9911796707
TMI Blog1965 (3) TMI 18X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... of that place imposed under section 66(1)(b) of the Central Provinces Municipalities Act, 1922 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) as applied to Berar, a tax at the rate of one anna per bojha of ginned cotton and one anna per bale of pressed cotton as from December 22, 1936, on which date a notification sanctioning the imposition under section 241(1) of the Act was published in the official Gazette by order of the Government of the Province. The notification in question runs as follows : " No. 7911-3242-M-VIII.---In exercise of the powers conferred by clause (a) of sub-section (1) of section 241 of the Central Provinces Municipalities Act, 1922 (C.P. Act II of 1922), as applied to Berar, the Local Government is pleased to confirm the following rule made by the Notified Area Committee Dhamangaon, in the Amravati district, under clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 66 of the said Act, for imposing a tax on persons carrying on the trade of ginning and pressing cotton by means of steam or mechanical process within its limits : RULE The committee shall levy from all persons carrying on within its limits the trade of ginning or pressing cotton into bales by means of steam or ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... n had replaced the Notified Area Committee proposed to raise the tax from four annas to one rupee per bojha and per bale but eventually dropped the proposal. Apparently, being alarmed at the abortive attempt of the Municipal Committee to raise the tax further, the appellant and other factory owners in Dhamangaon instituted suits for recovery from the Municipal Committee of excess tax paid by them within 3 years of the dates of the respective suits. The company claimed refund of Rs. 12,511-6-6 on the ground that it was recovered from it illegally by the Municipal Committee and paid by it under a mistake. The amount has been computed by them thus : Rs. 6,905-14-6 recovered from them in respect of ginned cotton between 29th March, 1949, and some date in the year 1952 plus Rs. 8,048-8-0 in respect of pressed cotton recovered from them during the same period less Rs. 3,738-9-6 which was legally due from them thus totalling to Rs. 11,215-13-0. To this they added Rs. 1,295-9-6 as interest by way of damages on the aforesaid amount at the rate of 9 per cent. p.a. In the plaint it was contended by the company that after the coming into force of section 142A of the Government of India Act, 19 ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ef which he claims, has been, in the case of a committee, delivered or left at its office, and, in the case of any such member, officer or servant or person as aforesaid, delivered to him or left at his office or usual place of abode, and the plaint shall contain a statement that such notice has been so delivered or left. (2) Every such suit shall be dismissed unless it is instituted within six months from the date of the accrual of the alleged cause of action. Mr. Patwardhan for the appellant contends that this was a case of recovery of an illegal tax and, therefore, a claim for its refund fell outside the provisions of section 48 of the Act. In support of his contention he relied upon a number of decisions and we will proceed to examine them. The first of these cases is Municipal Committee, Karanja v. New East India Press Co. Ltd. That was also a case where enhancement of a tax was made by the Municipal Committee of Karanja after March 31, 1939, in excess of Rs. 50 per year payable by one person. There, a Division Bench of the High Court held that the enhancement was in contravention of section 142A of the Government of India Act, 1935, and was illegal, that a suit for refu ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... erefore section 48 does not apply. The distinction between a case where section 48 applies and a case where it does not is clearly shown in Amraoti Town Municipal Committee v. Shaikh Bhikan." Kishorilal's case to which reference is made in the above quotation is a decision of a Division Bench upon a reference made by Bose J. and which, though rendered earlier, has been reported in I.L.R. 1949 Nag. 87. In that case a tax imposed by the District Council, Bhandara, under a similar provision of the local Self-Government Act, 1920, at the rate of three pies per khandi on persons carrying on trade of husking, milling or grinding of grains was raised by it to one anna as from April 1, 1942, with the sanction of the Provincial Government. It was contended on behalf of the respondent that the recovery was illegal. Since the matter involved the interpretation of section 142A of the Government of India Act, 1935, Bose J., acting under one of the rules of the High Court, referred it to a Division Bench. This is what the Division Bench held : " We are clear that the tax in question is a tax which can be so termed. This was in fact conceded in the court below and the contention raised before ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... Lordships of the Privy Council laid down concludes the matter so far as this Act is concerned. Their Lordships say: 'A public servant can only be said to act or to purport to act in the discharge of his official duty, if his act is such as to lie within the scope of his official duty'. Now I can understand it being said that an