gold ornaments which was her stridhan. Her mother made a Will bequeathing the gold ornaments to the Plaintiff and the other children of Bansidhar from his second wife in proportion of the number of daughters of each of such children to meet the dowry demand and marriage requirements of their daughters. These ornaments were kept in the custody of the father of the Plaintiff who died on 10th February 1990. After his death the ornaments came in the custody of Babulal (Defendant No. 1). It was at th ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... Devi (supra) was completely different from the factual matrix before us. 56. We must mention here that it is too well settled a proposition that the ratio of any decision must be understood in the background of the facts of that case. It has been said a long time ago that a case is only an authority for what it actually decides, and not what logically follows from it. If one must refer to any authority on this subject, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Sarva Shramik Sanghatana (K.V.) Mumbai V/S State of Maharashtra and Others [2008 (1) SCC 494] has very succinctly and eloquently reiterated the said proposition. Paragraphs 14 to 18 of the said judgment reads thus:- "14. On the subject of precedents Lord Halsbury, L.C., said in Quinn v. Leathem [1901 AC 495 : (1900-1903) All ER Rep 1 (HL)] : (All ER p. 7 G-I) "Before discussing Allen v. Flood [1898 AC 1 : (1895-1899) All ER Rep 52 (HL)] and what was decided therein, there are two observations of a general character which I wish to make; and one is to repeat what I have very often said before-that every judgment must be read as applicable to the particular facts proved or assumed to be proved, since the generality of the e ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... at p. 761), Lord MacDermott observed : (All ER p. 14 C-D) 'The matter cannot, of course, be settled merely by treating the ipsissima verba of Willes, J. as though they were part of an Act of Parliament and applying the rules of interpretation appropriate thereto. This is not to detract from the great weight to be given to the language actually used by that most distinguished Judge, ...' 10. In Home Office v. Dorset Yacht Co. Ltd. [1970 AC 1004 : (1970) 2 WLR 1140 : (1970) 2 All ER 294 (HL)] Lord Reid said, 'Lord Atkin's speech ... is not to be treated as if it were a statutory definition. It will require qualification in new circumstances.' (All ER p. 297g) Megarry, J. in Shepherd Homes Ltd. v. Sandham (No. 2) [(1971) 1 WLR 1062 : (1971) 2 All ER 1267], observed : (All ER p. 1274d) 'One must not, of course, construe even a reserved judgment of even Russell, L.J. as if it were an Act of Parliament;' And, in British Railways Board v. Herrington [1972 AC 877 : (1972) 2 WLR 537 : (1972) 1 All ER 749 (HL)] Lord Morris said : (All ER p. 761c) 'There is always peril in treating the words of a speech or a judgment as though they were words in a legislative enactment, and ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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