TMI Blog1993 (9) TMI 130X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ent suit based on title where the same issue directly and substantially arises between the parties. The appellant is a person deriving title from `K' who was a party in the former suit is also hit by the doctrine of lis pendens under Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act. Accordingly, we hold that the view of the Calcutta High Court is not good law and contra view is upheld. The judgments and decree under Exs. A-2 to A-5 operate as res judicata against the appellant, who derives his title from `K'. The appeal is accordingly dismissed. - 5152 of 1993 - - - Dated:- 24-9-1993 - K. Ramaswamy and N.P. Singh, JJ. [Judgment per : K. Ramaswamy, J.]. - Leave granted. 2.The conflict of judicial opinion among the High Courts in interpretation of Explanation VIII to Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as introduced by the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1976, is to be resolved in this appeal. Kutty Amma executed Udambadi (settlement deed) on May 19, 1961 giving life-estate to her husband Krishnan Nair, for short `K' and vested remainder in favour of the respondent. She died in the year 1971. `K' alienated the property in 1972 by a registered sale deed in fa ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ey claim title or litigating under the same title. Explanation VIII only brings within the fold of Section 11, the decree or order of the Courts of special Jurisdiction like probate Court, land acquisition Court, rent control Court, etc. The non obstante clause incorporated in Explanation VIII would be only in relation to such decrees. The purpose of the explanation, therefore, is only to remove that anomaly. The legislature having been aware of the law laid down by courts, that the decree of a Court of limited pecuniary jurisdiction does not operate as res judicata in a subsequent suit, did not intend to alter the law by suitable amendment to the body of Section 11. It was urged that the view of the Calcutta High Court in Nabin Majhi v. Tele Majhi, AIR 1978 Cal 440 and Pramode Ranjan Banerjeee v. Nirpada Mondal, AIR 1980 Cal 181 is correct interpretation and the contra views of the Kerala High Court in P.V.N. Devoki Amma v. P.V.N. Kunhi Raman, AIR 1980 Ker 230, Orissa High Court in Kumarmoni Sa v. Himmachal Sahu, AIR 1981 Orissa 177 and C. Arumugathan v. S. Muthuswamy Naidu, (1991) 1 Mad LW 63 are not correct. 5.Section 11 of C.P.C. embodies the rule of conclusiveness as evidenc ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... it either of limited pecuniary jurisdiction or of special jurisdiction, like insolvency Court, probate Court, land acquisition Court, Rent Controller, Revenue Tribunal, etc. No doubt main body of Section 11 was not amended, yet the expression "the Court of limited jurisdiction" in Explanation VIII is wide enough to include a Court whose jurisdiction is subject to pecuniary limitation and other cognate expressions analogous thereto. Therefore, Section 11 is to be read in combination and harmony with Explanation VIII. The result that would flow is that an order or an issue which had arisen directly and substantially between the parties or their privies and decided finally by a competent Court or Tribunal, though of limited or special jurisdiction which includes pecuniary jurisdicton, will operate as res judicata in a subsequent suit or proceeding, notwithstanding the fact that such Court of limited or special jurisdiction was not competent Court to try the subsequent suit. The issue must directly and substantially arise in a later suit between the same parties or their privies. This question is no longer res integra. In Bajrang Bahadur Singh v. Beni Madho Rakesh Singh, AIR 1938 PC 2 ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... order and decree of an insolvency court, the scope of enlarging Explanation VIII would be defeated and the decree of Civil Courts of limited pecuniary jurisdiction shall stand excluded, while that of the former would be attracted. Such an anomalous situation must be avoided. The Tribunal whose decisions were not operating as res judicata would be brought within the ambit of Section 11, while the Civil Court which is accustomed to the doctrine of res judicata, the decree of limited pecuniary jurisdiction shall stand excluded from its operation. Take for instance , now the decree of a Rent Controller shall operate as res judicata, but a decree of a District Munsif (Civil Judge) Junior Division, according to the stand of the appellant will not operate as res judicata, though the same officer might have decided both the cases. To keep the litigation unending successive suits could be filed in the first instance in the Court of limited pecuniary jurisdiction and later in a Court of higher jurisdiction and the same issue shall be subject of trial again, leading to conflict of decisions. It is obvious from the objects underlying Explanation VIII, that by operation of the non obstante cla ..... 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