act which is within the scope of an official duty cannot be taken out of that category simply because it is carelessly or negligently performed, but I cannot see how an act which is expressly prohibited by law can be said to lie there. If a magistrate directed to supervise a sentence of whipping duly imposed by a competent court has the wrong man whipped by mistake or imposes more lashes than warranted, I can understand him being protected. He is there acting within the scope of his duty. But if, instead of having the man whipped, he has him branded with a hot iron he would not, in my opinion, be able to claim the protection. In the same way I cannot see how a Municipal Committee can be said to be acting 'under the Act' when it does that which is expressly prohibited by the legislature. Say it purported to tax salt. Its action would not be covered by section ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... is relevant for consideration in this appeal. In that case a Division Bench, while pointing out that the particular tax which was levied by the municipality was in substance a tax on trade within the meaning of article 276 of the Constitution and being in excess of Rs. 250 p.a. was beyond the competence of the municipality, held that a suit for its refund beyond the time prescribed by rules was barred by limitation. According to the learned judges the levy of the tax though beyond the authority of a municipality was " an act done in pursuance or execution or intended execution of the Bombay District Municipal Act " and was merely a wrongful act as distinguished from an ultra vires or illegal act. In coming to this conclusion they followed a previous decision of the High Court in Jalgaon Borough Municipality v. Khandesh Spinning and Weaving Mills Co. Ltd. Incidentally we may mention that an appeal was brought before this court from that part of the decision in Municipality of Chopda, East Khandesh v. Motilal Manekchand Press Factory, which held that the levy was unconstitutional. Ayyangar J., who spoke for the court, has stated towards the end of the judgment as follows : " In ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... Court held that what the municipality did was not an act done in pursuance of the Act, but it was an act which it purported to do in pursuance of the Act and that therefore its action was well within the terms of section 206. In the course of the judgment Bhagwati J. observed that the acts which fell within the category of those " done or purporting to have been done in pursuance of this Act " could only be those which were done under a vestige or semblance of authority or of a shadow of right. If an act was outrageous and extraordinary or could not be supported at all, not having been done with a vestige or semblance of authority, or a shadow of right invested in the party doing that act, it would not be an act which is done or purported to have been done in pursuance of the Act. The distinction is really between ultra vires and illegal acts, on the one hand, and wrongful acts, on the other---wrongful in the sense that they purport to have been done in pursuance of the Act ; they are intended to have been done in pursuance of the Act if they are done with a vestige or semblance of authority, or a sort of a right invested in the party doing those acts. The learned judge then referr ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... id and that the suit was barred by limitation. This court upheld the contention of the respondents that the corporation had no power to impose the tax and that in fact there was a prohibition against the imposition of such a tax by the corporation. On the plea of limitation, which was founded upon the provisions of section 487 of the Bombay Act, which are almost the same as those of section 48 of the Act with which we are concerned, this court observed : " The benefit of this section would be available to the corporation only if it was held that this deduction of ten per cent, was 'an act done or purported to be done in pursuance or execution or intended execution of this Act.' We have already held that this levy was not in pursuance or execution of the Act. It is equally clear that in view of the provisions of section 127(4) (to which we have already referred) the levy could not be said to be 'purported to be done in pursuance or execution or intended execution of the Act.' For, what is plainly prohibited by the Act cannot be claimed to be purported to be done in pursuance or intended execution of the Act." Sub-section(4) of section 127 of the Act to which this court has refer ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... (which was formerly Rs. 50 p.a. and is after the coming into force of the Constitution Rs. 250 p.a.). The mischief, according to him, is not in the levy but in the realisation of an excess over the limit. To put it differently, the ban is not upon the rate of tax but upon excess collection thereof. Therefore, the collection of a tax above the constitutional limit was not without jurisdiction but only illegal or irregular. A suit by an assessee to recover the amount paid by him in excess of the constitutional limit would therefore be in respect of a matter " purported to be done " under the Act and the provisions of section 48 of the Act would apply to it. Further according to him every suit against a committee for anything done or purported to be done under the Act must comply with the conditions laid down in the section. He points out that the assessment of the tax was made by an authority competent to make an assessment, that in making it the authority proceeded in accordance with the provisions of the Act and assessed the tax as authorised by Rules which had been sanctioned by the former Government of Central Provinces and Berar. So, even if it is assumed that any of the Rules w ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... t to entertain a suit for recovery of damages brought by one Hurkissondass Hurgovundass against the Collector of Bombay and others in respect of trespass and nuisance committed by certain officers of the Collectorate while purporting to execute a distress warrant issued against one Narrondass for non-payment of arrears of land revenue. Under the Letters Patent dated December 8, 1823, the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court was barred " in any matter concerning the revenue under the management of the said Governor and Council of Bombay respectively ...... or concerning any act done according to the usage and practice of the country, or the regulations of the Governor and Council of Bombay aforesaid. " Similar provisions were contained in section 8 of Statute 21, Geo. III, c. 70. The Supreme Court overruled the defendant's contention on the ground that what was due from the plaintiff was not revenue but a perpetual ground rent which was incapable of being enhanced and could not be regarded as revenue at all. After holding so, Lord Campbell, who delivered the opinion of the Judicial Committee, observed : " The point, therefore, is, whether the exception of jurisdiction only arises whe ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... or instance, the collection of a lawful tax from a person other than the one from whom it was due. But this decision is no authority for the proposition that if the Collector recovered or tried to recover from a person a sum of money as arrears of land revenue even though it did not fall within the definition of revenue or tried to collect a sum of money which he was expressly prohibited by law from collecting, he would still be said to have purported to act under the revenue law which empowered him to collect land revenue. If an act of trespass was committed in execution of a distress warrant for recovery of such monies, a suit for damages would not have been barred. In the next case what the High Court was dealing with was the claim of the plaintiff against the Government for damages occasioned by the wrongful cancellation of his licence to sell liquor. The suit had been dismissed by the trial judge as barred by the provisions of section 67 of the Bombay Abkari Act, 1878, firstly, because the Collector had acted bona fide in pursuance of the Act and, secondly, because it was not instituted within four months from the date of the act complained of. The High Court upheld the dism ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... was not exceeded. What is, however, contended on behalf of the appellant is that the action of the committee in compelling it to pay the tax in excess of the amount which was constitutionally recoverable from it in respect of any one year was ultra vires, that thereby the provisions of section 142A have been transgressed and, therefore, this was a case of utilization by the committee of the provisions of the Act and the rules made thereunder for doing something which was prohibited by the Government of India Act, 1935, and is now, by the Constitution. It is true that the committee had jurisdiction to recover an amount up to the constitutional limit. But it cannot fairly be contended on its behalf that merely because of this, the recovery by it of an amount in excess of the constitutional limit was only irregular or at the worst illegal. Where power exists to assess and recover a tax up to a particular limit and the assessment or recovery of anything above that amount is prohibited the assessment or recovery of an amount in excess is wholly without jurisdiction and nothing else. To such a case the statute under which action was purported to be taken can afford no protection. Indeed ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... uch rules may impose limitations on such refunds. Sub-section (2) thereof provides that no refund of any tax shall be claimable by any person otherwise than in accordance with the provisions of this Act and the Rules made thereunder. This sub-section can be availed only if the Act or the rules provide for making a claim for refund. The rules relating to refunds, if there are any, were, however, not placed before us. Nor was our attention drawn to any provision of the Act or to any rule which makes it obligatory upon a person to apply to the municipal committee for a refund of a tax. Even assuming that the Act contemplates obtaining a refund only upon compliance with rules made thereunder, does it contemplate cases where refund or repayment on the ground of the unconstitutionality of the levy ? It will be noticed that sub-section (1) of this section empowers the State Government to impose by rules limitations on the refunds-presumably including limitation on the amount of refunds---and sub-section (2) bars a claim for refund otherwise than in accordance with the rules made under sub-section (1). These provisions cannot possibly apply to a case where the right to obtain a refund or r ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e the Privy Council considered the effect of certain provisions of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, which prescribed remedies to an assessee who sought to challenge the assessment made against him and also the provisions of section 67. The relevant portion of section 67 was that " no suit shall be brought in any civil court to set aside or modify any assessment made under this Act. " After examining all these provisions the Privy Council said that an effective and appropriate machinery was provided by the Act itself for the review of any assessment on grounds of law, including the question whether a provision of the Act was ultra vires and it was in that setting that section 67 had to be construed. Then it went on to say that the phrase " assessment made under this Act " in section 67 meant an assessment finding its origin in an activity of the assessing officer acting as such and that the circumstance that he had taken into account an ultra vires provision of the Act was in that view immaterial in determining whether the assessment was " made under this Act. " But, with respect, we find it difficult to appreciate how taking into account an ultra vires provision which in law must b ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... to raise that point before the taxing authority and take it for a decision before the High Court under section 66(1) of the Act. It is not necessary for us to consider whether this assumption is well founded or not. But the presence of the alternative machinery by way of appeals which a particular statute provides to a party aggrieved by the assessment order on the merits, is a relevant consideration and that consideration is satisfied by the Act with which we are concerned in the present appeal. " We have already adverted to the provisions of sections 83 and 85 of the Act which are the only provisions brought to our notice as providing a machinery under the Act for challenging an assessment and we have pointed out that they do not cover a case like the present. Again the provision for an appeal before a Deputy Commissioner who is an authority who performs numerous functions under different laws, functions which are executive, as well as administrative and judicial, cannot be regarded as on par with one which provides for an appeal before an Appellate Assistant Commissioner under the Income-tax Act, an authority whose duties are confined to matters arising under that Act. Further ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... article 276 of the Constitution. We have already pointed out that no machinery is provided by the Act for obtaining a refund of tax assessed and recovered in excess of the constitutional limit and that the machinery actually provided by the Act is not adequate for enabling an assessee to challenge effectively the constitutionality or legality of assessment or levy of a tax by a municipality or to recover from it what was realised under an invalid law. It is, therefore, not possible to infer that the jurisdiction of the civil court is barred. The decision in Raleigh Investment Co.'s case does not, therefore, help the respondent. Moreover, we must bear in mind the provisions of article 265 of the Constitution which preclude the levy or collection of a tax except by authority of law, which means only a valid law. There was no corresponding provision in the various Acts for the governance of India which preceded the Constitution. Under article 226 the Constitution has provided a remedy to a citizen to obtain redress in respect of a tax levied or collected under an invalid law. This remedy will not be affected by any provision like section 67 of the Indian Income-tax Act or like secti ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... tion 142A of the Government of India Act and now in article 276 of the Constitution, which precludes a State legislature from making a law enabling a local authority to impose a tax on " professions, trades, callings and employments " in excess of Rs. 250 per annum. These provisions have to be read in the Act or to be deemed by implication to be there as the Constitution is the paramount law to which all other laws are subject as was the Government of India Act, 1935, before January 26, 1950. If, therefore, after the date specified in section 142A of the Government of India Act or after the commencement of the Constitution a local authority or any of its instrumentalities imposed or imposes a tax which is in excess of the permissible amount, it would be exceeding its jurisdiction and a provision like section 84(3) of the Act will not bar the jurisdiction of a civil court to entertain a suit instituted by a person from whom it is collected for the repayment of the money recovered from him in excess of the permissible amount. There is a real distinction between those cases where a suit was held to be incompetent and the kind of cases which we have before us. Thus where the question m ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ng which the committee has, in some manner, acted beyond the provisions of the Act or beyond any other legal provision. Section 48 of the Act refers to suits against the committee or any of the other specified persons acting under the directions of the committee, for anything done or purported to be done under the Act. If a suit is for anything done or purported to be done under the Act, the necessary conditions laid down in the section are to be satisfied before the institution of the suit. One condition is that the suit is to be instituted after the expiration of two months after the service of a notice, in writing, to the persons mentioned in sub-section (1). Another is that that suit be instituted within six months from the date of accrual of the alleged cause of action. If a suit is not instituted after giving notice or within this period, it has to be dismissed. The question then is : What is the present suit for ? And it is only on the determination of the nature of the act to which the present suit relates that it can be said whether the suit is covered by section 48 or not, i.e., whether the act can be said to be done or purported to be done under the Act. The plaint ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ing tax in excess of Rs. 250 per annum. The Municipality, therefore, was empowered to impose tax in accordance with the notification of 1941, and, in view of section 142A of the 1935 Act and article 276 of the Constitution, the total tax claimable on account of this tax from the appellant could not exceed Rs. 50 or Rs. 250 respectively during the period when section 142A was in force and later when article 276 came into force. The next step, after the imposition of a valid tax, according to the Act, relates to the assessment of tax and the person's liability to pay it. Section 71 empowers the State Government to make rules under the Act regulating assessment of tax and for preventing the evasion of assessment and section 76 empowers the State Government to make rules regulating the collection of taxes. The rules for assessment and collection of taxes framed in 1936 were notified on December 22, 1936. Rule 1 required a person carrying on the trade of ginning or pressing cotton into bales by means of steam or mechanical process to furnish to the committee, annually, a return in the prescribed form which required the furnishing of the number of bojhas ginned and the number of bale ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the opinion of the High Court on any question as to the liability or the principle of assessment of tax if such a question arises on the hearing of the appeal or revision. Sub-section (3) of section 84 provides : " No objection shall be taken to any valuation, assessment or levy, nor shall the liability of any person to be assessed or taxed be questioned, in any other manner or by any other authority than is provided in this Act. " Section 85 reads : " (1) The State Government may make rules under this Act regulating the refund of taxes, and such rules may impose limitations on such refunds. (2) No refund of any tax shall be claimable by any person otherwise than in accordance with the provisions of this Act and the rules made thereunder. " It follows from the above provisions that an assessee has to pay the tax assessed and that if aggrieved with the assessment of tax he has to appeal against the assessment order. He can raise questions of law and fact in the appeal. The appellant, in the present case, could have appealed against the assessment on the ground that the amount assessed exceeded the limits laid down for the tax under section 142A of the 1935 Act if that a ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ause of action. The suit was instituted in the instant case on December 6, 1952, more than 8 months after the date of recovery of most of the amounts alleged to have been illegally recovered from the appellant and, clearly, the suit for the recovery of such amounts had to be dismissed. The taxes for the years 1951-52 were recovered in small amounts on January 17, 1952, March 13, 1952, March 31, 1952, and August 27, 1952. The suit for the amount recovered on January 17 was also instituted after the period of limitation. No notice with respect to the alleged illegal collection of taxes in March and August, 1952, had been given to the municipal committee as notice was given on January 10, 1952, prior to those collections and could not have possibly referred to them. The suit for these amounts also has to be dismissed as the condition precedent for the institution of the suit under sub-section (1) of section 48 has not been satisfied. There is another reason which justifies the dismissal of the appellant's suit, though the view of the High Court on that point is in favour of the appellant. In view of section 84(3) the assessment of the tax or the liability of the person assessed ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... realised on account of the illegal assessment. The Privy Council said at page 621 : " In form the relief claimed does not profess to modify or set aside the assessment. In substance it does, for repayment of part of the sum due by virtue of the notice of demand could not be ordered so long as the assessment stood. " The same can be said with respect to the claim for repayment of the alleged illegal collection of the excess amount from the appellant. The Privy Council further said : " An assessment made under the machinery provided by the Act, if based on a provision subsequently held to be ultra vires, is not a nullity like an order of a court lacking jurisdiction. Reliance on such a provision is not an excess of jurisdiction but a mistake of law made in the course of its exercise. " In view of what, the Privy Council has said, the Committee's overlooking the constitutional provisions in the exercise of its jurisdiction to assess the tax will not make its assessment of the tax an assessment without jurisdiction but would only show that the committee made a mistake of law in the course of the exercise of its jurisdiction. The Privy Council took into consideration the mac ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... o the procedure of appeal and revision laid down in section 83 of the Act and thus became liable under the statute to pay the amount assessed, makes his questioning the correctness of the amount through the court inconsistent with that obligation. It appears that the Privy Council considered a special provision barring the taking of objection to assessment of tax by any authority to be unnecessary. It said at page 65 : " The only doubt, indeed, in their Lordships' mind, is whether an express provision was necessary in order to exclude jurisdiction in a civil court to set aside or modify an assessment." This would meet the contention for the appellant that sub-section (3) of section 84 does not specifically refer to the civil court and therefore does not specifically bar the jurisdiction of the civil court from taking cognizance of a suit relating to the assessment of tax. It may also be mentioned that section 84(3) of the Act, by its terms, refers to an objection to assessment and not to " assessment under the Act or assessment made under the Act ". This makes the provisions of section 84(3), much wider in scope than those of section 67 of the Indian Income-tax Act. The oth ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... tutional validity of the taxing provision could be challenged by adopting the procedure prescribed by the Income-tax Act, a question which does not arise for consideration in the present case. We are therefore of opinion that the construction put on the expression " assessment made under the Act " in these two cases justifies the conclusion that the assessment of tax made on the appellant in this case is covered by sub-section (1) of section 83 of the Act and amounts to " an act done under the Act " for the purposes of sub-section (1) of section 48 of the Act. It is therefore unnecessary to determine the scope of the expression " an act purported to be done under the Act " in sub-section (1) of section 48. We may now briefly deal with the cases relied on for the appellant. Before, however, doing so, we may first deal with the case of Poona City Municipal Corporation v. Dattatraya Nagesh Deodhar decided by this court. In this case the Poona Municipality had imposed a tax on the amount of octroi duty which had been levied on the goods imported within the municipal limits but had been subsequently exported out of such limits within the specified periods. The Poona Municipality u ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ther contention for the Poona Municipal Corporation was that the suit was instituted beyond the period of limitation prescribed under section 487 of the 1949 Act. The suit would have been time-barred if the act of the Corporation imposing the tax on octroi refund could be held to be " an act done or purported to be done in pursuance or in execution or intended execution " of the 1949 Act. This court held that the tax was not levied in pursuance or in execution of the Act and therefore the benefit of section 487 could not be available to the corporation. The expression used in section 487 is different from the one used in section 48 of the Act. Apart from this consideration, the act of imposing the tax could not be said to have originated from any provision of the 1949 Act and therefore could not possibly be held to be an act done under the 1949 Act. We do not think this case can be taken to support the appellant's contention that the assessment of the tax on it and the consequential collection of the amount in excess of the limit laid down by article 276 of the Constitution was not an act done under the Act. The appellant has mainly relied on the cases decided by the Nagpur Hig ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... d by Niyogi J., we may say with respect, find full support from Raleigh's case and Subbayya Chetty's case. Amraoti Municipal Committee's case was in a way on all fours with the present case. In that case the municipal committee overlooked the provision of law about considering the objections to the proposed enhancement in tax. In the present case the committee overlooked the constitutional requirement that the maximum limit of the tax payable by a single individual is Rs. 250. The next case is District Council, Bhandara v. Kishorilal. In this case the question before Bose J. was whether a suit for the recovery of an amount recovered in excess of what could be legally taxed came within the mischief of section 71 and section 73(1) of the Central Provinces Local Self-Government Act, 1920 (4 of 1920). Bose J. said at page 92 : "It will be observed that both section 79 and the rule are confined to orders and decisions given under the Act. It is impossible to say that an order which contravenes the law or is made in the face of an express statutory prohibition can be said to be under the Act. The words 'purporting to be given' or 'made under the Act' are not present in this section a ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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